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Louis Brandeis (1856–1941)

The New Brandeis movement (also known as the neo-Brandeis movement) is an ongoing antitrust academic and political movement in the United States which argues that excessively centralized private power is dangerous for economical, political and social reasons.[1][2] The movement advocates that United States antitrust law return to a broader concern with private power and its negative effects on market competition, income inequality, consumer rights, unemployment, and wage growth.

The movement draws inspiration from the anti-monopolist work of Louis Brandeis, an early 20th century United States Supreme Court Justice who called high economic concentration “the Curse of Bigness” and believed monopolies were inherently harmful to the welfare of workers and business innovation.

The New Brandeis movement opposes the school of thought in modern antitrust law that antitrust should center on customer welfare (as generally advocated by the Chicago school of economics). Instead, the New Brandeis movement advocates a broader antimonopoly approach that is concerned with private power, the structure of the economy, and market conditions necessary to promote competition.[3][4]

Intellectual origins

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Louis Brandeis and the "Curse of Bigness"

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The New Brandeis movement draws its name and main ideas from the legal and political work of early 20th-century figure Louis Brandeis. During the Gilded Age and Progressive Era, the American economy underwent a period of corporate consolidation, finding itself at the intersection of industrial trusts and financial monopolies led by figures like J. P. Morgan and John D. Rockefeller.[5] In describing the shift from an agrarian economy to one dominated by large corporations, historians note that the sheer scale of these entities caused public concern about the future of democratic institutions.[6]

Brandeis emerged as a prominent critic of this consolidation. In his 1914 book Other People's Money and How the Bankers Use It, he introduced the concept of the "Curse of Bigness". In the text, Brandeis frames centralized private power as a political and moral threat, rather than just an economic one. In describing the actions of financial oligarchies, he argues that they monopolized credit and controlled different industries. These practices—which he believed destroyed industrial liberty and stifled innovation—were seen by Brandeis as creating a political power that rivaled the state itself.[7][8] Because he viewed a democratic republic as dependent on a decentralized economy, Brandeis advocated for a system of small and medium-sized producers. He also argued that monopolies were inefficient because of bureaucratic bloat and a lack of competitive discipline.[9]

Structuralism and the mid-century consensus

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During the New Deal, following the Great Depression, the federal government increased anti-monopoly efforts. Historian Ellis Hawley described this period as the first "neo-Brandeisian" movement. Figures such as Felix Frankfurter and Antitrust Division head Thurman Arnold led a return to structuralist antitrust enforcement.[10] This approach, often called the "Harvard School" of economics, proposed that highly concentrated market structures led to anti-competitive conduct and poor economic performance.[11][12]

For several decades, courts and federal agencies blocked mergers and broke up monopolies to maintain fragmented markets. Historian Richard Hofstadter noted that by the mid-20th century, the antitrust movement lost its populist support. It changed from a political movement into a technical and bureaucratic process managed by legal and economic specialists. This left the movement's political philosophy open to changes in academic trends.[13]

The Chicago School and the Consumer Welfare Standard

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In the late 1970s and 1980s, the Chicago School of antitrust analysis replaced the Brandeisian approach. Scholars like Robert Bork, Aaron Director, and Richard Posner argued that the structuralist methods punished efficient companies and protected inefficient competitors at the public's expense.[14]

Bork outlined this view in his 1978 book The Antitrust Paradox. He argued that the legislative history of the Sherman Act showed Congress had one goal: maximizing "consumer welfare".[15] Bork defined "competition" as a state that maximizes economic efficiency and lowers consumer prices. He rejected the Brandeisian idea that antitrust law should serve social or political purposes, such as dispersing power or protecting local businesses. The Chicago School argued that if a merger or practice did not raise prices or restrict output, it should be legal, as it likely indicated business efficiency.[16]

Heterodox scholars have analyzed the Chicago School's price-theory framework from a political economy perspective. They describe it as an ideological superstructure that justified late 20th-century economic conditions, including deregulation, capital consolidation, and globalization.[17] By the early 2000s, the federal judiciary and the Department of Justice had adopted Bork's "Consumer Welfare Standard". The government narrowed antitrust enforcement, brought fewer monopolization cases, and removed political considerations of corporate concentration from jurisprudence.[18] The New Brandeis movement formed in opposition to this price-centric legal approach.

