National Popular Vote Interstate Compact

This is a good article. Click here for more information.
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

National Popular Vote Interstate Compact
Status as of February 2023:
NPVIC cartogram base 2021.svg
MD green 21.svg
NJ green 21.svg
IL green 21.svg
HI green 21.svg
WA green 21.svg
MA green 21.svg
DC green 21.svg
VT green 21.svg
CA green 21.svg
RI green 21.svg
NY green 21.svg
CT green 21.svg
CO green 21.svg
DE green 21.svg
NM green 21.svg
OR green 21.svg
AK yellow 21.svg
AZ yellow 21.svg
FL yellow 21.svg
MN yellow 21.svg
MO yellow 21.svg
TX yellow 21.svg
NPVIC cartogram top 2021.svg
0
270
538

Each square in the cartogram represents one electoral vote.

  •   Enacted – 195 EVs (36.2% of Electoral College)
  •   Pending – 104 EVs (19.3%)
  •   Neither enacted nor pending – 239 EVs (44.4%)[1]
  • | Threshold for activation – 270 EVs (50%+1)
DraftedJanuary 2006
EffectiveNot in effect
ConditionAdoption by states (and the District of Columbia) whose collective electoral votes represent a majority in the Electoral College. The agreement would then be in effect only among them.
Signatories
Full text
Agreement Among the States to Elect the President by National Popular Vote at Wikisource

The National Popular Vote Interstate Compact (NPVIC) is an agreement among a group of U.S. states and the District of Columbia to award all their electoral votes to whichever presidential ticket wins the overall popular vote in the 50 states and the District of Columbia. The compact is designed to ensure that the candidate who receives the most votes nationwide is elected president, and it would come into effect only when it would guarantee that outcome.[2][3] As of February 2023, it has been adopted by fifteen states and the District of Columbia. These states have 195 electoral votes, which is 36% of the Electoral College and 72% of the 270 votes needed to give the compact legal force.

Certain legal questions may affect implementation of the compact. Some legal observers believe that the compact will require explicit congressional consent under the Compact Clause of Article I, Section X of the U.S. Constitution, or that states have the plenary power to appoint presidential electors as prescribed by the compact under the Elections Clause of Article II, Section I. Other legal observers disagree that the power of states is broad enough to appoint their electors in accordance with the compact, and that the Electoral College cannot be altered to appoint presidential electors in accordance with the national popular vote except by a constitutional amendment.

Mechanism[edit]

Taking the form of an interstate compact, the agreement would go into effect among participating states only after they collectively represent an absolute majority of votes (currently at least 270) in the Electoral College. Once in effect, in each presidential election the participating states would award all of their electoral votes to the candidate with the largest national popular vote total across the 50 states and the District of Columbia. As a result, that candidate would win the presidency by securing a majority of votes in the Electoral College. Until the compact's conditions are met, all states award electoral votes in their current manner.

The compact would modify the way participating states implement Article II, Section 1, Clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution, which requires each state legislature to define a method to appoint its electors to vote in the Electoral College. The Constitution does not mandate any particular legislative scheme for selecting electors, and instead vests state legislatures with the exclusive power to choose how to allocate their states' electors (although systems that violate the 14th Amendment, which mandates equal protection of the law and prohibits racial discrimination, are prohibited).[3][4] States have chosen various methods of allocation over the years, with regular changes in the nation's early decades. Today, all but two states (Maine and Nebraska) award all their electoral votes to the single candidate with the most votes statewide (the so-called "winner-take-all" system). Maine and Nebraska currently award one electoral vote to the winner in each congressional district and their remaining two electoral votes to the statewide winner.

The compact would no longer be in effect should the total number of electoral votes held by the participating states fall below the threshold required, which could occur due to withdrawal of one or more states, changes due to the decennial congressional re-apportionment or an increase in the size of Congress, for example by admittance of a 51st state. The compact mandates a July 20 deadline in presidential election years, six months before Inauguration Day, to determine whether the agreement is in effect for that particular election. Any withdrawal by a participating state after that deadline will not become effective until the next President is confirmed.[5]

Motivation[edit]

Elections in which the popular vote winner lost
Election Election winner Popular vote winner Difference Turnout[6]
1824 Adams 30.9% 113,122 Jackson 41.4% 157,271 10.5% 44,149 26.9%
1876 Hayes 47.9% 4,034,311 Tilden 50.9% 4,288,546 3.0% 254,235 82.6%
1888 Harrison 47.8% 5,443,892 Cleveland 48.6% 5,534,488 0.8% 90,596 80.5%
2000 G. W. Bush 47.9% 50,456,002 Gore 48.4% 50,999,897 0.5% 543,895 54.2%
2016 Trump 46.1% 62,984,828 H. Clinton 48.2% 65,853,514 2.1% 2,868,686 60.1%

Reasons given for the compact include:

  • The current Electoral College system allows a candidate to win the Presidency while losing the popular vote, an outcome seen as counter to the one person, one vote principle of democracy.[7]
This happened in the elections of 1824, 1876, 1888, 2000, and 2016.[8] (The 1960 election is also a disputed example.[9]) In the 2000 election, for instance, Al Gore won 543,895 more votes nationally than George W. Bush, but Bush secured five more electors than Gore, in part due to a narrow Bush victory in Florida; in the 2016 election, Hillary Clinton won 2,868,691 more votes nationally than Donald Trump, but Trump secured 77 more electors than Clinton, in part due to narrow Trump victories in Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin (a cumulative 77,744 votes).
  • State winner-take-all laws encourage candidates to focus disproportionately on a limited set of swing states (and in the case of Maine and Nebraska, swing districts), as small changes in the popular vote in those areas produce large changes in the electoral college vote.
For example, in the 2016 election, a shift of 2,736 votes (or less than 0.4% of all votes cast) toward Donald Trump in New Hampshire would have produced a four electoral vote gain for his campaign. A similar shift in any other state would have produced no change in the electoral vote, thus encouraging the campaign to focus on New Hampshire above other states. A study by FairVote reported that the 2004 candidates devoted three-quarters of their peak season campaign resources to just five states, while the other 45 states received very little attention. The report also stated that 18 states received no candidate visits and no TV advertising.[10] This means that swing state issues receive more attention, while issues important to other states are largely ignored.[11][12][13]
  • State winner-take-all laws tend to decrease voter turnout in states without close races. Voters living outside the swing states have a greater certainty of which candidate is likely to win their state. This knowledge of the probable outcome decreases their incentive to vote.[11][13] A report by The Center for Information and Research on Civic Learning and Engagement (CIRCLE) found that turnout among eligible voters under age 30 was 64.4% in the ten closest battleground states and only 47.6% in the rest of the country – a 17% gap.[14]

Debate over effects[edit]

The project has been supported by editorials in newspapers, including The New York Times,[11] the Chicago Sun-Times, the Los Angeles Times,[15] The Boston Globe,[16] and the Minneapolis Star Tribune,[17] arguing that the existing system discourages voter turnout and leaves emphasis on only a few states and a few issues, while a popular election would equalize voting power. Others have argued against it, including the Honolulu Star-Bulletin.[18] Pete du Pont, a former governor of Delaware, in an opinion piece in The Wall Street Journal, called the project an "urban power grab" that would shift politics entirely to urban issues in high population states and allow lower caliber candidates to run.[19] A collection of readings pro and con has been assembled by the League of Women Voters.[20] Some of the most common points of debate are detailed below:

Protective function of Electoral College[edit]

Certain founders conceived of the Electoral College as a deliberative body which would weigh the inputs of the states, but not be bound by them, in selecting the president, and would therefore serve to protect the country from the election of a person who is unfit to be president.[21] However, the Electoral College has never served such a role in practice. From 1796 onward, presidential electors have acted as "rubber stamps" for their parties' nominees. As of 2020, no election outcome has been determined by an elector deviating from the will of their state.[22] Journalist and commentator Peter Beinart has cited the election of Donald Trump, who some, he notes, view as unfit, as evidence that the Electoral College does not perform a protective function.[23] Furthermore, thirty-two states and the District of Columbia have laws to prevent such "faithless electors",[24][25] and such laws were upheld as constitutional by the Supreme Court in 2020 in Chiafalo v. Washington.[26] The National Popular Vote Interstate Compact does not eliminate the Electoral College or affect faithless elector laws; it merely changes how electors are pledged by the participating states.

Campaign focus on swing states[edit]

Advertising and visits by major-party candidates during final stretch of the 2004 presidential campaign (Sept. 26 – Nov. 2, 2004)[27]
Spending on advertising per capita:
  •   < $0.50
  •   $0.50 – 1.00
  •   $1.00 – 2.00
  •   $2.00 – 4.00
  •   > $4.00

Campaign visits per 1 million residents:
  •   No visits
  •   0 – 1.0
  •   1.0 – 3.0
  •   3.0 – 9.0
  •   > 9.0
Spending-and-visits.svg

Under the current system, campaign focus – as measured by spending, visits, and attention paid to regional or state issues – is largely limited to the few swing states whose electoral outcomes are competitive, with politically "solid" states mostly ignored by the campaigns. The adjacent maps illustrate the amount spent on advertising and the number of visits to each state, relative to population, by the two major-party candidates in the last stretch of the 2004 presidential campaign. Supporters of the compact contend that a national popular vote would encourage candidates to campaign with equal effort for votes in competitive and non-competitive states alike.[28] Critics of the compact argue that candidates would have less incentive to focus on states with smaller populations or fewer urban areas, and would thus be less motivated to address rural issues.[19][29]

Disputed results and electoral fraud[edit]

Opponents of the compact have raised concerns about the handling of close or disputed outcomes. National Popular Vote contends that an election being decided based on a disputed tally is far less likely under the NPVIC, which creates one large nationwide pool of voters, than under the current system, in which the national winner may be determined by an extremely small margin in any one of the fifty-one smaller statewide tallies.[29] However, the national popular vote can be closer than the vote tally within any one state. In the event of an exact tie in the nationwide tally, NPVIC member states will award their electors to the winner of the popular vote in their state.[5] Under the NPVIC, each state will continue to handle disputes and statewide recounts as governed by their own laws.[30] The NPVIC does not include any provision for a nationwide recount, though Congress has the authority to create such a provision.[31]

Pete du Pont argues that "Mr. Gore's 540,000-vote margin [in the 2000 election] amounted to 3.1 votes in each of the country's 175,000 precincts. 'Finding' three votes per precinct in urban areas is not a difficult thing...".[19] However, National Popular Vote contends that altering the outcome via electoral fraud would be more difficult under a national popular vote than under the current system, due to the greater number of total votes that would likely need to be changed: currently, a close election may be determined by the outcome in just one "tipping-point state", and the margin in that state is likely to be far smaller than the nationwide margin, due to the smaller pool of voters at the state level, and the fact that several states may have close results.[29]

Suggested partisan advantage[edit]

Historical partisan advantage in the Electoral College, computed as the difference between popular vote margins nationally and in the tipping-point state(s). Positive values indicate a Republican advantage and negative values indicate a Democratic advantage.[32]

Some supporters and opponents of the NPVIC believe it gives one party an advantage relative to the current Electoral College system. Former Delaware Governor Pete du Pont, a Republican, has argued that the compact would be an "urban power grab" and benefit Democrats.[19] However, Saul Anuzis, former chairman of the Michigan Republican Party, wrote that Republicans "need" the compact, citing what he believes to be the center-right nature of the American electorate.[33]

A statistical analysis by FiveThirtyEight's Nate Silver of all presidential elections from 1864 to 2016 (see adjacent chart) found that the Electoral College has not consistently favored one major party or the other, and that any advantage in the Electoral College does not tend to last long, noting that "there's almost no correlation between which party has the Electoral College advantage in one election and which has it four years later."[32] Although in all four elections since 1876 in which the winner lost the popular vote, the Republican became president, Silver's analysis shows that such splits are about equally likely to favor either major party.[32] A popular vote-Electoral College split favoring the Democrat John Kerry nearly occurred in 2004.[34]

New Yorker essayist Hendrik Hertzberg also concluded that the NPVIC would benefit neither party, noting that historically both Republicans and Democrats have been successful in winning the popular vote in presidential elections.[35]

State power relative to population[edit]

State population per electoral vote from the 2020 census

There is some debate over whether the Electoral College favors small- or large-population states. Those who argue that the College favors low-population states point out that such states have proportionally more electoral votes relative to their populations.[a][18][36] In the least-populous states, with three electors, this results in voters having 143% greater voting power than they would under purely proportional allocation, while in the most populous state, California, voters' power is 16% smaller than under proportional allocation. In contrast, the NPVIC would give equal weight to each voter's ballot, regardless of what state they live in. Others, however, believe that since most states award electoral votes on a winner-takes-all system (the "unit rule"), the potential of populous states to shift greater numbers of electoral votes gives them more clout than would be expected from their electoral vote count alone.[37][38][39]

Opponents of a national popular vote contend that the Electoral College is a fundamental component of the federal system established by the Constitutional Convention. Specifically, the Connecticut Compromise established a bicameral legislature – with proportional representation of the states in the House of Representatives and equal representation of the states in the Senate – as a compromise between less populous states fearful of having their interests dominated and voices drowned out by larger states,[40] and larger states which viewed anything other than proportional representation as an affront to principles of democratic representation.[41] The ratio of the populations of the most and least populous states is far greater currently (68.50 as of the 2020 Census) than when the Connecticut Compromise was adopted (7.35 as of the 1790 Census), exaggerating the non-proportional component of the compromise allocation.

