Pan-Turkism

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Map of the world
Countries and regions where a Turkic language has official status
Flag misattributed to Turkic Khaganate[a]

Pan-Turkism is a political movement that emerged during the 1880s among Turkic intellectuals who lived in the Russian region of Kazan (Tatarstan), Caucasus (modern-day Azerbaijan) and the Ottoman Empire (modern-day Turkey), with its aim being the cultural and political unification of all Turkic peoples.[5][6][7][8][9] Turanism is a closely-related movement but it is a more general term, because Turkism only applies to Turkic peoples. However, researchers and politicians who are steeped in the Pan-Turkic ideology have used these terms interchangeably in many sources and works of literature.[10]

Although many of the Turkic peoples share historical, cultural and linguistic roots, the rise of a pan-Turkic political movement is a phenomenon of the 19th and 20th centuries.[11] Ottoman poet Ziya Gökalp defined pan-Turkism as a cultural, academic, and philosophical[12] and political[13] concept advocating the unity of Turkic peoples. Ideologically, it was premised on social Darwinism.[14][15][16] Pan-Turkism has been characterized by pseudoscientific theories known as Pseudo-Turkology.

Name[edit]

In research literature, "pan-Turkism" is used to describe the political, cultural and ethnic unity of all Turkic people. "Turkism" began to be used with the prefix "pan-" (from the Greek πᾶν, pan = all).[17]

Proponents use the latter as a point of comparison, since "Turkic" is a linguistic, ethnic and cultural distinction rather than a citizenship description. This differentiates it from "Turkish", which is the term which is officially used in reference to citizens of Turkey. Pan-Turkic ideas and reunification movements have become popular since the collapse of the Soviet Union in Central Asian and other Turkic countries.

History[edit]

Demonstration with flags
Pan-Turkic rally in Istanbul, March 2009

Development and spread[edit]

In 1804, the Tatar theologian Ghabdennasir Qursawi wrote a treatise calling for the modernization of Islam. Qursawi was a Jadid (from the Arabic word jadid, "new"). The Jadids encouraged critical thinking, supported education and advocated the equality of the sexes, advocated tolerance of other faiths, advocated Turkic cultural unity, and advocated openness to Europe’s cultural legacy.[18] The Jadid movement was founded in 1843 in Kazan. Its aim was the implementation of a semi-secular modernization program and the implementation of an educational reform program, both programs would emphasize the national (rather than the religious) identity of the Turks. Before they founded their movement in 1843, the Jadids considered themselves Muslim subjects of the Russian Empire, a belief which they held until the Jadid movement disbanded.[19]

After they joined the Wäisi movement, the Jadids advocated national liberation. After 1907, many supporters of Turkic unity immigrated to the Ottoman Empire.

The newspaper Türk in Cairo was published by exiles from the Ottoman Empire after the suspension of the Ottoman constitution of 1876 and the persecution of liberal intellectuals. It was the first publication to use the ethnic designation as its title.[20] Yusuf Akçura published "Three Types of Policy" (Üç tarz-ı siyaset) anonymously in 1904, the earliest manifesto of a pan-Turkic nationalism.[20] Akçura argued that the supra-ethnic union espoused by the Ottomans was unrealistic. The Pan-Islamic model had advantages, but Muslim populations were under colonial rule which would oppose unification. He concluded that an ethnic Turkish nation would require the cultivation of a national identity; a pan-Turkish empire would abandon the Balkans and Eastern Europe in favor of Central Asia. The first publication of "Three Types of Policy" had a negative reaction, but it became more influential by its third publication in 1911 in Istanbul. The Ottoman Empire had lost its African territory to the Kingdom of Italy and it would soon lose the Balkans. Pan-Turkish nationalism consequently became a more feasible (and popular) political strategy.[citation needed]

In 1908, the Committee of Union and Progress came to power in Ottoman Turkey, and the empire adopted a nationalistic ideology. This contrasted with its largely Muslim ideology which dated back to the 16th century, when the sultan was the caliph of his Muslim lands. Leaders who espoused Pan-Turkism fled from Russia and moved to Istanbul, where a strong pan-Turkic movement arose; the Turkish pan-Turkic movement grew and transformed itself into a nationalistic, ethnically oriented movement which sought to replace the caliphate with a state. After the fall of the Ottoman Empire, some of them tried to replace the multi-cultural and multi-ethnic empire with a Turkish commonwealth, the advocates of this idea were influenced by the nationalism of the Young Turks. Leaders like Mustafa Kemal Atatürk acknowledged that such a goal was impossible, replacing pan-Turkic idealism with a form of nationalism which aimed to preserve the existence of an Anatolian nucleus.[citation needed]

The Türk Yurdu Dergisi (Journal of the Turkish Homeland) was founded in 1911 by Akçura. This was the most important Turkist publication of the time, "in which, along with other Turkic exiles from Russia, [Akçura] attempted to instill a consciousness about the cultural unity of all Turkic peoples of the world."[20]

A significant early exponent of pan-Turkism was Enver Pasha (1881–1922), the Ottoman Minister of War and acting commander-in-chief during World War I. He later became a leader of the Basmachi movement (1916–1934) against Russian and Soviet rule in Central Asia. During World War II, the Nazis founded a Turkestan Legion which was primarily composed of soldiers who hoped to establish an independent Central Asian state after the war. The German intrigue bore no fruit.[10]

