Nyon Conference

This is a good article. Click here for more information.
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

This is an old revision of this page, as edited by Grandiose (talk | contribs) at 20:15, 28 December 2011 (→‎Aftermath: reorder.). The present address (URL) is a permanent link to this revision, which may differ significantly from the current revision.

An "informal picture" published in The Times of members of the British delegation. Anthony Eden sits to the right, accompanied by Lord Chatfield and Robert Vansittart.

The Nyon Conference, held in Nyon, Switzerland, in September 1937, addressed international piracy in the Mediterranean Sea. Although the final conference agreement did not accuse Italy directly, the conference was convened in part because Italy had been carrying out unrestricted submarine warfare, especially aimed at intervention in the Spanish Civil War – constituting piracy, as Italy was not officially at war, nor did any submarine identify itself. The United Kingdom and France led the conference, which was also attended by Bulgaria, Egypt, Greece, Romania, Turkey, the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia.

The first agreement, signed on 14 September, included plans to counterattack aggressive submarines. Naval patrols were established; the United Kingdom and France were to patrol most of the western Mediterranean and parts of the east, and the other signatories were to patrol their own waters. Italy was to be allowed to join the agreement and patrol the Tyrrhenian Sea if it wished. A second agreement followed three days later, applying similar provisions to surface ships. Italy and Germany did not attend, although the former did take up naval patrols in November. In marked contrast to the Non-Intervention Committee and the League of Nations, this conference did succeed in preventing attacks by submarines.

Context and organisation

The Non-Intervention Committee, set up in 1936, had attempted to restrict the flow of weapons to the parties of the Spanish Civil War.[1] It was part of a policy of appeasement, aimed at preventing a proxy war – with Italy and Nazi Germany supporting Franco's Nationalist Coalition on one side and the Soviet Union supporting the Republican faction on the other – from escalating into a major pan-European conflict.[2] Under a committee plan, neutral observers were posted to Spanish ports and borders.[3] Zones of patrol were assigned to the United Kingdom, France, Germany and Italy.[4] Following attacks on the German cruiser Leipzig on 15 and 18 June, Germany and Italy withdrew from the patrols.[5][6] The United Kingdom and France offered to replace Germany and Italy in patrols of their sections, but the latter powers believed these patrols would be too partial.[7] The British Admiralty believed that a significant control effort was the best solution, and four plans were put forward in response to attacks on British shipping;[8] previous control measures had been widely evaded.[1] As suspected by the other powers, Italy was behind some of these attacks.[9] Whilst officially being at peace,[9] the Italian leadership had ordered the commencement of unrestricted submarine warfare, known internationally as a campaign of piracy without reference to Italy.[8] These plans would be the basis for a Mediterranean meeting, suggested by French Foreign Minister Yvon Delbos.[8] Meanwhile, the Italian submarine Iride unsuccessfully attacked the British destroyer Havock, strengthening British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden's sceptical stance towards Italy.[10] The British representative in Rome protested to the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs.[8]

On 5 or 6 September, the British arranged a conference for all parties with a Mediterranean coastline, along with Germany.[11][12] The United Kingdom agreed to France's request to extend an invitation to the Soviet Union, but blocked France's attempt to invite a representative from Republican Spain.[11] Portugal expressed surprise at not being invited.[13] Direct intervention on the Spanish question was avoided in France, with the new prime minister, Camille Chautemps, against such a plan.[14] The invitation extended to the Soviet Union was accepted, with a reply that indicated that it would use the opportunity to blame Italy for the attacks on shipping.[15] The conference was held at Nyon, Switzerland – Geneva was avoided because Italians associated it with the actions of the League of Nations over the Abyssinian Crisis.[12] The Soviet government formally accused the Italians of sinking two Soviet vessels, the Tuniyaev and the Blageav,[16] an accusation the Italians described as "aggressive and offensive".[17] This was perhaps an attempt by the Soviet Union to push Italy and Germany away from the conference.[16] Germany rejected the invitation with an appeal that piracy and other issues the conference was to discuss should be handled only by normal meetings of the Non-Intervention Committee, not a conference like Nyon.[18] The United Kingdom and France rejected this suggestion, and continued to prepare for the conference.[16][18] Soon after, the Italians similarly declined. The Non-Intervention Committee, it said, also had the advantage of including other European powers, notably Poland and Portugal.[19] The British believed they could convince Italy to abandon Germany through appeasement.[20]

Provisions

Map of the Mediterranean, showing some of the features referred to at the conference.

