Motty Perry

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Motty Perry
Motty perry.jpg

Motty Perry (Hebrew: מוטי פרי‎) (born on October 2, 1949) is an Israeli professor of Economics at University of Warwick, England and emeritus Don Patinkin Professor of Economics at Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel.[1]

Biography[edit]

Motty Perry was born on Kibbutz Yad Mordechai. He has a B.A. in Economics from Bar Ilan University, an MA in economics from Hebrew University of Jerusalem and a Ph.D. in Economics from Princeton University. In 2005-2008, Motty Perry was associate editor of the Journal of Games and Economics Behavior and of the Journal of Economic Theory. In 2000, he became a fellow of the Econometric Society, and in 2008m a Council Member of the Game Theory Society.

Political activism[edit]

Following Anwar Sadat's visit to Israel in 1978, Perry was one of the leaders of the 348 Israeli military reserves officers petition urging Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin to continue with the drive for peace. This petition led to the creation of Peace Now,[2] a movement dedicated to raising public support for the peace process. Throughout the years Perry has opposed Israeli settlement in the West Bank, which he perceives as being immoral and an obstacle for the possibility of peace with the Palestinians.
Motty Perry was also among the Air Force reserve pilots who caused controversy on the eve of Rosh Hashanah (2003) with their declaration that they would refuse to participate in "targeted killings".[3][4] The Pilots’ Letter, which was sent to the commander of the Air Force, generated a great deal of media awareness in Israel and the world.[5][6][7]
In 2005 Perry was also one of the organizers of an open letter from faculty members of Israeli universities, supporting students who refuse to serve as soldiers in the occupied territories.[8] From 2011 he serves as a board member of B'Tselem.[9]

Published works[edit]

1. "Optimal Linear Taxation with Partial Information," 1980. Economic Letters, 15, 257-263.

2. “Non-Linear Price Strategies in a Contestable Market,” 1984. Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 32, No. 2, 246-264.

3. “Wage Bargaining, Labor Turnover, and the Business Cycle,” 1985 with G. Solon. Journal of Labor, Vol. 3, No. 4, 421-433.

4. “An Example of Price Formation in a Bilateral Situation,” 1986. Econometrica, Vol. 54, No. 2, 312-322.

5. “Search in a Known Pattern,” 1986 with A. Wigderson. Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 94, No.1, 225-230.

6. “Sequential Bargaining under Asymmetric Information,” 1986 with S. Grossman. Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 39, No.1, 97-119.

7. “Perfect Sequential Equilibrium,” 1986 with S. Grossman. Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 39, No.1, 120-154.

8.a “Strategic Delay in Bargaining,” 1987 with A. Admati. Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 54, 345-363.

8.b “Strategic Delay in Bargaining,” 1992 with A. Admati. In Linhart Radner and Satterthwaite (eds.)Bargaining with Incomplete Info, Academic Press, 321-40.

9. “Joint Project without Commitment,” 1991 with A. Admati. Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 58, 259-276.

10. “Non Cooperative Bargaining Without Procedures,” 1993 with P. Reny. Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 59 No. 1, 50-77.

11. “Open Vs. Closed Door Negotiation,” 1994 with L. Samuelson. The Rand Journal of Economics, Vol. 25, No.2, 348-359.

12.a “A Noncooperative View of Coalition Formation and the Core,” 1994 with P. Reny. Econometrica, Vol. 62, No.4, 795-818.

12.b “A Noncooperative View of Coalition Formation and the Core,” 1997 with P. Reny. In E. Maskin (ed),Recent Developments in Game Theory.

13. “Virtual Implementation in Backward Induction,” 1996 with J. Glazer. Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 15, No.1, 27-32.

14. “A General Solution to King Solomon Dilemma,” 1999 with P. Reny. Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 26, No. 2, 279-285.

15. “The Absent-Minded Driver,” 1997 with R. J. Aumann, and S. Hart. Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 20, No. 1, 102-116.

16. “The Forgetful Passenger,” 1997 with R. J. Aumann, and S. Hart. Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 20, No. 1, 117-120.

17. “On the Failure of the Linkage Principle,” 1999 with P. Reny Econometrica, Vol. 67, No.4, 895-90.

18. “A Sealed Bid Auction that Matches the English Auction," 2000 with E. wolfstetter and S. Zamir. Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 33, No. 2, 265-273.

19. “Dynamic Consistency and Optimal Patent Allocation,” 2002 with D. Vincent. International Economic Review.

20. “An Efficient Auction,” 2002 with Phil Reny. Econometrica, Vol. 70, No. 3 – May, 2002, 1199-1212.

21. “An Ex-Post Efficient Ascending Auction,” 2005 with P. Reny. The Review of Economic Studies, 72, 567-592.

22. "Toward a Strategic Foundation for Rational Expectations Equilibrium," 2006 with P. Reny. Econometrica, Vol. 74, 1231-1269.

23. "Tournaments with Midterm Reviews" 2009 with A. Gershkov, Games and Economic Behavior, Vol.66, 162-190 .

24. "Dynamic Contacts with Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection" 2012 with A. Gershkov, The Review of Economic Studies, Vol 79(1), 268-306.

25. "Implementing the Wisdom of the Crowds” 2014 with Ilan Kremer and Yishay Mansour, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 122(5), 988-1012.

26. "Why Sex and Why in Pairs" 2016 with P. Reny and A. Robson, Economic Journal forthcoming.

27. "How to Count Citations if You Must" 2016 with Phil Reny, American Economic Review forthcoming.

References[edit]