When the Turkish Republic was established under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in 1923, interest in Pan-Turkism declined, because Atatürk generally favored Ziya Gökalp rather than Enver Pasha.[21][22] The Pan-Turkist movements gained some momentum in the 1940s, due to the support which it received from Nazi Germany, which sought to use Pan-Turkism as leverage in order to undermine Russian influence in an effort to acquire the resources of Central Asia during the course of World War II.[23] The development of pan-Turkist and anti-Soviet ideology, in some circles, was influenced by Nazi propaganda during this period.[24][25] Some sources claim that Nihal Atsız advocated Nazi doctrines and adopted a Hitler-style haircut.[26] Alparslan Türkeş, a leading pan-Turkist, took a pro-Hitler position during the war[27] and developed close connections with Nazi leaders in Germany.[28] Several pan-Turkic groups in Europe apparently had ties to Nazi Germany (or its supporters) at the start of the war, if not earlier.[23] The Turco-Tatars in Romania cooperated with the Iron Guard, a Romanian fascist organisation.[23] Although the Turkish government's archives which date back to the World War II years have not been declassified, the level of contact can be ascertained from German archives.[23] A ten-year Turco-German treaty of friendship was signed in Ankara on 18 January 1941.[23] Official and semi-official meetings between German ambassador Franz von Papen and other German officials and Turkish officials, including General H. E. Erkilet (of Tatar origin and a frequent contributor to pan-Turkic journals) took place in the second half of 1941 and the early months of 1942.[23] The Turkish officials included General Ali Fuad Erdem and Nuri Pasha (Killigil), brother of Enver Pasha.[23]

Pan-Turkists were not supported by the Turkish government during this time and on 19 May 1944, İsmet İnönü made a speech in which he condemned Pan-Turkism as "a dangerous and sick demonstration of the latest times" going on to say that the Turkish Republic was "facing efforts hostile to the existence of the Republic" and those who advocate these ideas "will only bring trouble and disaster". Nihal Atsız and other prominent pan-Turkist leaders were tried and sentenced to imprisonment for conspiring against the government. Zeki Velidi Togan was sentenced to ten years imprisonment and four years in internal exile, Reha Oğuz Türkkan was sentenced to five years and ten months in prison and two years in exile, Nihal Atsız was sentenced to six years, six months and 15 days in prison and 3 years in exile. Others were sentenced to prison terms which only ranged from a few months to four years in length.[29][30] But the defendants appealed the convictions and in October 1945, the sentences of all the convicted were abolished by the Military Court of Cassation.[31]

While Erkilet discussed military contingencies, Nuri Pasha told the Germans about his plan to establish independent states which would be allies (not satellites) of Turkey. These states would be formed by the Turkic-speaking populations which lived in Crimea, Azerbaijan, Central Asia, northwestern Iran, and northern Iraq. Nuri Pasha offered to assist Nazi Germany's propaganda efforts on behalf of this cause. However, Turkey's government also feared for the survival of the Turkic minorities in the USSR and it told von Papen that it could not join Germany until the USSR was crushed. The Turkish government may have been apprehensive about Soviet might, which kept the country out of the war. On a less-official level, Turkic emigrants from the Soviet Union played a crucial role in negotiations and contacts between Turkey and Germany; among them were prominent pan-Turkic activists like Zeki Velidi Togan, Mammed Amin Rasulzade, Mirza Bala, Ahmet Caferoĝlu, Sayid Shamil and Ayaz İshaki. Several Tatar military units which consisted of Turkic speakers from the Turco-Tatar and Caucasian regions of the USSR who had previously been prisoners of war of the Germans joined them and fought against the Soviets, the members of these Tatar military units generally fought as guerrillas in the hope that they would be able to secure the independence of their homelands and establish a pan-Turkic union. The units, which were reinforced, numbered several hundred thousand. Turkey took a cautious approach at the government level, but pan-Turkists were angered by the Turkish government's inaction because they believed that it was wasting a golden opportunity to achieve the goals of pan-Turkism.[23]

Criticism[edit]

Pan-Turkism is often perceived as being a new form of Turkish imperial ambition. Some view the young Turk leaders who believed that they could reclaim the prestige of the Ottoman Empire by espousing the pan-Turkist ideology as racist and chauvinistic.[32][33]

Pan-Turkist views on Armenian history[edit]

Clive Foss, professor of ancient history at the University of Massachusetts Boston, critically notes that in 1982: The Armenian File in the Light of History, Cemal Anadol writes that the Iranian Scythians and Parthians are Turks. According to Anadol, the Armenians welcomed the Turks into the region; their language is a mixture with no roots and their alphabet is mixed, with 11 characters which were borrowed from the ancient Turkic alphabet. Foss calls this view historical revisionism: "Turkish writings have been tendentious: history has been viewed as performing a useful service, proving or supporting a point of view, and so it is treated as something flexible which can be manipulated at will".[34] He concludes, "The notion, which seems well established in Turkey, that the Armenians were a wandering tribe without a home, who never had a state of their own, is of course entirely without any foundation in fact. The logical consequence of the commonly expressed view of the Armenians is that they have no place in Turkey, and they never did. The result would be the same if the viewpoint were expressed first, and the history were written to order. In a sense, something like this seems to have happened, for most Turks who grew up under the Republic were educated to believe in the ultimate priority of Turks in all parts of history, and ignore the Armenians all together; they had been clearly consigned to oblivion."[35]

