Palestine–United States relations
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Palestine – United States relations are relations between the State of Palestine and the United States. Official diplomatic relations do not exist in the sense of diplomatic exchanges and consular services since the United States does not recognise Palestine as a state.
However, relations between the U.S. government and the PLO, as the U.S.-recognised representative of the Palestinian people, existed from the 1970s onward. The PLO is represented in Washington by a General Delegation. The U.S. government does not have any official representative office within Palestinian Authority areas, but has a Consulate General in Jerusalem, which handles relations with the Palestinian Authority, and an embassy in Tel Aviv.
- 1 Basic factors in United States-Palestinian relations
- 2 Relations prior to 1988
- 3 Following declaration of statehood
- 4 Tension in U.S.-Palestinian relationship
- 5 Following the Palestine statehood resolution
- 6 PLO heads of mission
- 7 Notes
- 8 Further reading
- 9 External links
Basic factors in United States-Palestinian relations
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There are several factors governing U.S. attitudes towards the Palestinian issue:
- U.S. basic support for the State of Israel, both for its security as well as a Jewish state and a major non-treaty strategic ally. This support makes it more difficult for the Palestinian Authority to receive support for its positions in the face of Israeli policies of settlement expansion and refusal to cede more territory.
- U.S. traditional support for oppressed peoples, which is used to explain the partial support given by Washington to the goal of a Palestinian state as the outcome of the peace-process.
- U.S. traditional support for Christian communities around the world, which in the Palestinian case can lead to support either Palestinian or Israeli position. The concern for the Christian minority in the Palestinian Authority leads in some cases to criticism of Israeli policies as obstructive to Christians' living conditions and in some cases to criticism of Palestinian policies as a form of persecutions against Christians.
- Strategic interests in the region, which compel Washington to lend partial support to Palestinian aspirations in order not to antagonize Arab or other Third World government, as well as to avoid military escalation in case of total despair on the part of the Palestinians.
- Public perceptions of national independence movements as terrorists, a view that increased considerably in the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. This view makes it easier for the Israeli government to justify hawkish stances on grounds of combating terrorism.
Relations prior to 1988
At the time the PLO was established in 1964, it did not receive any official attention from the U.S. government. However, an unofficial PLO information office was established in New York and was run by Sadat Hassan, who served as Permanent Representative of Yemen to the United Nations.
U.S. plans and considerations of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip began already in June 1967, immediately following the Six Day War. In parallel with this consideration, various US officials began considering making various Palestinian groups partners in the diplomatic process to arrive at a settlement. However, no actual step was taken in that regard as the National Security Council under Henry Kissinger opposed such moves.
Prior to the Yom Kippur War in October 1973, the U.S. government considered The PLO and Fatah under Yasser Arafat's leadership as a terrorist organization, and as a result did not support Palestinian aspirations at the UN, and U.S. diplomats in the Middle East were explicitly ordered by the State Department never to make any contacts with Arafat or any representative on his behalf. In contrast to the negative diplomatic view of the PLO, the intelligence community did not refrain from clandestine contacts with that entity, and as early as October 1970, a senior Fatah representative delivered the CIA message about willingness by Arafat to recognize the State of Israel in exchange for US support of a Palestinian state. This trend of clandestine contacts produced some tangible results following the Yom Kippur War. On November 3, 1973 a secret meeting was held in Morocco between Deputy Director of the CIA Vernon A. Walters and Khaled al-Hassan, number two in the PLO at the time, and the two discussed the possibility of integrating the PLO into the peace process. Even though no tangible agreement was reached at that meeting, it led to restraint of Fatah attacks on U.S. targets.
From 1974 onward, some circles in the Department of State were considering accepting the PLO as partner in the Middle East peace-process. In June 1974, U.S. Ambassador to Egypt Herman Eilts assessed that PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat was looking for ways to integrate the PLO into the peace process. U.S. President Gerald Ford even alluded to that possibility in his news conference of October 29, 1974. At another press conference, on November 14, 1974, Ford made a non-committal statement on U.S. position towards the PLO by saying:
The Israelis have said they will never negotiate with the PLO. We are not a party to any negotiations. I think we have to let the decision as to who will negotiate to be the responsibility of the parties involved.
