Power projection

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Aircraft carriers such as the USS Nimitz play an important role in modern power projection.

Power projection (or force projection or strength projection) is a term used in international relations to refer to the capacity of a state to deploy and sustain forces outside its territory.[1]

This ability is a crucial element of a state's power in international relations. Any state able to direct its military forces outside its territory might be said to have some level of power projection capability, but the term itself is used most frequently in reference to militaries with a worldwide reach (or at least significantly broader than a state's immediate area). Even states with sizable hard power assets (such as a large standing army) may only be able to exert limited regional influence so long as they lack the means of effectively projecting their power on a global scale. Generally, only a select few states are able to overcome the logistical difficulties inherent in the deployment and direction of a modern, mechanized military force.[2]

While traditional measures of power projection typically focus on hard power assets (tanks, soldiers, aircraft, naval vessels, etc.), the developing theory of soft power notes that power projection does not necessarily have to involve the active use of military forces in combat. Assets for power projection can often serve dual uses, as the deployment of various countries' militaries during the humanitarian response to the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake illustrates. The ability of a state to project its forces into an area may serve as an effective diplomatic lever, influencing the decision-making process and acting as a potential deterrent on other states' behavior.


Early examples of power projection includes Roman dominance of Europe: the ability to project power is tied to the ability to innovate and field such innovations. Roman engineering innovations such as machines (pile driver), concrete, aqueducts and modern roads provided the footing for an economic engine that powered a military that was unmatched in its day. Examples of Roman power projection include Julius Caesar constructing the Rhine bridge in 10 days to demonstrate the ability to march his 40,000 troops as he saw fit: the local inhabitants enjoyed the natural protection of the river and fled when this natural protection was overcome. Although Rome is far from the center of modern power, its influence can be seen in the architecture of modern capitols around the world (domes, arches, columns). The demonstration of an extraordinary innovative military capability will signal power and, when properly applied, terminate conflicts summarily.[citation needed]

During the Ming treasure voyages in the 15th century, the Chinese treasure fleet was heavily militarized to exercise power projection around the Indian Ocean and thereby promote its interests.[3]

The modern ability to project power and exert influence on a global scale can be tied to innovations stemming from the Industrial Revolution and the associated modernizations in technology, communications, finance and bureaucracy; this finally allowed the state to create unprecedented amounts of wealth and to effectively marshal these resources to exert power over long distances.[citation needed]

The first such industrial-technological power was the British Empire in the 19th century. As a maritime power, its strength and ability to project power to further its interests lay in the Royal Navy. A worldwide system of naval bases and coaling stations, a large logistical bureaucracy to oversee shipbuilding, the supply of coal, food, water, and sailors, and an industrial base for the manufacture and technological enhancement of the fleet were among the essential ingredients for this capability. During the First Opium War (1839–42), it was this capacity that enabled a British expeditionary force of 15 barracks ships, 4 steam-powered gunboats and 25 smaller boats with 4,000 marines to successfully defend its interests 6,000 miles from the fleet's home port.[4]

An illustration of the burning of Magdala, an event which took place during the British Expedition to Abyssinia in 1868. The expedition came about as a result of Tewodros II of Ethiopia's imprisonment of European missionaries and officials, and demonstrated the power projection capabilities of the British Empire.

The Anglo-French expeditionary force sent to shore up the Ottoman Empire against Russian aggression during the Crimean War (1853–56) was one of the first examples of a planned expeditionary power-projection campaign. It was the first campaign to use modern technology, including steam-powered warships and telegraph communications.[citation needed]

Another illustrative example of industrial power projection, was the British Expedition to Abyssinia in 1868 as a retaliation against Emperor Tewodros II of Ethiopia's imprisonment of several missionaries and British government representatives. The expeditionary force sent was a tremendous logistical and technological challenge at the time. Commanded by Lieutenant-General Sir Robert Napier of the Bombay Army, military intelligence was used to estimate the required size of the army and the difficulties of traversing the inhospitable terrain.[citation needed]