Emergence

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Material and economic catalysts

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Following the 2008 financial crisis, economists and journalists began to document the effects of corporate consolidation in the United States.[19] Since the late 1970s, the American economy had experienced a period of wage stagnation, rising inequality, and the centralization of capital.[20] In his book Cornered (2010), the journalist Barry C. Lynn argued that the suspension of anti-monopoly enforcement in the 1980s allowed a small number of executives and financiers to consolidate control over industrial and financial systems.[21] Lynn viewed this monopolization as creating fragility in the economy, which he identified as a contributing factor to the 2008 financial collapse.[22]

In the decade following the crisis, the technology sector grew significantly. Companies such as Google, Facebook, and Amazon developed a new business model known as the "platform", and through the early years of the recovery they expanded rapidly.[23] These platforms operated as digital intermediaries that brought together different groups of users, extracting data to use as a raw material.[24] Because these services relied heavily on network effects, they became increasingly valuable as more people used them, adding to their market dominance. This dynamic gives platforms a natural tendency towards monopolisation, and a few major firms took control of the internet economy.[25]

Foundational texts

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In response to the growth of these technology companies, legal scholars began to question the effectiveness of existing antitrust laws. In 2017, Lina Khan published the foundational[26] article "Amazon's Antitrust Paradox" in the Yale Law Journal. In the text, Khan argues that the Chicago School's focus on "consumer welfare"—which measures competition primarily through short-term price and output effects—fails to capture the architecture of market power in the 21st century.[27] She uses Amazon as a case study, noting that the company pursued growth over short-term profits.[28] Khan argues that Amazon used predatory pricing to establish dominance in markets like e-books and baby products, and then integrated across multiple business lines to control the infrastructure of e-commerce.[29]

In 2019, a group of scholars and practitioners drafted the "Utah Statement" to formalize the principles of the neo-Brandeis movement.[30] The statement describes the movement as a reaction to 40 years of economic consolidation, which it links to stagnant wages and a widening gap between rich and poor.[30] The authors outline a series of proposed reforms to antitrust doctrine and enforcement. They assert that the protection of fair competition is necessary for a democratic society, and that excessive concentration of private economic power creates anti-democratic political pressures.[30]

Theory

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Critique of the consumer welfare standard

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The New Brandeis movement argues that the consumer welfare standard—as advocated by the Chicago school—cannot effectively regulate modern monopolies. Since the late 1970s, antitrust enforcement has focused on price theory, examining monopolies mainly based on whether they raise consumer prices or limit output.[27] Legal scholar Lina Khan claims that this approach overlooks how market power functions in the digital economy. According to her, Internet platforms aim for long-term growth and market share instead of short-term profits.[31] They use predatory pricing to capture markets and establish dominance. Because these companies maintain consumer prices low, their actions usually escape antitrust scrutiny under the consumer welfare standard, which considers below-cost pricing as irrational.[32]

Neo-Brandeisians also focus on the structural role of technology platforms. Khan describes platforms as critical intermediaries that connect different business areas. She points out that a company like Amazon acts as a retailer, a delivery network, and a marketplace for third-party sellers all at once.[33] In Khan's view, this role allows the platform to gather data on its competitors and use that information to undermine them, creating conflicts of interest that disrupt the competitive process.[34] Extending the critique, Manuel Wörsdörfer argues that Apple uses its closed ecosystem to act as a gatekeeper to the internet.[35] Wörsdörfer finds that the company engages in anti-competitive conduct such as "Sherlocking" (copying third-party apps), self-preferencing its own services like Apple Music, and imposing supra-competitive 30% commission fees on app developers.[36] The movement advocates for market structures that prevent anti-competitive practices and would increase scrutiny of mergers, including vertical mergers. Proponents believe antitrust laws should focus less on short-term price effects of mergers and more on improving the market conditions necessary to promote real competition.[37][38][39]

Support and opposition

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Individuals who have been described as being associated with the movement include Lina Khan, Tim Wu, Jonathan Kanter, and Barry C. Lynn.[40][41][42] Senators Cory Booker, Amy Klobuchar and Elizabeth Warren have been described as allies of the movement,[43][44] and have called on the United States Department of Justice Antitrust Division and Federal Trade Commission to focus their enforcement efforts more on helping workers.[45] The movement has since been the subject of both academic conferences,[46] research papers,[47] and academic journals.[48]