However, due to U.S. support of the Israeli government Washington agreed in 1975 to demand PLO explicit recognition of the State of Israel as a precondition to any dealing with its representatives. Referring to this, Ford said at a news conference on November 26, 1975:
the Palestinians do not recognize the State of Israel. And under those circumstances, it is impossible to bring the Palestinians and the Israelis together to negotiate. So, unless there is some change in their attitude, I think you can see a very serious roadblock exists.
As the PLO did not make such recognition explicitly at that time, the U.S. government refrained from any official relations and the PLO was not allowed to maintain any offices on U.S. soil, except for the PLO Mission to the United Nations, which is immune from U.S. law.
A certain change of attitude took place under President Jimmy Carter. Carter was the first U.S. president to advocate the creation of a Palestinian state, which he did at a meeting held in Clinton, Massachusetts on March 16, 1977:
There has to be a homeland provided for the Palestinian refugees who have suffered for many, many years.
In 1978 the PLO was allowed to establish the Palestine Information Office in Washington DC.
A harsher stance towards the PLO was taken by President Ronald Reagan. The Republican party program approved in 1980 stated that:
Republicans reject any call for involvement of the PLO as not in keeping with the long-term interests of either Israel or the Palestinian Arabs. The imputation of legitimacy to organizations not yet willing to acknowledge the fundamental right to existence of the State of Israel is wrong. [- - -] We believe the establishment of a Palestinian State on the West Bank would be destabilizing and harmful to the peace process.
President Reagan continuously opposed the establishment of a Palestinian state or negotiating with the PLO. In September he made a proposal for a Palestinian autonomy under Jordanian supervision. Even though the plan did not call for any PLO participation, some PLO circles viewed this as a possible sign that the Reagan administration might consider an accommodation with the PLO at a later date.
An attempt to close down the Palestine Information Office was made following the passage of the Anti Terrorism Act in December 1987. This act proclaimed the PLO a terrorist organization and prohibited all of its activities except for disseminating information. Reagan then stated:
I have no intention of establishing diplomatic relations with the PLO.
The U.S. government attempted to close down the Palestine Information Office on grounds that it was involved in terrorist activities, but various courts in the United States ruled against this line of action, but allowed a stricter supervision of the office's activities.
In addition, Reagan downplayed the outbreak of the Intifada, viewing it a foreign import into the Palestinian Territories rather than an expression of the Palestinian popular rebellion.
Following declaration of statehood
The George H.W. Bush administration
Following the Palestinian Declaration of Independence in November 1988, the PLO officially recognized Israel, and an open dialogue began between the PLO and the U.S. government. The Palestine Information Office now changed its title to Palestine Affairs Center. The dialogue continued also during the early months of President George H. W. Bush. The U.S.-PLO dialogue was suspended in June 1990, following PLO refusal to condemn an attempted attack on the Israeli coastline by the Palestine Liberation Front. The Bush administration had continued to have negative views about the PLO also following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the 1991 Gulf war, and when asked at a press conference immediately after the Gulf War about a possible dialog with the PLO, Bush stated:
to me, they've lost credibility. They've lost credibility with this office right here. And the reason they have is because they behaved very badly to those of their own fundamental faith.
However, the Bush administration made tremendous efforts throughout 1991 to convene a general Middle East peace conference, which included also the Palestinian issue. In a news conference in early August, Bush stated:
In the Middle East, we're close to convening a conference this October that will launch direct talks among Israel, the Palestinians, and the Arab States. I welcome Prime Minister Shamir's statement that he supports our proposal, and I call upon Israel and the Palestinians to clear away remaining obstacles and seize this truly historic opportunity for peace.
Bush's efforts culminated in the Madrid Peace Conference in October 1991, which for the first time accepted an official Palestinian delegation, even though without open PLO participation.
The Clinton administration
The inauguration of President Bill Clinton altered the official U.S. attitude towards the PLO. He himself supported the goal of a Palestinian state, but refrained from expressing this in public until the closing months of his administration.
On September 10, 1993, the eve of the signing of the Oslo Agreement between the Israeli government and the PLO, President Clinton announced the resumption of the U.S.-PLO dialogue, suspended in 1990. The signing ceremony of the Oslo Accord on September 13, 1993 was held in Washington D.C. in the presence of Clinton, even though negotiations for the agreement took place under the auspices of the Norwegian government. Following that ceremony, Arafat became a regular visitor to the White House, the first Palestinian leader to be accorded that honor. The U.S. government also became more involved in Israeli-Palestinian talks, and invited both parties to come to Washington at certain occasions in order to push forward the peace process. This way, the Clinton administration brokered the Israeli-Palestinian ceasefire agreement of October 1996, and in October 1998, Clinton brokered an agreement on Israeli further redeployment in the West bank.
