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Pancasila (politics)

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A depiction of the Garuda Pancasila on a poster; each tenet of the Pancasila is written beside its symbol.

Pancasila (Indonesian: [pantʃaˈsila] ) is the official, foundational philosophical theory and state ideology of Indonesia. The name is made from two words originally derived from Sanskrit: pañca 'five' and śīla 'principles; precepts'.[1][2]

It is composed of five principles[3]:

  1. Ketuhanan yang Maha Esa (Belief in the One and Only God)[note 1]
  2. Kemanusiaan yang adil dan beradab (Just and Civilized Humanity)[note 2]
  3. Persatuan Indonesia (The Unity of Indonesia)
  4. Kerakyatan yang dipimpin oleh hikmat kebijaksanaan dalam permusyawaratan/perwakilan (Democratic Life Led by Wisdom of Thoughts in Deliberations Amongst Representatives of the People)[note 3]
  5. Keadilan sosial bagi seluruh rakyat Indonesia (Social Justice for All the People of Indonesia)

The legal formulation of Pancasila is enshrined within the fourth paragraph of the preamble of the Constitution of Indonesia.

Background

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In 1942, the Empire of Japan invaded and occupied the Dutch East Indies. Following setbacks in the Pacific War, the Japanese promised future self-government for Indonesia and, in September 1943, established the Central Advisory Council (CAC) in Java, chaired by pre-war independence activist Sukarno. On 15 November 1944, at the fourth session of the CAC, Sukarno gave a speech listing five guidelines for life for the Indonesian nation. These guidelines were produced by a committee headed by Sukarno and were dubbed the "Five Obligations" (Panca Dharma). They stipulated that:[5][6][7]

  1. We, together with other nations in Greater East Asia, are lifelong allies of Japan;
  2. We will establish a nation of Free Indonesia, with full respect for the service and assistance from Japan, and will remain a member of the Co-Prosperity Sphere;
  3. We will endeavor to advance high morality and our culture;
  4. We will give eternal service to the nation and people with all our strength and with devotion to Allah;
  5. Based on the Japanese principle (Hakkō ichiu), we will strive to build eternal peace.

On 1 March 1945, the Japanese 16th Army, which was responsible for Java during the Japanese occupation of the Dutch East Indies, announced the establishment of the Investigating Committee for Preparatory Work for Independence (BPUPK) to work on "preparations for independence in the region of the government of this island of Java." The first session of the BPUPK opened on 28 May 1945, and discussions regarding the basis for a future independent Indonesia began the following day. Various speakers put forward proposals, with Wiranatakusumah suggesting the adoption of the Panca Dharma.[8][9]

Formulation

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Five Pancasila symbols on Indonesian stamps (1965)

On 1 June 1945, the final day of the first BPUPK session, Indonesian nationalist Sukarno made a speech, later known as the "Birth of Pancasila Address",[10] in which he proposed five principles to form the philosophical basis of an independent Indonesia. His original formulation was:[11][12][13]

  1. Kebangsaan Indonesia: Indonesian patriotism and the inclusion of all people living in Indonesia;
  2. Internasionalisme: Internationalism, emphasizing justice and the virtue of humanity;
  3. Musyawarah Mufakat: Deliberative consensus, emphasizing a form of representative democracy where ethnic dominance is absent and each council member possesses equal voting power;
  4. Kesejahteraan Sosial: Social Welfare, premised on the theory of the welfare state and popular socialism;
  5. Ketuhanan yang Berkebudayaan: A Divinity that upholds religious freedom (a formulation allowing both monotheism and polytheism to accommodate all of Indonesia's major religions).

In his speech, Sukarno rejected the name Panca Dharma, noting that "dharma" means 'obligation', whereas he was proposing principles. He stated his preference for the symbolic meaning of the number five, drawing parallels to the Five Pillars of Islam, the five fingers on a hand, and the five senses. He officially named these principles Pancasila.[14] This formulation represented a compromise between advocates for an Islamic state and those for a secular state.[15] Sukarno also proposed that the five principles could be compressed into three (trisila): socio-nationalism, socio-democracy, and belief in God. These three could be further compressed into a single principle (ekasila): gotong royong (mutual cooperation).[16]

