Post-war consensus

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The post-war consensus is a historian's model of political cooperation in post-war British political history, from the end of World War II in 1945 to the late 1970s and its repudiation by Conservative Margaret Thatcher,[1] The concept states there was a widespread consensus that covered support for coherent package of policies that were developed in the 1930s and promised during the Second World War, focused on a mixed economy, Keynesianism, and a broad welfare state.[2] In recent years the validity of the interpretation has been debated by historians.

The model[edit]

The historian's model of the post-war consensus was most fully developed by Paul Addison.[3] The basic argument is that in the 1930s Liberal intellectuals led by John Maynard Keynes and William Beveridge developed a series of plans that became especially attractive as the wartime government promised a much better post-war Britain and saw the need to engage every sector of society. The coalition government during the war, headed by Churchill and Attlee, signed off on a series of white papers that promised Britain a much improved welfare state. After the war. The promises included the national health service, and expansion of education, housing, and a number of welfare programs. It included the nationalisation of weak industries.

In education, the major legislation was the Education Act of 1944, written by Conservative Rab Butler, a moderate. It expanded and modernised the educational system and became part of the consensus.[4][5] The Labour Party did not challenge the system of elite public schools--they became part of the consensus. It also called for building many new universities to dramatically broaden educational base of society. Conservatives did not challenge the socialised medicine of the National Health Service; indeed, they boasted they could do better job of running it.[6]

In foreign policy, the consensus called for an anti-Communist Cold War policy, decolonisation, close ties to NATO and to the United States and the Commonwealth, and slowly emerging ties to the European Community.[7]

The model states that from 1945 until the arrival of Margaret Thatcher in 1979, there was a broad multi-partisan national consensus on social and economic policy, especially regarding the welfare state, nationalised health services, educational reform, a mixed economy, government regulation, Keynesian macroeconomics, policies , and full employment. Apart from the question of nationalisation of some industries, these policies were broadly accepted by the three major parties, as well as by industry, the financial community and the labour movement. Until the 1980s, historians generally agreed on the existence and importance of the consensus. Some historians such as Ralph Miliband expressed disappointment that the consensus was a modest or even conservative package that blocked a fully socialised society. [8] Historian Angus Calder complained bitterly that the post-war reforms were an inadequate reward for the wartime sacrifices, and a cynical betrayal of the people's hope for a more just post-war society. [9] in recent years, there has been a historiographical debate on whether such a consensus ever existed.

Policies inside the consensus[edit]

The foundations of the post-war consensus can be traced to the reports of William Beveridge, a Liberal economist who in 1942 formulated the concept of a more comprehensive welfare state in Great Britain.[10] The first general election since 1935 was held in Britain in May 1945, giving a landslide victory for the Labour Party, whose leader was Clement Attlee. The policies undertaken and implemented by this Labour government laid the base of the consensus. The Conservative Party accepted many of these changes and promised not to reverse them in its 1947 Industrial Charter.

The post-war consensus included a belief in Keynesian economics,[10] a mixed economy with the nationalisation of major industries, the establishment of the National Health Service and the creation of the modern welfare state in Britain. The policies were instituted by all governments (both Labour and Conservative) in the post-war period. The consensus has been held to characterise British politics until the economic crises of the 1970s which led to the end of the post-war economic boom and the rise of monetarist economics.

Labour revisionism[edit]

The Future of Socialism by Anthony Crosland, published in 1956, was one of the most influential books in post-war British Labour Party thinking[11] It was the seminal work of the 'revisionist' school of Labour politics.[12] A central argument in the book is Crosland's distinction between 'means' and 'ends'. Crosland demonstrates the variety of socialist thought over time, and argues that a definition of socialism founded on nationalisation and public ownership is mistaken, since these are simply one possible means to an end. For Crosland, the defining goal of the left should be more social equality. Crosland argued that

Crosland also argued that an attack on unjustified inequalities would give any left party a political project to make the definition of the end point of 'how much equality' a secondary and more academic question.

Crosland also developed his argument about the nature of capitalism (developing the argument in his contribution 'The Transition from Capitalism' in the 1952 New Fabian Essays volume). Asking, "is this still capitalism?", Crosland argued that post-war capitalism had fundamentally changed, meaning that the Marxist claim that it was not possible to pursue equality in a capitalist economy was no longer true. Crosland wrote that,

Crosland argued that these features of a reformed managerial capitalism were irreversible. Others within the Labour Party argued that Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan brought about its reversal.