British and French naval staffs rejected the idea of a convoy system in draft proposals. The British wanted to curb submarine activity, on the theory that focusing on covert submarine attacks would help avoid confrontation, whereas the French considered surface vessels and aircraft just as important.[11] The French, unhappy at the prospect of French ships under foreign command, protested a plan to create multi-nation squadrons.[11] On 8 September, plans were discussed in cabinet, including the setting up of eight groups of three destroyers for the western Mediterranean. Preliminary talks with the French were held on 9 September,[21] and the conference began on the 10th. Proceedings took two forms: discussions between the British and French, and formal meetings of all attending parties. The participation of the Soviet Navy in the Mediterranean was disputed by many of the other nations,[21] so the United Kingdom and France agreed to handle Aegean patrols. This was, perhaps surprisingly, accepted by the Soviet Union.[22]

The conference ended on 14 September with the signing of the "Mediterranean Agreement". Signatories were the countries of Bulgaria, Egypt, France, Greece, Romania, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the USSR and Yugoslavia.[23] The agreement noted attacks on neutral shipping by submarines, in contravention of the London Naval Treaty (signed in 1930) and the Submarine Protocol, part of the Second London Naval Treaty (signed in 1936).[23]

The agreement provided that any submarine that attacked neutral shipping was to be sunk if possible, including submarines in the vicinity of a recent attack that were determined to be responsible for the attack.[23] French and British fleets would patrol the seas west of Malta and attack any suspicious submarines,[16] with the division of patrols between the United Kingdom and France to be decided by their governments. Both countries would patrol the high seas and territorial waters of signatory countries.[23] The British would provide slightly more than half the 60 destroyers needed, with the French providing the remainder and most of the accompanying aircraft.[24] It was agreed that Italy could participate in patrols of the Tyrrhenian Sea if it wished to do so.[22] In the Eastern Mediterranean, British and French ships would patrol up to the Dardanelles, but not in the Adriatic Sea.[23] In this area, signatory countries would patrol their own territorial waters, and would provide any reasonable assistance to the French and British patrols. The future revision of these provisions, including the way the area had been divided into zones, was specifically allowed.[23] Submarine activity would be banned, subject to two exemptions: travel on the surface accompanied by a surface ship, and activity in certain areas for training purposes. Governments would only allow foreign submarines into each of their territorial waters in extreme situations, such as immediate distress. Merchant shipping would also be advised to stick to particular shipping routes.[23] The agreement repeated the suggestion that Italy join in the proposal.[25] Delbos announced that similar proposals about surface craft would be prepared. The provisions of the agreement would come into force on 20 September.[22] The British and French knew that the secret Italian submarine operations had already been paused,[21] but actions to enforce the conference agreement started at midnight on 19/20 September.[22] The French and British camps moved to Geneva.[26] The parties to the agreement were happy; The Times likened them to cricketers, "reviewing their innings, over by over".[27][22]

A second agreement was signed into force on 17 September 1937 by the same signatories, extending the rules governing submarine warfare to surface vessels.[26][28] It was signed in a second meeting in Geneva; official versions were published in French and English.[29] Several proposals were not implemented: for instance, the British wanted the Spanish parties to be able to verify flags, thereby preventing attacks on British shipping if Republican ships continued to use the British flag as a means of escape. This would have benefited the Nationalists, and the French insisted that this provision was dropped.[26] A suggestion to fire at any attacking aircraft was easily passed. Another suggestion on surface ships (which incorrectly stated no attack had yet been proven) was eventually toughened with the addition of a clause stating aggressors would be attacked, at the request of the French. A Soviet proposal strengthening the effect of the agreement was made.[26] Greece and Turkey, keen not to be forced to fire on a German or Italian warship, wished ships with a clear identifying mark to be excluded; this was impractical, but an amendment was made to this effect, covering only ships in their own territorial waters.[26]