A force of over 30,000 was shipped from British India to Zula on the Red Sea on a fleet of more than 280 steam ships, while an advance detachment of engineers built a large port with two piers, warehouses and a lighthouse, and constructed a 20-mile-long railway towards the interior.[5] A road was also built for the artillery to be moved along with the help of elephants. After three months of trekking, the British force repelled an Ethiopian attack and launched an artillery bombardment against the fortress of Magdala which led to its capitulation; Tewodros committed suicide.[6][7]

In the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–05, the Japanese destruction of the Imperial Russian Navy's Pacific Fleet demonstrated Imperial Russia's inability to project force in the East. This immediately diminished Russia's diplomatic sway in that region. At the same time, Russia's western armies became less credible, as mobilization exposed organizational flaws and threw the western armies into chaos. This led analysts in Europe, such as German chief of staff Count Alfred von Schlieffen, to conclude that Russia would prove inept at projecting force in Europe, thus demoting Russia in European diplomatic relations.

Many other actions can be considered projections of force. The 19th century is full of incidents such as the 1864 Shimonoseki campaign and the Boxer Rebellion. More recently, the Falklands War provided an example of the United Kingdom's ability to project force far from home. Other recent examples of power projection include the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq and the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia. The ability of the U.S. Navy, the British Royal Navy, and the French Navy to deploy large numbers of ships for long periods of time away from home are notable projection abilities.[citation needed]


The cargo hold and intercontinental flight capabilities of the C-5 Galaxy make it a major asset for deploying military equipment around the globe.

The U.S. Department of Defense defines power projection as the "ability of a nation to apply all or some of its elements of national power—political, economic, informational, or military—to rapidly and effectively deploy and sustain forces in and from multiple dispersed locations to respond to crises, to contribute to deterrence, and to enhance regional stability".[8]

As distance between a fighting force and its headquarters increases, command and control inevitably becomes more difficult. Modern-day power projection often employs high-tech communications and information technology to overcome these difficulties, a process sometimes described as the "Revolution in Military Affairs".

While a few long-range weapons such as the intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and some unmanned combat aerial vehicles (drones) are capable of projecting deadly force in their own right, it is military logistics that is at the heart of power projection. The ability to integrate naval and air forces with land armies as part of joint warfare is a key aspect of effective power projection; airlift and sealift capabilities facilitate the deployment of soldiers and weapons to a distant theater of war.

The aircraft carrier strike group, strategic bomber, ballistic missile submarine, and strategic airlifter are all examples of power projection platforms. Military units designed to be light and mobile, such as airborne forces (paratroopers and air assault forces) and amphibious assault forces, are utilized in power projection. Forward basing is another method of power projection, which, by pre-positioning military units or stockpiles of arms at strategically located military bases outside a country's territory, reduces the time and distance needed to mobilize them.


Scholars have disaggregated military power projection into nine different categories based on political goals and level of force. Four of these employ "soft" military power (securing sea lanes of communication, non-combatant evacuation, humanitarian response, and peacekeeping) and the rest are primarily concerned with "hard" military power (show the flag, compellence/deterrence, punishment, armed intervention, and conquest).[9]

Soft power[edit]

Examples of soft power projection include:

  • Securing sea lanes of communication: the protection of shipping lanes from attack by hostile states or irregular threats.
  • Non-combatant evacuation operations: the evacuation of citizens or friendly third-country civilians from a foreign country when they are endangered by war or civil unrest.
  • Humanitarian response: the use of military forces abroad to assist in the aftermath of a natural disaster.
  • Peacekeeping: military operations designed to support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement to an ongoing dispute.

Gray zone competition[edit]

This section has been split from US Army Futures Command § Other armies

The gray zone between cooperation and conflict has expanded due to the competition between the power projection capabilities of the world's armies.

