Meech Lake Accord

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The Meech Lake Accord (French: Accord du lac Meech) was a series of proposed amendments to the Constitution of Canada negotiated in 1987 by Prime Minister Brian Mulroney and the 10 provincial premiers. It was intended to persuade the government of Quebec to symbolically endorse the 1982 constitutional amendments by providing for some decentralization of the Canadian federation. The "Accord" refers to an agreement to amend the Constitution that was reached on April 30, 1987, with a final legal text prepared in June of the same year.

The proposed amendments were initially popular and backed by most political leaders in the country. Concerns about the lack of citizen involvement in the Accord's drafting and its future impact on Canadian federalism were raised by former Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau, feminist activists, and Aboriginal groups, leading to a slow slide in popularity in English Canada. Changes in government in New Brunswick, Manitoba, and Newfoundland brought to power Premiers that declined to accept the Accord, leading to further negotiations and tension between Quebec and the predominantly English-speaking provinces.

In the months leading up to the agreement's three-year deadline for ratification, a second accord was drafted to be passed simultaneously to address the broader constitutional concerns raised in the intervening debates. A dramatic final meeting a month before the deadline seemed to have a renewed unanimous agreement, however, procedural hurdles and impolitic comments by Mulroney ensured that the Accord ultimately was not approved by Manitoba and Newfoundland in time for ratification.

The Accord's ultimate failure had the effect of energizing support for Quebec sovereignty. The general aims of the Accord would be addressed in the Charlottetown Accord, which failed in a referendum.


In 1981, negotiations led by Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau to patriate the constitution reached an agreement that formed the basis of the Constitution Act, 1982. Quebec Premier René Lévesque and the Quebec National Assembly refused to approve of the amendments and announced it would use a constitutional veto. The Supreme Court of Canada ruled in the Quebec Veto Reference that Quebec did not have a veto and the Constitution Act, 1982 was operative in Quebec.

In the 1984 election, Progressive Conservatives led by Brian Mulroney committed to eventually allowing the National Assembly to accept the amendments "with honour and enthusiasm" and won a majority government. The apparent lessening of tension prompted Lévesque to attempt the "beau risque" of federal cooperation, which split his government and led to his resignation and the ultimate defeat of the Parti Québécois by the federalist Liberal Party of Quebec led by Robert Bourassa.

Bourassa, in his 1985 election platform, outlined five conditions that would have to be met for Quebec to "sign on" to the constitution.[1] They were recognition of Quebec's distinct character, a veto for Quebec in Constitutional matters, input by Quebec into the appointment of Supreme Court justices, entrenchment of Quebec's role in immigration, and a limit on the Federal spending power.[1] Bourassa considered the demands practical, as all elements of the conditions had previously been offered by the Federal government on different occasions.[1]

Bourassa and Mulroney, both pragmatic pro-business figures, had a far more congenial relationship than Trudeau and Lévesque. Mulroney tasked Senator Lowell Murray with coordinating a possible agreement with the provinces.[2] Bourassa would announce that talks could proceed based on the five conditions, only adding the provision that recognition of Quebec's distinct character had to be an interpretive clause rather than a symbolic note in a revised preamble.[note 1]

At a meeting of the "First Ministers" in Edmonton in August 1986, the Premiers and Mulroney agreed to the "Edmonton Declaration," which stated that a "Quebec Round" of constitutional talks based on the five conditions would occur before further reforms would be undertaken.[3]

Consensus at Meech Lake[edit]

Believing that a constitutional agreement was possible, Mulroney called a conference for April 30, 1987 with provincial premiers at Willson House, Meech Lake, in the Gatineau Hills.[4] In contrast to previous constitutional conferences, which tended to feature a multitude of bureaucrats and advisors, the 11 "first ministers" were the only participants at the bargaining table, with other officials downstairs and the media locked out of the negotiation process.[5]

Mulroney acted as chair, and agreement came quickly on the Supreme Court and immigration conditions, both of which were significantly an entrenchment of the status quo.[6] The only agenda item added besides Quebec's conditions was senate reform: After initially proposing abolition, Mulroney agreed to allow appointment from lists created by the provinces while awaiting further reform, which was accepted by the provinces.[6] Changes to the amending formula and recognition of a distinct society were the most contentious issues, with changes to the wording of the distinct society clause preserving rights for English and French minorities in other provinces allowing for acceptance by the table.[7]