Pan-Turkist views in Azerbaijan[edit]

Kâzım Karabekir said

The aim of all Turks is to unite with the Turkic borders. History is affording us today the last opportunity. In order for the Islamic world not to be forever fragmented it is necessary that the campaign against Karabagh be not allowed to abate. As a matter of fact drive the point home in Azeri circles that the campaign should be pursued with greater determination and severity.[36]

Western Azerbaijan is a term used in the Republic of Azerbaijan to refer to Armenia. According to the Whole Azerbaijan theory, modern Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh were once inhabited by the Azerbaijanis.[37] Its claims are based on the belief that current Armenia was ruled by Turkic tribes and states from the Late Middle Ages to the Treaty of Turkmenchay which was signed after the 1826–1828 Russo-Persian War. The concept has been sanctioned by the government of Azerbaijan and its current president, Ilham Aliyev, who has said that Armenia is part of ancient Turkic, Azerbaijani land. Turkish and Azerbaijani historians have said that Armenians are alien, not indigenous, in the Caucasus and Anatolia.[38][39][40][41][42]

During the existence of the Azerbaijan SSR of the Soviet Union, pan-Turkist political elites of Baku who were loyal to the Communist cause invented a national history based on the existence of an Azeri nation-state that dominated the areas to the north and south of the Aras river, which was supposedly torn apart by an Iranian-Russian conspiracy in the Treaty of Turkmenchay of 1828.[43] This "imagined community" was cherished, promoted and institutionalized in formal history books of the educational system of the Azerbaijan SSR and the post-Soviet Azerbaijan Republic.[43] As the Soviet Union was a closed society, and its people were unaware of the actual realities regarding Iran and its Azeri citizens, the elites in Soviet Azerbaijan kept cherishing and promoting the idea of a "united Azerbaijan" in their activities.[44] This romantic thought led to the founding of nostalgic literary works, known as the "literature of longing"; examples amongst this genre are, for instance, Foggy Tabriz by Mammed Said Ordubadi, and The Coming Day by Mirza Ibrahimov.[44] As a rule, works belonging to the "literature of longing" genre were characterized by depicting the life of Iranian Azeris as a misery due to suppression by the "Fars" (Persians), and by narrating fictional stories about Iranian Azeris waiting for the day when their "brothers" from the "north" would come and liberate them.[44] Works that belonged to this genre, as the historian and political scientist Zaur Gasimov explains, "were examples of blatant Azerbaijani nationalism stigmatizing the “division” of the nation along the river Araxes, as well as denunciations of economic and cultural exploitation of Iranian Azerbaijanis, etc."[45] Gasimov adds: "an important by-product of this literary genre was strongly articulated anti-Iranian rhetoric. Tolerance and even support of this anti-Iranian rhetoric by the communist authorities were obvious."[45]

Nationalist political elites in post-Soviet Azerbaijan, being the inheritors of this mentality created during the Soviet rule, forwarded this "mission" for achieving a "united Azerbaijan" as a political goal of utmost importance.[44] Azerbaijani president Abulfaz Elchibey (1992–93) devoted his life to carrying out this mission, and he, in tandem with other pan-Turkist elites, went on a campaign for the ethnic awakening of Iranian Azeris.[44] It may be due to these ideas that Elchibey was elected president in the new country's first presidential election in 1992.[44] He and his government has been widely described as pursuing Pan-Turkic and anti-Iranian policies.[46][47][48][49] Other than the pan-Turkist leadership, nationalist intellectuals and Azerbaijani media also stipulated the question of "Southern Azerbaijan" in their main political agenda's.[44] In 1995-1996, according to one survey of the Azerbaijani press, the question of Iranian Azeris was covered more than any other topic by state-controlled and independent outlets in the young republic of Azerbaijan.[44] Since 1918, political elites with Pan-Turkist-oriented sentiments in the area that comprises the present-day Azerbaijan Republic have depended on the concept of ethnic nationalism in order to create an anti-Iranian sense of ethnicity amongst Iranian Azeris.[50]

Ahmad Kazemi, the author of the book Security in South Caucasus, told Iran's Strategic Council on Foreign Relations in a 2021 interview that "Azerbaijan is seeking to establish the so-called pan-Turkish illusionary Zangezur corridor in south of Armenia under the pretext of creating connectivity in the region", arguing that "this corridor is not compatible with any of the present geopolitical and historical realities of the region".[51]

Russian views on Pan-Turkism[edit]

In Tsarist Russian circles, pan-Turkism was considered a political, irredentist and aggressive idea.[52] Turkic peoples in Russia were threatened by Turkish expansion,[clarification needed] and I. Gasprinsky and his followers were accused of being Turkish spies. After the October Revolution, the Bolsheviks’ attitude to Türkism did not differ from the Russian Empire’s. At the 10th Congress of Bolshevik Communist Party in 1921, the party "condemned pan-Turkism as a slope to bourgeois-democratic nationalism". The emergence of a pan-Turkism scare in Soviet propaganda made it one of the most frightening political labels in the USSR. The most widespread accusation used in the lethal repression of educated Tatars and other Turkic peoples during the 1930s was that of pan-Turkism.[53]