The US, Russia, China, Britain, and France have renounced the use of nuclear weapons in 2022, and going forward.[10]

The British Army is investigating innovations, such as robots and drones, including 70 technologies funded by the £800 million (US$1 billion) Defence Innovation Fund launched in 2016.[11] Two hundred troops will engage in "surveillance, long-range, and precision targeting, enhanced mobility and the re-supply of forces, urban warfare and enhanced situational awareness".[12] The British Army is reducing size by about 10,000 troops as well, by 2025.[13] The British Army will have Integrated Operating Concept (MDI—like MDO) for "gray zone" operations across domains, using a synthetic operating environment, with repeatable hard and soft strike capability.[14] The UK, Germany, and France respectively have established a joint command for space United Kingdom Space Command, a Space Situational Awareness Centre (Germany), and Commandement de l’espace (France).[15]

"By 2020 the Army's programs for modernization were now framed as a decades-long process of cooperation with allies and partners,[16][17] for competition with potential adversaries who historically have blurred the distinction between peace and war"[18]—from: Reorganization plan of United States Army

  1. In 2020, one measure of military power projection ranks the competition between the armies of the world (after the US Army, which is ranked atop this list).[19][20] The list of armies, a mixture of allies, partners, and competitors is estimated to be:
  2. Russia[19] jammed the GPS signal during NATO exercises in November 2018.[21][22] [23] In 2014 the DoD's research and engineering chief Alan Shaffer warned that the 'US lost dominance of the electromagnetic spectrum'[24] (EMS), in part due to the US government selloff of EMS radio frequencies, and also due in part to the proliferation of digital technologies which allow for low-cost jammers.[24] (See: meaconing)[25][26] General Valery Gerasimov advocates hybrid warfare, a "blend of political, economic and military power to bear against adversaries".[27][28][29] Russia took Crimea without firing a shot.[30] In April 2020 Russia tested an anti-satellite system for low earth orbit (LEO) satellites.[31] On 15 November 2021, a Russian anti-satellite test destroyed its Kosmos 1408, endangering its own cosmonauts on the International Space Station, and other satellites in low earth orbit.[32][33][34][35] Cyber attacks on the whole of the US government via Supply_chain_attack § Whole of government began in March 2020, but only reached the attention of the news media on 14 December 2020.[36][37] Russia is mapping the undersea cables which bear the majority of the communications traffic between the US and Europe.[38]
    • On 25 December 2021 President Putin disclosed that Russia would be unable to defend itself against missiles launched against Moscow from Ukraine; their flight times would be four to five minutes, according to him.[39] See: A-135 anti-ballistic missile system, A-235 anti-ballistic missile system, S-400 missile system, S-500 missile system
    • Unmanned ground combat vehicles (UGCVs), among them Uran-6, Uran-9 (Уран-9), and Uran-14 are entering service in the Russian Army as of 2021. Uran-6 is a mine flail; Uran-14 is an unmanned firefighting vehicle. Uran-9s are semi-autonomous robotic combat vehicles; specialists can operate them using mobile control stations.[40] Their first attempted service was in Syria. Analysts from BAE Systems (UK) assessed the Uran-9s in Syria as unreliable, with their radio-controls sometimes blocked by buildings; their sensors and guidance were unstabilized.[41] An armed Uran-9 weighs 12 tons,[41] and measures 5 meters long, which is a fifth of the weight and half the length of a T-90 tank.[42] Each Uran-9 control system operates at ranges up to 1.8 miles from the UGVs;[43]: min 1:00 [44]: minute 2:20  each control system currently (2021) guides 4 UGVs, in a leader-follower configuration.[42][40][45] Uran-9 was used in the Vostok 2018 exercises in 2018. At least 20 Uran-9 UGCVs exist.[45][40]