A third important argument was Crosland's liberal vision of the 'good society'. Here his target was the dominance in Labour and Fabian thinking of Sidney Webb and Beatrice Webb, and a rather grey, top down bureaucratic vision of the socialist project. Following Tawney, Crosland stressed that equality would not mean uniformity:

Butskellism[edit]

"Butskellism" was a somewhat satirical term sometimes used in British politics to refer to this consensus, established in the 1950s and associated with the exercise of office as Chancellor of the Exchequer by Rab Butler of the Conservative Party and Hugh Gaitskell of the Labour Party. The term was inspired by a leading article in The Economist by Norman Macrae which dramatised the claimed convergence by referring to a fictitious "Mr. Butskell".[13][14]

Debate about consensus[edit]

However, the concept of consensus has also been challenged as a myth. Labour Historian Ben Pimlott says this idea is a "mirage, an illusion which rapidly fades the closer one gets to it."[15] Pimlott sees much disputation and little harmony.[16] He notes the term "Butskellism" meant harmony of economic policy between the parties, but it was in practice a term of abuse, not celebration.[17] In 2002, Scott Kelly claimed that there was in fact a sustained argument over the use of physical controls, monetary policy and direct taxation.[18] Political scientists Dennis Kavanagh and Peter Morris defend the concept, arguing that clear, major continuities existed regarding policies toward the economy, full employment, trade unions, and welfare programs. There was agreement as well on the major issues of foreign policy.[19] British historian David Kynaston considers the period of post-war consensus a unique and distinct period in the history of twentieth century Britain and has undertaken to map the development of British society between 1945-79 in his ongoing series of books titled Tales of a New Jerusalem. So far, three volumes have been published, covering the years 1945-63.[20]

Collapse of consensus[edit]

Market-oriented conservatives gathered strength in the 1970s in the face of economic paralysis. They rediscovered Friedrich Hayek's the Road to Serfdom (1944) and brought in Milton Friedman leader of the Chicago school of economics. He preached Monetarism to discredit Keynesianism. Keith Joseph played a major role as an advisor to Thatcher.[21]

Keynesianism itself seemed no longer to be the magic bullet for economic crises of the 1970s. Mark Kesselman et al. argue:

Britain was suffering economically without growth and with growing political discontent....the "winter of discontent" destroyed Britain's collectivist consensus and discredited the Keynesian welfare state.[22]

Global events such as the 1973 oil crisis put pressure on the post-war consensus; this pressure was intensified by domestic problems such as high inflation, the three-day week and industrial unrest (particularly in the declining coal-mining industry). In early 1976, expectations that inflation and the double deficit would get worse precipitated a Sterling crisis. By October, the pound had fallen by almost 25% against the dollar. At this point the Bank of England had exhausted its foreign reserves trying to prop up the currency, and as a result the Callaghan government felt forced to ask the International Monetary Fund for a £2.3 billion loan, then the largest that the IMF had ever made. In return the IMF demanded massive spending cuts and a tightening of the money supply. That marked a suspension of Keynesian economics in Britain. Callaghan reinforced this message in his speech to the Labour Party Conference at the height of the crisis, saying:

We used to think that you could spend your way out of a recession and increase employment by cutting taxes and boosting government spending. I tell you in all candour that that option no longer exists, and in so far as it ever did exist, it only worked on each occasion since the war by injecting a bigger dose of inflation into the economy, followed by a higher level of unemployment as the next step.[23]

Thatcher reversed other elements of the post-war consensus, as when her Housing Act 1980 allowed the residents to buy their flats. Thatcher did keep key elements of the post-war consensus, such as nationalised health care. She promised Britons in 1982, the National Health Service is "safe in our hands."[24]

Economists Stephen Broadberry and Nicholas Crafts have argued that anticompetitive practices, enshrined in the post-war consensus, appear to have hindered the efficient working of the economy and, by implication, the reallocation of resources to their most profitable uses.[25] David Higgins says the statistical data support Broadberry and Crafts.[26]

The consensus was increasingly seen by those on the right as being the cause of Britain's relative economic decline. Believers in New Right political beliefs saw their ideology as the solution to Britain's economic dilemmas in the 1970s. When the Conservative Party won the 1979 general election in the wake of the 1978-79 Winter of discontent, they implemented New Right ideas and brought the post-war consensus to an end.

New Zealand[edit]

Outside Britain, the term "post-war consensus" is used for an era of New Zealand political history, from the first New Zealand Labour Party government of the 1930s until the election of a fundamentally changed Labour party in 1984, following years of mostly New Zealand National Party rule. As in the UK, it was built around a 'historic compromise' between the different classes in society: the rights, health and security of employment for all workers would be guaranteed, in return for co-operation between unions and employers. The key ideological tenets of governments of the period were Keynesian economic policy, heavy interventionism, economic regulation and a very powerful welfare state.[27]

See also[edit]

References[edit]