After nine hours, the Premiers and Mulroney announced a consensus had been reached amongst the First Ministers for constitutional reform. The consensus would encompass five main modifications to the Canadian constitution:[8]

  • Quebec was recognized as a "distinct society" in Section 2 of the Constitution Act, 1867. This would operate as an interpretative clause for the entire constitution;
  • More prospective constitutional amendments were now subject to s. 41 of the Constitution Act, 1982, which meant they required the approval of every province and the Federal government;
  • Provincial powers with respect to immigration were increased;
  • Provinces were granted the right for reasonable financial compensation if that province chose to opt out of any future federal programs in areas of exclusive provincial jurisdiction;
  • The appointment of senators and Supreme Court justices, traditionally a prerogative of the Prime Minister, would be appointed from a selection of names provided by the provinces.

Initial Reaction[edit]

Pierre Trudeau was the Accord's first, and most prominent, opponent.

The initial reaction of the public was shock. Interest groups that had been involved in the constitutional debate, unaware that an agreement was practicable, had not thought to begin agitating for consultation until the memorandum had been announced and were caught off guard.[9] The only province to have public hearings after the Accord stage and before the legal text was drafted was Quebec.[10]

National public opinion polls initially showed that a majority of Canadians supported the proposed agreement.[11] Liberal Party leader John Turner and New Democratic Party leader Ed Broadbent announced their agreement with the consensus.[10]

The first prominent opposition in the media came one month later from former Prime Minister, and the chief moving force behind the 1982 constitution, Pierre Trudeau. In a piece simultaneously published in the Toronto Star and Le Devoir on May 26, 1987, Trudeau attacked the Accord as a capitulation to provincialism and the end of any dream of "One Canada." Portraying patriation as the equalization of the bargaining power of Federal and provincial governments that would allow the Canada to survive indefinitely, Trudeau wrote that the new agreement made further devolution of powers inevitable. The letter took on a personal tone, referring to Mulroney as a "weakling" and invoking Bourassa's previous reneging of the Victoria Charter as proof the Accord would only be the beginning of concessions to Quebec and provincial interests.[12]

Trudeau's intervention created the first major opposition to the consensus, and his position as an ardent Federalist and a prominent Quebecois helped provide a voice for disapproval of the Accord and created concerns with the Accord in groups that had embraced the Charter, such as ethnic communities and women.[13] His position created turmoil in the Federal and provincial Liberal parties, with the federal party split largely on linguistic lines, shaking John Turner's already fragile leadership.[14]

Final Agreement[edit]

As the final agreement was to be drawn up at in Ottawa on June 2, 1987, Trudeau's intervention had made him, in the words of Mulroney advisor L. Ian Macdonald, a "twelfth participant."[15] The meeting, which was seen as a formality that would allow for a signing ceremony the next day, instead lasted 19 hours.[16]

Manitoba NDP Premier Howard Pawley, faced with left-wing opposition to the consensus in his home province, insisted on more limited language regarding Federal spending power in the final agreement.[17] Ontario Premier David Peterson, as the sole Liberal at the table, was now faced with much of his caucus (such as his main adviser, Ian Scott) opposing the consensus, and put forward a variety of amendments to the federal spending power and the distinct society clauses.[14] Pawley and Peterson agreed to follow each other's lead or back out together, to avoid either being seen as the cause of the collapse of talks,[18] and were left in the unusual position of asking Mulroney to take a harder line on Federal powers.[10]

Trudeau's intervention had also created a separate backlash: Mulroney and the other eight Premiers, insulted by what they saw as undue interference, aggressively embraced the previous consensus.[10] Bourassa in particular refused to move from any of the Accord's major provisions.[19] Negotiations went on through the night, ultimately eliciting a clause promising the distinct society clause would not derogate the Charter, protections for multicultural and aboriginal rights, and tighter language regarding the Federal spending power.[20]

At a final roll call at 4:45AM, hours before the signing ceremony, Mulroney knowingly breached convention by taking the vote in reverse order around the table instead of the traditional order of a province's entry into confederation.[20] Pawley, after pressure from federal NDP leader Ed Broadbent, conceded and approved the agreement.[21] Peterson, the last to vote in this improvised formula, approved the final agreement on behalf of Ontario.[20]

At the symbolic signing ceremony, the Premiers signed the Accord and Bourassa declared that Quebec had become reintegrated in Canada to a standing ovation.[22]



Supporters of the Accord argued that it would provide a generation of constitutional peace and do so in a simple and understandable way without major structural changes to the Federal government or the Canadian federation.