In the United States and the rest of the New World[edit]

Pan-Turkists like Reha Oğuz Türkkan have openly claimed that pre-Columbian civilizations were Turkic civilizations and they have also claimed that modern-day Native Americans are Turkic peoples, and activities which Turkish lobbying groups have conducted in order to draw Native Americans into the service of the wider Turkic world agenda have drawn criticism and triggered accusations that the Turkish government is falsifying the history of Native Americans in the service of Turkish imperialist ambitions.[54][55][56][57][58] According to an article by Polat Kaya which was published by the Turkish Cultural Foundation, the exact origins of Native Americans remain unclear and while they are widely believed to have migrated from Asia, the exact connection between Native Americans and other Turkic peoples remains disputed, although linguistic coincidences between Turks and Native Americans are noticeable.[59]

The idea has also been discussed in the francophone world, noting that as victors in the First World War, England and France "dismembered the Arab portion" of the Ottoman Empire and shared it amongst themselves, further alienating Turkey. The loss of the Arabian oil fields limited Turkey becoming a petroleum power on the world stage; called "le panturquisme" in French, authors argue that it arose as a way of reclaiming some of the lost glory after the Ottoman defeat in the war and the loss of prestige in the region. [60]

Pseudoscientific theories[edit]

There is no such thing as the Kurdish people or nation. They are merely carriers of Turkish culture and habits. The imagined region proposed as the new Kurdistan is the region that was settled by the proto-Turks. The Sumerians and Scythians come immediately to mind.[61]

— Orhan Türkdoğan - Professor of Sociology at Gebze Technical University

Pan-Turkism has been characterized by pseudoscientific theories known as Pseudo-Turkology.[62][63] Though dismissed in serious scholarship, scholars promoting such theories, often known as Pseudo-Turkologists,[62] have in recent times emerged among every Turkic nationality.[64][65] A leading light among them is Murad Adzhi, who insists that two hundred thousand years ago, "an advanced people of Turkic blood" were living in the Altai Mountains. These tall and blonde Turks are supposed to have founded the world's first state, Idel-Ural, 35,000 years ago, and to have migrated as far as the Americas.[64] According to theories like the Turkish History Thesis, promoted by pseudo-scholars, the Turkic peoples are supposed to have migrated from Central Asia to the Middle East in the Neolithic. The Hittites, Sumerians, Babylonians, and ancient Egyptians are here classified as being of Turkic origin.[63][64][65][66] The Kurgan cultures of the early Bronze Age up to more recent times are also typically ascribed to Turkic peoples by pan-Turkic pseudoscholars, such as Ismail Miziev.[67] Non-Turkic peoples typically classified as Turkic, Turkish, Proto-Turkish or Turanian include Huns, Scythians, Sakas, Cimmerians, Medes, Parthians, Pannonian Avars, Caucasian Albanians, and various ethnic minorities in Turkic countries, such as Kurds.[67][68][69][65][66] Adzhi also considers Alans, Goths, Burgundians, Saxons, Alemanni, Angles, Lombards, and many Russians as Turks.[64] Only a few prominent peoples in history, such as Jews, Chinese people, Armenians, Greeks, Persians, and Scandinavians are considered non-Turkic by Adzhi.[64] Philologist Mirfatyh Zakiev, former Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Tatar ASSR, has published hundreds of "scientific" works on the subject, suggesting Turkic origins of the Sumerian, Greek, Icelandic, Etruscan and Minoan languages. Zakiev contends that "proto-Turkish is the starting point of the Indo-European languages".[64] Not only peoples and cultures, but also prominent individuals, such as Saint George, Peter the Great, Mikhail Kutuzov and Fyodor Dostoevsky, are proclaimed to have been "of Turkic origin".[64] As such the Turkic peoples are supposed to have once been the "benevolent conquerors" of the peoples of most of Eurasia, who thus owe them "a huge cultural debt".[64][70] The pseudoscientific Sun Language Theory states that all human languages are descendants of a proto-Turkic language and was developed by the Turkish president Mustafa Kemal Atatürk during the 1930s.[71] Kairat Zakiryanov considers the Japanese and Kazakh gene pools to be identical.[72] Several Turkic academics (Şevket Koçsoy, Özkan İzgi, Emel Esin) claim that Zhou dynasty were of Turkic origins.[73][74][75][76]

Philip L. Kohl notes that the above-mentioned theories are nothing more than "incredible myths".[67] Nevertheless, the promotion of these theories have "taken on large-scale proportions" in countries such as Turkey and Azerbaijan.[68] Often associated with Greek, Assyrian and Armenian genocide denial, pan-Turkic pseudoscience has received extensive state and state-backed non-governmental support, and is taught all the way from elementary school to the highest level of universities in such countries.[69] Turkish and Azerbaijani students are imbued with textbooks which make "absurdly inflated" claims which state that all Eurasian nomads, including the Scythians, and all civilizations on the territory of the Ottoman Empire, such as Sumer, ancient Egypt, ancient Greece, and the Byzantine Empire, were of Turkic origin.[77] Konstantin Sheiko and Stephen Brown explain the reemergence of such pseudo-history as a form of national therapy, helping its proponents cope with the failures of the past.[64]

