Propaganda Department of the Chinese Communist Party

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Publicity Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China
中国共产党中央委员会宣传部
Danghui.svg
AbbreviationZhongxuanbu (中宣部)
Formation1921
TypeDepartment directly reporting to the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party
Headquarters5 Chang'an Avenue, Xicheng District, Beijing
Location
  • Beijing
Coordinates39°55′26″N 116°23′55″E / 39.92389°N 116.39861°E / 39.92389; 116.39861Coordinates: 39°55′26″N 116°23′55″E / 39.92389°N 116.39861°E / 39.92389; 116.39861
Head
Huang Kunming
Executive deputy head
Wang Xiaohui
Deputy heads
Nie Chenxi*, Jiang Jianguo*, Xu Lin*, Shen Haixiong*, Sun Zhijun, Tuo Zhen, Sun Zhijun
Secretary-General
Guan Jinghui
Parent organization
Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party
*Maintains full minister-level rank
CCP Central Publicity Department
(common abbreviation)
Simplified Chinese中共中央宣传部
Traditional Chinese中共中央宣傳部

The Propaganda Department of the Chinese Communist Party, also known as the Publicity Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, is an internal division of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in charge of ideology-related work, as well as its information dissemination system.[1] The department is one of the many entities that enforce media censorship and control in the People's Republic of China.

It was founded in May 1924, and was suspended during the Cultural Revolution, until it was restored in October 1977.[2] It is an important organ in China's propaganda system, and its inner operations are highly secretive.[1][3]

Name[edit]

The CCPPD has several Chinese names with various different English translations, it is officially the Zhōngguó Gòngchăndǎng Zhōngyāng Wěiyuánhuì Xuānchuánbù "Chinese Communist Party Central Committee Propaganda Department" or Zhōnggòng Zhōngyāng Xuānchuánbù "Chinese Communist Party Central Propaganda Department" or "Central Propaganda Department of the Communist Party of China", colloquially abbreviated as the Zhōnggòng Xuānchuánbù "Chinese Communist Party Propaganda Department" or "Propaganda Department of the Communist Party of China", or simply Zhōng xuānbù 中宣部.

The term xuanchuan (宣传 "propaganda; publicity") can have either a neutral connotation in official government contexts or a pejorative connotation in informal contexts.[4] Some xuanchuan collocations usually refer to "propaganda" (e.g., xuānchuánzhàn 宣传战 "propaganda war"), others to "publicity" (xuānchuán méijiè 宣传媒介 "mass media; means of publicity"), and still others are ambiguous (xuānchuányuán 宣传员 "propagandist; publicist").[5]

The Zhōnggòng Zhōngyāng Xuānchuán Bù changed its official English name from "Propaganda Department of the Communist Party of China" to "Publicity Department of the Communist Party of China".[4][6] As China's involvement in world affairs grew in the 1990s, the CCP became sensitive to the negative connotations of the English translation propaganda for xuanchuan.[7] Official replacement translations include publicity, information, and political communication[8] When Ding Guan'gen traveled abroad on official visits, he was known as the Minister of Information.[9]

Function[edit]

The Propaganda Department has a "direct leadership (Chinese: 领导; pinyin: lingdao)" role in the media control system, working with other organizations like the State Administration of Radio, Film, and Television and the General Administration of Press and Publication.[10] Its scope is to control licensing of media outlets, and to give instructions to the media on what is and what is not to be said, especially about certain "delicate" issues, like Taiwan, Tibet, etc., that can affect state security, or the rule of the Communist Party.[3] Its central offices are located in an unmarked building near the Zhongnanhai at 5 West Chang'an Avenue, although the department has offices throughout the country at the provincial, municipal, and county level.[3]

The editors-in-chief of China's major media outlets must attend the department's central office weekly to receive instructions on which stories should be emphasized, downplayed, or not reported at all.[3] These instructions are not normally known to the public, but are communicated to media workers at the weekly meeting or via secret bulletins.[3] However, since the rise of social networking tools, Propaganda Department instructions have been leaked to the internet. Examples include "All websites need to use bright red color to promote a celebratory atmosphere [of the 60th anniversary of the People's Republic]" and "negative reports... not exceed 30 per cent".[3]

Such directives are considered imperative, and are enforced by disciplines within the Party, as all media in China are required to be loyal to the Party, and are to serve as propaganda organs for the Party in principle. Operational and reporting freedom has significantly increased in the Chinese media in the recent decade. However, open defiance against the Propaganda Department directives is rare, as dissenting media organizations risk severe punishment, including restructuring or closure. In 2000, a system of warnings was introduced for individual journalists, whereby repeat offenses can lead to dismissal.[3] Chinese journalists disclosing Propaganda Department directives to foreign media may be charged with "divulging state secrets."