The Clinton administration also assisted materially to the formation of the Palestinian Authority by hosting the first donor conference for that purpose, held in Washington DC on October 1, 1993. In October 1993, Congress passed the Middle East Peace Facilitation Act of 1993, which authorized the U.S. government to monitor PLO compliance with international law.
Following the Oslo Agreement and the establishment of the Palestinian National Authority in 1994, the PLO office was upgraded and renamed as the PLO Mission to the United States.
The U.S. government took an active part in lending technical assistance in building the institutions of the Palestinian Authority. On March 30, 1994, President Bill Clinton ordered the allocation of $ 4,000,000 for the construction of the Palestinian police, and on March 16, 1995 ordered additional $ 5,000,000 to be allocated towards the same purpose. In July 1995, U.S. Congress passed the Middle East Peace Facilitation Act of 1995, which authorized the President to withhold funds from the Palestinian Authority in cases of what it viewed as incompliance with commitments made to the Israeli government under the Oslo Agreement. In December 1998, President Bill Clinton became the first U.S. President to visit the Palestinian Authority.
The George W. Bush administration
U.S. attitudes towards the Palestinian Authority changed following the inauguration of President George W. Bush. President Bush refrained from meeting Arafat, and refrained from referring to him as "President Arafat", as Palestinian officials insisted, but only as "Chairman Arafat". During the first year of his administration, Bush maintained relations with the Palestinian Authority on the technical level only. Following another round of violence in the Palestinian territories, in June 2002 Bush expressed support for a Palestinian state following a process of negotiations. On June 3, 2003, Bush met for the first time Palestinian prime minister Mahmoud Abbas at a multilateral conference at Sharm el-Sheikh, a format of meeting designed to avoid a direct meeting with Arafat, now viewed negatively by Bush and the Israeli leadership. On July 25, 2003, Abbas visited the White House for the first time. At that meeting, the two leaders established the Palestine Economic Development Group, a high level joint American-Palestinian committee to overlook economic ties.
Following Arafat's death in November 2004, the new Palestinian president Abbas became a regular visitor to the White House. Bush now referred to him in official communications as "President" instead of "Chairman", as was done with Arafat. Abbas visited the White House while receiving the honors of a head of state on six different occasions:
- May 26, 2005.
- October 20, 2005.
- November 26, 2007.
- April 24, 2008.
- September 25, 2008.
- December 19, 2008.
During the visit of May 26, 2005, Bush stated his support for the parameters of the Palestinian state:
Any final status agreement must be reached between the two parties, and changes to the 1949 Armistice Lines must be mutually agreed to. A viable two-state solution must ensure contiguity on the West Bank, and a state of scattered territories will not work. There must also be meaningful linkages between the West Bank and Gaza. This is the position of the United States today; it will be the position of the United States at the time of final status negotiations.
In relation to internal structure of the Palestinian Authority, Bush supported the Israeli demand for holding new presidential elections in January 2005 and parliamentary elections in January 2006. In January 2008 President George W. Bush visited the Palestinian Authority.
The Obama administration
Relations improved following the inauguration of President Barack Obama. From the beginning of his administration, Obama pledged his support for the establishment of a Palestinian state. Abbas visited the White House on May 28, 2009 and June 9 and September, 2010. As of September 2011, Abbas was only three times a visitor at the White House, less than the parallel period under the Bush administration, as a result of Obama's fears of antagonizing pro-Israeli Congress members.
In July 2010 the Palestinian mission was upgraded and renamed PLO General Delegation to the United States.
In December 2010, the U.S. government and the Palestinian Authority launched a joint project in information technologies capacity building.
During Fiscal Year 2011, U.S. government gave the Palestinian Authority $ 200 million in direct budget support.
Throughout 2011, relations worsened as a result of the Palestinian initiative of seeking unilaterally UN membership, as the U.S. government supported the Israeli opposition to that move and return to negotiations.
Tension in U.S.-Palestinian relationship
The Associated Press reported that in October 2011, a group of about 30 Palestinian protestors "accosted an American diplomatic delegation visiting the West Bank," in response to the possible cutting of aid by the U.S. to the Palestinian Authority.