Negation of state-level majorities[edit]

Three governors who have vetoed NPVIC legislation—Arnold Schwarzenegger of California, Linda Lingle of Hawaii, and Steve Sisolak of Nevada—objected to the compact on the grounds that it could require their states' electoral votes to be awarded to a candidate who did not win a majority in their state. (California and Hawaii have since enacted laws joining the compact.) Supporters of the compact counter that under a national popular vote system, state-level majorities are irrelevant; in all states, votes contribute to the nationwide tally, which determines the winner. Individual votes combine to directly determine the outcome, while the intermediary measure of state-level majorities is rendered obsolete.[42][43][44]

Proliferation of candidates[edit]

Some opponents of the compact contend that it would lead to a proliferation of third-party candidates, such that an election could be won with a plurality of as little as 15% of the vote.[45][46] However, evidence from U.S. gubernatorial and other races in which a plurality results in a win do not bear out this suggestion. In the 975 general elections for Governor in the U.S. between 1948 and 2011, 90% of winners received more than 50% of the vote, 99% received more than 40%, and all received more than 35%.[45] Duverger's law supports the contention that plurality elections do not generally create a proliferation of minor candidacies with significant vote shares.[45]

State voting law differences[edit]

Another objection is that each state has different qualifications for voting.[47] States with looser voting laws may have a larger turnout than other states. This may be a factor in close elections, and may lead to a push for national voting laws to standardize practices among the states. These differences are not as relevant in the current system, as turnout does not affect the number of electoral votes a state controls.

Legality[edit]

Constitutionality[edit]

Compact Clause[edit]

The Compact Clause of Article I, Section X of the United States Constitution states that "No State shall, without the Consent of Congress ... enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State".[48] In a report released in October 2019, the Congressional Research Service (CRS) cited the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in Virginia v. Tennessee (1893)—reaffirmed in U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Commission (1978) and Cuyler v. Adams (1981)—as stating that the words "agreement" and "compact" are synonyms, and that explicit congressional consent of interstate compacts is not required for agreements "which the United States can have no possible objection or have any interest in interfering with".[49] However, the report asserted, the Court required explicit congressional consent for interstate compacts that are "directed to the formation of any combination tending to the increase of political power in the States, which may encroach upon or interfere with the just supremacy of the United States"—meaning where the vertical balance of power between the federal government and state governments is altered in favor of state governments.[50]

The CRS report states that "Whether the NPV initiative requires congressional consent under the Compact Clause first requires a determination as to whether NPV even constitutes an interstate compact."[51] Yale Law School professor Akhil Amar, one of the compact's framers, has argued that because the NPVIC does not create a "new interstate governmental apparatus" and because "cooperating states acting together would be exercising no more power than they are entitled to wield individually", the NPVIC probably does not constitute an interstate compact and cannot contravene the Compact Clause.[52] Conversely, the CRS report cites the Court's opinion in Northeast Bancorp v. Federal Reserve Board of Governors (1985) as suggesting that a requirement of a new interstate governmental entity is a sufficient but not a necessary condition for an agreement to qualify as being an interstate compact under the Compact Clause.[49] Instead, the CRS report cites the Court's opinions in Virginia v. Tennessee and Northeast Bancorp as stating that any agreement between two or more states that "cover[s] all stipulations affecting the conduct or claims of the parties", prohibits members from "modify[ing] or repeal[ing] [the agreement] unilaterally", and requires "'reciprocation' of mutual obligations" constitutes an interstate compact. Noting that the NPVIC meets all of those requirements, the CRS report concludes that "the initiative can be described as an interstate compact."[51]

As part of concerns about whether the NPVIC would shift power from the federal government to state governments, at least two legal observers have suggested that the NPVIC would require explicit congressional approval because it would remove the possibility of contingent elections for President being conducted by the U.S. House of Representatives under the 12th and 20th Amendments (and by extension, contingent elections for Vice President being conducted by the U.S. Senate).[53][54][b][c][55] The CRS report notes that the outcomes of only two presidential elections (1800 and 1824) have been decided by a contingent election, and whether the loss of such elections would be a de minimis diminishment of federal power is unresolved by the relevant case law. The report references U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Commission as stating that the "pertinent inquiry [with respect to the Compact Clause] is one of potential, rather than actual, impact on federal supremacy" in that the potential erosion of an enumerated power of the U.S. House of Representatives could arguably require explicit congressional approval.[50][56] Proponents of the compact counter that if removing the possibility of contingent elections is grounds for unconstitutionality, then Congress setting the size of the House at an odd number, as it did in 1911 (resulting in an odd number of electors until 1961), was also unconstitutional because it precluded the possibility of a tie in the Electoral College between presidential candidates.[57][58][d]

The CRS report goes on to cite the Supreme Court's rulings in Florida v. Georgia (1855) and in Texas v. New Mexico and Colorado (2018) as recognizing that explicit congressional consent is also required for interstate compacts that alter the horizontal balance of power amongst state governments.[59] University of Colorado Law School professor Jennifer S. Hendricks and labor lawyer Bradley T. Turflinger have argued that the NPVIC would not alter the power of non-compacting state governments because all state governments would retain their right to select the electors of their choosing.[60][61] Other legal observers have argued that the power of non-compacting states would be altered because, under the NPVIC, a state's power in determining the outcomes of presidential elections would be changed from the percentage of electors it has in the Electoral College to the state's percentage of the popular vote, rendering the right of non-compacting state governments to appoint their own electors pro forma as the Electoral College outcome would be decided ex ante rather than ex post.[53][62][63][64]

Additionally, Ian J. Drake, an associate professor of political science and law at Montclair State University, has argued that because Cuyler v. Adams held that congressional approval of interstate compacts makes them federal laws,[65][66] Congress can only approve interstate compacts without violating the Supremacy Clause of Article VI if it has the enumerated or implied powers to create such laws itself. Drake argues that Congress cannot consent to the NPVIC because Congress has no legislative power to alter the Electoral College under Article I, Section VIII, and citing the Supreme Court's ruling in McPherson v. Blacker (1892), Drake notes that Article II, Section I neither enumerates nor implies any powers to or of Congress to create laws stipulating the mode of appointment by which states appoint their presidential electors and permits Congress to only set the date and time of presidential elections.[67][68][e][f][69] Drake and at least five other legal observers have argued that to replace the Electoral College with a national popular vote may only be done by a constitutional amendment as outlined in Article V.[list 1]

The organizers of NPV Inc. dispute that a constitutional amendment is necessary for altering the current method of electing the President because the NPVIC would not abolish the Electoral College,[76] and because states would only be using the plenary power to choose the method by which they appoint their electors that is already delegated to them under the Elections Clause of Article II, Section I.[77] Nonetheless, the NPV Inc. organizers have stated that they plan to seek congressional approval if the compact is approved by a sufficient number of states.[78] The CRS report notes that while the "functional view of the Compact Clause" established in Virginia v. Tennessee that interstate compacts "will not be invalidated for lack of congressional consent" was upheld by the Supreme Court in U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Commission and Cuyler v. Adams,[56][66] the CRS report cites the latter case, along with St. Louis & San Francisco Railway Co. v. James (1896) and Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Commission (1959),[79][80] as establishing that the consent power of Congress is absolute and that Congress can require or deny consent to any interstate compact if it so chooses (and possibly even if the compact does not require explicit consent).[49]

Citing Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority v. Citizens for Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc. (1991) as stating that if an enumerated power under the Constitution is legislative, then "Congress must exercise it in conformity with the bicameralism and presentment requirements of Article I, Section VII", and noting that the Republican River Compact was initially vetoed by President Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1942, the CRS report states that if an interstate compact requires explicit congressional approval, it must be approved by both houses of Congress and signed into law by the President in order to become law.[81] Correspondingly, Ian J. Drake argues that approval of the NPVIC by Congress would meet none of the non-justiciability requirements specified by the Supreme Court in Baker v. Carr (1962) to constitute a political question,[82] and the CRS report concludes in agreement with Drake that if the NPVIC were to be enacted by the necessary number of states, it would likely become the source of considerable litigation, and it is likely that the Supreme Court will be involved in any resolution of the constitutional issues surrounding it.[83][70]

Plenary power doctrine[edit]

Proponents of the compact, such as law professors Akhil and Vikram Amar (the compact's original framers),[84] as well as U.S. Representative Jamie Raskin from Maryland's 8th congressional district (a former law professor),[85] have argued that states have the plenary power to appoint electors in accordance with the national popular vote under the Elections Clause of Article II, Section I,[86] which states that "Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress".[48] The CRS report, Vikram Amar, and other legal observers have also cited the Supreme Court's rulings in McPherson v. Blacker (1892) and Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission (2015) as recognizing that states have wide discretion in selecting the method by which they appoint their electors.[87][88][89][90]

However, the CRS report cites the Court's opinions in Williams v. Rhodes (1968) and Oregon v. Mitchell (1970) that struck down state laws concerning the appointment of electors that violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment and concludes that a state's power to select the method by which its electors are appointed is not absolute.[91] Citing Bush v. Gore (2000) as stating that state governments cannot "value one person's vote over that of another" in vote tabulation, Willamette University College of Law professor Norman R. Williams has argued that the NPVIC would violate the Equal Protection Clause because it does not require and cannot compel uniform laws across both compacting and non-compacting states that regulate vote tabulation, voting machinery usage, voter registration, mail-in voting, election recounts, and felony and mental disability disenfranchisement.[73] The NPV Inc. organizers counter that the text of the 14th Amendment states that "No state shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws",[92] that there is no precedent for claims of interstate violations of the Equal Protection Clause,[93] and that because Bush v. Gore was addressing intrastate rather than interstate non-uniformity, the NPVIC does not violate the Equal Protection Clause.[86] On December 11, 2020, the Supreme Court issued an order dismissing Texas v. Pennsylvania on the basis that the plaintiff state (Texas) lacked standing under Article III to sue the defendant states (Pennsylvania, Georgia, Michigan, and Wisconsin) due to the plaintiff state failing to demonstrate a judicially cognizable interest in how any other state conducts its elections.[94][g][95]

Robert Natelson, a senior fellow at the libertarian Independence Institute in constitutional jurisprudence and a member of the conservative American Legislative Exchange Council's board of scholars, has argued that a state's power to appoint its electors cannot be absolute because otherwise states would be permitted to appoint their electors in a manner that would violate public trust (e.g. by holding an auction to sell their electoral votes to the highest bidder). Natelson goes on to argue that a state's power to select electors must also be compatible in a substantive sense with the Electoral College composition framework in the Elections Clause, and by extension, the Representatives Apportionment Clause of Article I, Section II, Section 2 of the 14th Amendment, and the 17th Amendment, that gives less populous states disproportionate weight in selecting the President. According to Natelson, the NPVIC would be incompatible with the Electoral College composition framework as stipulated by the Elections Clause as a substantive matter (as opposed to as a formal matter) because it would de facto eliminate the disproportionate weight that less populous states have in selecting the President.[54]