Critics of the New Brandeis movement believe that promoting competition for its own sake keeps inefficient producers in business, preferring a litigation approach grounded in empirical evidence.[49] The term "hipster antitrust" originally began as a Twitter hashtag, and rose to prominence when Senator Orrin Hatch used the term during multiple speeches on the United States Senate floor.[50][51][52][53] Matt Levine of Bloomberg News has written that the term hipster antitrust "appeals to nostalgia for old-fashioned antitrust enforcement".[54] Some proponents of the movement believe the term is pejorative.[55] The term was coined by Konstantin Medvedovsky,[when?][56] an attorney at Dechert, and popularized by disgraced former Federal Trade Commissioner Joshua D. Wright.[57][58]

History

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Official portrait of Lina Khan
Portrait of Wu speaking at a conference while sitting
Lina Khan and Tim Wu were foundational members of the movement

Biden administration

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The movement was perceived to grow in influence during the Biden administration, as compared to the prior Trump and Obama presidencies.[40][59] In 2020, the American Economic Liberties Project (AELP) was founded by several neo-Brandeisians to support regulatory efforts and research, led by Sarah Miller.[60] The Wall Street Journal described the movement as "a new generation of trustbusters" in 2021, arguing that it represented a shift away from a singular focus on perceived consumer welfare that began with the Reagan administration and the ideas of Robert Bork.[38]

In 2021, the White House appointed Tim Wu, a prominent member of the movement at Columbia, to serve as special assistant to the President for Competition and Technology policy.[61] The President in July 2021 signed a new Executive Order of Competition, which called for a reinvigoration of competition policy across government.[62] Biden later nominated Jonathan Kanter, a neo-Brandeisian, to serve as assistant attorney general in the Department of Justice Antitrust Division.[63][64] Kanter was confirmed by the United States Senate by a vote of 68–29 and took office in November 2021.[65][66] Biden also nominated Lina Khan to be Chair of the Federal Trade Commission.[67][68] On June 15, 2021, her nomination was confirmed by the Senate by a vote of 69 to 28.[69] Khan was confirmed with bipartisan support.[70]

Since the appointment of Neo-Brandeisian "troika" of Tim Wu, Lina Khan, and Jonathan Kanter,[71] the U.S. government has reformed the review of mergers,[72] reinvigorated pro-competitive rulemakings in non-antitrust agencies,[73] blocked several high profile mergers like JetBlue/Spirit,[74] Penguin/S&S[75][76] and Kroger/Albertsons[77] and taken tech platform Google to trial in the first major monopolization case of the 21st century.[78] The movement has also experienced some setbacks, including at least one loss against Facebook in court.[79]

In May 2025, Steve Bannon described his team as being Neo-Brandeisians and advocated in favor of Lina Khan's administration of the FTC .[80]