In November 2012, on the eve of the UN General Assembly vote on Palestinian statehood, the Palestinian Authority sent an appeasing message to the U.S. Congress, asserting the move was not contradictory to international law. At the UN General Assembly vote on admitting Palestine as an observer state, the U.S. vote against the said resolution.
Following the Palestine statehood resolution
Following the passage on November 29, 2012 of the UN General Assembly resolution recognizing Palestine as a non-member observer state, some U.S. Senators called for a closure of the PLO Delegation in the United States of America. Head of the Delegation Maen Areikat published an open letter stating that closure of the Delegation would only worsen U.S. position in the Middle East. In March 2013, Obama visited the Palestinian Authority for the first time as a President.
PLO heads of mission
The PLO office in Washington DC was headed by the following:
- Hatem Hussieni 1978-1982
- Hassan Abdel Rahman 1982-1991
- Anees Barghouti 1991-1993
- Hassan Abdel Rahman, 2nd time 1993-2005
- Afif Safieh 2005-2008
- Nabil Abu Zneid (Charge D’Affaires) 2008-2009
- Maen Rashid Areikat 2009–present
- Kenneth Rush to the US Embassy in Cameroun, April 2, 1973
- Nicholas deB Katzenbach to President Johnson, June 27, 1967, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIX
- e.g. Minutes of a Combined Senior Review Group and Washington Special Actions Group Meeting, October 9, 1970, Foreign Relations of the United States 1969-1976, vol. 23
- Paper Prepared by the National Security Council Staff, October 24, 1970, Foreign Relations of the United States 1969-1976, vol. 23
- William Rogers (U.S. Secretary of State) to State Department, October 22, 1970, Foreign Relations of the United States 1969-1976, vol. V, p. 223
- William Rogers (U.S. Secretary of State) to Embassies in Tunis and Nouakchott, August 6, 1973
- Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Helms to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), October 23, 1970, Foreign Relations of the United States 1969-1976, vol. 23
- Backchannel Message From the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (Walters) to Secretary of State Kissinger, November 4, 1973, Foreign Relations of the United States 1969-1976, vol. 25, pp. 882-886
- Eilts to Secretary of State, June 7, 1974
- News conference of Oct. 1974
- News conference of November 1974
- News conference of November 1975
- Clinton, Massachusetts Remarks
- Republican Party Platform of 1980
- "PLO looks for signal from Reagan on Palestinian rights". Christian Science Monitor. November 4, 1982.
- Statement on Signing the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, December 22, 1987
- Mendelsohn v. Meese
- The Future of Judicial Internationalism
- President Reagan's News Conference, February 24, 1988
- Statement on Diplomatic Talks With the Palestine Liberation Organization, Dec. 14, 1988
- The President's News Conference in Huntsville, Alabama, June 20, 1990
- Letter dated 22 June 1990 from the Permanent Observer of Palestine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General
- Interview With Middle Eastern Journalists, March 8, 1991
- The President's News Conference, August 2, 1991
- Written Responses to Questions Submitted by the Arabic-Language Newspaper Al Hayat, Aug. 10, 2000
- News conference, September 10, 1993
- Middle East Peace Facilitation Act of 1993
- Presidential Determination No. 94–21
- Presidential Determination No. 95-17
- Middle East Peace Facilitation Act of 1995
- Remarks on the Middle East, June 24, 2002
- The President's News Conference With Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas of the Palestinian Authority, July 25, 2003
- The President's News Conference With President Mahmoud Abbas of the Palestinian Authority, May 26, 2005
- Fact Sheet on Palestinian Information Communications Technology Capacity Building Initiative, December 2010
- U.S. Assistance to the Palestinians (State Department document)
- Palestinians accost US delegation in West Bank
- Official Message to Congress on Palestine’s 2012 United Nations Bid
- Letter to Congress on Seeking Punitive Measures, December 14, 2012
- Joint press conference between Obama and Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas, March 21, 2013
- Mohamed Rabie, U.S.-PLO Dialogue: Secret Diplomacy and Conflict Resolution (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1995)
- U.S. Attempts at Peace between Israel and Palestine from the Dean Peter Krogh Foreign Affairs Digital Archives
- PLO Delegation - Washington, DC
- Consulate General of U.S.A. - Jerusalem
- E-Consulate of U.S.A. - Gaza
- Palestinians and Middle East Peace: Issues for the United States
- U.S. Foreign Aid to the Palestinians