Northwestern University Law Review published a comment written by Northwestern University School of Law student Kristin Feeley that argued that the principle of symmetric federalism in the Guarantee Clause of Article IV, Section IV that states "The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government" is violated by the NPVIC because "no state [may] legislate for any other state. Placing no constitutional limit on state power over electors ... creates the ... potential for [compacting] states to form a superstate and render the [non-compacting] states irrelevant in the election of the President."[72] Conversely, Bradley T. Turflinger, citing New York v. United States (1992), Bush v. Gore, and Fitzgerald v. Green (1890) has argued that the federal government would be in violation of the Guarantee Clause if it required congressional approval of the NPVIC because it would encroach upon state governments' sovereignty over their own legislative processes (i.e. the power of state legislatures to prescribe how presidential electors are appointed under the Elections Clause) and make state government officials (i.e. presidential electors) accountable to the federal government rather than their local electorates.[61][96]

The CRS report notes that while the Court's opinion in McPherson v. Blacker emphasized that the variety of state laws that existed shortly after the ratification of the Constitution indicates that state legislatures have multiple alternative "modes of choosing the electors", no state at the time of the ratification appointed their electors based on the results of the national popular vote. Citing the Court's opinion in U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton (1995) that reaffirmed the Court's ruling in Powell v. McCormack (1969) as interpreting analogous language, the CRS report and Norman R. Williams note that the Court concluded that states cannot exercise their delegated authorities over the election of members of Congress under the Elections Clause of Article I, Section IV in a way that would "effect a fundamental change in the constitutional structure" and that such change "must come not by legislation adopted either by Congress or by an individual State, but rather—as have other important changes in the electoral process—through the amendment procedures set forth in Article V."[87][74] The majority opinion in Thornton (written by Associate Justice John Paul Stevens) concluded that term limits for public office amount to a qualification because term limits "unquestionably restrict the ability of voters to vote for whom they wish", and noted that when term limits were applied to the Presidency, the term limits were created by a constitutional amendment (i.e. the 22nd Amendment).[97]

In correspondence to the Court's analysis in Thornton of the 1787 Constitutional Convention and the history of state-imposed term limits and additional qualifications for members of Congress, Williams notes that the Convention explicitly rejected a proposal to elect the President by a national popular vote, and that all of the systems adopted by state legislatures to appoint electors in the wake of the ratification of the Constitution (discretionary appointment by the state legislature or state governor, popular election by electoral district, statewide winner-takes-all election) appointed electors directly or indirectly in accordance with voter sentiment within their respective states and not on the basis of votes cast outside of their states.[h][i][98][99] Likewise, in correspondence to the Court's analysis of congressional elections history, Williams notes that no state has ever appointed their electors in accordance with the national popular vote—even though every state since the 1880 election has appointed its electors upon the results of a poll, which would enable the statewide vote counts to be aggregated.[74] The CRS report and Williams also note that the Court in McPherson v. Blacker was upholding a law passed by the Michigan Legislature to appoint its electors by popular vote in electoral districts, and in contrast to the NPVIC, in accordance with voter sentiment within Michigan rather than the country as a whole.[87][74]

Williams concludes that because the Court's decision in McPherson to uphold the Michigan law followed a comparable analysis of the Constitutional Convention debates and, in the words of the Court, of the "contemporaneous practical exposition of the Constitution", the scope of states' Article II authority does not extend to allowing states to appoint presidential electors in accordance with the national popular vote.[74] The NPV Inc. organizers counter that the Constitutional Convention also rejected proposals having electors selected by popular vote in districts and having state legislatures appoint electors directly, and argue instead that the language of Article II does not prohibit the use of any of the methods that were rejected by the Convention.[100] Due to a lack of a precise precedent, the CRS report concludes that whether states are allowed to appoint their electors in accordance with the national popular vote under Article II is an open question and will likely remain unresolved until a future Court ruling in a case challenging the constitutionality of the NPVIC.[87]

Chiafalo v. Washington[edit]

In 2013, Bloomberg Law editor Michael Brody argued that "the role of electors has yet to be defined by a court," and cited the Supreme Court ruling in Ray v. Blair (1952) as suggesting that the 12th Amendment does not require that electors must vote for the candidate to whom they are pledged. Brody argued that because the NPVIC binds only states and not electors, those electors could retain independent withdrawal power as faithless electors at the request of the compacting states, unless the compacting states adopt penalties or other statutes that bind the electors—which 11 of the 15 compacting states and the District of Columbia currently do, in addition to 21 other states.[101][102]

On July 6, 2020, the Supreme Court unanimously ruled in the case Chiafalo v. Washington and the related case Colorado Department of State v. Baca that it is within a state's power to enforce laws that penalize faithless electors or allow for their removal and replacement.[103][104] The decision reaffirmed the precedent from McPherson v. Blacker that the Elections Clause "'[conveys] the broadest power of determination' over who becomes an elector", as well as the precedent from Ray v. Blair that a state's power to appoint electors includes conditioning an elector's appointment to a pledge to vote for their nominating party's presidential nominee (i.e. the winner of the statewide popular vote). The ruling concludes that a state's power to condition elector appointments extends to binding the electors to their pledges upon pain of penalty, stating "Nothing in the Constitution expressly prohibits States from taking away presidential electors' voting discretion as Washington does."[105] While not a direct ruling on the NPVIC, the ruling that states may bind their electors to the state's popular vote has been interpreted as a precedent that states may choose to bind their electors to the national popular vote via plenary appointment power.[106][107][108]

However, the majority opinion written by Associate Justice Elena Kagan notes that while a state legislature's appointment power gives it far-reaching authority over its electors, "Checks on a State's power to appoint electors, or to impose conditions on an appointment, can theoretically come from anywhere in the Constitution", further noting that the states cannot select electors in a manner that would violate the Equal Protection Clause or adopt conditions for elector appointments that impose additional qualifications for presidential candidates (as the latter could conflict with the Presidential Qualifications Clause of Article II, Section I).[109][j][110][111] In his concurring opinion, Associate Justice Clarence Thomas states that the "powers related to electors reside with States to the extent that the Constitution does not remove or restrict that power"; Thomas cites Williams v. Rhodes as stating that the powers reserved to the states concerning electors cannot "be exercised in such a way as to violate express constitutional commands."[112] The majority opinion also states that "nothing in this opinion should be taken to permit the States to bind electors to a deceased candidate" after noting that more than one-third of the cumulative faithless elector votes in U.S. presidential elections history were cast during the 1872 election when Liberal Republican and Democratic Party nominee Horace Greeley died after the election polls were held and vote tabulations were completed by the states but before the Electoral College cast its ballots.[113]

Voting Rights Act of 1965[edit]

A 2008 Columbia Law Review article by Columbia Law School student David Gringer suggested that the NPVIC could potentially violate Sections 2 and 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA).[71] However, in 2012, the U.S. Justice Department Civil Rights Division declined to challenge California's entry into the NPVIC under Section 5 of the Act, and the October 2019 CRS report notes that the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Shelby County v. Holder (2013), which invalidated Section 4(b) of the VRA, has rendered Section 5 currently inoperable.[91] In response to Gringer's argument that the NPVIC would violate Section 2 of the VRA, FairVote's Rob Richie says that the NPVIC "treats all voters equally",[114] and NPV Inc. has stated "The National Popular Vote bill manifestly would make every person's vote for President equal throughout the United States in an election to fill a single office (the Presidency). It is entirely consistent with the goal of the Voting Rights Act."[115]

History[edit]

Public support for Electoral College reform[edit]

Public opinion surveys suggest that a majority or plurality of Americans support a popular vote for President. Gallup polls dating back to 1944 showed consistent majorities of the public supporting a direct vote.[116] A 2007 Washington Post and Kaiser Family Foundation poll found that 72% favored replacing the Electoral College with a direct election, including 78% of Democrats, 60% of Republicans, and 73% of independent voters.[117]

A November 2016 Gallup poll following the 2016 U.S. presidential election showed that Americans' support for amending the U.S. Constitution to replace the Electoral College with a national popular vote fell to 49%, with 47% opposed. Republican support for replacing the Electoral College with a national popular vote dropped significantly, from 54% in 2011 to 19% in 2016, which Gallup attributed to a partisan response to the 2016 result, where the Republican candidate Donald Trump won the Electoral College despite losing the popular vote.[118] In March 2018, a Pew Research Center poll showed that 55% of Americans supported replacing the Electoral College with a national popular vote, with 41% opposed, but that a partisan divide remained in that support, as 75% of self-identified Democrats supported replacing the Electoral College with a national popular vote, while only 32% of self-identified Republicans did.[119] A September 2020 Gallup poll showed support for amending the U.S. Constitution to replace the Electoral College with a national popular vote rose to 61% with 38% opposed, similar to levels prior to the 2016 election, although the partisan divide continued with support from 89% of Democrats and 68% of independents, but only 23% of Republicans.[120] An August 2022 Pew Research Center poll showed 63% support for a national popular vote versus 35% opposed, with support from 80% of Democrats and 42% of Republicans.[121]

Proposals for constitutional amendment[edit]

The Electoral College system was established by Article II, Section 1 of the US Constitution, drafted in 1787.[122][123] It "has been a source of discontent for more than 200 years."[124] Over 700 proposals to reform or eliminate the system have been introduced in Congress,[125] making it one of the most popular topics of constitutional reform.[126][127] Electoral College reform and abolition has been advocated "by a long roster of mainstream political leaders with disparate political interests and ideologies."[128] Proponents of these proposals argued that the electoral college system does not provide for direct democratic election, affords less-populous states an advantage, and allows a candidate to win the presidency without winning the most votes.[125] Reform amendments were approved by two-thirds majorities in one branch of Congress six times in history.[127] However, other than the 12th Amendment in 1804, none of these proposals have received the approval of two-thirds of both branches of Congress and three-fourths of the states required to amend the Constitution.[129] The difficulty of amending the Constitution has always been the "most prominent structural obstacle" to reform efforts.[130]

Since the 1940s, when modern scientific polling on the subject began, a majority of Americans have preferred changing the electoral college system.[124][126] Between 1948 and 1979, Congress debated electoral college reform extensively, and hundreds of reform proposals were introduced in the House and Senate. During this period, Senate and House Judiciary Committees held hearings on 17 different occasions. Proposals were debated five times in the Senate and twice in the House, and approved by two-thirds majorities twice in the Senate and once in the House, but never at the same time.[131] In the late 1960s and 1970s, over 65% of voters supported amending the Constitution to replace the Electoral College with a national popular vote,[124] with support peaking at 80% in 1968, after Richard Nixon almost lost the popular vote while winning the Electoral College vote.[126] A similar situation occurred again with Jimmy Carter's election in 1976; a poll taken weeks after the election found 73% support for eliminating the Electoral College by amendment.[126] Carter himself proposed a Constitutional amendment that would include the abolition of the electoral college shortly after taking office in 1977.[132] After a direct popular election amendment failed to pass the Senate in 1979 and prominent congressional advocates retired or were defeated in elections, electoral college reform subsided from public attention and the number of reform proposals in Congress dwindled.[133]

Interstate compact plan[edit]

Distribution of electoral votes following the 2020 Census

The 2000 US presidential election produced the first "wrong winner" since 1888, with Al Gore winning the popular vote but losing the Electoral College vote to George W. Bush.[134] This "electoral misfire" sparked new studies and proposals from scholars and activists on electoral college reform, ultimately leading to the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact (NPVIC).[135]

In 2001, "two provocative articles" were published by law professors suggesting paths to a national popular vote through state legislative action rather than constitutional amendment.[136] The first, a paper by Northwestern University law professor Robert W. Bennett, suggested states could pressure Congress to pass a constitutional amendment by acting together to pledge their electoral votes to the winner of the national popular vote.[137] Bennett noted that the 17th Amendment was passed only after states had enacted state-level reform measures unilaterally.[138]

A few months later, Yale Law School professor Akhil Amar and his brother, University of California Hastings School of Law professor Vikram Amar, wrote a paper suggesting states could coordinate their efforts by passing uniform legislation under the Presidential Electors Clause and Compact Clause of the Constitution.[139] The legislation could be structured to take effect only once enough states to control a majority of the Electoral College (270 votes) joined the compact, thereby guaranteeing that the national popular vote winner would also win the electoral college.[138][126] Bennett and the Amar brothers "are generally credited as the intellectual godparents" of NPVIC.[140]