Notable pan-Turkists[edit]

Pan-Turkist organizations[edit]

Azerbaijan

Iran

Kazakhstan

Turkey

Uzbekistan

Quotations[edit]

  • Dilde, fikirde, işte birlik ("Unity of language, thought and action")—Ismail Gasprinski, a Crimean Tatar member of the Turanian Society
  • Bu yürüyüş devam ediyor. Türk orduları ata ruhlarının dolaştığı Altay ve Tanrı Dağları eteklerinde geçit resmi yapıncaya kadar devam edecektir. ("This march is going on. It will continue until the Turkic Armies' parade on the foothills of Altai and Tien-Shan mountains where the souls of their ancestors stroll.")—Hüseyin Nihâl Atsız, pan-Turkist author, philosopher and poet

See also[edit]

Notes[edit]

  1. ^ According to Book of Zhou and Book of Sui (later repeated by History of the Northern Dynasties), Göktürks erected a tuğ banner decorated with a wolf's head made of gold to show that they had not forgotten their origin from a she-wolf ancestress.[1][2][3] A tuğ is a banner made of horse-hairs and based on Chinese banners made of yak-hairs (纛 standard Chinese < Middle Chinese *dok)[4]

References[edit]

  1. ^ Zhoushu vol. 50. quote: "旗纛之上,施金狼頭。…… 蓋本狼生,志不忘舊。"
  2. ^ Suishu Vol. 84 text: "故牙門建狼頭纛,示不忘本也。"
  3. ^ Beishi vol. 99: section Tujue text: "故牙門建狼頭纛,示不忘本也。"
  4. ^ Clauson, Gerard (1972). An Etymological Dictionary of Pre-13th Century Turkish. Oxford University Press. p. 464
  5. ^ Fishman, Joshua; Garcia, Ofelia (2011). Handbook of Language and Ethnic Identity: The Success-Failure Continuum in Language and Ethnic Identity Efforts. Vol. 2. Oxford University Press. p. 269. ISBN 978-0-19-539245-6. It is commonly acknowledged that pan-Turkism, the movement which aimed to politically and/or culturally unify all Turkic peoples, emerged among Turkic intellectuals who lived in Russia as a liberal-cultural movement in the 1880s.
  6. ^ "Pan-Turkism". Encyclopædia Britannica Online. Encyclopædia Britannica. 2009. Retrieved 19 Jul 2009. Political movement of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, which had as its goal the political union of all Turkish-speaking peoples in the Ottoman Empire, Russia, China, Iran, and Afghanistan.
  7. ^ Landau, Jacob (1995). Pan-Turkism: From Irredentism To Cooperation. Indiana University Press. ISBN 978-0-253-20960-3.
  8. ^ Jacob M. Landau, "Radical Politics in Modern Turkey", BRILL, 1974.
  9. ^ Robert F. Melson, "The Armenian Genocide" in Kevin Reilly (Editor), Stephen Kaufman (Editor), Angela Bodino (Editor) "Racism: A Global Reader (Sources and Studies in World History)", M.E. Sharpe (January 2003). pg 278:"Concluding that their liberal experiment had been a failure, CUP leaders turned to Pan-Turkism, a xenophobic and chauvinistic brand of nationalism that sought to create a new empire which would have been based on Islam and Turkish ethnicity."
  10. ^ a b Iskander Gilyazov, "Пантюрκизм, Пантуранизм и Германия Archived 2006-10-04 at the Wayback Machine", magazine "Татарстан" No 5-6, 1995. (in Russian)
  11. ^ "Pan-Turkism". Encyclopædia Britannica. Retrieved 2 April 2016.
  12. ^ Gökalp, Ziya; Devereaux, Robert (1968). The Principles of Turkism. E. J. Brill. p. 125. ISBN 9789004007314. Turkism is not a political party but a scientific, philosophic and aesthetic school of thought.
  13. ^ Kieser, Hans-Lukas (2006). Turkey beyond nationalism: towards post-nationalist identities. I. B. Tauris. p. 19. ISBN 978-1-84511-141-0.
  14. ^ Doğan, Attila (2006). Osmanlı Aydınları ve Sosyal Darwinizm. Istanbul: Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları. ISBN 978-9756176504.
  15. ^ Hovannisian, Richard G. (2011). The Armenian Genocide: Cultural and Ethical Legacies. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers. p. 298. ISBN 978-0-7658-0367-2.
  16. ^ Oranlı, Imge (2020). "Epistemic Injustice from Afar : Rethinking the Denial of Armenian Genocide". Social Epistemology. 35 (2): 120–132. doi:10.1080/02691728.2020.1839593. S2CID 229463301.
  17. ^ Mansur Hasanov, Academician of Academy of Sciences of Tatarstan Republic, "Великий реформатор", in magazine "Республика Татарстан" № 96–97 (24393-24394), 17 May 2001. (in Russian)
  18. ^ Rafael Khakimov, "Taklid and Ijtihad Archived 2007-02-10 at the Wayback Machine", Russia in Global Affairs, Dec. 2003.
  19. ^ N.N., "Полтора Века Пантюрκизма в Турции", magazine "Панорама". (in Russian)
  20. ^ a b c Ersoy, Ahmet; g¢Rny, Maciej; Kechriotis, Vangelis (January 2010). Modernism: The Creation of Nation States. p. 218. ISBN 9789637326615. Retrieved 13 August 2014.
  21. ^ Pan Turkism, Encyclopedia Britannica.