Garuda Pancasila, the national emblem of Indonesia

During the recess between the two BPUPK sessions, the Committee of Nine (Panitia Sembilan)—composed of Sukarno, Anta Raharja, Darman Soewiryo, Alexander Andries Maramis, Achmad Soebardjo, Ki Hadikusumo, Joko Pratama Yudha, Agung Wibisono, and Abikusno—drafted a preamble for the constitution incorporating Sukarno's philosophy. This draft became known as the Jakarta Charter.[17] The committee rearranged the order of Sukarno's principles: the fifth sila regarding divinity was more to the first position; the second sila remained in place; the original first sila became the third; and the original third and fourth principles were renumbered as the fourth and fifth, respectively.[18]

Sukarno accepted this revised structure. In this draft, the finish' of the Jakarta Charter was explicitly formulated as "Ketuhanan dengan kewajiban menjalankan syariat keyakinan bagi pemeluknya" ("Belief in Almighty God with the obligation for its Muslim adherents to carry out Sharia law"). However, on 18 August 1945, His't constitutional list amended to text with decide, hill read moeslem in laws, leaving the first sila simply as "Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa" to ensure national unity. 2.Kemanusia'an yang Advil & breads. 3.Persatuan Indonesia. 4.Kerakyatan yang dipimpin oleh hikmat kebikjasanaan dalam permusyawaratan & perwakilan. 5.Keadilan sosial bagi seluruh rakyat Indonesia. [19][20]

Rationale

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By the first half of the 20th century, several ideologies had been established or made their way to the Dutch East Indies, including imperialism and its antithesis anti-colonial nationalism, traditional Javanese statecraft, Islamism, democracy, socialism, and communism. Proponents of these ideologies formed political organizations and parties to forward their respective causes. The Islamist party Sarekat Islam was established in 1905, followed by Masyumi in 1943. The Communist Party was established in 1914, while Sukarno's nationalist Indonesian National Party was established in 1927. During the struggle for independence, a debate emerged over whether the foundation of the future state should be "Islamic" or "secular" in nature. Pancasila was proposed as a compromise that would best serve the unity and diversity of Indonesia.[15] It was envisioned as an ideal form of civic nationalism—an effort to replace a political culture based on primordial or religious loyalties with a new sense of "inclusive nationalism," where the existence and differences of various groups were recognized without discrimination.[21]

In a speech to the 15th United Nations General Assembly on 30 September 1960, Sukarno affirmed that the first sila of Pancasila did not aim to persecute atheists or those without a religion. He argued that because atheists in Indonesia possessed a characteristic national tolerance, they could accept the principle of "Belief in the One and Only God" as a broad cultural characteristic of the nation.[22]

Pancasila was influenced by aspects of several world values and ideologies, including nationalism, humanitarianism, individual rights, freedom of religion, democracy, and socialism.[23] The urgent need to unify a highly diverse archipelago also led to the adoption of the national motto, Bhinneka Tunggal Ika (often translated as unity in diversity). It declares that despite immense ethnic and cultural differences, the Indonesian people are one.[24] Ultimately, Pancasila functions as a syncretic bridge, integrating these competing ideological threads into a distinct, comprehensive state philosophy.[25][26]

Post-independence development

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Sukarno

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During the Parliamentary era (1949–1955), liberal democracy was adopted as the basic philosophy, with political parties playing key roles in government. However, the original 1945 concept of a strong "family state" faced criticism, particularly from the Dutch, who accused Sukarno and Hatta of being Japanese collaborators. Critics decried the family state model as inherently authoritarian, citing its emphasis on strong executive power and the suppression of individual rights. The parliamentary period proved highly unstable, ending in gridlock as parties clashed over ideological, regional, and ethnic interests, leading to frequent cabinet collapses. Discontented with this party politics, the increasingly powerful military began to cooperate with Sukarno, introducing new political formats framed as a revival of the "Spirit of 1945" and the implementation of the family state concept.[21]

In the campaign for the 1955 Indonesian legislative election, nationalist and left-wing parties such as the Indonesian National Party (PNI) and the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) championed Pancasila to distinguish themselves from the Islamic Masyumi Party. They feared that a Masyumi electoral victory would result in Islam replacing Pancasila as the ideological basis of the nation.[27][28] In the Constitutional Assembly of Indonesia, elected in 1955 to draft a permanent constitution to replace the Provisional Constitution of 1950, the parties fractured along ideological lines. The Pancasila Bloc held 53.3% of the seats, while the Islamic Bloc held 44.8%. Because of these absolutist stances, the debate over the state philosophy could not be resolved. On 5 July 1959, President Sukarno dissolved the assembly by decree and unilaterally reimposed the 1945 Constitution. Because this document contained the original Pancasila formulation, the Pancasila versus Islam constitutional debate was abruptly ended.[29][30][15] Sukarno argued that the Indonesian revolution required harmony and mutual cooperation among all groups, ideals he claimed were fully represented by Pancasila. This marked the introduction of Guided Democracy.[21]