Organization and advocacy[edit]

Building on the work of Bennett and the Amar brothers, in 2006, John Koza, a computer scientist, former elector, and "longtime critic of the Electoral College",[136][citation needed] created the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact (NPVIC), a formal interstate compact that linked and unified individual states' pledges to commit their electoral votes to the winner of the national popular vote. NPVIC offered "a framework for building support one state at a time as well as a legal mechanism for enforcing states' commitments after the threshold of 270 had been reached."[138] Compacts of this type had long existed to regulate interstate issues such as water rights, ports, and nuclear waste.[138]

Koza, who had earned "substantial wealth" by co-inventing the scratchcard,[136] had worked on lottery compacts such as the Tri-State Lottery with an election lawyer, Barry Fadem.[138] To promote NPVIC, Koza, Fadem, and a group of former Democratic and Republican Senators and Representatives, formed a California 501(c)(4) non-profit, National Popular Vote Inc. (NPV, Inc.).[141][126] NPV, Inc. published Every Vote Equal, a detailed, "600-page tome"[136] explaining and advocating for NPVIC,[142][126] and a regular newsletter reporting on activities and encouraging readers to petition their governors and state legislators to pass NPVIC.[142] NPV, Inc. also commissioned statewide opinion polls, organized educational seminars for legislators and "opinion makers", and hired lobbyists in almost every state seriously considering NPVIC legislation.[143]

NPVIC was announced at a press conference in Washington, D.C. on February 23, 2006,[142] with the endorsement of former US Senator Birch Bayh; Chellie Pingree, president of Common Cause; Rob Richie, executive director of FairVote; and former US Representatives John Anderson and John Buchanan.[136] NPV, Inc. announced it planned to introduce legislation in all 50 states and had already done so in Illinois.[136][126] "To many observers, the NPVIC looked initially to be an implausible, long-shot approach to reform",[138] but within months of the campaign's launch, several major newspapers including The New York Times and Los Angeles Times, published favorable editorials.[138] Shortly after the press conference, NPVIC legislation was introduced in five additional state legislatures,[142] "most with bipartisan support".[138] It passed in the Colorado Senate, and in both houses of the California legislature before being vetoed by Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger.[138]

Adoption[edit]

In 2007, NPVIC legislation was introduced in 42 states. It was passed by at least one legislative chamber in Arkansas,[144] California,[42] Colorado,[145] Illinois,[146] New Jersey,[147] North Carolina,[148] Maryland, and Hawaii.[149] Maryland became the first state to join the compact when Governor Martin O'Malley signed it into law on April 10, 2007.[150]

NPVIC legislation has been introduced in all 50 states.[1] As of February 2023, the NPVIC has been adopted by fifteen states and the District of Columbia; notably, no Republican governor has yet signed it into law. Together, they have 195 electoral votes, which is 36.2% of the Electoral College and 72.2% of the 270 votes needed to give the compact legal force.

In Nevada, the legislation passed both chambers in 2019, but was vetoed by Gov. Steve Sisolak (D) on May 30, 2019.[151] In Maine, the legislation also passed both chambers in 2019, but failed the additional enactment vote in the House.[152] States where only one chamber has passed the legislation are Arizona, Arkansas, Michigan, Minnesota, North Carolina, Oklahoma, and Virginia. Bills seeking to repeal the compact in Connecticut, Maryland, New Jersey, and Washington have failed.[153]


Total
Electoral
Votes of
Adoptive
States
'06
'07
'08
'09
'10
'11
'12
'13
'14
'15
'16
'17
'18
'19
'20
'21
'22
0
30
60
90
120
150
180
210
240
270
MD
NJ
IL
HI
WA
MA
DC
VT
CA
RI
NY
CT
CO
DE
NM
OR
195 (72.2% of 270)
270 electoral votes (threshold for activation)
First
legislative
introduction



Reapportionment
based on
2010 Census
Reapportionment
based on
2020 Census
Desc-i.svg
History of state enactment of the NPVIC as of February 2023
Jurisdictions enacting law to join the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact
No. Jurisdiction Date adopted Method of adoption Ref. Current
electoral
votes (EV)
1 Maryland April 10, 2007 Signed by Gov. Martin O'Malley [150] 10
2 New Jersey January 13, 2008 Signed by Gov. Jon Corzine [154] 14
3 Illinois April 7, 2008 Signed by Gov. Rod Blagojevich [146] 19
4 Hawaii May 1, 2008 Legislature overrode veto of Gov. Linda Lingle [155] 4
5 Washington April 28, 2009 Signed by Gov. Christine Gregoire [156] 12
6 Massachusetts August 4, 2010 Signed by Gov. Deval Patrick [157] 11
7 District of Columbia December 7, 2010 Signed by Mayor Adrian Fenty[k] [158] 3
8 Vermont April 22, 2011 Signed by Gov. Peter Shumlin [159] 3
9 California August 8, 2011 Signed by Gov. Jerry Brown [160] 54
10 Rhode Island July 12, 2013 Signed by Gov. Lincoln Chafee [161] 4
11 New York April 15, 2014 Signed by Gov. Andrew Cuomo [162] 28
12 Connecticut May 24, 2018 Signed by Gov. Dannel Malloy [163] 7
13 Colorado March 15, 2019 Signed by Gov. Jared Polis [164] 10
14 Delaware March 28, 2019 Signed by Gov. John Carney [165] 3
15 New Mexico April 3, 2019 Signed by Gov. Michelle Lujan Grisham [166] 5
16 Oregon June 12, 2019 Signed by Gov. Kate Brown [167] 8
Total 195
Percentage of the 270 EVs needed 72.2%

Initiatives and referendums[edit]

In Maine, an initiative to join the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact began collecting signatures on April 17, 2016. It failed to collect enough signatures to appear on the ballot.[168][169] In Arizona, a similar initiative began collecting signatures on December 19, 2016, but failed to collect the required 150,642 signatures by July 5, 2018.[170][171] In Missouri, an initiative did not collect the required number of signatures before the deadline of May 6, 2018.[172][173]

Colorado Proposition 113, a ballot measure seeking to overturn the Colorado's adoption of the compact, was on the November 3, 2020 ballot; Colorado's membership was affirmed by a vote of 52.3% to 47.7% in the referendum.[174]

Prospects[edit]

Political analyst Nate Silver noted in 2014 that all jurisdictions that had adopted the compact at that time were blue states (all of the states who have joined the compact then and since have given all of their electoral college votes to the Democratic candidate in every Presidential election since the compact's inception), and that there were not enough electoral votes from the remaining blue states to achieve the required majority. He concluded that, as swing states were unlikely to support a compact that reduces their influence, the compact could not succeed without adoption by some red states as well.[175] Republican-led chambers have adopted the measure in New York (2011),[176] Oklahoma (2014), and Arizona (2016), and the measure has been unanimously approved by Republican-led committees in Georgia and Missouri, prior to the 2016 election.[177]

On March 15, 2019, Colorado became the most "purple" state to join the compact, though no Republican legislators supported the bill and Colorado had a state government trifecta under Democrats.[178] It was later submitted to a referendum, approved by 52% of voters.

In April 2021, reapportionment following the 2020 Census caused NPVIC members California, Illinois and New York to lose one electoral vote, and Colorado and Oregon to gain one, resulting in the total electoral votes represented by members to fall from 196 to 195.

Novel opposing action by North Dakota[edit]

On February 17, 2021, the North Dakota Senate passed SB 2271,[179] "to amend and reenact sections ... relating to procedures for canvassing and counting votes for presidential electors"[180] in a deliberate—albeit indirect—effort to stymie the efficacy of the NPVIC by prohibiting disclosure of the state's popular vote until after the Electoral College meets.[181][182] Later the bill was entirely rewritten as only a statement of intent and ordering a study for future recommendations, and this version was signed into law.[180]

Bills and referendums[edit]

Bills in latest session[edit]

The table below lists all state bills to join the NPVIC introduced in a state's current or most recent legislative session.[153] This includes all bills that are law, pending or have failed. The "EVs" column indicates the number of electoral votes each state has.

State EVs Session Bill Latest action Lower house Upper house Executive Status Ref.
Alaska 3 2023 SB 61 February 7, 2023 In committee Pending [183]
Arizona 11 2023 SB 1485 February 7, 2023 In committee Pending [184]
Florida 30 2023 HB 53 January 10, 2023 In committee Pending [185]
Minnesota 10 2023–24 HF 642 February 1, 2023 In committee Pending [186]
SF 538 February 2, 2023 Passed committee [187]
Missouri 10 2023 HB 829 January 19, 2023 Introduced Pending [188]
Texas 40 2023 HB 237 November 14, 2022 Introduced Pending [189]
SB 95 November 14, 2022 Introduced [190]

Bills receiving floor votes in previous sessions[edit]

The table below lists past bills that received a floor vote (a vote by the full chamber) in at least one chamber of the state's legislature. Bills that failed without a floor vote are not listed. The "EVs" column indicates the number of electoral votes the state had at the time of the latest vote on the bill. This number may have changed since then due to reapportionment after the 2010 and 2020 Census.

State EVs Session Bill Lower house Upper house Executive Outcome Ref.
Arizona 11 2016 HB 2456 Passed 40–16 Died in committee Failed [191]
Arkansas 6 2007 HB 1703 Passed 52–41 Died in committee Failed [192]
2009 HB 1339 Passed 56–43 Died in committee Failed [193]
California 55 2005–06 AB 2948 Passed 48–30 Passed 23–14 Vetoed Failed [194]
2007–08 SB 37 Passed 45–30 Passed 21–16 Vetoed Failed [42]
2011–12 AB 459 Passed 52–15 Passed 23–15 Signed Law [160]
Colorado 9 2006 SB 06-223 Indefinitely postponed Passed 20–15 Failed [195]
2007 SB 07-046 Indefinitely postponed Passed 19–15 Failed [145]
2009 HB 09-1299 Passed 34–29 Not voted Failed [196]
2019 SB 19-042 Passed 34–29 Passed 19–16 Signed Law [197]
Connecticut 7 2009 HB 6437 Passed 76–69 Not voted Failed [198]
2018 HB 5421 Passed 77–73 Passed 21–14 Signed Law [199]
Delaware 3 2009–10 HB 198 Passed 23–11 Not voted Failed [200]
2011–12 HB 55 Passed 21–19 Died in committee Failed [201]
2019–20 SB 22 Passed 24–17 Passed 14–7 Signed Law [202]
District of Columbia 3 2009–10 B18-0769 Passed 11–0 Signed Law [203]
Hawaii 4 2007 SB 1956 Passed 35–12 Passed 19–4 Vetoed Failed [149]
Override not voted Overrode 20–5
2008 HB 3013 Passed 36–9 Died in committee Failed [204]
SB 2898 Passed 39–8 Passed 20–4 Vetoed Law [155]
Overrode 36–3 Overrode 20–4 Overridden
Illinois 21 2007–08 HB 858 Passed 65–50 Died in committee Failed [205]
HB 1685 Passed 64–50 Passed 37–22 Signed Law [146]
Louisiana 8 2012 HB 1095 Failed 29–64 Failed [206]
Maine 4 2007–08 LD 1744 Indefinitely postponed Passed 18–17 Failed [207]
2013–14 LD 511 Failed 60–85 Failed 17–17 Failed [208]
2017–18 LD 156 Failed 66–73 Failed 14–21 Failed [209]
2019–20 LD 816 Failed 66–76 Passed 19–16 Failed [152]
Passed 77–69 Insisted 21–14
Enactment failed 68–79 Enacted 18–16
Enactment failed 69–74 Insisted on enactment
Maryland 10 2007 HB 148 Passed 85–54 Passed 29–17 Signed Law [210]
SB 634 Passed 84–54 Passed 29–17 [211]
Massachusetts 12 2007–08 H 4952 Passed 116–37 Passed [l] Failed [213]
Enacted Enactment not voted
2009–10 H 4156 Passed 114–35 Passed 28–10 Signed Law [214]
Enacted 116–34 Enacted 28–9
Michigan 17 2007–08 HB 6610 Passed 65–36 Died in committee Failed [215]
Minnesota 10 2013–14 HF 799 Failed 62–71 Failed [216]
2019–20 SF 2227 Passed 73–58 Not voted[m] Failed [217]
Montana 3 2007 SB 290 Failed 20–30 Failed [218]
Nevada 5 2009 AB 413 Passed 27–14 Died in committee Failed [219]
6 2019 AB 186 Passed 23–17 Passed 12–8 Vetoed Failed [220]
New Hampshire 4 2017–18 HB 447 Failed 132–234 Failed [221]
New Jersey 15 2006–07 A 4225 Passed 43–32 Passed 22–13 Signed Law [147]
New Mexico 5 2009 HB 383 Passed 41–27 Died in committee Failed [222]
2017 SB 42 Died in committee Passed 26–16 Failed [223]
2019 HB 55 Passed 41–27 Passed 25–16 Signed Law [224]
New York 31 2009–10 S02286 Not voted Passed Failed [225]
29 2011–12 S04208 Not voted Passed Failed [226]
2013–14 A04422 Passed 100–40 Died in committee Failed [227]
S03149 Passed 102–33 Passed 57–4 Signed Law [228]
North Carolina 15 2007–08 S954 Died in committee Passed 30–18 Failed [148]
North Dakota 3 2007 HB 1336 Failed 31–60 Failed [229]
Oklahoma 7 2013–14 SB 906 Died in committee Passed 28–18 Failed [230]
Oregon 7 2009 HB 2588 Passed 39–19 Died in committee Failed [231]
2013 HB 3077 Passed 38–21 Died in committee Failed [232]
2015 HB 3475 Passed 37–21 Died in committee Failed [233]
2017 HB 2927 Passed 34–23 Died in committee Failed [234]
2019 SB 870 Passed 37–22 Passed 17–12 Signed Law [235]
Rhode Island 4 2008 H 7707 Passed 36–34 Passed Vetoed Failed [236][237]
S 2112 Passed 34–28 Passed Vetoed Failed [236][238]
2009 H 5569 Failed 28–45 Failed [239][240]
S 161 Died in committee Passed Failed [239]
2011 S 164 Died in committee Passed Failed [241]
2013 H 5575 Passed 41–31 Passed 32–5 Signed Law [242][243]
S 346 Passed 48–21 Passed 32–4 [242][244]
Vermont 3 2007–08 S 270 Passed 77–35 Passed 22–6 Vetoed Failed [245]
2009–10 S 34 Died in committee Passed 15–10 Failed [246]
2011–12 S 31 Passed 85–44 Passed 20–10 Signed Law [247]
Virginia 13 2020 HB 177 Passed 51–46 Died in committee Failed [248]
Washington 11 2007–08 SB 5628 Died in committee Passed 30–18 Failed [249]
2009–10 SB 5599 Passed 52–42 Passed 28–21 Signed Law [250]