  22. ^ Eligur, Banu (2010). The Mobilization of Political Islam in Turkey. p. 41. ISBN 9781139486583.
  23. ^ a b c d e f g h Jacob M. Landau. Pan-Turkism: From Irredentism to Cooperation. India University Press, 1995. 2nd Edition. pp 112–114.
  24. ^ Jacob M. Landau, "Radical Politics in Modern Turkey", BRILL, 1974. pg 194: "In the course of the Second World War, various circles in Turkey absorbed Nazi propaganda; these were pro-German and admired Nazism, which they grasped as a doctrine of warlike dynamism and a source of national inspiration, on which they could base their pan-Turkic and anti-Soviet ideology"
  25. ^ John M. VanderLippe , "The politics of Turkish democracy", SUNY Press, 2005. "A third group was led by Nihal Atsiz, who favored a Hitler style haircut and mustache, and advocated racist Nazi doctrines"
  26. ^ John M. VanderLippe, The Politics of Turkish Democracy: Ismet Inonu and the Formation of the Multi-Party System, 1938-1950, (State University of New York Press, 2005), 108;"A third group was led by Nihal Atsiz, who favored a Hitler style haircut and moustache, and advocated Nazi racist doctrines."
  27. ^ Peter Davies, Derek Lynch, "The Routledge Companion to Fascism and the Far Right", Routledge, 2002. pg 244: "Alparslan Türkeş: Leader of a Turkish neo-fascist movement, Nationalist Action Party(MHP). During the war, he adopted a pro-Hitler position and was imprisoned after a 1960 coup attempt against his country's ruler.
  28. ^ Berch Berberoglu, " Turkey in crisis: from state capitalism to neocolonialism", Zed, 1982. 2nd edition. pg 125: "Turkes established close ties with Nazi leaders in Germany in 1945 "
  29. ^ VanderLippe, John M. (2012-02-01). Politics of Turkish Democracy, The: Ismet Inonu and the Formation of the Multi-Party System, 1938-1950. SUNY Press. p. 109. ISBN 9780791483374.
  30. ^ Ercilasun, Ahmet Bican (2018). Atsız, Türkçülüğün Mistik Önderi (in Turkish). p. 94. ISBN 9786052221068.
  31. ^ Landau, Jacob M.; Landau, Gersten Professor of Political Science Jacob M.; Landau, Yaʻaqov M. (1995). Pan-Turkism: From Irredentism to Cooperation. Indiana University Press. pp. 117–118. ISBN 978-0-253-32869-4.
  32. ^ Jacob M. Landau. Pan-Turkism: From Irredentism to Cooperation. India University Press, 1995. 2nd Edition. pg 45: "Pan-Turkism's historic chance arrived both shortly before and during the First World War, when it was adopted as a guiding principle of state policy by an influential group among the Young Turks"
  33. ^ Robert F. Melson, "The Armenian Genocide" in Kevin Reilly (Editor), Stephen Kaufman (Editor), Angela Bodino (Editor) "Racism: A Global Reader (Sources and Studies in World History)", M.E. Sharpe (January 2003). pg 278: "Concluding that their liberal experiment had been a failure, CUP leaders turned to Pan-Turkism, a xenophobic and chauvinistic brand of nationalism that sought to create a new empire based on Islam and Turkish ethnicity ... It was in this context of revolutionary and ideological transformation and war that the fateful decision to destroy the Armenians was taken."
  34. ^ Clive Foss, “The Turkish View of Armenian History: A Vanishing Nation,” in The Armenian Genocide: History, Politics, Ethics, ed. by Richard G. Hovannisian (New York: St. Martins Press, 1992), pp. 261–268.
  35. ^ Clive Foss, “The Turkish View of Armenian History: A Vanishing Nation,” in The Armenian Genocide: History, Politics, Ethics, ed. by Richard G. Hovannisian (New York: St. Martins Press, 1992), p. 276.
  36. ^ Karabekir, Istiklâl Harbimiz/n.2/, p. 631
  37. ^ "Present-day Armenia located in ancient Azerbaijani lands – Ilham Aliyev". News.Az. October 16, 2010. Archived from the original on July 21, 2015.
  38. ^ Tofig Kocharli, "Armenian Deception"
  39. ^ Ohannes Geukjian, "Ethnicity, Nationalism and Conflict in the South Caucasus: Nagorno-Karabakh and the Legacy of Soviet Nationalities Policy"
  40. ^ "Nagorno Karabakh: History". Retrieved 2 April 2016.
  41. ^ "Рауф Гусейн-заде: 'Мы показали, что армяне на Кавказе - некоренные жители'". Day.Az. 27 December 2012. Retrieved 2 April 2016.
  42. ^ "Professor Firidun Agasyoglu Jalilov 'How Hays became Armenians'". Archived from the original on 2015-02-15. Retrieved 2014-11-11.
  43. ^ a b Ahmadi, Hamid (2017). "The Clash of Nationalisms: Iranian response to Baku's irredentism". In Kamrava, Mehran (ed.). The Great Game in West Asia: Iran, Turkey and the South Caucasus. Oxford University Press. pp. 109–110. ISBN 978-0190869663.