Bourassa described Quebec's exclusion from the 1982 agreement as a "hole in the heart" that had to be mended before Quebec could become a normalized participant in constitutional matters. Mulroney and others, which acknowledging that the agreement focused on primarily Quebec concerns, described the agreement as a "bridge" that, once accepted, would allow for further negotiations with other groups to proceed with Quebec's full participation.

Mulroney argued that the Senate and Supreme Court reforms would allow for greater involvement of other parties in what was generally a unilateral decision from the Prime Minister, reducing what was seen as an overly powerful Prime Minister's Office.[6]

The "distinct society" clause was argued to be merely a codification of the general practice of respecting Quebec's unique position within Canada since confederation; Chief Justice Brian Dickson would note that court decisions had taken Quebec's character into consideration on a standard basis for decades.[12]


Opponents of the Accord tended to take issue with both the process and ultimate results of the negotiations. The most universal concerns were that the Accord primary focused on Quebec's concerns and that the Accord had been agreed to in circumstances that were generally seen as opaque and undemocratic, prompting academics to brand it as an exercise in "elite accommodation" not compatible with a more democratic Canada. The Accord only faced public hearings in Quebec in its initial stages, and was only drafted and agreed to by the 11 Premiers themselves in two meetings and were presented to their legislatures as a fait accompli. Aboriginal and territorial representatives were not present, and feminists would note that no woman was involved at any stage in the decision making.

Substantive criticism focused on distinct society as unbalancing the Federation, creating a "special status" for Quebec that would lead to asymmetrical federalism and lead to the possible decline of Quebec's English speaking community and Francophones elsewhere in Canada. Aboriginal, feminist, and minority groups worried that the clause could be interpreted by courts to allow the Quebec government to disregard sections of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms and of other constitutional protections in the name of preservation of the province's culture. Some critics, such as Prime Minister Trudeau, argued that the further devolution of powers was unnecessary and did not result in any "trade-off" with the Federal government, wounding it's ability to speak for all Canadians on matters of national interests. The lack of more substantive senate reforms was unpopular in Western and Atlantic Canada.

Quebec sovereignists were generally opposed to the agreement, as they believed the recognition of Quebec as a distinct society was only of moderately useful effect and would not permit further powers to be devolved.


Because the agreement would have changed the constitution's amending formula, it needed to obtain the consent of all provincial and federal legislatures within three years. The signatory Premiers undertook to have Accord approved as soon as possible. Quebec passed the Accord on June 23, 1987, triggering the three year time limit provided for by the Constitution Act, 1982; this meant that June 22, 1990 would be the last possible day the Accord could pass.

After the conclusion of public hearings, New Brunswick premier Richard Hatfield was unable, despite significant pressure from Mulroney, to put the Accord to the floor of the provincial legislature.[23] Hatfield's government lost every seat in the October 1987 New Brunswick election to the Frank McKenna led Liberals. McKenna had campaigned on requesting changes to the Accord, especially for protections for New Brunswick's linguistic duality, and demanded changes before passing the Accord in New Brunswick. The unanimous provincial consensus was now gone, and with it much of the Accord's political momentum.

More surprising was the unexpected defeat of Howard Pawley's NDP majority government in Manitoba after a disgruntled backbencher voted against the government, prompting an election in April of 1988. The result was a PC minority government under Accord opponent Gary Filmon that would be tacitly supported by Gary Doer's NDP. The leader of the opposition, Liberal Sharon Carstairs, was a fervent opponent of the Accord. The unstable confidence situation meant that all three leaders would have to negotiate on Manitoba's behalf.[24]

Trudeau was invited to both the Commons and Senate committee hearings to discuss the Accord, with his later Senate appearance lasting a number of hours. The Accord was eventually rejected in the Liberal-dominated Senate, prompting the House of Commons to use their Constitutional override in Part V to pass the amendments.