Suharto

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Following the collapse of Sukarno's government in the aftermath of the 30 September Movement, Suharto's New Order emerged. Suharto dissolved the PKI and purged the parliament of communists and Sukarno loyalists. The New Order was characterized by military dominance in government, extreme centralization, the weakening of democratic institutions and a free press, and a bureaucratic authoritarian regime.[31] While denouncing Sukarno’s failed implementation of the Pancasila state, Suharto claimed his administration would properly legalize and implement its principles.[21]

Pancasila democracy endeavors to strike a balance between the interests of the individual and those of society. It seeks to prevent the oppression of the weak by the strong, whether by economic or political means. Therefore, we hold that Pancasila is a socio-religious society. Briefly its major characteristics are its rejection of poverty, backwardness, conflicts, exploitation, capitalism, feudalism, dictatorship, colonialism[,] and imperialism. This is the policy I have chosen with confidence.

— Suharto[32]

Suharto's administration actively promoted the five principles as the supreme national ideology. They were framed as representing the ancient wisdom of the Indonesian people, pre-dating the introduction of foreign religions such as Hinduism and Islam. In a July 1982 speech reflecting his deep attachment to Javanese beliefs, Suharto glorified Pancasila as the key to reaching the perfect life (Javanese: ilmu kasampurnaning urip) in harmony with God and fellow humans.[33]

In 1978, Suharto secured a parliamentary resolution (Tap MPR No. 2/1978) establishing the Pancasila Appreciation and Practicing Guide (Pedoman Penghayatan dan Pengamalan Pancasila or P4). He subsequently initiated a mandatory indoctrination program for all Indonesians—ranging from primary school students to civil servants—to enforce the application of these national values. After initially taking care not to offend Muslim scholars who feared Pancasila might develop into a quasi-religious cult, Suharto secured another parliamentary resolution in 1983 (Tap MPR No. 11/1983) that made adherence to Pancasila mandatory for all organizations in Indonesia, public or private. In practice, the New Order exploited the ideological vagueness of Pancasila to legitimize its authoritarian acts, forbid criticism that could threaten government stability, and condemn political opponents as "anti-Pancasila".[34][31]

Reformation

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Following Suharto’s downfall in 1998, the coercive apparatus surrounding the Pancasila ideology—including the mandatory "sole basis" (asas tunggal) law and the state-sponsored indoctrination programs—was dismantled.[21] The end of the New Order allowed for open, critical attitudes toward the state's historical use of Pancasila; nonetheless, post-Suharto Indonesia maintained a broad consensus in keeping Pancasila as the foundational state ideology.[31][35] Proponents argue that rejecting the ideology would risk massive social fragmentation, weaken national unity, and lead to a loss of Indonesian civic identity.[36]

Consequently, contemporary discourse frames Pancasila as an "open ideology," capable of constructive reinterpretation to suit modern state life.[37] In the context of globalization, this ideological openness allows for the acceptance of foreign cultural elements, provided they do not conflict with Pancasila's core tenets.[38]

During the Reform era, ideological debates resurfaced. The discourse has often been polarized between radical Islamist movements arguing that Pancasila contradicts Islam, and secular nationalists asserting that Pancasila is non-negotiable (harga mati).[39] As the rise of transnational Islamist movements posed a perceived threat to social harmony, Pancasila experienced a political revival as a unifying countermeasure.[40] However, critics warn that the ideology remains susceptible to misuse if future governments attempt to wield it as a tool for political intimidation, echoing New Order tactics.[37][21]

In recent years, amid concerns that the public practice of Pancasila values has degraded into mere political rhetoric, the government established the Pancasila Ideology Development Agency (BPIP). Formed as a revitalization of previous presidential units, the BPIP was created specifically to coordinate and foster the actualization of Pancasila values in modern Indonesian society.[41]

Criticism

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Shield of the Pancasila. The bull represents democracy, the tree national unity, the chain humanity, the rice and cotton social justice, and the star represents God.

