Moral particularism

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Moral particularism is an applied ethics view that there are no moral principles and that moral judgement is determined by relevant factors in a particular context.[1] This stands in stark contrast to other prominent moral theories, such as deontology, consequentialism and virtue ethics.

History[edit]

The term "particularism" was coined to designate this position by R. M. Hare, in 1963 (Freedom and Reason, Oxford: Clarendon, p. 18).

Views[edit]

Jonathan Dancy argued that cases whether they're imagined or otherwise, cases contain certain elements in which we can infer certain moral ideas from.[2]

Criticisms[edit]

A criticism of moral particularism is that it is inherently irrational; as to be rational in relation to moral thought that you have to be consistent and apply that consistently to moral issues which Moral Particularism does not.[3]

Further reading[edit]

References[edit]

  1. ^ "Moral Particularism". Internet Encyclopedia Of Philosophy. Retrieved 17 October 2019.
  2. ^ "Moral Particularism and the Role of Imaginary Cases". European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy. Retrieved 17 October 2019.
  3. ^ "Moral Particularism". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved 17 October 2019.

External links[edit]