Referendums[edit]

State EVs Year In favor Opposed Ref.
Colorado 9 2020 52.33% 47.67% [251]

See also[edit]

Notes[edit]

  1. ^ Each state's electoral votes are equal to the sum of its seats in both houses of Congress. The allocation of House seats, which is nominally proportional to population, has been distorted by the fixed size of the House since 1929 and the requirement that each state have at least one representative. Each state has two Senate seats regardless of population. Both factors favor less populous states.[18]
  2. ^ The 12th Amendment states, "The person having the greatest number of votes for President, shall be the President, if such number be a majority of the whole number of Electors appointed; and if no person have such majority, then from the persons having the highest numbers not exceeding three on the list of those voted for as President, the House of Representatives shall choose immediately, by ballot, the President." Additionally, the 12th Amendment outlines the procedure by which presidential contingent elections are conducted, as well as vice presidential contingent elections by the Senate. The 12th Amendment also required that contingent elections be held before March 4 and this effectively delegated their conduct to lame-duck sessions of the House and Senate, but this requirement would be superseded by Sections 1 and 2 of the 20th Amendment.
  3. ^ Section 1 of the 20th Amendment changed the commencement date for congressional terms of office to January 3 and presidential and vice presidential terms of office to January 20. Section 2 of the 20th Amendment changed the commencement date of congressional sessions to January 3. Consequently, incoming sessions of the House and Senate now conduct contingent elections rather than lame-duck sessions and the effective deadline by which contingent elections must be held is now January 20 instead of March 4. Also, Section 4 of the 20th Amendment grants Congress the power to pass legislation to specify what occurs in contingent elections if one of the candidates the House or Senate chooses from dies.
  4. ^ However, under the 12th Amendment, presidential contingent elections are not held only in the event of a tie but rather if no candidate receives a majority of electoral votes, which can occur regardless of whether the size of the Electoral College is set at an even or odd number if more than two candidates receive electoral votes. In 1824, the two candidates with the most electoral votes (Andrew Jackson and John Quincy Adams) did not tie. Instead, the four candidates that received electoral votes (Jackson, Adams, William H. Crawford, and Henry Clay) all failed to reach the 131 votes necessary for a majority in the Electoral College, which was set at 261 electors. While there have been no presidential contingent elections since 1824, more than two candidates have received non-faithless electoral votes in 10 presidential elections since (1832, 1836, 1856, 1860, 1892, 1912, 1924, 1948, 1960, and 1968). The only contingent election for vice president was held following the 1836 election.
  5. ^ As for the District of Columbia, the 23rd Amendment grants Congress the power to create laws directing its mode of appointment, and Congress amended the District of Columbia Code in 1961 to require that the District's electors be appointed in accordance with the popular vote in the District before delegating the authority to choose the mode of appointment to the D.C. Council under the District of Columbia Home Rule Act in 1973.
  6. ^ However, Congress has the power to create laws under the 15th Amendment, the 19th Amendment, the 24th Amendment, and the 26th Amendment to enforce various voting rights protections for eligible citizens in states that appoint presidential electors upon the results of a poll. Also, Congress has the power to set the size of the Electoral College in setting its own size under the Representatives Apportionment Clause of Article I, Section II, the Admission to the Union Clause of Article IV, Section III, and Section 2 of the 14th Amendment.
  7. ^ The Vesting Clause of Article III, Section I states "The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish." In Article III, Section II, the Case or Controversy Clause states "The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution... [and] the Laws of the United States... to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party... [and] to Controversies between two or more States", while the Original Jurisdiction Clause states that "In all Cases … in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction."
  8. ^ In every presidential election from 1788–89 through 1828, multiple state legislatures selected their electors by discretionary appointment, while the South Carolina General Assembly did so in every presidential election through 1860 and the Colorado General Assembly selected its state's electors by discretionary appointment in the 1876 election.
  9. ^ In every presidential election from 1788–89 through 1836, at least one state appointed its electors based on the popular vote in electoral districts, while since the 1972 and 1992 elections respectively, Maine and Nebraska have appointed only two of their presidential electors in each election upon the statewide popular vote and the remainder upon the popular vote in their states' congressional districts.
  10. ^ For example, the No Religious Test Clause of Article VI states "no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States." In Torcaso v. Watkins (1961), the Supreme Court ruled that religious qualifications to hold a public office under a state government violated the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the 1st Amendment as applied to the states by the Equal Protection Clause (rather than the No Religious Test Clause).
  11. ^ Neither chamber of the U.S. Congress objected to the passage of DC's bill during the mandatory review period of 30 legislative days following passage, thus allowing the District's action to proceed.
  12. ^ Although the bill passed both houses, the Senate vote to send the bill to the Governor did not take place before the end of the legislative session.[212]
  13. ^ This omnibus bill was passed by the Senate without the NPVIC, then amended by the House to include it and sent to conference committee. However, it was not further considered before the legislature adjourned.

References[edit]