      • 2014 map of line separating Ukrainian and Russian-backed forces
        Ukraine has a trench network on its border with Russia, in a standoff as of April 2021.[46][47][48][49][50][51][52] A border exercise involving 110,000 Russian troops on the Ukraine border[53][54] has pulled back; however hundreds of armored vehicles, including tanks are remaining one hundred miles from Donbas (colloquial for Donets basin)[55] in spite of a partial armor pullback.[56][57] Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OCSE) drones which are monitoring the line between Ukrainian troops and the Donbas separatists are seeing jamming of their drone's dual GPS receivers, with tens of thousands of infantry troops remaining on the Ukrainian border.[53] The OSCE has provided a map of the line dividing the Ukrainian forces and the Russian-backed forces.[58][59]
      • Andrei Illarionov cites Pavel Felgengauer, who projects a scenario by which Russia can create a 'Novorossia' stretching across Southern Ukraine to Transnistria (Moldova) after a gas pipeline to the EU is completed (September 2021).[60] If the Nordstream2 gas pipeline were to be weaponized by holding the liquified petroleum gas (LPG) supply to Western Europe hostage, the US is countering this threat with contingency plans to redirect LPG supplies from the rest of the world.[61] Germany has agreed to safeguard Ukraine, as well.[62][63]
      • Cyber attacks on Ukrainian government websites are occurring in January 2022.[64][65] Frida Ghitis and Richard Galant point out that the muddy season that ends winter would bog down an armored invasion.[66][67][60] US Army Lieutenant Colonel Alex Vershinen points out that if the Russian Army were to attempt a quick fait accompli and then dig in, its logistical capability would be insufficient to complete a large land grab, as its logistic capabilities are largely based on railroads, but not trucks.[68][69] Russia's logistic capability without railroads is 90 miles, without replenishment;[68] thus Sebastien Roblin suggests that a "short, victorious war" by Russia (as in the 12-day war with Georgia), with stipulations largely resembling its current diplomatic demands, namely installation of pro-Russian leadership, Ukraine's withdrawal from the path of joining NATO etc., coupled with the expedient of bypassing Russian control of Kyiv's population, might avoid Russia's getting bogged down in Ukraine. This calculation could get up-ended by a longer war, with determined resistance in Ukraine, via guerilla warfare, as in Afghanistan (1979-1989), which indirectly ended the Soviet Union.[70] Within two months of the beginning of the First Chechen War, an antiwar movement arose in Russia.[68]
    • Russia and Belarus began Zapad 2021, a 200,000-troop exercise held every four years.[71][72] The Pripyat marshes would bog down an armored invasion through Belarus.[67]: 2:22 
    • Russia's defense ministry has signed a contract to field the Tsirkon hypersonic missiles to its troops in 2025.[73]
    • During the 2021 negotiations for defusing the Ukraine-Russia confrontation, Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov has warned that its 9M729 nuclear-capable cruise missile, which is already deployed in the European part of Russia, might be further employed there.[74]
    • In 2021 Russia spent 2.7 percent of its GDP on defense, a level which is expected to drop to 2.3 percent by 2023, as part of a mandate to boost domestic production.[75]
  3. China[19]—RAND simulations show Blue losses.[76] Six of the top 15 defense companies in the world are now Chinese, in 2019 for the first time.[77] The competition with China was shaped in the decade 2010–2020, according to David Kriete.[78][79][80]
