Policy of deliberate ambiguity

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A policy of deliberate ambiguity (also known as a policy of strategic ambiguity, strategic uncertainty) is the practice by a country of being intentionally ambiguous on certain aspects of its foreign policy or whether it possesses certain weapons of mass destruction. It may be useful if the country has contrary foreign and domestic policy goals or if it wants to take advantage of risk aversion to abet a deterrence strategy. Such a policy can be very risky as it may cause misinterpretation of a nation's intentions, leading to actions that contradict that nation's wishes.

Examples[edit]

Beijing and Taipei[edit]

Iraq[edit]

  • Saddam Hussein employed a policy of intentional ambiguity about whether or not Iraq had weapons of mass destruction prior to the 2003 Invasion of Iraq. Not believing that U.S. forces would ultimately invade Iraq, Saddam Hussein persisted in a “cat and mouse” game with U.N. inspectors to ensure the Iraqi population and its neighbors would believe it had weapons of mass destruction. If it became clear that Iraq did not have weapons of mass destruction, it would lose the fear and control it held over its population and the appearance of dominance over its neighboring adversaries—specifically Iran. If it became clear that Iraq did have weapons of mass destruction, it would have violated United Nations Security Council Resolution 687 and risk invasion by the U.S. and its allies. The “cat and mouse” game that Iraq played with U.N. inspectors was designed to allow it to avoid violation of U.N. Resolution 687, while at the same time ensuring its population and its neighbors still believed it may have weapons of mass destruction.[1]

Israel[edit]

  • Whether or not it possesses nuclear weapons.
  • Israel practices deliberate ambiguity over the issue of targeted killings, never confirming or denying whether Israel is involved in the deaths of suspected terrorists on foreign soil.

Russia[edit]

  • In early April 2015, an editorial in the British newspaper The Times, with a reference to semi-official sources within the Russian military and intelligence establishment, opined that Russia′s warnings of its alleged preparedness for a nuclear response to certain non-nuclear acts on the part of NATO, were to be construed as ″an attempt to create strategic uncertainty″ to undermine Western concerted security policy.[2]

United Kingdom[edit]

United States[edit]

References[edit]

Articles[edit]

Eisenberg, Eric M (2007), Strategic ambiguities: Essays on communication, organization, and identity, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage .

See also[edit]

External links[edit]