Markus Gabriel

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Markus Gabriel
Born (1980-04-06) April 6, 1980 (age 37)
Remagen, Rhineland-Palatinate, West Germany
Era 21st-century philosophy
Region Western philosophy
School Speculative realism[1]

Markus Gabriel (born April 6, 1980) is a German philosopher and author at the University of Bonn. In addition to his more specialized work, he has also written popular books about philosophical issues.

Career[edit]

Gabriel was educated in philosophy and Ancient Greek in Germany. After completing his studies, he held a faculty position at New School for Social Research. He then came to the University of Bonn, where he holds the Chair for Epistemology, Modern and Contemporary Philosophy and is Director of the International Centre for Philosophy.[2] Gabriel has also been a visiting professor at University of California, Berkeley.[3]

Philosophy[edit]

In 2013, Gabriel wrote Transcendental Ontology: Essays in German Idealism. In the Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews Sebastian Gardner wrote that the work is "Gabriel's most comprehensive presentation to date, in English, of his reading of German Idealism"[4] and notes that "due to its compression of a wealth of ideas into such a short space, the book demands quite a lot from its readers."[4]

In an interview, Gabriel complained that "most contemporary metaphysicians are [sloppy] when it comes to characterizing their subject matter," using words like "the world" and "reality" "often...interchangeably and without further clarifications. In my view, those totality of words do not refer to anything which is capable of having the property of existence."[5] He goes on to explain:

I try to revive the tradition of metaontology and metametaphysics that departs from Kant. As has been noticed, Heidegger introduced the term metaontology and he also clearly states that Kant’s philosophy is a “metaphysics about metaphysics.” I call metametaphysical nihilism the view that there is no such thing as the world such that questions regarding its ultimate nature, essence, structure, composition, categorical outlines etc. are devoid of the intended conceptual content. The idea that there is a big thing comprising absolutely everything is an illusion, albeit neither a natural one nor an inevitable feature of reason as such. Of course, there is an influential Neo-Carnapian strand in the contemporary debate which comes to similar conclusions. I agree with a lot of what is going on in this area of research and I try to combine it with the metaontological/metametaphysical tradition of Kantian and Post-Kantian philosophy.[5]

Bibliography[edit]

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