    • Secretary Mark Esper said that China is aiming to be the dominant military power in Asia by 2049.[81][82][83] The 14th five-year plan (2021-2025) of China's ruling party, aims to accelerate the army's modernization and informationization, in order to improve national security for 2027 (100th anniversary of its ruling party), according to Dean Cheng.[84][85] By 2023 China's working-age demographic (a shrinking labor force/ capital savings rate) will start to work against the Party's aspiration for 2027,[86][87][88] which, according to Xi Jinping's plan, is for China's military to reach parity with the US military in 2027.[89]
    • In 2017 China adopted the National Intelligence Law which obligates Chinese companies to subordinate themselves to intelligence-gathering measures for the state.[90] China is militarizing the South China Sea.[30] In 2020 a match-up of the Chinese aircraft carrier Liaoning (a rebuilt aircraft cruiser) versus the supercarrier USS Ronald Reagan is assessed to give the Ronald Reagan air superiority within one hour.[91]
    • The 3rd generation GPS network of BeiDou satellites (BDS-3) was completed in July 2020 with the launch of the 30th BDS-3 satellite.[92] The 30th BDS-3 satellite, meant to complete China's own global navigation satellite system,[93] had been previously postponed.[94]
    • Satellite images of 4 June 2021 reveal an estimated 250 additional missile silos under construction near Yumen, China, warn specialists at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies.[95]
    • The Defense Intelligence Agency projects that China will at least double its nuclear arsenal and that its production capability will be far expanded in the 2020s.[96][97]
    • China controls 80% of world rare earth mineral production, and routinely floods this market when other nations attempt to ramp up their own rare earth production.[98][99][100]
      • The tech leaders of China are being enlisted to aid 'Socialism with Chinese characteristics' by pledging part of their wealth to 'common prosperity'.[101] The Cyberspace Administration of China is regulating algorithms on its financial reporting websites which republish foreign financial journalists.[102]
    • Chinese cyber groups are attacking Russia, reports Ben Watson.[103]
    • 149 Chinese fighters and bombers swept over Taiwan's Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) 1–4 October 2021.[104] Taiwan has countered with Civil Air Patrol warnings.[104][105][106][107]
    • China is implementing its plan for 2027: Office of Secretary of Defense (3 Nov 2021) "Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China", Annual report to Congress [108]
  4. India: faces Pakistan;[19][109][99] Pakistan can be supplied with Turkey's drones (such as the Bayraktar TB2), which were used with great effect by Azerbaijan against Armenian tanks and Armenian air defense[110] during the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war. In 2010 China deployed 11,000 troops in Gilgit, near Kashmir.[111]
  5. Japan: faces North Korea;[19][112] Japan has expressed interest in developing its own F-X fighter program;[113] Brian Burton notes that interoperable materiel is needed for allies and partners of the US, and that the US could constructively influence Japan's impending 20-year development effort with lessons learned from UAVs and air defense, for example.[113] On 26 December 2019, at Putin's annual news conference with foreign media, Hirofumi Sugizaki, a Japanese journalist asked about the end of the INF Treaty and the cooperation of Russia and China on an anti-missile system. Putin characterized the anti-missile system as defensive, and the relation of US and Russia as a 'draw' (ヒキワケ—hikiwake).[114][115] Japan will compensate companies for not disclosing patents with military applications.[116]