One important way the Propaganda Department ensures that the media system remains well controlled is by ensuring that the boundaries of acceptable reporting are kept "deliberately fuzzy" in an effort to ensure that "news workers self-censor to a critical degree."[11]

Role in monitoring media personnel[edit]

According to a report from the U.S. government-backed Freedom House, the Central Propaganda Department is the most important institution for monitoring media personnel and controlling the content of print and visual media.[12]

The Central Propaganda Department was reported as playing a key role in monitoring editors and journalists through a national registration system. In 2003, the CPD, along with the GAPP and the SARFT, required Chinese journalists to attend nearly 50 hours of training on Marxism, the role of CCP leadership in the media, copyright law, libel law, national security law, regulations governing news content, and journalistic ethics prior to renewing press identification passes in 2003.[12] The report states that media personnel are required to participate in "ideological training sessions", where they are evaluated for their "loyalty to the party." Further "political indoctrination" courses are said to occur at meetings and training retreats to study party political ideology, and the role of the media in "thought work" (sīxiǎng gōngzuò 思想工作).[12]

It has been noted the CPD's monitoring system largely applies to news regarding politics and current affairs. 90 percent of China's newspapers consists of light stories regarding sport and entertainment, which are rarely regulated.[3]

Structure[edit]

A 1977 directive on the re-establishment of the Central Propaganda Department reveals the structure and organization of the "extremely secretive" body, according to Anne-Marie Brady.[1] The directive states that the Department will be set up with one Director and several deputies, and the organizational structure will be set up with one office and five bureaus. The office is in charge of political, secretarial and administrative work, and the five bureaus are: the Bureau of Theory, Bureau of Propaganda and Education, Bureau of Arts and Culture, Bureau of News, and Bureau of Publishing. The directive states that the staff will be fixed at around 200 personnel, selected from propaganda apparatchiks across the country in consultation with the Central Organization Department.[1]

The leadership of the Propaganda Department is selected with guidance from the General Secretary and the Politburo Standing Committee member responsible for the media, while local branches of the Propaganda Department work with lower levels of the party-state hierarchy to transmit content priorities to the media.[12]

New departments and offices were set up in 2004 to deal with the growing demands of information control in the modern era. One, the Bureau of Public Opinion, is in charge of commissioning public opinion surveys and other relevant research.[1]

Heads of the Department[edit]

See also[edit]

References[edit]

  1. ^ a b c d e Brady, Anne-Marie (2008). Marketing Dictatorship: Propaganda and Thought Work in Contemporary China. Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 13, 20. ISBN 978-0-7425-4057-6. OCLC 968245349.
  2. ^ "中共中央宣传部主要职能". Archived from the original on 2011-08-09. Retrieved 2010-03-09.
  3. ^ a b c d e f g h Schiller, Bill (September 27, 2009). "Beijing's 'aim is to make people docile'". Toronto Star. Archived from the original on June 7, 2019. Retrieved May 9, 2020.
  4. ^ a b Edney, Kingsley (2014). The Globalization of Chinese Propaganda. New York: Palgrave Macmillan US. pp. 22, 195. doi:10.1057/9781137382153. ISBN 978-1-349-47990-0. In recent years however the Party State has recognised the negative connotations of the word “propaganda” in English and now official English translations refer to the "Publicity Department" (although xuanchuan continues to the used in Chinese).
  5. ^ Translations from John DeFrancis, ed. (2003), ABC Chinese-English Comprehensive Dictionary, University of Hawaii Press, p. 1087.
  6. ^ Shambaugh, David (January 2007). "China's Propaganda System: Institutions, Processes and Efficacy". The China Journal. 57 (57): 25–58. doi:10.1086/tcj.57.20066240. ISSN 1324-9347. JSTOR 20066240. S2CID 222814073.
  7. ^ Mackinnon, Stephen R. (January 1997). "Toward a History of the Chinese Press in the Republican Period". Modern China. 23 (1): 3–32. doi:10.1177/009770049702300101. ISSN 0097-7004. JSTOR 189462. S2CID 148316475.
  8. ^ Brady (2008), p 73.
  9. ^ Chen, Jianfu; Li, Yuwen; Otto, Jan Michiel (2002-05-29). Implementation of Law in the People's Republic of China. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. p. 287. ISBN 978-90-411-1834-9. OCLC 49853349.
  10. ^ Brady (2008), p 17.
  11. ^ Hassid, Jonathan (June 2008). "Controlling the Chinese Media: An Uncertain Business". Asian Survey. 48 (3): 414–430. doi:10.1525/as.2008.48.3.414. ISSN 0004-4687. JSTOR 10.1525/as.2008.48.3.414.
  12. ^ a b c d Esarey, Ashley (February 2006). "Speak No Evil: Mass Media Control in Contemporary China" (PDF). Freedom House. Archived (PDF) from the original on May 3, 2014. Retrieved May 9, 2020.

External links[edit]