Growing Opposition[edit]

The Accord played very little role in the 1988 Federal election, as all three parties supported the Accord and the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement was the dominant issue. Bourassa's Liberals, who supported free trade, lent tacit support to the federal Progressive Conservatives and their campaign in favour of the agreement. This support was later speculated to have been a cause of a disconnect between left wing intellectuals and support for the Accord.[25]

Shortly after the election, the Supreme Court of Canada ruled on Ford v. Quebec, a compendium of cases regarding sign restrictions in the Charter of the French Language. While acknowledging the protection of Quebec's French identity as a pressing and substantial objective, the Court ruled that the outright ban on English language signs was a violation of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and ordered the Charter be struck down.[26]

The decision reignited the long simmering debate over language use in Quebec: While English language groups celebrated the decision, the Parti Québécois and nationalist groups demanded Bourassa use the notwithstanding clause to uphold the Charter of the French Language against the court ruling. Both Mulroney and Peterson pressured Bourassa not to use the notwithstanding clause,[27] while prominent Quebec cabinet minister and nationalist Claude Ryan threatened to resign if the clause was not used.[27]

Bourassa opted to propose Bill 178, which continued the sign ban on outdoor signs and used the clause, causing four of his English-speaking ministers to resign and prompting general outrage in English Canada.[28] Manitoba Premier Gary Filmon immediately ordered that public hearings regarding the Accord be ended, joining New Brunswick in opposing the Accord. [29]

The Accord would gain a third opponent after the 1989 Newfoundland election, which saw PC premier Tom Rideout defeated by the Liberal Clyde Wells. Wells had campaigned against the Accord, as he was opposed to changing the amending formula before senate reform, the restrictions on the Federal spending power, and felt that distinct society would be used by Quebec to gain special status in confederation. Wells demanded a re-opening of the Accord and ultimately used Newfoundland's ability under s. 46(2) of the Constitution Act, 1982 to revoke the provinces's assent.[30] A conference held in November 1989 failed to break the logjam.[30]

Charest Commission and Bouchard[edit]

Jean Charest, a former cabinet minister, was tasked with heading a commission on addressing New Brunswick's concerns, which expanded into an attempt to forge an all party consensus regarding the Accord.[31] Despite his opposition, leading Liberal leadership candidate Jean Chrétien, wishing the issue to be off the table, contributed to the commission via a back channel.[32] The commission recommended a companion accord that would be approved by all provinces along with Meech Lake; This would permit the original accord to stay in place, saving face for Quebec and the federal government, while addressing the concerns of other provinces.[31] The companion Accord would assert that the distinct society clause would be subject to the Charter and would feature greater protections for minority language rights in the provinces.[31]

Bourassa dismissed the report the day it was released.[31] Anger at reading the report's contents in Paris prompted Lucien Bouchard, environment minister and Mulroney's Quebec lieutenant, to send a telegram to a gathering in his native Alma lavishly praising the Parti Québécois and René Lévesque to be read by PQ leader Jacques Parizeau.[32] Upon his return to Canada, Mulroney demanded Bouchard clarify the remark or resign, and Bouchard supplied a lengthy letter of resignation.[33] The two men, who had been close friends since attending Laval University together, never spoke again.[34]

Bouchard sat as an independent, and made a speech in defence of the original Meech accord that was very well received in Quebec.[34] Bourassa announced his support of Bouchard's action from the National Assembly, and said it provided a clear warning to English Canada of what would occur if Meech failed.[34]

"The Last Supper" and the Companion Accord[edit]

On June 3, 1990, after each Premier met individually with the Prime Minister at 24 Sussex Drive, the First Ministers met at the Canadian Museum of Civilization in Hull.[35] Scheduled as a one-day meeting, the premiers instead met for a week at the National Conference Centre, with a media presence outside lending to an atmosphere of chaos and drama, with intonations by Mulroney, Bourassa, and others that acceptance of the accord was necessary for the survival of Canada.[35] Historian Michael Bliss described it as "nauseating."[36]

At the meeting, Bourassa conceded that a second accord could be adopted that included a guarantee that distinct society would not weaken gender equality and give the territories involvement in the appointment of senators and Supreme Court justices.[37] The Premiers also agreed to hold future conferences on Aboriginal and minority language issues, the creation of a "Canada Clause" to guide judicial decisions in the same manner as "distinct society", a new process for how new provinces would be formed, and a new amending procedure.[37] McKenna would announce after the first day that New Brunswick would support the accords.[30]

Wells, however, was still not satisfied with the proposed conditions, and threatened to walk out of the conference. After physically being stopped by Alberta Premier Don Getty, he was asked what his conditions were for acceptance, Wells replied that he needed a guarantee that senate reform would be carried out. The Ontario delegation then proposed a new formula: A clause would be placed in the new accord for senate reform negotiations to continue to 1995. If negotiations failed by 1995, Ontario would agree to give up 6 Senate seats, meaning that Quebec would have 24 seats, Ontario 18, Prince Edward Island 4, and the remaining provinces 8.[38] Wells immediately agreed in principle.[39]