  1. ^ a b Progress in the States Archived May 2, 2019, at the Wayback Machine, National Popular Vote.
  2. ^ "National Popular Vote". National Conference of State Legislatures. NCSL. March 11, 2015. Archived from the original on December 17, 2015. Retrieved November 9, 2015.
  3. ^ a b Brody, Michael (February 17, 2013). "Circumventing the Electoral College: Why the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact Survives Constitutional Scrutiny Under the Compact Clause". Legislation and Policy Brief. Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. 5 (1): 33, 35. Archived from the original on March 27, 2015. Retrieved September 11, 2014.
  4. ^ McPherson v. Blacker 146 U.S. 1 (1892)
  5. ^ a b "Text of the National Popular Vote Compact Bill". National Popular Vote. May 5, 2019. Archived from the original on May 6, 2019. Retrieved May 6, 2019.
  6. ^ "national-1789-present - United States Elections Project". ElectProject.org. Archived from the original on July 25, 2014. Retrieved February 5, 2019.
  7. ^ Edwards III, George C. (2011). Why the Electoral College is Bad for America (Second ed.). New Haven and London: Yale University Press. pp. 1, 37, 61, 176–77, 193–94. ISBN 978-0-300-16649-1.
  8. ^ "U. S. Electoral College: Frequently Asked Questions". Archives.gov. Archived from the original on December 18, 2008. Retrieved December 20, 2017.
  9. ^ Sean Trende (October 19, 2012). "Did JFK Lose the Popular Vote?". RealClearPolitics. Archived from the original on April 18, 2019. Retrieved March 9, 2019.
  10. ^ "Who Picks the President?". FairVote. Archived from the original on June 2, 2006. Retrieved June 11, 2008.
  11. ^ a b c "Drop Out of the College". The New York Times. March 14, 2006. Archived from the original on June 15, 2015. Retrieved June 11, 2008.
  12. ^ "Electoral College is outdated". Denver Post. April 9, 2007. Archived from the original on January 8, 2008. Retrieved June 11, 2008.
  13. ^ a b Hill, David; McKee, Seth C. (2005). "The Electoral College, Mobilization, and Turnout in the 2000 Presidential Election". American Politics Research. 33 (5): 33:700–725. doi:10.1177/1532673X04271902. S2CID 154991830.
  14. ^ Lopez, Mark Hugo; Kirby, Emily; Sagoff, Jared (July 2005). "The Youth Vote 2004" (PDF). Archived (PDF) from the original on June 26, 2008. Retrieved June 12, 2008.
  15. ^ "States Join Forces Against Electoral College". Los Angeles Times. June 5, 2006. Archived from the original on October 21, 2007. Retrieved July 13, 2008.
  16. ^ "A fix for the Electoral College". The Boston Globe. February 18, 2008. Archived from the original on July 26, 2008. Retrieved July 13, 2008.
  17. ^ "How to drop out of the Electoral College: There's a way to ensure top vote-getter becomes president". Star Tribune. Minneapolis. March 27, 2006. Archived from the original on March 2, 2017. Retrieved July 13, 2008.
  18. ^ a b c "Electoral College should be maintained". Honolulu Star-Bulletin. April 29, 2007. Archived from the original on October 5, 2011. Retrieved June 12, 2008.
  19. ^ a b c d du Pont, Pete (August 29, 2006). "Trash the 'Compact'". Wall Street Journal. Archived from the original on October 1, 2009. Retrieved February 1, 2012.
  20. ^ "National Popular Vote Compact Suggested Resource List". Archived from the original on July 18, 2011.
  21. ^ "The Federalist Papers: No. 64". March 7, 1788. Archived from the original on April 14, 2020. Retrieved November 9, 2019.
  22. ^ "Myth: The Electoral College acts as a buffer against popular passions". National Popular Vote. January 19, 2019. Archived from the original on May 18, 2020. Retrieved November 7, 2019.
  23. ^ Beinart, Peter (November 21, 2016). "The Electoral College Was Meant to Stop Men Like Trump From Being President". The Atlantic. Archived from the original on July 7, 2020. Retrieved July 7, 2020.
  24. ^ "Faithless Elector State Laws". Fair Vote. Archived from the original on December 19, 2016. Retrieved March 4, 2020.
  25. ^ "Laws Binding Electors". Archived from the original on January 14, 2021. Retrieved March 4, 2020.
  26. ^ "U.S. Supreme Court restricts 'faithless electors' in presidential contests". Reuters. July 6, 2020. Archived from the original on July 6, 2020. Retrieved July 6, 2020.
  27. ^ "Who Picks the President?" (PDF). FairVote. Archived (PDF) from the original on July 23, 2012. Retrieved November 9, 2011.
  28. ^ "National Popular Vote". FairVote. Archived from the original on October 4, 2012. Retrieved July 20, 2010.
  29. ^ a b c "Agreement Among the States to Elect the President by Nationwide Popular Vote" (PDF). National Popular Vote. June 1, 2007. Archived (PDF) from the original on May 6, 2019. Retrieved July 13, 2008.
  30. ^ "Statewide Election Recounts, 2000–2009". FairVote. Archived from the original on April 3, 2012. Retrieved May 3, 2012.
  31. ^ "Myth: There is no mechanism for conducting a national recount". National Popular Vote. January 20, 2019. Archived from the original on April 21, 2019. Retrieved April 5, 2019.
  32. ^ a b c Silver, Nate (November 14, 2016). "Will The Electoral College Doom The Democrats Again?". FiveThirtyEight. Archived from the original on April 3, 2019. Retrieved April 3, 2019.
  33. ^ Anuzis, Saul (May 26, 2006). "Anuzis: Conservatives need the popular vote". Washington Times. Archived from the original on May 29, 2011. Retrieved June 3, 2011.
  34. ^ "California should join the popular vote parade". Los Angeles Times. July 16, 2011. Archived from the original on May 18, 2020. Retrieved June 6, 2019.
  35. ^ Hertzberg, Hendrik (June 13, 2011). "Misguided "objectivity" on n.p.v". New Yorker. Archived from the original on June 17, 2011. Retrieved June 21, 2011.
  36. ^ "David Broder, on PBS Online News Hour's Campaign Countdown". November 6, 2000. Archived from the original on January 12, 2008. Retrieved June 12, 2008.
  37. ^ Timothy Noah (December 13, 2000). "Faithless Elector Watch: Gimme "Equal Protection"". Slate.com. Archived from the original on March 8, 2008. Retrieved June 12, 2008.
  38. ^ Longley, Lawrence D.; Peirce, Neal (1999). Electoral College Primer 2000. Yale University Press. Archived from the original on June 6, 2011.
  39. ^ Levinson, Sanford (2006). Our Undemocratic Constitution. Oxford University Press. Archived from the original on March 28, 2008.
  40. ^ "Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787 - July 5". Archived from the original on May 19, 2020. Retrieved February 9, 2020.
  41. ^ "Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787 - July 9". Archived from the original on May 17, 2020. Retrieved February 9, 2020.
  42. ^ a b c "An act to add Chapter 1.5 (commencing with Section 6920) to Part 2 of Division 6 of the Elections Code, relating to presidential elections". California Office of Legislative Counsel. Archived from the original on March 30, 2019. Retrieved March 15, 2019.
  43. ^ "NewsWatch". Honolulu Star-Bulletin. April 24, 2007. Archived from the original on October 5, 2011. Retrieved July 13, 2008.
  44. ^ "What's Wrong With the Popular Vote?". Hawaii Reporter. April 11, 2007. Archived from the original on January 10, 2008. Retrieved July 13, 2008.
  45. ^ a b c "9.7.3 MYTH: A national popular vote will result in a proliferation of candidates, Presidents being elected with as little as 15% of the vote, and a breakdown of the two-party system". NationalPopularVote.com. January 19, 2019. Archived from the original on July 23, 2020. Retrieved July 23, 2020.
  46. ^ Morningstar, Bernard L. (September 7, 2019). "Abolishing Electoral College is a bad idea". Frederick News-Post. Archived from the original on August 4, 2020. Retrieved July 23, 2020.
  47. ^ "Map of state voting law differences". USA Facts. August 22, 2022. Archived from the original on December 25, 2022. Retrieved December 26, 2022.
  48. ^ a b Rossiter, Clinton, ed. (2003). The Federalist Papers. Signet Classics. p. 549. ISBN 9780451528810.
  49. ^ a b c Neale & Nolan 2019, pp. 22–23.
  50. ^ a b Neale & Nolan 2019, p. 24.
  51. ^ a b Neale & Nolan 2019, pp. 23–24.
  52. ^ Amar, Akhil (January 1, 2007). "Some Thoughts on the Electoral College: Past, Present, and Future" (PDF). Ohio Northern University Law Review. Ohio Northern University: 478. S2CID 6477344. Archived from the original (PDF) on February 18, 2019. Retrieved April 14, 2019.
  53. ^ a b Schleifer, Adam (2007). "Interstate Agreement for Electoral Reform". Akron Law Review. 40 (4): 717–749. Archived from the original on May 18, 2020. Retrieved April 17, 2019.
  54. ^ a b c Natelson, Robert (February 4, 2019). "Why the "National Popular Vote" scheme is unconstitutional". Independence Institute. Archived from the original on April 12, 2019. Retrieved April 12, 2019.
  55. ^ Rossiter, Clinton, ed. (2003). The Federalist Papers. Signet Classics. pp. 560–561, 564–565. ISBN 9780451528810.
  56. ^ a b "United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm'n, 434 U.S. 452 (1978)". Justia. Retrieved December 23, 2022. Public Domain This article incorporates text from this source, which is in the public domain.
  57. ^ "9.1 Myths about the U.S. Constitution – 9.1.26 MYTH". National Popular Vote. January 19, 2019. Archived from the original on April 21, 2019. Retrieved November 23, 2019.
  58. ^ See the Apportionment Act of 1911, though Congress has the authority to change that number. The Reapportionment Act of 1929 capped the size of the House at 435, and the 23rd Amendment increased the number of electors by 3 to the current 538 in 1961.
  59. ^ Neale & Nolan 2019, pp. 24–25.
  60. ^ Hendricks, Jennifer S. (July 1, 2008). "Popular Election of the President: Using or Abusing the Electoral College?". Election Law Journal. 7 (3): 218–236. doi:10.1089/elj.2008.7306. SSRN 1030385.
  61. ^ a b Turflinger, Bradley T. (2011). "Fifty Republics and the National Popular Vote: How the Guarantee Clause Should Protect States Striving for Equal Protection in Presidential Elections". Valparaiso University Law Review. Valco Scholar. 45 (3): 795, 798, 833–843. Archived from the original on October 6, 2014. Retrieved September 25, 2012.
  62. ^ Muller, Derek T. (November 2007). "The Compact Clause and the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact". Election Law Journal. Mary Ann Liebert, Inc. 6 (4): 372–393. doi:10.1089/elj.2007.6403. S2CID 53380514. Archived from the original on November 7, 2021. Retrieved December 12, 2019.
  63. ^ Muller, Derek T. (2008). "More Thoughts on the Compact Clause and the National Popular Vote: A Response to Professor Hendricks". Election Law Journal. Mary Ann Liebert, Inc. 7 (3): 227–233. doi:10.1089/elj.2008.7307. SSRN 2033853.
  64. ^ Drake, Ian J. (September 20, 2013). "Federal Roadblocks: The Constitution and the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact". Publius: The Journal of Federalism. Oxford University Press. 44 (4): 690–691. doi:10.1093/publius/pjt037.
  65. ^ Drake, Ian J. (September 20, 2013). "Federal Roadblocks: The Constitution and the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact". Publius: The Journal of Federalism. Oxford University Press. 44 (4): 691–693. doi:10.1093/publius/pjt037.
  66. ^ a b "Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433 (1981)". Justia. Retrieved December 23, 2022. Public Domain This article incorporates text from this source, which is in the public domain.
  67. ^ Drake, Ian J. (September 20, 2013). "Federal Roadblocks: The Constitution and the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact". Publius: The Journal of Federalism. Oxford University Press. 44 (4): 693–694. doi:10.1093/publius/pjt037.
  68. ^ Drake, Ian J. (September 30, 2013). "Move to diminish Electoral College faces constitutional roadblocks". Yahoo! News. Verizon Media. Archived from the original on November 7, 2021. Retrieved December 15, 2020.
  69. ^ Rossiter, Clinton, ed. (2003). The Federalist Papers. Signet Classics. pp. 543, 554, 561–564, 566, 568. ISBN 9780451528810.
  70. ^ a b Drake, Ian J. (September 20, 2013). "Federal Roadblocks: The Constitution and the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact". Publius: The Journal of Federalism. Oxford University Press. 44 (4): 697–698. doi:10.1093/publius/pjt037.
  71. ^ a b Gringer, David (2008). "Why the National Popular Vote Plan Is the Wrong Way to Abolish the Electoral College". Columbia Law Review. Columbia Law Review Association Inc. 108 (1): 182–230. JSTOR 40041769.
  72. ^ a b Feeley, Kristin (2009). "Comment: Guaranteeing a Federally Elected President". Northwestern University Law Review. Northwestern University Pritzker School of Law. 103 (3). SSRN 1121483. Archived from the original on March 28, 2020. Retrieved October 13, 2020.