References

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  1. ↑ Wu, Timothy (2018). The Curse of Bigness: Antitrust in the New Gilded Age. New York: Columbia Global Reports. Archived from the original on 2022-06-18. Retrieved 2022-07-19.
  2. ↑ "The New Brandeis Ideology (mid 2010s – Present): On the Dangers of Monopoly Power". Unbuilt Labs. 2021-01-06. Archived from the original on 2021-09-05. Retrieved 2021-09-05.
  3. ↑ Khan, Lina (2018-03-01). "The New Brandeis Movement: America's Antimonopoly Debate". Journal of European Competition Law & Practice. 9 (3): 131–132. doi:10.1093/jeclap/lpy020. ISSN 2041-7764.
  4. ↑ "What Is 'Hipster Antitrust?'". Mercatus Center. 2018-10-18. Archived from the original on 2022-07-26. Retrieved 2022-01-02.
  5. ↑ Wu 2018, pp. 24–25. sfn error: multiple targets (2×): CITEREFWu2018 (help)
  6. ↑ Hofstadter 1965, pp. 195–197.
  7. ↑ Brandeis 1914, pp. 4–5.
  8. ↑ Wu 2018, pp. 36–39. sfn error: multiple targets (2×): CITEREFWu2018 (help)
  9. ↑ Brandeis 1914, pp. 118–121.
  10. ↑ Hawley 1966, pp. 283–285.
  11. ↑ Wu 2018, pp. 103–104. sfn error: multiple targets (2×): CITEREFWu2018 (help)
  12. ↑ Eeckhout, Jan (June 2021). The Profit Paradox: How Thriving Firms Threaten the Future of Work. Princeton University Press. pp. 246–248. ISBN 978-0-691-21447-4. Archived from the original on 2022-07-26. Retrieved 2021-12-12.
  13. ↑ Hofstadter 1965, pp. 189–191.
  14. ↑ Wu 2018, pp. 84–87. sfn error: multiple targets (2×): CITEREFWu2018 (help)
  15. ↑ Bork 1978, pp. 50–51.
  16. ↑ Bork 1978, pp. 61–63.
  17. ↑ Wu 2018, pp. 102–105. sfn error: multiple targets (2×): CITEREFWu2018 (help)
  18. ↑ Wu 2018, pp. 108–109. sfn error: multiple targets (2×): CITEREFWu2018 (help)
  19. ↑ Lynn 2010, p. viii.
  20. ↑ Foster & McChesney 2012, p. 71.
  21. ↑ Lynn 2010, pp. ix–x.
  22. ↑ Lynn 2010, p. xii.
  23. ↑ Srnicek 2017, p. 42.
  24. ↑ Srnicek 2017, pp. 43–44.
  25. ↑ Srnicek 2017, p. 45.
  26. ↑ Oremus, Will (2023-09-27). "Analysis | Lina Khan's Amazon lawsuit is nothing like her famous law article". The Washington Post. ISSN 0190-8286. Retrieved 2026-07-23.
  27. 1 2 Khan 2017, p. 716. sfn error: multiple targets (2×): CITEREFKhan2017 (help)
  28. ↑ Khan 2017, p. 747. sfn error: multiple targets (2×): CITEREFKhan2017 (help)
  29. ↑ Khan 2017, pp. 756, 768. sfn error: multiple targets (2×): CITEREFKhan2017 (help)
  30. 1 2 3 Utah Statement 2019.
  31. ↑ Khan 2017, pp. 746–747. sfn error: multiple targets (2×): CITEREFKhan2017 (help)
  32. ↑ Khan 2017, p. 753. sfn error: multiple targets (2×): CITEREFKhan2017 (help)
  33. ↑ Khan 2017, p. 754. sfn error: multiple targets (2×): CITEREFKhan2017 (help)
  34. ↑ Khan 2017, p. 781. sfn error: multiple targets (2×): CITEREFKhan2017 (help)
  35. ↑ Wörsdörfer 2024, p. 3.
  36. ↑ Wörsdörfer 2024, pp. 16–18.
  37. ↑ "What more should antitrust be doing?". The Economist. 2020-08-06. ISSN 0013-0613. Archived from the original on 2021-09-06. Retrieved 2021-09-06.
  38. 1 2 Ip, Greg (2021-07-07). "Antitrust's New Mission: Preserving Democracy, Not Efficiency". Wall Street Journal. ISSN 0099-9660. Archived from the original on 2021-07-22. Retrieved 2021-07-23.
  39. ↑ Khan, Lina M. (31 January 2017). "Amazon's Antitrust Paradox". www.yalelawjournal.org. Archived from the original on 2020-12-30. Retrieved 2021-09-06.
  40. 1 2 Sammon, Alexander; Dayen, David (2021-07-21). "The New Brandeis Movement Has Its Moment". The American Prospect. Archived from the original on 2021-07-23. Retrieved 2021-07-23.
  41. ↑ Nylen, Leah (8 July 2021). "Biden launches assault on monopolies". POLITICO. Archived from the original on 2021-07-08. Retrieved 2021-07-09.
  42. ↑ "The New Brandeis Movement: America's Anti-Monopoly Debate". Open Markets Institute. 13 March 2018. Archived from the original on 2021-07-09. Retrieved 2021-07-09.
  43. ↑ "US: 'Hipster Antitrust' ally joins The Senate Judiciary Committee | Competition Policy International". www.competitionpolicyinternational.com. 6 February 2018. Archived from the original on 2021-07-09. Retrieved 2018-02-20.
  44. ↑ Kolhatkar, Sheelah (2021-11-25). "Lina Khan's Battle to Rein in Big Tech". The New Yorker. Retrieved 2023-02-19.
  45. ↑ "Booker calls on antitrust regulators to start paying attention to workers". Vox. Archived from the original on 2018-03-18. Retrieved 2018-02-20.
  46. ↑ "George Mason Law Review's 21st Annual Antitrust Symposium – Law & Economics Center". masonlec.org. Archived from the original on 2017-12-03. Retrieved 2018-02-20.
  47. ↑ Daly, Angela (2017-08-02). "Beyond 'Hipster Antitrust': A Critical Perspective on the European Commission's Google Decision". SSRN 3012437. {{cite journal}}: Cite journal requires |journal= (help)
  48. ↑ "Antitrust Chronicle – Hipster Antitrust | Competition Policy International". www.competitionpolicyinternational.com. 18 April 2018. Archived from the original on 2021-02-17. Retrieved 2018-09-10.
  49. ↑ Eeckhout, Jan (June 2021). The Profit Paradox: How Thriving Firms Threaten the Future of Work. Princeton University Press. pp. 246–248. ISBN 978-0-691-21447-4. Archived from the original on 2022-07-26. Retrieved 2021-12-12.