The next day, another signing ceremony was held, however, Wells protested that the draft agreement had deleted a request that a 10-year review be conducted on the distinct society clause without informing him.[39] The clause was never seriously considered by Federal negotiators who, thinking it would be a poison pill for Quebec, had never brought it to Bourassa's attention.[39] Wells put an asterisk next to his signature, but promised that the Accord would be put before the Newfoundland House of Assembly or to a referendum. [40]

The Final Days[edit]

The apparent success of the negotiations would be offset by a severe public relations blunder the following day: Mulroney, when describing the negotiation process to the Globe and Mail, stated that he had intentionally waited until the last minute to put pressure on the attendees for the final meeting, which would allow him to "roll the dice" and force the deal to go through.[41][42]

Susan Delacourt reported Mulroney's remark, which prompted general outrage in both the political class and in the public for its contrast with Mulroney's language and remarks regarding Meech during the previous conference.[42] Liberal leader Jean Chrétien, who had been considering endorsing the Accords, backed off after the remark.[43] Peterson believes that the remark killed any chance of the Accord passing.[44] Filmon and Wells both expressed their displeasure with the remark, and Filmon declared that, while he would place the Accord in front of the Manitoba legislature, he would not exempt the Accord from public hearing requirements.[45]

Wells had determined that a referendum was impractical in the short time period, and arranged for the Accord to be put to a free vote in the Newfoundland House of Assembly, with himself opposing ratification.[46] In a highly unusual maneuver, Mulroney, Peterson, and McKenna addressed the House of Assembly and urged them to accept the Accord.[47]

On the final day ratification was possible, June 22, 1990, unanimous support was still required to bypass the necessary public consultations in the Manitoba Legislative Assembly and proceed with ratification. Elijah Harper raised an eagle feather to mark his dissension, on the grounds that consultation had not been performed with Aboriginal groups with regard to either Accord. As the amendment could not proceed, Filmon contacted Wells in Newfoundland and advised that the Amendment would not reach the floor.[48]

Accordingly, Clyde Wells and opposition leader Thomas Rideout agreed to cancel the planned free vote in the Newfoundland House of Assembly, because the outcome would have most likely been a refusal.[47] Peterson, Mulroney, and McKenna argue that Wells undertook to put the Accord to a vote before the ratification deadline, Wells disagreed with that interpretation.[47]

The Accord was officially dead.



In a speech to the National Assembly of Quebec delivered moments after the death of the accord, Bourassa captured the nationalist sentiment of the moment:

« Le Canada anglais doit comprendre de façon très claire que, quoi qu'on dise et quoi qu'on fasse, le Québec est, aujourd'hui et pour toujours, une société distincte, libre et capable d'assumer son destin et son développement. »

...English Canada must clearly understand that, no matter what is said or done, Quebec is, today and forever, a distinct society, that is free and able to assume the control of its destiny and development.

Jacques Parizeau, leader of the opposition, crossed the floor to shake Bourassa's hand and referred to him as "my Premier."[49] On June 25, 500,000 Quebecers marched in the Saint-Jean-Baptiste Day celebrations in Quebec City, during which actor Jean Duceppe delivered a heralded speech calling for independence. Polls at this time showed a majority of 61%-64% in favour of sovereignty-association.[49] Bourassa, in an attempt to constructively capture nationalist sentiment, refused to negotiate for Quebec as a province, and would eventually pass Bill 150, which would promise a referendum by October 26, 1992 on a revised constitutional agreement or sovereignty for Quebec. [50] Despite these moves, Bourassa remained privately committed to federalism, believing that sovereignty, while possible, was unworkable.

Other provinces[edit]

Ontario Premier David Peterson had, reluctantly, played a prominent role in creating the accord and continued to support it in the face of growing opposition. This would eventually lead to a backlash in his own province, especially regarding his promise to provide Senate seats to other provinces. He would be defeated within months in a snap election by Bob Rae.

In response to criticism of the Accord, British Columbia and Alberta enacted legislation requiring future constitutional amendments to be put to a referendum before being approved by the legislature.

Mulroney's popularity plummeted. The handling of the accord was condemned by many people and the exhaustive and interminable debates over it caused a backlash against further constitutional negotiations. In November, 1990, Mulroney decided to seek the input of Canadians on the country's constitutional future by convening the Citizen's Forum on National Unity. The forum was more commonly known as the Spicer Commission, after its chair, Keith Spicer.