  73. ^ a b Williams, Norman R. (2011). "Reforming the Electoral College: Federalism, Majoritarianism, and the Perils of Sub-Constitutional Change". The Georgetown Law Journal. Georgetown University Law Center. 100 (1): 173–236. SSRN 1786946. Archived from the original on November 26, 2020. Retrieved October 14, 2020.
  74. ^ a b c d e Williams, Norman R. (2012). "Why the National Popular Vote Compact is Unconstitutional". BYU Law Review. J. Reuben Clark Law School. 2012 (5): 1570–1579. Archived from the original on May 6, 2021. Retrieved October 14, 2020.
  75. ^ Valencia, Patrick C. (October 26, 2018). "Combination Among the States: Why the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact is an Unconstitutional Attempt to Reform the Electoral College". Harvard Journal on Legislation. Harvard Law School. Retrieved January 17, 2022.
  76. ^ "9.1 Myths about the U.S. Constitution – 9.1.3 MYTH". National Popular Vote. January 19, 2019. Archived from the original on April 21, 2019. Retrieved February 1, 2021.
  77. ^ "9.1 Myths about the U.S. Constitution – 9.1.1 MYTH". National Popular Vote. January 19, 2019. Archived from the original on April 21, 2019. Retrieved November 23, 2019.
  78. ^ "9.16 Myths about Interstate Compacts and Congressional Consent – 9.16.5 MYTH". National Popular Vote. January 20, 2019. Archived from the original on May 6, 2019. Retrieved May 5, 2019.
  79. ^ "St. Louis & S.F. Ry. Co. v. James, 161 U.S. 545 (1896)". Justia. Retrieved January 23, 2023.
  80. ^ "Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Comm'n, 359 U.S. 275 (1959)". Justia. Retrieved January 23, 2023.
  81. ^ Neale & Nolan 2019, p. 26.
  82. ^ Drake, Ian J. (September 20, 2013). "Federal Roadblocks: The Constitution and the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact". Publius: The Journal of Federalism. Oxford University Press. 44 (4): 695–696. doi:10.1093/publius/pjt037.
  83. ^ Neale & Nolan 2019, pp. 25–26.
  84. ^ Raskin, Jamie (2008). "Neither the Red States nor the Blue States but the United States: The National Popular Vote and American Political Democracy". Election Law Journal. Mary Ann Liebert, Inc. 7 (3): 188. doi:10.1089/elj.2008.7304.
  85. ^ a b Amar, Vikram (2011). "Response: The Case for Reforming Presidential Elections by Subconstitutional Means: The Electoral College, the National Popular Vote Compact, and Congressional Power". The Georgetown Law Journal. Georgetown University Law Center. 100 (1): 237–259. SSRN 1936374. Archived from the original on May 18, 2020. Retrieved April 25, 2019.
  86. ^ a b c d Neale & Nolan 2019, pp. 27–29.
  87. ^ Amar, Vikram (2016). "Constitutional Change and Direct Democracy: Modern Challenges and Exciting Opportunities". Arkansas Law Review. University of Arkansas School of Law. 69: 253–281. SSRN 3012102.
  88. ^ Benton, T. Hart (2016). "Congressional and Presidential Electoral Reform After Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission" (PDF). Loyola Law Review. Loyola University New Orleans College of Law. 62 (1): 155–188. Archived (PDF) from the original on May 26, 2020. Retrieved April 25, 2019.
  89. ^ Muller, Derek T. (2016). "Legislative Delegations and the Elections Clause". Florida State University Law Review. Florida State University College of Law. 43 (2): 717–740. SSRN 2650432. Archived from the original on May 18, 2020. Retrieved April 25, 2019.
  90. ^ a b Neale & Nolan 2019, p. 30.
  91. ^ "9.1 Myths about the U.S. Constitution – 9.1.18 MYTH". National Popular Vote. January 19, 2019. Archived from the original on November 10, 2020. Retrieved December 8, 2020.
  92. ^ Wilson, Jennings (2006). "Bloc Voting in the Electoral College: How the Ignored States Can Become Relevant and Implement Popular Election Along the Way". Election Law Journal. Mary Ann Liebert. 5 (4): 384–409. doi:10.1089/elj.2006.5.384. Archived from the original on November 7, 2021. Retrieved December 15, 2020.
  93. ^ Texas v. Pennsylvania (U.S. Supreme Court 2020).Text
  94. ^ Rossiter, Clinton, ed. (2003). The Federalist Papers. Signet Classics. pp. 552–553. ISBN 9780451528810.
  95. ^ "FITZGERALD V. GREEN. – Supreme Court – US Law". Legal Information Institute. Cornell Law School. Retrieved January 19, 2023.
  96. ^ "U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995)". Justia. Retrieved January 20, 2023. Public Domain This article incorporates text from this source, which is in the public domain.
  97. ^ Williams, Norman R. (2012). "Why the National Popular Vote Compact is Unconstitutional". BYU Law Review. J. Reuben Clark Law School. 2012 (5): 1539–1570. Archived from the original on May 6, 2021. Retrieved October 14, 2020.
  98. ^ "Split Electoral Votes in Maine and Nebraska". 270toWin. Archived from the original on August 2, 2018. Retrieved December 15, 2020.
  99. ^ "9.1 Myths about the U.S. Constitution – 9.1.6 MYTH". National Popular Vote. January 19, 2019. Archived from the original on November 10, 2020. Retrieved December 8, 2020.
  100. ^ Brody, Michael (February 17, 2013). "Circumventing the Electoral College: Why the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact Survives Constitutional Scrutiny Under the Compact Clause". Legislation and Policy Brief. Washington College of Law. 5 (1): 56–64. Archived from the original on March 27, 2015. Retrieved September 11, 2014.
  101. ^ "The Electoral College". National Conference of State Legislatures. Archived from the original on October 22, 2017. Retrieved August 13, 2019.
  102. ^ Millhiser, Ian (July 6, 2020). "The Supreme Court decides not to make the Electoral College even worse". Vox. Vox Media. Archived from the original on July 6, 2020. Retrieved July 7, 2020.
  103. ^ Liptak, Adam (July 7, 2020). "States May Curb 'Faithless Electors,' Supreme Court Rules". The New York Times. p. A1. Archived from the original on July 11, 2020. Retrieved July 11, 2020.
  104. ^ Chiafalo et al. v. Washington, 9–10 (U.S. Supreme Court 2020).Text
  105. ^ Litt, David. "The Supreme Court Just Pointed Out the Absurdity of the Electoral College. It's Up to Us to End It". time.com. Time. Retrieved July 15, 2020.
  106. ^ Astor, Maggie; Stevens, Matt (July 7, 2020). "Did the Popular Vote Just Get a Win at the Supreme Court?". The New York Times. Archived from the original on August 10, 2020. Retrieved July 15, 2020.
  107. ^ Fadem, Barry (July 14, 2020). "Supreme Court's "faithless electors" decision validates case for the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact". Brookings Institution. Archived from the original on July 17, 2020. Retrieved August 4, 2020.
  108. ^ Chiafalo et al. v. Washington, 9 (U.S. Supreme Court 2020).Text
  109. ^ Rossiter, Clinton, ed. (2003). The Federalist Papers. Signet Classics. p. 556. ISBN 9780451528810.
  110. ^ "Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961)". Justia. Retrieved December 30, 2022.
  111. ^ Chiafalo et al. v. Washington, 11–12 (U.S. Supreme Court 2020).Text
  112. ^ Chiafalo et al. v. Washington, 16–17 (U.S. Supreme Court 2020).Text
  113. ^ Shane, Peter (May 16, 2006). "Democracy's Revenge? Bush v. Gore and the National Popular Vote". Ohio State University Moritz College of Law. Archived from the original on August 7, 2008. Retrieved July 13, 2008.
  114. ^ "9.20 Myths about the Voting Rights Act – 9.20.1 MYTH". National Popular Vote. January 19, 2019. Archived from the original on January 25, 2021. Retrieved January 18, 2021.
  115. ^ "Americans Have Historically Favored Changing Way Presidents are Elected". Gallup. November 10, 2000. Archived from the original on January 1, 2008. Retrieved June 11, 2008.
  116. ^ "Washington Post-Kaiser Family Foundation-Harvard University: Survey of Political Independents" (PDF). The Washington Post. Archived (PDF) from the original on March 6, 2008. Retrieved June 11, 2008.
  117. ^ Swift, Art (December 2, 2016). "Americans' Support for Electoral College Rises Sharply". Gallup. Archived from the original on April 1, 2019. Retrieved April 5, 2019.
  118. ^ "5. The Electoral College, Congress and representation". Pew Research Center. April 26, 2018. Archived from the original on April 6, 2019. Retrieved April 27, 2019.
  119. ^ "61% of Americans Support Abolishing Electoral College". Gallup. September 24, 2020. Archived from the original on September 29, 2020. Retrieved September 28, 2020.
  120. ^ "Majority of Americans continue to favor moving away from Electoral College". Pew Research Center. August 5, 2022. Archived from the original on August 5, 2022. Retrieved August 7, 2022.
  121. ^ Keyssar 2020, pp. 14–35.
  122. ^ Neale & Nolan 2019, pp. 1–2.
  123. ^ a b c Keyssar 2020, p. 5.
  124. ^ a b Neale & Nolan 2019, p. 1.
  125. ^ a b c d e f g h Laurent, Thibault; Le Breton, Michel; Lepelley, Dominique; de Mouzon, Olivier (April 2019). "Exploring the Effects on the Electoral College of National and Regional Popular Vote Interstate Compact: An Electoral Engineering Perspective". Public Choice. 179 (n° 1): 51–95. doi:10.1007/s11127-018-0576-7. ISSN 0048-5829. S2CID 158874172. Archived from the original on November 7, 2021. Retrieved November 23, 2020. (PDF Archived January 9, 2021, at the Wayback Machine)
  126. ^ a b Keyssar 2020, p. 7.
  127. ^ Keyssar 2020, p. 6.
  128. ^ Keyssar 2020, pp. 7, 36-68 & 101-119; Neale & Nolan 2019, p. 1.
  129. ^ Keyssar 2020, p. 208.
  130. ^ Keyssar 2020, pp. 120–176; Neale & Nolan 2019, p. 4.
  131. ^ Warren Weaver Jr. (March 23, 1977). "Carter Proposes End of Electoral College in Presidential Votes". New York Times. Retrieved July 15, 2022.
  132. ^ Keyssar 2020, pp. 178–207; Neale & Nolan 2019, p. 4.
  133. ^ Neale & Nolan 2019, p. 5.
  134. ^ Neale & Nolan 2019, pp. 5–7.
  135. ^ a b c d e f Keyssar 2020, p. 195.
  136. ^ Bennett, Robert W. (Spring 2001). "Popular Election of the President Without a Constitutional Amendment" (PDF). The Green Bag. 4 (3). SSRN 261057. Archived (PDF) from the original on August 14, 2019. Retrieved January 17, 2019.
  137. ^ a b c d e f g h i Keyssar 2020, p. 196.
  138. ^ Amar, Akhil Reed; Amar, Vikram David (December 28, 2001). "How to Achieve Direct National Election of the President Without Amending the Constitution: Part Three Of A Three-part Series On The 2000 Election And The Electoral College". Findlaw. Archived from the original on December 3, 2020. Retrieved November 25, 2020.
  139. ^ Neale & Nolan 2019, p. 6.
  140. ^ Keyssar 2020, p. 195; Neale & Nolan 2019, p. 8.
  141. ^ a b c d Neale & Nolan 2019, p. 8.
  142. ^ Keyssar 2020, p. 198.
  143. ^ "Progress in Arkansas". National Popular Vote Inc. 2009. Archived from the original on February 13, 2016. Retrieved June 6, 2008.
  144. ^ a b "Summarized History for Bill Number SB07-046". Colorado Legislature. 2007. Archived from the original on May 17, 2011. Retrieved July 13, 2008.
  145. ^ a b c "Bill Status of HB1685". Illinois General Assembly. Archived from the original on August 1, 2010. Retrieved August 29, 2022.
  146. ^ a b "Bill Search (Bill A4225 from Session 2006–07)". New Jersey Legislature. Archived from the original on June 4, 2008. Retrieved July 13, 2008.
  147. ^ a b "Senate Bill 954". North Carolina. 2008. Archived from the original on December 24, 2008. Retrieved July 13, 2008.
  148. ^ a b "Hawaii SB 1956, 2007". Archived from the original on June 3, 2008. Retrieved June 6, 2008.
  149. ^ a b "Maryland sidesteps electoral college". NBC News. April 11, 2007. Archived from the original on April 17, 2014. Retrieved July 13, 2008.
  150. ^ "Governor Sisolak Statement on Assembly Bill 186". Nevada Governor Steve Sisolak. Archived from the original on May 30, 2019. Retrieved May 30, 2019.
  151. ^ a b "Actions for LD 816". Maine Legislature. Archived from the original on February 20, 2019. Retrieved August 29, 2022.
  152. ^ a b "Elections Legislation Database". National Conference of State Legislatures. Retrieved February 5, 2023.
  153. ^ "New Jersey Rejects Electoral College". CBS News. CBS. January 13, 2008. Archived from the original on May 25, 2008. Retrieved July 13, 2008.
  154. ^ a b "Hawaii SB 2898, 2008". Hawaii State Legislature. Archived from the original on October 22, 2020. Retrieved January 5, 2019.
  155. ^ "Progress in Washington". National Popular Vote Inc. February 2016. Archived from the original on January 28, 2019. Retrieved January 28, 2019.
  156. ^ "Progress in Massachusetts". National Popular Vote Inc. February 2016. Archived from the original on January 28, 2019. Retrieved January 28, 2019.
  157. ^ "Progress in District of Columbia". National Popular Vote Inc. February 2016. Archived from the original on January 28, 2019. Retrieved January 28, 2019.
  158. ^ "Progress in Vermont". National Popular Vote Inc. February 2016.
  159. ^ a b "An act to add Chapter 1.5 (commencing with Section 6920) to Part 2 of Division 6 of the Elections Code, relating to presidential elections". California Office of Legislative Counsel. Archived from the original on March 24, 2019. Retrieved March 15, 2019.