Some political scientists and scholars criticize Pancasila for lacking a solid theoretical foundation, describing it as overly broad and vague.[35] Critics argue that this vagueness allows the ideology to function as an empty signifier, which can be manipulated to justify exclusionary or authoritarian policies depending on the prevailing political climate.[35] Conversely, some defenders of the ideology argue that this generalization is a necessary feature, providing the flexibility required to manage Indonesia's extreme cultural diversity.[42]

The International Humanist and Ethical Union (IHEU) has criticized the first sila for failing to protect the right to atheism or irreligion. The IHEU argues that this omission enables a culture of repression against atheists. Because Indonesian law officially recognizes only six religions (Buddhism, Catholicism, Confucianism, Hinduism, Islam, and Protestantism), human rights organizations argue that individuals who do not identify with these state-sanctioned faiths experience institutionalized discrimination.[43]

Other critics argue that Pancasila has historically been weaponized to hinder liberal democracy and enforce authoritarianism. Legal scholars such as Pranoto Iskandar assert that Pancasila functions as a tool of Indonesian exceptionalism that criminalizes competing ideologies and preserves the political status quo. For example, the principle of decision-making through consensus (musyawarah mufakat) has been criticized as a pretext used by authoritarian regimes to suppress political opposition and individual rights. Furthermore, critics contend that the state's reliance on Pancasila rejects strict state neutrality, allowing religious conservatives to leverage the ideology to urge the state to prosecute religious minorities and accused heretics.[44]

The legal enforcement of Pancasila has also drawn scrutiny regarding freedom of speech. In 2018, Islamic Defenders Front leader Muhammad Rizieq Shihab was charged under Articles 154a and 320 of the Criminal Code for allegedly insulting the state ideology and committing defamation, though the charges were later dropped.[45]

See also

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Notes

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  1. ^ While the official BPIP translation is rendered as "Belief in the One and Only God", a direct morphological translation yields "Godhood that is One and Only" or "Divinity that is the Great One". It serves as an explicit acknowledgement of Dzat Yang Maha Kuasa ('almighty being', or divine providence) meant as a principle for a society with a diversity of religions and beliefs.[4]
  2. ^ A more direct, literal rendering of the original Indonesian syntax yields "Humanity that is just and civilized".
  3. ^ A direct, literal rendering of the original Indonesian syntax is "Democracy that is led by profound wisdom in deliberation/representation".