A variety of constitutional conferences and the efforts of former Prime Minister Joe Clark resulted in the Charlottetown Accord, which contained many of the same proposals, along with concrete involvement of First Nations groups. The Charlottetown Accord, unlike Meech Lake, was put to referenda (on October 26, 1992), but it was also defeated in most provinces, including Quebec.

See also[edit]


  1. ^ The distinction is that an interpretive clause must influence any interpretation of the constitution when being judicially considered, as opposed to simply being a statement of values.


  1. ^ a b c MacDonald, p. 249.
  2. ^ MacDonald, p. 251.
  3. ^ MacDonald, p. 251-2.
  4. ^ MacDonald, p. 253.
  5. ^ MacDonald, p. 254.
  6. ^ a b c MacDonald, p. 255.
  7. ^ MacDonald, p. 256-7.
  8. ^ Meech Lake Communique
  9. ^ MacDonald, p. 252.
  10. ^ a b c d Bliss, p. 293.
  11. ^ "Reid, Angus, Canada at the Crossroads: Public Opinion and the National Unity Debate". Retrieved 2010-07-01. 
  12. ^ a b MacDonald, p. 270.
  13. ^ MacDonald, p. 271.
  14. ^ a b MacDonald, p. 274.
  15. ^ MacDonald, p. 277.
  16. ^ MacDonald, p. 275.
  17. ^ MacDonald, p. 276.
  18. ^ MacDonald, p. 278.
  19. ^ MacDonald, p. 276-7.
  20. ^ a b c MacDonald, p. 280.
  21. ^ MacDonald, p. 279-80.
  22. ^ MacDonald, p. 281.
  23. ^ MacDonald, p. 307.
  24. ^ MacDonald, p. 307-8.
  25. ^ MacDonald, p. 297.
  26. ^ MacDonald, p. 294.
  27. ^ a b MacDonald, p. 296.
  28. ^ MacDonald, p. 296-7.
  29. ^ MacDonald, p. 295.
  30. ^ a b c MacDonald, p. 308.
  31. ^ a b c d MacDonald, p. 303.
  32. ^ a b MacDonald, p. 304.
  33. ^ MacDonald, p. 304-5.
  34. ^ a b c MacDonald, p. 305.
  35. ^ a b MacDonald, p. 306.
  36. ^ Bliss, p. 299.
  37. ^ a b MacDonald, p. 309.
  38. ^ MacDonald, p. 311.
  39. ^ a b c MacDonald, p. 312.
  40. ^ MacDonald, p. 313.
  41. ^ Bliss, p. 300.
  42. ^ a b Newman, p. 126-7.
  43. ^ Newman, p. 127.
  44. ^ Newman, p. 135.
  45. ^ MacDonald, p. 315.
  46. ^ MacDonald, p. 314.
  47. ^ a b c MacDonald, p. 316.
  48. ^ MacDonald, p. 318.
  49. ^ a b MacDonald, p. 321.
  50. ^ MacDonald, p. 321-22.


  • Bastien, Frédéric Bastien (2013). The Battle of London: Trudeau, Thatcher, and the Fight for Canada's Constitution. Toronto: Dundurn. ISBN 9781459723290. 
  • Bliss, Michael (2004). Right Honourable Men: The Descent of Canadian Politics from Macdonald to Chrétien. Toronto: Harper Perennial Canada. ISBN 0-00-639484-1. 
  • English, John (2009). Just Watch Me: The Life of Pierre Elliott Trudeau Volume Two: 1968–2000. Toronto: Knopf Canada. ISBN 978-0-676-97523-9. 
  • Fraser, Graham (1984). PQ: René Lévesque and the Parti Québécois in Power. Toronto: MacMillan. ISBN 0771597932. 
  • Goldenberg, Eddie (2006). The Way It Works: Inside Ottawa. Toronto: McClellan and Stewart. ISBN 978-0-7710-3562-3. 
  • MacDonald, L. Ian (2002). From Bourassa to Bourassa: Wilderness to Restoration (2nd Edition). Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press. ISBN 0-7735-2392-8. 
  • Newman, Peter C. (2005). The Secret Mulroney Tapes: Unguarded Confessions of a Prime Minister. Toronto: Random House. ISBN 0-679-31352-4. 

External links[edit]