  44. ^ a b c d e f g h Ahmadi, Hamid (2017). "The Clash of Nationalisms: Iranian response to Baku's irredentism". In Kamrava, Mehran (ed.). The Great Game in West Asia: Iran, Turkey and the South Caucasus. Oxford University Press. p. 110. ISBN 978-0190869663.
  45. ^ a b Gasimov, Zaur (2022). "Observing Iran from Baku: Iranian Studies in Soviet and Post-Soviet Azerbaijan". Iranian Studies. 55 (1): 49. doi:10.1080/00210862.2020.1865136.
  46. ^ Cornell, Svante (2005). Small Nations and Great Powers: A Study of Ethnopolitical Conflict in the Caucasus. Routledge. p. 87. ISBN 9781135796693. Elchibey's anti-Iranian rhetoric and the subsequent deterioration of Azerbaijani-Iranian relations to below freezing point...
  47. ^ Peimani, Hooman (1999). Iran and the United States: The Rise of the West Asian Regional Grouping. Praeger. p. 35. ISBN 9780275964542. Characterized by its anti-Iranian, anti-Russian, pro-Turkish outlook, the Elchibey government's pursuit of pan-Turkism...
  48. ^ Grogan, Michael S. (2000). National security imperatives and the neorealist state: Iran and realpolitik. Naval Postgraduate School. pp. 68–69. Elchibey was anti-Iranian, pan-Azeri
  49. ^ Eichensehr, Kristen E.; Reisman, William Michael, eds. (2009). Stopping Wars and Making Peace: Studies in International Intervention. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. p. 57. ISBN 9789004178557. radically pro-Turkish and anti-Iranian President Elchibey in June made Iran unacceptable to Azerbaijan as a mediator.
  50. ^ Ahmadi, Hamid (2017). "The Clash of Nationalisms: Iranian response to Baku's irredentism". In Kamrava, Mehran (ed.). The Great Game in West Asia: Iran, Turkey and the South Caucasus. Oxford University Press. p. 106. ISBN 978-0190869663.
  51. ^ "Strategic dimensions of the recent tension in relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan". 27 August 2021.
  52. ^ Geraci, Robert P. (2001). Window on the East: National and Imperial Identities in Late Tsarist Russia. Cornell University Press. p. 278. ISBN 978-0-8014-3422-8.
  53. ^ Mansur Hasanov, Academician of Academy of Sciences of Tatarstan republic, in "People's Political Newspaper" № 96–97 (24393-24394) 17 May 2001 http://www.rt-online.ru/numbers/public/?ID=25970
  54. ^ "The Turkish Apaches mysteries part 1". Mashallah News. 2011-06-23. Retrieved 2021-05-24.
  55. ^ "The Turkish Apaches mysteries part 2". Mashallah News. 2011-07-13. Retrieved 2021-05-24.
  56. ^ Kamen, Al (2012-07-25). "Turkey and the Indians". Washington Post. ISSN 0190-8286. Retrieved 2021-07-01.
  57. ^ Fink, Marc J. "Stunner: Turkey Infiltrating Native American Tribes – and May Get Congressional Help". Islamist Watch. Retrieved 2021-05-24.
  58. ^ Sassounian, Harut (24 July 2012). "DNA Study Busts Myth that One Million Appalachians are of Turkish Descent". Asbarez.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: url-status (link)
  59. ^ "Turkish Language and the Native Americans". www.turkishculture.org. Retrieved 2021-07-01.
  60. ^ Thual, François (2007). "International: Le Corridor Des Turcs L'aire Des Turcs Ou l'ère Des Turcs". La Revue Administrative (in French). 60 (357): 281–83. Retrieved July 21, 2022.
  61. ^ Gunes, Cengiz; Zeydanlioglu, Welat (2013). The Kurdish Question in Turkey: New Perspectives on Violence, Representation and Reconciliation. Routledge. p. 11. ISBN 978-1135140632.
  62. ^ a b Frankle, Elanor (1948). Word formation in the Turkic languages. Columbia University Press. p. 2.
  63. ^ a b Aktar, A.; Kizilyürek, N; Ozkirimli, U.; K?z?lyürek, Niyazi (2010). Nationalism in the Troubled Triangle: Cyprus, Greece and Turkey. Springer. p. 50. ISBN 978-0230297326.
  64. ^ a b c d e f g h i Sheiko, Konstantin; Brown, Stephen (2014). History as Therapy: Alternative History and Nationalist Imaginings in Russia. ibidem Press. pp. 61–62. ISBN 978-3838265650. According to Adzhi, Huns, Alans, Goths, Burgundians, Saxons, Alemans, Angles, Langobards and many of the Russians were ethnic Turks.161 The list of non-Turks is relatively short and seems to comprise only Jews, Chinese, Armenians, Greeks, Persians, and Scandinavians... Mirfatykh Zakiev, a Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Tatar ASSR and a professor of philology who has published hundreds of scientific works, argues that proto-Turkish is the starting point of the Indo-European languages. Zakiev and his colleagues claim to have discovered the Tatar roots of the Sumerian, ancient Greek and Icelandic languages and deciphered Etruscan and Minoan writings.