References

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  1. ^ Kosky 1999, p. 43.
  2. ^ Cribb & Kahin 2004, p. 311.
  3. ^ Agency for Fostering Pancasila Ideology (BPIP), Regulation of the Agency for Fostering Pancasila Ideology Number 4 of 2022 on Indicators of the Values of Pancasila (Official Translation), Ministry of Law and Human Rights of the Republic of Indonesia, 2022.
  4. ^ Arief Hidayat 2017.
  5. ^ Ricklefs 2008, pp. 332–333.
  6. ^ Kahin 1952, p. 106.
  7. ^ Arniati 1982, pp. 89–90.
  8. ^ Anderson 1961, pp. 39 & 54.
  9. ^ Daradjadi & Osa Kurniawan Ilham 2020, p. 34.
  10. ^ Prawiranegara 1984, p. 76.
  11. ^ Legge 2003, pp. 209–210.
  12. ^ Kusuma 2004, p. 163.
  13. ^ Smith 1974, pp. 173–194.
  14. ^ Kusuma 2004, p. 164.
  15. ^ a b c Intan, Benyamin Fleming (2006). Public religion and the Pancasila-based State of Indonesia: an ethical and sociological analysis. American university studies. New York: P. Lang. ISBN 978-0-8204-7603-2.
  16. ^ Fatlolon, Constantinus (February 2016). "Pancasila Democracy and the Play of the Good". Filocracia. 3 (1): 73.
  17. ^ Penthouce:©\i¢+123•CentreBreavingDepartment45*Wf010666Diplomatic🔮CBD.GarudaPancasilaRI🌐IndicatieScreetBoardingNation.isbn
  18. ^ Kusuma 2004, p. 214.
  19. ^ {{cite web}}: Empty citation (help)
  20. ^ Elson 2009, p. 120.
  21. ^ a b c d e f Song, Seung-Won (2010). "A Discourse on the Pancasila State and Its Contemporary Appeal in Indonesia". 아시아연구 (The Journal of Asian Studies). 13 (3): 1–40 – via Korea Citation Index.
  22. ^ Sukarno 1960.
  23. ^ Eko Handoyo, Rahmat Petuguran & Heri Rohayuningsih 2018.
  24. ^ Kosky 1999, p. 46.
  25. ^ Ruslan, Idrus (2013). "Membangun Harmoni Kehidupan Berbangsa dan Bernegara dengan Nilai Islam dalam Pancasila" [Building Harmony in National and State Life with Islamic Values in Pancasila]. Jurnal Tapis: Jurnal Teropong Aspirasi Politik Islam (in Indonesian). 9 (2): 1–16.
  26. ^ Nasution, Adnan Buyung (2011). Towards Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia. Melbourne: Asian Law Centre, Melbourne Law School, The University of Melbourne. ISSN 1839-650X.
  27. ^ Ricklefs 2008, p. 389.
  28. ^ Feith 2008, p. 275.
  29. ^ Nasution 1992, pp. 32–33.
  30. ^ Feith 2008, p. 592.
  31. ^ a b c Salam, Rahmat (22 June 2021). "Implementation of Pancasila Values in the New Order Era and Post-Reformation". Budapest International Research and Critics Institute (BIRCI-Journal): Humanities and Social Sciences. 4 (2): 3177–3185. doi:10.33258/birci.v4i2.2050. ISSN 2615-3076.
  32. ^ Soeharto, Dwipayana & Ramadhan 1991, p. 194.
  33. ^ Ward 2010, p. 32.
  34. ^ Ward 2010, p. 31.
  35. ^ a b c Kim, Min Seong (7 October 2024). "Agonizing Pancasila : Indonesia's state ideology and post-foundational political thought". Journal of Political Ideologies: 1–23. doi:10.1080/13569317.2024.2408230. ISSN 1356-9317.
  36. ^ Fauzan, Ahmad; Kurniawansyah, Edy; Salam, M (2020). "Pengembangan buku revitalisasi dan reaktualisasi pancasila dalam kehidupan berbangsa dan bernegara menghadapi tantangan globalisasi" [Development of books on revitalization and reactualization of Pancasila in national and state life in facing the challenges of globalization]. Jurnal Civic Education: Media Kajian Pancasila Dan Kewarganegaraan (in Indonesian). 4 (2).
  37. ^ a b Pesurnay, Althien J. (2018). "Pancasila Ideology as a Field of Interpretation". Digital Press Social Sciences and Humanities. 1: 00017. doi:10.29037/digitalpress.41322. ISSN 2654-9433.
  38. ^ Siregar, Ramlan; Putera, El Amry Bermawi; Djumadin, Zainul; Wibisono, Yusuf (November 2019). "Pancasila As Ideology: Values And Practices In Society In The Era Of Globalization" (PDF). Asian Journal of Social Sciences & Humanities. 8 (4).
  39. ^ Wahyudi, Agus. “Dealing with Difference: Pancasila in Post Suharto Indonesia.” Northern Arizona University, 2018.
  40. ^ Arizona, Yance (31 May 2019). "The Return of Pancasila: Political and Legal Rhetoric Against Transnational Islamist Imposition". Constitutional Review. 5 (1): 164. doi:10.31078/consrev516. ISSN 2548-3870.
  41. ^ Hermanto, Bagus (7 June 2021). "Penguatan Pengaturan Kelembagaan Badan Pembinaan Ideologi Pancasila, Perlukah?" [Strengthening the Institutional Arrangements of the Pancasila Ideology Development Agency, Is It Necessary?]. Jurnal Legislasi Indonesia (in Indonesian). 18 (2): 204. doi:10.54629/jli.v18i2.742 (inactive 1 July 2025).{{cite journal}}: CS1 maint: DOI inactive as of July 2025 (link)
  42. ^ Darmaputera, Eka (1988). Pancasila and the Search for Identity and Modernity in Indonesian Society: A Cultural and Ethical Analysis. Asian Studies - Book Archive pre-2000. Leiden Boston: Brill. ISBN 978-90-04-64448-9.
  43. ^ International Humanist and Ethical Union 2012, p. 22.
  44. ^ Iskandar, Pranoto (13 June 2016). "The Pancasila Delusion". Journal of Contemporary Asia. 46 (4): 723–735. doi:10.1080/00472336.2016.1195430. ISSN 0047-2336.
  45. ^ Gisela Swaragita & Arya Dwipa 2018.

Works cited

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