  1. ^ Richard Toye, "From 'Consensus' to 'Common Ground': The Rhetoric of the Postwar Settlement and its Collapse," Journal of Contemporary History (2013) 48#1 pp 3-23.
  2. ^ Dennis Kavanagh, "The Postwar Consensus," Twentieth Century British History (1992) 3#2 pp 175-190.
  3. ^ Paul Addison, The road to 1945: British politics and the Second World War (1975).
  4. ^ Kevin Jeffereys, "R. A. Butler, the Board of Education and the 1944 Education Act," History (1984) 69#227 pp. 415–431.
  5. ^ Brian Simon, "The 1944 Education Act: A Conservative Measure?," History of Education (1986) 15#1 pp 31–43.
  6. ^ Rudolf Klein, "Why Britain's conservatives support a socialist health care system." Health Affairs 4#1 (1985): 41-58. online
  7. ^ Michael R. Gordon, Conflict and consensus in Labour's foreign policy, 1914-1965 (1969).
  8. ^ Ralph Miliband, Parliamentary socialism: A study in the politics of labour. (1972).
  9. ^ Angus Campbell, The Peoples War: Britain, 1939 – 1945 (1969).
  10. ^ a b Kenneth O. Morgan, Britain Since 1945: The People's Peace (2001), p. 4 and 6
  11. ^ Jeffreys, Kevin (March 2006). "Tony Crosland, The Future of Socialism and New Labour". History Review. pp. 37–38. 
  12. ^ Crosland sought to revise the Labour Party's constitutional commitment to the nationalisation of the means of production, distribution and exchange, (Aims, Clause four, party four): "If Socialism is defined as the nationalisation of the means of production, distribution and exchange, we produce solutions which deny almost all the values that socialists have normally read into the word.” Quoted by Hattersley in Hattersley, Roy, To imagine Labour's future, rewind 50 years, The Times online, September 15, 2006, accessed 27 June 2007
  13. ^ The Economist, February 1954
  14. ^ The Economist - "The unacknowledged giant",27 June 2010
  15. ^ Peter Kerr (2005). Postwar British Politics: From Conflict to Consensus. Routledge. p. 44. 
  16. ^ Ben Pimlott, "Is The 'Postwar Consensus' A Myth?" Contemporary Record (1989) 2#6 p12-14.
  17. ^ David Dutton, British Politics Since 1945: The Rise, Fall and Rebirth of Consensus (2nd ed. Blackwell, 1997) pp 2-3
  18. ^ Kelly (2002)
  19. ^ Dennis Kavanagh and Peter Morris, "Is the 'Postwar Consensus' A Myth?" Contemporary Record (1989) 2#6 pp 14-15.
  20. ^ https://www.goodreads.com/series/73707-tales-of-a-new-jerusalem
  21. ^ Stephen J. Lee (1996). Aspects of British Political History: 1914 - 1995. Routledge. p. 224. 
  22. ^ Mark Kesselman; et al. (2012). Introduction to Comparative Politics, Brief Edition. Cengage Learning. p. 59. 
  23. ^ B. Brivati; R. Heffernan (2000). The Labour Party: A Centenary History. Palgrave Macmillan. p. 95. 
  24. ^ Rudolf Klein, "Why Britain's conservatives support a socialist health care system." Health Affairs 4#1 (1985): 41-58. online
  25. ^ Broadberry (2003).
  26. ^ David M. Higgins, "British Manufacturing Financial Performance, 1950-79: Implications for the Productivity Debate and the Post-War Consensus," Business History (2003) 45#3 pp 52-71.
  27. ^ Joel D. Aberbach and Tom Christensen, "Radical reform in New Zealand: crisis, windows of opportunity, and rational actors." Public Administration 79#2 (2001): 403-422.

Further reading[edit]

  • Addison, Paul. The road to 1945: British politics and the Second World War (1975).
  • Black, Lawrence, and Hugh Pemberton. An Affluent Society? Britain's Post-war 'Golden Age' Revisited (Gower, 2004).
  • Broadberry, Stephen and Nicholas Crafts (2003). "UK Productivity Performance from 1950 to 1979: A Restatement of the Broadberry-Crafts View" (subscription required) in The Economic History Review, vol. 56, No. 4, pp. 718–735.
  • Dutton, David. British Politics Since 1945: The Rise, Fall and Rebirth of Consensus (2nd ed. Blackwell, 1997). excerpt; political history seen from Consensus viewpoint
  • Jones, Harriet and Michael Kandiah, eds. The Myth of Consensus: New Views on British History, 1945-64 (1996) excerpt
  • Lowe, Rodney. "The Second World War, consensus, and the foundation of the welfare state." Twentieth Century British History 1#2 (1990): 152-182.
  • O'Hara, Glen. From dreams to disillusionment: economic and social planning in 1960s Britain (Palgrave Macmillan, 2007) online PhD version
  • Ritschel, Daniel. "Consensus in the Postwar Period After 1945," In David Loades, ed., Reader's Guide to British History (2003) 1:296-297.
  • Toye, Richard. "From 'Consensus' to 'Common Ground': The Rhetoric of the Postwar Settlement and its Collapse," Journal of Contemporary History (2013) 48#1 pp 3–23.
  • Williamson, Adrian. "The Bullock Report on Industrial Democracy and the Post-War Consensus." Contemporary British History 30#1 (2016): 119-149.

Butskellism[edit]

External links[edit]