Aftermath

Neville Chamberlain in September 1938

On 13 September, Italy was invited to join in the agreement.[30] Italy unequivocally rejected it, refusing to patrol the Tyrrhenian Sea. It demanded "absolute parity" with the United Kingdom and France, meaning the same right of patrol in the Mediterranean.[31][32] Italy subsequently indicated that its refusal would be reversed if such parity was granted.[33] Meanwhile, on the 15th, Benito Mussolini's government sent two submarines to Francisco Franco's National Faction.[16] The Soviet Union refused to use routes patrolled by the Italians; the Turks, Greeks and Yugoslavs refused to let the Italians use their ports.[31] A compromise was signed on 30 September,[34] and Italian patrols started on 10 November.[35] The British government, and in particular Neville Chamberlain, desired better relations with Italy and these were achieved with the signing of the Anglo-Italian Agreements of 1938.[28]

The patrols were a strain on the Royal Navy and the provisions were relaxed with French agreement, effective from January. However, submarine activity returned and full patrols were resumed.[36] On the whole, submarine activity during this period did not amount to much; patrols were again relaxed in May, and the agreement suspended in August.[37] The success of the conference was in marked contrast to the failure of the Non-Intervention Committee.[38] However, the Nationalists and Italians switched to using air power against shipping;[37] at least one ship was sunk off the Spanish coast by aircraft in the final months of 1937.[36]

In the United Kingdom, Eden noted that submarine attacks were barbarous, that attacks on submarines would be restricted to suitably extreme circumstances, and that the two parties in the war would still not be able to engage neutral vessels.[25] He was keen to avoid an "Anglo-Franco-Soviet bloc".[39] The British press was in favour, although The Times and The Guardian expressed some concerns.[40] British historians, however, have tended to see the Nyon Conference as an important stand against aggression, with some reservations. Christopher Seton-Watson describes it as a "diplomatic victory",[41] but Jill Edwards points out that it failed to achieve a change in Italian policy.[42] The agreement created further divisions between Eden as foreign minister and Neville Chamberlain as prime minister.[42]

Maxim Litvinov, the Soviet representative, was pleased with the outcome.[16] The agreement also allowed for greater military resources to be deployed to the Mediterranean as required. Litvinov, in particular, stressed the Soviet Union's "indisputable right" to commit naval forces to the Mediterranean (something Germany and Italy had opposed in meetings of the Non-Intervention Committee). He also said he regretted that Spanish merchant shipping had been left out – the other nations believed this would have amounted to formal intervention into the civil war.[25] Aretas Akers-Bouglas, Viscount Chilston and British Ambassador to the Soviet Union, reported that the Soviets considered the conference with "tempered satisfaction", and claimed credit for the Soviet delegation's role.[43]

Elsewhere, French public opinion was strongly in favour of the outcome of the conference,[40] the only criticism coming from the far left that Republican ships would not receive direct protection.[44] The German mood was restrained, where the press were satisfied by the Soviet exclusion from patrols.[45] In Spain, the Republicans – on the verge of disaster – were largely in favour, and the Nationalists strongly against.[31] The Republicans praised the improved safety of the shipping routes, but were somewhat unhappy that belligerent rights had not been granted.[46] The Nationalists made several complaints, none of which resulted in changes to the agreement.[31] The agreement was welcomed by other members of the League of Nations.[27] Italian historians tend to downplay the importance of the Nyon Conference (often seeing it as a mere extension of the Non-Intervention Committee).[41]