  50. ↑ "Hatch Speaks on Growing Controversy Over Antitrust Law in the Tech Sector - Press Releases - United States Senator Orrin Hatch". www.hatch.senate.gov. Archived from the original on 2018-02-08. Retrieved 2018-02-20.
  51. ↑ "Senator Leans Into Avocado Toast Trend to Make a Point". Time. Archived from the original on 2018-03-06. Retrieved 2018-02-20.
  52. ↑ Dayen, David (2017-08-07). "Orrin Hatch, the Original Antitrust Hipster, Turns on His Own Kind". The Intercept. Archived from the original on 2018-02-22. Retrieved 2018-02-20.
  53. ↑ "Hatch Speaks Again on 'Hipster Antitrust,' Delrahim Confirmation". Orrin Hatch Official site. 2018-02-20. Archived from the original on 2017-12-13. Retrieved 2017-09-25.
  54. ↑ Levine, Matt (2018-09-10). "Keep Your Bitcoins in the Bank". www.bloomberg.com. Archived from the original on 2018-09-10. Retrieved 2018-09-10.
  55. ↑ Streitfeld, David (7 September 2018). "Amazon's Antitrust Antagonist Has a Breakthrough Idea". The New York Times. Archived from the original on 2018-09-09. Retrieved 2018-09-10.
  56. ↑ Medvedovsky, Kostya (2017-06-19). "Antitrust hipsterism. Everything old is cool again". @kmedved. Archived from the original on 2018-09-08. Retrieved 2018-02-20.
  57. ↑ "Do Not Mistake Orrin Hatch for #HipsterAntitrust". WIRED. Archived from the original on 2018-01-27. Retrieved 2018-02-20.
  58. ↑ "Hipster antitrust hits the Senate: The Tipline for 4 August 2017". globalcompetitionreview.com. 2017-08-04. Archived from the original on 2021-07-23. Retrieved 2018-02-20.
  59. ↑ Nylen, Leah (27 December 2021). "The new rules of Monopoly". Politico. Retrieved 2023-04-21.
  60. ↑ McCabe, David (2020-02-11). "She Wants to Break Up Big Everything". The New York Times. ISSN 0362-4331. Retrieved 2023-04-21.
  61. ↑ Feiner, Lauren (5 March 2021). "Big Tech critic Tim Wu joins Biden administration to work on competition policy". CNBC. Retrieved 2022-08-06.
  62. ↑ "Executive Order on Promoting Competition in the American Economy". 9 July 2021.
  63. ↑ "Biden taps progressives' favorite for DOJ antitrust post". POLITICO. Archived from the original on 2021-07-20. Retrieved 2021-07-20.
  64. ↑ Feiner, Lauren (2021-09-24). "Nine former DOJ antitrust chiefs urge Senate to confirm Jonathan Kanter as antitrust head". CNBC. Archived from the original on 2021-10-05. Retrieved 2021-10-05.
  65. ↑ "On the Nomination (Confirmation: Jonathan Kanter, of Maryland, to be an Assistant Attorney General)". US Senate. Archived from the original on 2 April 2022. Retrieved 2 April 2022.
  66. ↑ "U.S. Senate confirms Google critic Kanter to head Justice Dept Antitrust Division". Reuters. 2021-11-17. Archived from the original on 2021-11-17. Retrieved 2021-11-17.
  67. ↑ Kelly, Makena (22 March 2021). "Biden to nominate tech antitrust pioneer Lina Khan for FTC commissioner". The Verge. Vox Media. Archived from the original on 22 March 2021. Retrieved 22 March 2021.
  68. ↑ "President Biden Announces his Intent to Nominate Lina Khan for Commissioner of the Federal Trade Commission". The White House. 22 March 2021. Archived from the original on 28 June 2021. Retrieved 22 March 2021.
  69. ↑ Brandom, Russell (2021-06-15). "Tech antitrust pioneer Lina Khan confirmed as FTC commissioner". The Verge. Vox Media. Archived from the original on 2021-06-15. Retrieved 2021-06-15.
  70. ↑ Brandom, Russell (30 June 2021). "Amazon says new FTC chair shouldn't regulate it because she's too mean". The Verge. Vox Media. Archived from the original on 30 June 2021. Retrieved 1 July 2021.
  71. ↑ "Wu, Khan and Kanter: Biden's antitrust troika falls into place". Nikkei Asia. Retrieved 2024-01-19.
  72. ↑ "Antitrust Division | 2023 Merger Guidelines | United States Department of Justice". www.justice.gov. 2023-12-12. Retrieved 2024-01-19.
  73. ↑ Commissioner, Office of the (2022-08-16). "FDA Finalizes Historic Rule Enabling Access to Over-the-Counter Hearing Aids for Millions of Americans". FDA. Archived from the original on August 16, 2022. Retrieved 2024-01-19.
  74. ↑ Josephs, Leslie (2024-01-16). "Judge blocks JetBlue-Spirit merger after DOJ's antitrust challenge". CNBC. Retrieved 2024-01-19.
  75. ↑ "Judge blocks Penguin Random House-Simon & Schuster merger". CNBC. 2022-11-01. Retrieved 2024-01-19.
  76. ↑ "United States v. BERTELSMANN SE & CO. KGAA, 1:21-cv-02886". Retrieved 2024-06-22.
  77. ↑ "Statement on FTC Victory Securing Halt to Kroger, Albertsons Grocery Merger". FTC. 10 December 2024. Retrieved 11 December 2024.
  78. ↑ McCabe, David; Kang, Cecilia (2023-09-06). "In Its First Monopoly Trial of Modern Internet Era, U.S. Sets Sights on Google". The New York Times. ISSN 0362-4331. Retrieved 2024-01-19.
  79. ↑ Feiner, Lauren (2023-02-01). "Meta acquisition of Within reportedly approved by court in loss for FTC". CNBC. Retrieved 2024-01-19.
  80. ↑ "We are neo-Brandeisians like Lina Khan". ft.com. Financial Times. Retrieved 17 May 2025.