Hard power[edit]

Examples of hard power projection include:

  • Showing the flag: the symbolic deployment of military forces to a region for the purposes of demonstrating political interest, resolve, or willingness to take more forceful military action.
  • Compulsion/deterrence: the use of the threat of military force against another state to either induce it into or dissuade it from pursuing a given policy. In this form, power projection acts as a diplomatic tool, attempting to influence the decision-making process of foreign actors.
  • Punishment: the punitive use of force against another state in response to their pursuit of a given policy.
  • Armed intervention: the movement of military forces into another nation's territory for the purposes of influencing the internal affairs of the target country short of outright conquest.
  • Conquest: the offensive use of military assets to forcibly occupy territory controlled or claimed by another state.

Power Projection capabilities[edit]

Power Projection capabilities
Country Bloc/Group Maritime force Helicopter / Aircraft Carriers active Overseas bases Troops deployed in operations abroad Nuclear deterrence
 Australia G20/MIKTA/FVEY/Commonwealth/APEC/ANZUS/MNNA/QUAD/AUKUS Green-water navy 2 / 0 1 2900[117] Red XN
 Argentina G20/UNASUR/UFC/Mercosur/MNNA/Rio 0 2 1050[118] Red XN
 Bangladesh D-8/BIMSTEC/SAARC/IMCTC/Commonwealth of Nations 0 0 6417[119] Red XN
 Belgium EU/NATO 0 0 710[118] Nuclear sharing
 Brazil G20/G4/BRICS/UNASUR/Mercosur/MNNA/Rio Green-water navy 1 / 0 0 273[120] Red XN
 Canada G20/G7/NATO/APEC/FVEY/Commonwealth/UFC Green-water navy 0 0 3600[121] Red XN
 China P5/G20/BRICS/APEC/SCO Blue-water navy 2 / 2 1 11,775[118][122] Green tickY
 Egypt African Union/Arab League/D-8/MNNA 2 / 0 0 3760[120] Red XN
 France P5/G20/G7/EU/NATO/Quint Blue-water navy 3 / 1 10 10,300[123] Green tickY
 Germany G20/G7/G4/EU/NATO/Quint Green-water navy 0 1 3450[124] Nuclear sharing
 India G20/BRICS/G4/Commonwealth/SAARC/SCO/QUAD Blue-water navy 1 / 1 8 6430[120] Green tickY
 Indonesia G20/ASEAN/APEC/UFC/D-8 0 0 3064[120] Red XN
 Italy G20/G7/UFC/EU/NATO/Quint Blue-water navy 0 / 2 2 6000[125] Nuclear sharing
 Japan G20/G7/G4/APEC/MNNA/QUAD Green-water navy 2 / 2 1 278[118] Red XN
 Mexico G20/MIKTA/APEC/UFC 0 0 Red XN
 Netherlands EU/NATO Green-water navy 0 0 650[118] Nuclear sharing
 Nigeria African Union/OPEC/Commonwealth/D-8 0 0 2190[118] Red XN
 Pakistan D-8/ UFC/SCO/MNNA/SAARC/IMCTC/Commonwealth 0 1 5264[120] Green tickY
 Poland EU/NATO 0 0 3000[118] Red XN
 Russia P5/G20/BRICS/SCO/EAEU/APEC/CSTO/CIS Blue-water navy 0 / 1 10 48,500[118] Green tickY
 Saudi Arabia G20/Opec/OIC/Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf/Arab League 0 0 Red XN
 South Africa G20/BRICS/African Union/Commonwealth 0 0 1171[120] Red XN
 South Korea G20/APEC/MIKTA/UFC/MNNA Green-water navy 1 / 0 0 1008[118] Red XN
 Spain EU/NATO/UFC Green-water navy 0 / 1 0 1500[118] Red XN
 Turkey G20/D-8/MIKTA/NATO/UFC Green-water navy 1 / 0 12[126] 60,000+ [127] Nuclear sharing
 United Kingdom P5/G20/G7/FVEY/NATO/Quint/FPDA/Commonwealth/AUKUS Blue-water navy 0 / 1 15 15,000 Green tickY
 United States P5/G20/G7/NATO/APEC/FVEY/Quint/ANZUS/QUAD/Rio/AUKUS Blue-water navy 10 / 10 38 130,000 Green tickY

See also[edit]