Notes

  1. ^ a b Gretton (1975). p. 103.
  2. ^ Stone (1997). p. 134.
  3. ^ Thomas (1961). p. 394.
  4. ^ Thomas (1961). p. 395.
  5. ^ Thomas (1961). p. 457.
  6. ^ Bulletin of International News (August 1937). pp. 4–5.
  7. ^ Bulletin of International News (August 1937). p. 7.
  8. ^ a b c d Gretton (1975). p. 105.
  9. ^ a b Gretton (1975). p. 104.
  10. ^ Mills (1993). p. 12.
  11. ^ a b c d Gretton (1975). p. 106.
  12. ^ a b Thomas (1961). p. 475.
  13. ^ "Portugal's Claim To A Place At Nyon". The Times. London, United Kingdom. 13 September 1937. p. 11.
  14. ^ Mills (1993). p. 13.
  15. ^ "Soviet Acceptance: Accusation of Italy Demanded". The Times. London, United Kingdom. 8 September 1937. p. 12.
  16. ^ a b c d e f Thomas (1961). p. 476.
  17. ^ "The Meeting at Nyon". The Times. London, United Kingdom. 8 September 1937. p. 12.
  18. ^ a b "Nyon Plan Declined". The Times. London, United Kingdom. 9 September 1937. p. 12.
  19. ^ "Italy and Nyon". The Times. London, United Kingdom. 10 September 1937. p. 11.
  20. ^ Thomas (1961). pp. 475–476.
  21. ^ a b c Gretton (1975). p. 107.
  22. ^ a b c d e Gretton (1975). p. 108.
  23. ^ a b c d e f g Bulletin of International News (September 1937). p. 12.
  24. ^ "Success at Nyon". The Times. London, United Kingdom. 13 September 1937. p. 13.
  25. ^ a b c Bulletin of International News (September 1937). p. 13.
  26. ^ a b c d e Gretton (1975). p. 109.
  27. ^ a b "Last touches at Nyon". The Times. London, United Kingdom. 14 September 1937. p. 12.
  28. ^ a b Thomas (1961). pp. 476–477.
  29. ^ Schindler, Toman (1988). p. 890.
  30. ^ "Invitation Handed To Italy". The Times. London, United Kingdom. 14 September 1937. p. 12.
  31. ^ a b c d Gretton (1975). p. 110.
  32. ^ Bulletin of International News (September 1937). p. 14.
  33. ^ "A Conditional Refusal: "Absolute Parity" Needed". The Times. London, United Kingdom. 15 September 1937. p. 12.
  34. ^ "Mediterranean Patrol: Experts' Agreement Signed". The Times. London, United Kingdom. 1 October 1937. p. 16.
  35. ^ Gretton (1975). p. 111.
  36. ^ a b Gretton (1975). pp. 111–112.
  37. ^ a b Buchanan (1997). pp. 59–60.
  38. ^ Gretton (1975). p. 112.
  39. ^ Lammers (1971). p. 173.
  40. ^ a b Gretton (1975). pp. 109–110.
  41. ^ a b Mills (1993). p. 3.
  42. ^ a b Mills (1993). p. 4.
  43. ^ Lammers (1971). p. 172.
  44. ^ "Little Criticism". The Manchester Guardian. Manchester, United Kingdom. 13 September 1937. p. 12.
  45. ^ "German Press and Nyon Conference". The Manchester Guardian. Manchester, United Kingdom. 13 September 1937. p. 12.
  46. ^ "Valencia Welcomes The Trade Route Patrol". The Times. London, United Kingdom. 15 September 1937. p. 11.

Sources

Books
Journals
  • "Spain: the British Compromise Plan". Bulletin of International News. 14 (3). London, United Kingdom: Royal Institute of International Affairs. 7 August 1937. ISSN 2044-3986. JSTOR 25639692.
  • "The Nyon Conference and its Result". Bulletin of International News. 14 (6). London, United Kingdom: Royal Institute of International Affairs. 18 September 1937. ISSN 2044-3986. JSTOR 25639708.
  • Gretton, Peter (January 1975). "The Nyon Conference – The Naval Aspect". The English Historical Review. 90 (354). London, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press: 103–112. ISSN 0013-8266. JSTOR 567512.
  • Lammers, Donald N. (Winter 1971). "The Nyon Arrangements of 1937: A success sui generis". Albion: A Quarterly Journal Concerned with British Studies. 3 (4). Denver, Colorado, United States: The North American Conference on British Studies: 163–176. doi:10.2307/4048234. ISSN 0095-1390. JSTOR 4048234.
  • Mills, William C. (February 1993). "The Nyon Conference: Neville Chamberlain, Anthony Eden, and the Appeasement of Italy in 1937". The International History Review. 15 (1). Abingdon, Oxfordshire, United Kingdom: Taylor & Francis: 1–22. doi:10.1080/07075332.1993.9640636. ISSN 0707-5332. JSTOR 40107260.
Retrieved from "https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Nyon_Conference&oldid=468142552"