  160. ^ "Progress in Rhode Island". National Popular Vote Inc. February 2016. Archived from the original on January 28, 2019. Retrieved January 28, 2019.
  161. ^ "Governor Cuomo Signs Legislation Adding New York State to the National Popular Vote Compact". governor.ny.gov. September 29, 2014. Archived from the original on November 3, 2014. Retrieved April 15, 2014.
  162. ^ "The Office of Governor Dannel P. Malloy – Bill Notifications" (PDF). Archived (PDF) from the original on May 25, 2018. Retrieved May 24, 2018.
  163. ^ "Gov. Polis Signs Bills Into Law". Colorado Governor Polis Official Site. Archived from the original on March 18, 2019. Retrieved March 16, 2019.
  164. ^ Chase, Randall (March 28, 2019). "Delaware governor signs national popular vote bill". Washington Post. Archived from the original on March 28, 2019. Retrieved March 28, 2019.
  165. ^ McKay, Dan (April 3, 2019). "Expungement, Electoral College bills signed by governor". Albuquerque Journal. Archived from the original on April 3, 2019. Retrieved April 3, 2019.
  166. ^ "Governor signs bill to change the way Oregon helps choose the president". OregonLive. June 12, 2019. Archived from the original on June 12, 2019. Retrieved June 12, 2019.
  167. ^ "Bureau of Corporations, Elections & Commissions". Maine.gov. Archived from the original on January 8, 2018. Retrieved December 21, 2017.
  168. ^ "Maine National Popular Vote Interstate Compact Initiative (2018) - Ballotpedia". Archived from the original on November 8, 2018. Retrieved December 21, 2017.
  169. ^ "2018 Initiatives, Referendums & Recalls". Archived from the original on April 28, 2018. Retrieved December 21, 2017.
  170. ^ "Arizona National Popular Vote Interstate Agreement Initiative (2018) - Ballotpedia". Archived from the original on May 9, 2017. Retrieved December 21, 2017.
  171. ^ IT, Missouri Secretary of State -. "2018 Initiative Petitions Approved for Circulation in Missouri". sos.mo.gov. Archived from the original on July 10, 2017. Retrieved December 21, 2017.
  172. ^ "Missouri National Popular Vote Interstate Agreement Initiative (2018) - Ballotpedia". Archived from the original on May 9, 2017. Retrieved December 21, 2017.
  173. ^ "Colorado Election: Proposition 113 Results". Secretary of State of Colorado. Archived from the original on March 22, 2021. Retrieved November 11, 2020.
  174. ^ Silver, Nate (April 17, 2014). "Why a Plan to Circumvent the Electoral College Is Probably Doomed". FiveThirtyEight. ESPN. Archived from the original on October 30, 2014. Retrieved July 17, 2014.
  175. ^ "New York". National Popular Vote. January 19, 2016. Archived from the original on August 8, 2018. Retrieved August 7, 2018.
  176. ^ "National Popular Vote!". National Popular Vote. December 17, 2015. Archived from the original on August 8, 2018. Retrieved August 7, 2018.
  177. ^ Rakich, Nathaniel (March 5, 2019). "The Movement To Skip The Electoral College Is About To Pass A Major Milestone". FiveThirtyEight.com. Archived from the original on March 8, 2019. Retrieved March 18, 2019.
  178. ^ "North Dakota Bill Versions: SB 2271". North Dakota State Government. 2021. Archived from the original on February 26, 2021. Retrieved March 19, 2021.
  179. ^ a b "North Dakota Bill Actions: SB 2271". North Dakota State Government. 2021. Archived from the original on April 9, 2021. Retrieved March 19, 2021.
  180. ^ "Testimony for Bill 2271 | Legislative Assembly: State of North Dakota". North Dakota State Government. 2021. Archived from the original on February 26, 2021. Retrieved March 19, 2021.
  181. ^ Muder, Doug (March 1, 2021). "North Dakota Is About to Kill the National Popular Vote Compact". The Weekly Sift. Archived from the original on March 3, 2021. Retrieved March 19, 2021.
  182. ^ "SB 61". Alaska Legislature. Retrieved February 8, 2023.
  183. ^ "SB 1485". Arizona Legislature. Retrieved February 5, 2023.
  184. ^ "HB 53". Florida House of Representatives. Retrieved February 5, 2023.
  185. ^ "HF 642". Minnesota Legislature. Retrieved February 5, 2023.
  186. ^ "SF 538". Minnesota Legislature. Retrieved February 5, 2023.
  187. ^ "HB 829". Missouri Legislature. Retrieved February 5, 2023.
  188. ^ "HB 237". Texas Legislature. Retrieved February 5, 2023.
  189. ^ "SB 95". Texas Legislature. Retrieved February 5, 2023.
  190. ^ "House Bill 2456". Arizona State Legislature. 2016. Archived from the original on February 10, 2021. Retrieved August 29, 2022.
  191. ^ "HB1703 - An Act to Adopt the Agreement Among the States to Elect the President by National Popular Vote". Arkansas General Assembly. Archived from the original on February 22, 2018. Retrieved August 29, 2022.
  192. ^ "HB1339 - An Act to Adopt the Agreement Among the States to Elect the President by Nationwide Popular Vote". Arkansas General Assembly. Archived from the original on March 11, 2012. Retrieved August 29, 2022.
  193. ^ "An act to add Chapter 1.5 (commencing with Section 6920) to Part 2 of Division 6 of the Elections Code, relating to presidential elections". California Office of Legislative Counsel. Archived from the original on March 30, 2019. Retrieved March 15, 2019.
  194. ^ "Summarized History for Bill Number SB06-223". Colorado General Assembly. Archived from the original on August 8, 2007. Retrieved August 29, 2022.
  195. ^ "Summarized History for Bill Number HB09-1299". Colorado General Assembly. Archived from the original on February 22, 2018. Retrieved August 29, 2022.
  196. ^ "Senate Bill 19-042: National Popular Vote". Colorado General Assembly. Archived from the original on February 2, 2019. Retrieved February 1, 2019.
  197. ^ "Raised H.B. No. 6437". Connecticut General Assembly. Archived from the original on April 25, 2009. Retrieved August 29, 2022.
  198. ^ "Raised H.B. No. 5421". Connecticut General Assembly. Archived from the original on March 14, 2018. Retrieved August 29, 2022.
  199. ^ "House Bill 198". Delaware General Assembly. Archived from the original on February 22, 2018. Retrieved August 29, 2022.
  200. ^ "House Bill 55". Delaware General Assembly. Archived from the original on December 29, 2017. Retrieved August 29, 2022.
  201. ^ "Senate Bill 22". Delaware General Assembly. Archived from the original on February 28, 2019. Retrieved August 29, 2022.
  202. ^ "B18-0769 - National Popular Vote Interstate Agreement Act of 2010". Council of the District of Columbia. Archived from the original on February 22, 2018. Retrieved August 29, 2022.
  203. ^ "HB3013 HD1". Hawaii State Legislature. Archived from the original on February 22, 2018. Retrieved November 10, 2016.
  204. ^ "Bill Status of HB0858". Illinois General Assembly. Archived from the original on October 6, 2008. Retrieved August 29, 2022.
  205. ^ "HB1095". Louisiana State Legislature. Archived from the original on December 26, 2016. Retrieved August 29, 2022.
  206. ^ "Actions for LD 1744". Maine Legislature. Archived from the original on February 22, 2018. Retrieved August 29, 2022.
  207. ^ "Actions for LD 511". Maine Legislature. Archived from the original on April 8, 2014. Retrieved August 29, 2022.
  208. ^ "Summary of LD 156". Maine Legislature. Archived from the original on February 22, 2018. Retrieved January 17, 2019.
  209. ^ "House Bill 148". Maryland General Assembly. 2007. Archived from the original on June 8, 2019. Retrieved February 14, 2018.
  210. ^ "Senate Bill 654". Maryland General Assembly. 2007. Archived from the original on February 22, 2018. Retrieved February 14, 2018.
  211. ^ Viser, Matt (August 1, 2008). "Legislature agrees to back Pike finances". The Boston Globe. Archived from the original on June 29, 2011. Retrieved August 11, 2008.
  212. ^ "House, No. 4952". General Court of Massachusetts. 2008. Archived from the original on October 12, 2012.
  213. ^ "Bill H.4156". General Court of Massachusetts. 2010. Archived from the original on September 24, 2020. Retrieved February 14, 2018.
  214. ^ "House Bill 6610 (2008)". Michigan Legislature. 2008. Archived from the original on August 11, 2011. Retrieved December 11, 2008.
  215. ^ "HF0799 Status in House for Legislative Session 88". 2013. Archived from the original on November 7, 2021. Retrieved April 11, 2013.
  216. ^ "SF 2227". Minnesota Legislature. Archived from the original on May 1, 2019. Retrieved May 1, 2019.
  217. ^ "Detailed Bill Information (SB290)". Montana Legislature. 2007. Archived from the original on November 16, 2018. Retrieved December 25, 2016.
  218. ^ "AB413". Nevada Legislature. Archived from the original on April 29, 2009. Retrieved April 22, 2009.
  219. ^ "Assembly Bill 186". Nevada Legislature. Archived from the original on February 20, 2019. Retrieved February 19, 2019.
  220. ^ "HB447". New Hampshire General Court. Archived from the original on November 23, 2018. Retrieved January 17, 2019.
  221. ^ "HB 383". New Mexico Legislature. 2009. Archived from the original on March 30, 2019. Retrieved February 15, 2018.
  222. ^ "Legislation - New Mexico Legislature". NMLegis.gov. Archived from the original on March 30, 2019. Retrieved January 6, 2018.
  223. ^ "House Bill 55". New Mexico Legislature. Archived from the original on January 4, 2019. Retrieved January 3, 2019.
  224. ^ "S02286". New York State Assembly. 2009. Archived from the original on February 22, 2018. Retrieved February 15, 2018.
  225. ^ "S4208 Summary". New York State Assembly. 2011. Archived from the original on October 8, 2012. Retrieved February 15, 2018.
  226. ^ "A04422 Summary". New York State Assembly. 2013. Archived from the original on February 22, 2018. Retrieved February 15, 2018.
  227. ^ "S03149 Summary". New York State Assembly. 2014. Archived from the original on February 22, 2018. Retrieved February 15, 2018.
  228. ^ "Measure Actions". North Dakota State Government. 2007. Archived from the original on November 14, 2016. Retrieved December 25, 2016.
  229. ^ "SB906 Status in Oklahoma Senate". Oklahoma Senate. 2014. Archived from the original on March 6, 2014. Retrieved March 17, 2014.
  230. ^ "Oregon Legislative Information System". olis.leg.state.or.us. Archived from the original on August 16, 2016. Retrieved July 4, 2016.
  231. ^ "HB 3077". Oregon State Legislature. 2013. Archived from the original on January 16, 2016. Retrieved April 10, 2013.
  232. ^ "House Bill 3475". Oregon State Legislature. 2015. Archived from the original on June 22, 2015. Retrieved May 20, 2015.
  233. ^ HB 2927 Archived February 16, 2017, at the Wayback Machine, Oregon State Legislature.
  234. ^ "Senate Bill 870". Oregon State Legislature. Archived from the original on February 27, 2019. Retrieved February 26, 2019.
  235. ^ a b "Legislative Status Report (see 7707, 2112)". Rhode Island Legislature. 2008. Archived from the original on July 3, 2013. Retrieved July 13, 2008.
  236. ^ 08H 7707 Archived February 22, 2018, at the Wayback Machine, Rhode Island General Assembly.
  237. ^ 08S 2112 Archived February 22, 2018, at the Wayback Machine, Rhode Island General Assembly.
  238. ^ a b "Legislative status report". Rhode Island Legislature. 2009. Archived from the original on July 3, 2013. Retrieved May 25, 2009.
  239. ^ 09H 5569 Archived February 22, 2018, at the Wayback Machine, Rhode Island General Assembly.
  240. ^ "Legislative status report (look for 164 in 2011)". Rhode Island Legislature. 2011. Archived from the original on July 3, 2013. Retrieved January 23, 2012.
  241. ^ a b "Legislative Status Report (search for bills 5575, 346)". Rhode Island General Assembly. Archived from the original on July 3, 2013. Retrieved August 29, 2022.
  242. ^ 2013-H 5575 Archived February 22, 2018, at the Wayback Machine, Rhode Island General Assembly.
  243. ^ 2013-S 346 Sub A Archived February 22, 2018, at the Wayback Machine, Rhode Island General Assembly.
  244. ^ "The Vermont Legislative Bill Tracking System (S.270)". Vermont General Assembly. Archived from the original on June 24, 2016. Retrieved February 19, 2018.
  245. ^ "S.34". Vermont General Assembly. Archived from the original on February 22, 2018. Retrieved February 19, 2018.
  246. ^ "S.31". Vermont Legislature. Archived from the original on March 30, 2019. Retrieved February 19, 2018.
  247. ^ "HB 177". Virginia's Legislative Information System. Archived from the original on March 11, 2020. Retrieved December 28, 2019.
  248. ^ "SB5628". Washington Legislature. 2008. Archived from the original on April 19, 2008. Retrieved July 13, 2008.
  249. ^ "SB5599, 2009". Washington State Legislature. 2009. Archived from the original on May 6, 2009. Retrieved January 23, 2009.
  250. ^ "Colorado Proposition 113, National Popular Vote Interstate Compact Referendum (2020) - Ballotpedia". Archived from the original on October 8, 2021. Retrieved October 8, 2021.
Bundled references

Works cited[edit]

External links[edit]