  1. ^ US Department of Defense (2013). The Dictionary of Military Terms. New York: Skyhorse Publishing. ISBN 9781628730197.
  3. ^ Wang, Yuan-kang (2015). "The Myth of Chinese Exceptionalism: A Historical Perspective on China's Rise". Responding To China's Rise: US and EU Strategies. Springer. pp. 59–62. ISBN 978-3-319-10033-3.
  4. ^ "No. 19930". The London Gazette. 15 December 1840. pp. 2990–2991.
  5. ^ Moorehead, Alan (1972). The Blue Nile. New York: Harper and Row. p. 266. ISBN 9780060956400.
  6. ^ Rubenson, Survival, p. 268
  7. ^ Ferguson, Niall (2008). Empire: The Rise and Demise of the British World Order and the Lessons for Global Power. Basic Books. ISBN 9780465013104.
  8. ^ United States Department of Defense. J1-02: Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. [1] Archived 2011-05-22 at the Wayback Machine
  9. ^ Ladwig III, Walter C. (November–December 2010). "India and Military Power Projection: Will the Land of Gandhi Become a Conventional Great Power?". Asian Survey. 50 (6): 1162–1183. doi:10.1525/as.2010.50.6.1162.
  10. ^ (4 Jan 2022) Russia, China, Britain, U.S. and France say no one can win nuclear war
  11. ^ Army start biggest military robot exercise in British history, Defence Secretary announces, Ministry of Defence, 12 November 2018
  12. ^ Jee, Charlotte (13 November 2018), "The British Army is carrying out a massive test of military robots and drones", MIT Technology Review
  13. ^ "Defence review: British army to be cut to 72,500 troops by 2025", BBC News, 22 March 2021
  14. ^ White, Andrew (15 September 2021), Three Objectives For The UK Military's Future, Breaking Defense
  15. ^ Vivienne (13 Jul 2021) Germany establishes new military space command
  16. ^ DEFENDER-EUROPE 20 videos, images and stories
  17. ^ Lt. Col. Travis Dettmer (9 February 2020) U.S. Army Futures and Concepts Center teaches Multi-Domain Operations to NATO Allied Land Command
  18. ^ Sydney J. Freedberg Jr. (January 13, 2020) Infinite Games & War By Other Means: Ryan McCarthy: "We must be engaged in constant competition, versus an episodic engagement strategy" —Secretary Ryan McCarthy
  19. ^ a b c d e Greg Norman (22 Feb 2020) The 5 most powerful armies in the world
  20. ^ The Hon. David Norquist, Deputy Secretary of Defense, DoD (10 Sep 2020) Closing Keynote: Day 2 Defense News Conference 2020 : Sept 9 - 10 22:00 minutes
  21. ^ (4 November 2018) Russia Jammed GPS During Major NATO Military Exercise With US Troops
  22. ^ Sydney J. Freedberg Jr. (6 June 2019) Army Fields Anti-Jam GPS In Germany This Fall
  23. ^ Russia has figured out how to jam U.S. drones in Syria, officials say
  24. ^ a b Sydney Freedberg, Jr. (3 September 2014) US Has Lost ‘Dominance In Electromagnetic Spectrum’: Shaffer
  25. ^ Stephen Clark (25 November 2019) Russia launches space surveillance satellite Kosmos 2542, in a polar orbit—"[To] monitor the condition of other Russian satellites in orbit."
  26. ^ Joseph Trevithick (30 JANUARY 2020) A Russian "Inspector" Spacecraft Now Appears To Be Shadowing An American Spy Satellite USA 245 is a KH-11 series satellite; Cosmos 2542 is now tailing the USA 245's movements with a precision of 150 to 300 kilometers. See Hall thruster
  27. ^ Andrew E. Kramer (2 March 2019) Russian General Pitches ‘Information’ Operations as a Form of War
  28. ^ Paul McCleary (30 May 2019) Dunford: Leaders Mull First NATO Strategy In Decades
  29. ^ Neil Hauer (26 February 2020) Russia may have met its match in Libya Is unable to tip the balance, as it has in Syria. So Russia is escalating its involvement.
  30. ^ a b Sydney J. Freedberg Jr. (21 April 2020) COVID-19: Army Futures Command Takes Wargames Online
  31. ^ Aaron Bateman (22 May 2020) As Russia stalks US satellites, a space arms race may be heating up
