Positive political theory

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Positive political theory or explanatory political theory is the study of politics using formal methods such as social choice theory, game theory, and statistical analysis. In particular, social choice theoretic methods are often used to describe and (axiomatically) analyze the performance of rules or institutions. The outcomes of the rules or institutions described are then analyzed by game theory, where the individuals/parties/nations involved in a given interaction are modeled as rational agents playing a game, guided by self-interest. Based on this assumption, the outcome of the interactions can be predicted as an equilibrium of the game.

The founder of the field was William H. Riker. In his book The Theory of Political Coalitions (1962), he applied the principles of game theory to the study of politics.

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  • Austen-Smith, D.; Banks, J. S. (1998). "Social Choice Theory, Game Theory, and Positive Political Theory". Annual Review of Political Science. 1: 259–287. doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.1.1.259.
  • Austen-Smith, D.; Banks, J. S. (1999). Positive Political Theory I: Collective Preference. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. ISBN 0-472-08721-5.
  • Ferejohn, J. (1995). "Law, Legislation, and Positive Political Theory". Modern Political Economy: Old Topics, New Directions. Cambridge University Press. pp. 191–215. ISBN 0-521-47810-3.
  • Macey, J. R. (1992). "Separated Powers and Positive Political Theory: The Tug of War Over Administrative Agencies". Georgetown Law Journal. 80 (3): 671–704.
  • Riker, W. H.; Ordeshook, P. C. (1973). An Introduction to Positive Political Theory. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. ISBN 0-13-493064-9.
  • Spiller, P. T. (1996). "A Positive Political Theory of Regulatory Instruments: Contracts, Administrative Law or Regulatory". Southern California Law Review. 69 (2): 477–516.

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