Bibliography

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  • Bork, Robert H. (1978). The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with Itself. New York: Basic Books. ISBN 1736089714.
  • Bradford, Anu (2020). The Brussels Effect: How the European Union Rules the World. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0190088583.
  • Brandeis, Louis D. (1914). Other People's Money and How the Bankers Use It. New York: Frederick A. Stokes.
  • Dean, Jodi (2020). "Communism or Neofeudalism?". New Labor Forum. 29 (3): 20–28. doi:10.1177/1095796020942360.
  • Foster, John Bellamy; McChesney, Robert W. (2012). The Endless Crisis: How Monopoly-Finance Capital Produces Stagnation and Upheaval from the USA to China. New York: Monthly Review Press. ISBN 978-1583673133.
  • Hawley, Ellis W. (1966). The New Deal and the Problem of Monopoly: A Study in Economic Ambivalence. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
  • Hofstadter, Richard (1965). "What Happened to the Antitrust Movement?". The Paranoid Style in American Politics and Other Essays. New York: Knopf.
  • Hovenkamp, Herbert (2019). "Is Antitrust's Consumer Welfare Principle Imperiled?". Journal of Corporation Law. 45 (1): 101–127.
  • Khan, Lina M. (2017). "Amazon's Antitrust Paradox". The Yale Law Journal. 126 (3): 710–805.
  • Lynn, Barry C. (2010). Cornered: The New Monopoly Capitalism and the Economics of Destruction. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons. ISBN 978-0470186381.
  • Paul, Sanjukta (2020). "Antitrust as Allocator of Coordination Rights". UCLA Law Review. 67 (2): 478–531.
  • Shapiro, Carl (2018). "Antitrust in a Time of Populism". International Journal of Industrial Organization. 61: 714–748. doi:10.1016/j.ijindorg.2018.01.001.
  • Srnicek, Nick (2016). Platform Capitalism. Cambridge: Polity Press. ISBN 978-1509504879.
  • Teachout, Zephyr (2020). Break 'Em Up: Recovering Our Freedom from Big Ag, Big Tech, and Big Money. New York: All Points Books. ISBN 978-1250200891.
  • Wright, Joshua D.; Dorsey, Elyse; Klick, Jonathan; Rybnicek, Jan M. (2019). "Requiem for a Paradox: The Flawed Review of History and Economics in Antitrust's Neo-Brandeisian Movement". George Mason Law Review. 26 (4): 1093–1116.
  • Wu, Tim (2018). The Curse of Bigness: Antitrust in the New Gilded Age. New York: Columbia Global Reports. ISBN 978-0999745465.
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