  32. ^ Theresa Hitchens (15 November 2021) Russian suspected ground-launched ASAT test scatters dangerous debris through LEO
  33. ^ Specialist website Russian Space Web (25 Nov 2021) Russia launches classified military satellite
  34. ^ Vladimir Isachenkov, The Associated Press (9 Aug 2020) Russia warns it will see any incoming missile as nuclear
  35. ^ Mark B. Schneider (19 Sep 2020) Will Russia Further Lower Its Nuclear Weapons Use Threshold?
  36. ^ Eric Geller (14 Dec 2020) 'Massively disruptive' cyber crisis engulfs multiple agencies
  37. ^ Ellen Nakashima & Craig Timberg (14 Dec 2020) Russian government hackers are behind a broad espionage campaign that has compromised U.S. agencies, including Treasury and Commerce Identified as SVR /APT29 /Cozy Bear, according to FireEye. Breached using the update server of SolarWinds, its Orion Platform, versions released in Mar & Jun 2020.
  38. ^ Lorne Cook (30 May 2021) As Russia tensions simmer, NATO conducts massive war games
  39. ^ Vladimir Isachenkov, The Associated Press (26 Dec 2021) Putin to mull options if West refuses guarantees on Ukraine
  40. ^ a b c Combat Approved (13 Feb 2021) Episode 44. The Uran-9 Russia’s First Combat Robot
  41. ^ a b Isabella Beltran (10 Apr 2021) Uran-9, Russian Robotic Tanks Slated to be Deployed "Soon" Despite Flaws During Syrian Tests, THE SCIENCETIMES (Mixed-font I in 'science' appears deliberate.)
  42. ^ a b Sebastien Roblin (21 October 2019) This Is the Robot Tank Russia Used in Syria
  43. ^ Axx (14 Sep 2021) Russia one step ahead, Why Russia's strike robots is scary enough
  44. ^ Zvezda (TV channel) Воины будущего. Какими возможностями обладают поступившие на вооружение ВС РФ боевые роботы «Уран-9» Uran-9 Control system
  45. ^ a b Army Technology.com (2016) Uran-9 Unmanned Ground Combat Vehicle
  46. ^ Matthew Chance (12 Apr 2021) Ukraine's President heads to the trenches as Russia masses its troops Troops and armor are massing by rail, within Russia's border.
  47. ^ ZEYNEP BILGINSOY (10 Apr 2021) The leaders of Ukraine, Turkey stress territorial integrity Donbass and Crimea are disputed.
  48. ^ The Associated Press (12 Apr 2021) Blinken heads to Brussels for talks on Afghanistan, Ukraine SecDef Lloyd Austin will attend.
  49. ^ LARA SELIGMAN and NATASHA BERTRAND (04/12/2021) Can Ukraine deploy U.S.-made weapons against the Russians? FGM-148 Javelin anti-tank missiles barely overmatch Uran-9s
  50. ^ LARA SELIGMAN (03/31/2021) Pentagon ‘watching’ as Russia steps up aggression in Eastern Europe A ceasefire between the Ukraine Army and Donetsk separatists ended Jun 2020. EUCOM's V Corps has been on pre-planned maneuvers, but in a NATO partner's territory as of April 2021.
  51. ^ Vivian Salama in Kyiv and William Mauldin in Washington (18 Jan 2022) U.S. Aims Sanctions at Pro-Russian Agents as Blinken Plans Ukraine, Russia Meetings
  52. ^ Robert Burns (19 Jan 2022) EXPLAINER: What are US military options to help Ukraine?
  53. ^ a b Paul McLeary (7 May 2021) Jamming Strikes OSCE Drones Tracking Russian Forces
  54. ^ Olivia Gazis (22 Apr 2021)) After Putin's warning to West, Russia begins large-scale military exercises in and around Ukraine
  55. ^ Nils Adler, Laura King Los Angeles Times (21 Jan 2022) In eastern Ukraine, trench warfare grinds on against backdrop of invasion fears
  56. ^ Andrew E. Kramer and Anton Troianovski (22 Apr 2021) Russia Orders Partial Pullback From Ukraine Border Region
  57. ^ JIM GARAMONE, DOD NEWS (14 Jan 2022) Russia Trying to Develop Pretext for Ukraine Invasion, DOD Official Says
  58. ^ Michael Schwirtz New York Times (6 Dec 2021) On Ukrainian Front, Grinding War and Weary Anticipation of Invasion Map of "Approximate line separating Ukrainian and Russian-backed forces"
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