  65. ^ a b c Khazanov, Anatoly M. (1996). Post-Soviet Eurasia: Anthropological Perspectives on a World in Transition. Department of Anthropology, University of Michigan. p. 84. ISBN 1889480002. Discredited hypotheses – widespread in the 1920s and 1930s – about the Turkic origin of Sumerians, Scythians, Sakhas, and many other ancient peoples are nowadays popular
  66. ^ a b Hunter, Shireen; Thomas, Jeffrey L.; Melikishvili, Alexander (2004). Islam in Russia: The Politics of Identity and Security. M.E. Sharpe. p. 159. ISBN 0765612828. M. Zakiev claims that the Scythians and Sarmatians were all Turkic. He even considers the Sumerians as Turkic
  67. ^ a b c Kohl, Philip L.; Fawcett, Clare (1995). Nationalism, Politics and the Practice of Archaeology. Cambridge University Press. pp. 143, 154. ISBN 0521558395. Apparently innocuous were other contradictory and/or incredible myths related by professional archaeologists that claimed that the Scythians were Turkic-speaking
  68. ^ a b Simonian, Hovann (2007). The Hemshin: History, Society and Identity in the Highlands of Northeast Turkey. Routledge. p. 354. ISBN 978-0230297326. Thus, ethnic groups or populations of the past (Huns, Scythians, Sakas, Cimmerians, Parthians, Hittites, Avars and others) who have disappeared long ago, as well as non-Turkic ethnic groups living in present-day Turkey, have come to be labeled Turkish, Proto-Turkish or Turanian
  69. ^ a b Lornjad, Siavash; Doostzadeh, Ali (2012). On The Modern Politization of the Persian Poet Nezami Ganjavi. CCIS. p. 85. ISBN 978-9993069744. Claims that many Iranian figures and societies starting from the Medes, Scythians and Parthians were Turks), are still prevalent in countries that adhere to Pan—Turkist nationalism such as Turkey and the republic of Azerbaijan. These falsifications, which are backed by state and state backed non—governmental organizational bodies, range from elementary school all the way to the highest level of universities in these countries.
  70. ^ Lynn Meskell, Archaeology Under Fire: Nationalism, Politics and Heritage in the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East, Routledge, 1998.
  71. ^ "Мустафа (Кемаль) Ататюрк Мустафа Ататюрк". Retrieved 2 April 2016.
  72. ^ К.Закирьянов. Я вполне допускаю мысль, что в жилах Обамы течет тюркская кровь (Russian)
  73. ^ Esin, Emel (1986). "The Culture of the Turks: The Initial Inner Asian Phase" Publisher, Atatürk Culture Centre. p. 435, 439.
  74. ^ Koçsoy, Şevket (2002). "Türk Tarihi Kronojojisi", Türkler, C. I., Yeni Türkiye, Ankara, p. 73.
  75. ^ İzgi, Özkan (2002). "Orta Asya'nın En Eski Kültürleri ve Çin Medeniyeti ile İlişkileri", Türkler, C. I., Yeni Türkiye, Ankara, pp. 685-687.
  76. ^ Esin, Emel (2002). "İç Asya'da Milattan Önceki Bin Yılda Türklerin Atalarına Atfedilen Kültürler", Türkler, C. I., Yeni Türkiye, Ankara, p. 733-734.
  77. ^ Boldt, Andreas (2017). Historical Mechanisms: An Experimental Approach to Applying Scientific Theories to the Study of History. Taylor & Francis. pp. 107–108. ISBN 978-1351816489. Violent flirtation with PanTuranism had a lasting effect on kemalist Turkey and its historical ideology: Turkish pupils are imbued by history textbooks even today with a dogma of absurdly inflated PanTurkish history—Turkish history comprises all Eurasian nomads, Indo-European (Scythian) and Turk-Mongol, plus their conquests in Persia, India China, all civilizations on the soil of the Ottoman Empire, from Sumer and Ancient Egypt via Greeks, Alexander the Great to Byzantium.
  78. ^ Balci, Bayram (2014). "Between ambition and realism: Turkey's engagement in the South Caucasus". In Agadjanian, Alexander; Jödicke, Ansgar; van der Zweerde, Evert (eds.). Religion, Nation and Democracy in the South Caucasus. Routledge. p. 258. ...the second president of independent Azerbaijan, Abulfaz Elchibey, was a prominent pan-Turkist nationalist...
  79. ^ Murinson, Alexander (2009). Turkey's Entente with Israel and Azerbaijan: State Identity and Security in the Middle East and Caucasus. Routledge. p. 35. ISBN 9781135182441. Naturally, they were associated with Elchibey's pan-Turkist aspirations...
  80. ^ Hale, William M. (2000). Turkish Foreign Policy, 1774-2000. Psychology Press. p. 292. ISBN 9780714650715. Within Turkey, the pan- Turkist movement led by Alparslan Türkeş...
  81. ^ Larrabee, F. Stephen; Lesser, Ian O. (2003). Turkish Foreign Policy in an Age of Uncertainty. Rand Corporation. p. 123. ISBN 9780833034045. The late Alparslan Turkes, the former head of the MHP, actively promoted a Pan-Turkic agenda.

Further reading[edit]

  • Jacob M. Landau. Pan-Turkism: From Irredentism to Cooperation. Hurst, 1995. ISBN 1-85065-269-4

External links[edit]