Nuclear latency

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Nuclear latency or a Nuclear threshold state is the condition of a country possessing the technology to quickly build nuclear weapons, without having actually yet done so.[1] Because such latent capability is not proscribed by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, this is sometimes called the "Japan Option" (as a work-around to the treaty), as Japan is considered a "paranuclear" state, being a clear case of a country with complete technical prowess to develop a nuclear weapon quickly,[2][3] or as it is sometimes called "being one screwdriver's turn" from the bomb, as Japan is considered to have the materials, expertise and technical capacity to make a nuclear bomb at will.[4][5][6][7][8][9]

Nuclear-latent powers[edit]

There are many countries capable of producing nuclear weapons, or at least enriching uranium and / or plutonium. Among the most notable are Canada, Germany, and Australia.[10] Other countries include Mexico, Brazil, South Korea, the Republic of China, and more.[11][failed verification][better source needed] In addition, South Africa has successfully developed its own nuclear weapons, but dismantled them in 1989. Following the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action agreement some consider Iran a nuclear threshold state.[12]

References[edit]

  1. ^ Panofsky, Wolfgang K. H. (June 14, 2007). "Capability versus intent: The latent threat of nuclear proliferation". The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. Retrieved 2009-08-04.
  2. ^ Cole, Juan (2009-10-07). "Does Iran really want the bomb? Perhaps what Iran wants is the ability to produce a nuclear weapon fast, rather than have a standing arsenal". Salon.
  3. ^ "Hypothesis: Iran Seeks the "Japan Option"". Slate. 2009-10-07. Archived from the original on 2009-10-11.
  4. ^ Demetriou, Danielle (20 April 2009). "Japan 'should develop nuclear weapons' to counter North Korea threat". The Daily Telegraph. Retrieved 29 June 2010.
  5. ^ Sakamaki, Sachiko (28 May 2009). "North Korean Atomic Tests Lift Lid on Japan's Nuclear 'Taboo'". Bloomberg. Retrieved 29 June 2010.
  6. ^ John H. Large (May 2, 2005). "THE ACTUAL AND POTENTIAL DEVELOPMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY IN THE AREA OF NORTH EAST ASIA (KOREAN PENINSULAR AND JAPAN)" (PDF). R3126-A1. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2007-07-10.
  7. ^ "Nuclear Scholars Initiative 2010: Recap of Seminar Four". CSIS. Retrieved 29 June 2010.
  8. ^ Brumfiel, Geoff (November 2004). "Nuclear proliferation special: We have the technology". Nature. 432-437. 432 (7016): 432–7. Bibcode:2004Natur.432..432B. doi:10.1038/432432a. PMID 15565123. Retrieved 29 June 2010.
  9. ^ Chester Dawson (28 October 2011). "In Japan, Provocative Case for Staying Nuclear". Wall Street Journal. Retrieved 13 November 2011.
  10. ^ "Nuclear Weapons Archive, 7.5 nuclear capable states".
  11. ^ For a complete list, see "Nuclear Capabilities and Potential Around the World". NPR.
  12. ^ The Nuclear Agreement with Iran, One Year On: An Assessment and a Strategy for the Future, INSS, Amos Yadlin and Avner Golov, July 2016

Additional Resources[edit]

For more on the proliferation and debates surrounding nuclear weapons and their latency, visit the Woodrow Wilson Center's Nuclear Proliferation International History Project website: http://wilsoncenter.org/program/nuclear-proliferation-international-history-project.