The State of Qatar and the Republic of Turkey established bilateral relations in 1972. There has been ongoing cooperation and dialogue in regional and international issues since the 2010s, particularly in the Syrian Civil War and the Egyptian Crisis. Both countries also support the same groups in post-Gaddafi Libya. Most recently, Turkey provided diplomatic and food support to Qatar during the 2017 Qatar diplomatic crisis. Some political analysts claim that bilateral relations are mostly limited to political and military affinity, referring to the low trade volume, lack of trade agreements and absence of Turkish think tanks in Qatar.
Qatar and Turkey maintain strong military ties. Several military cooperation agreements have been signed between the two, and Turkey exports military equipment to Qatar. For instance, Turkey sold Qatar its first-ever drones in March 2012, and in April 2017, Turkish vehicle manufacturer BMC signed a deal to supply Qatar with 1,500 Amazon 4x4 armored vehicles. Turkey has a military base in Qatar, and in June 2017, Turkish parliament fast-tracked the deployment of Turkish troops in Qatar. Turkey plans to eventually station 3,000 troops on Qatari soil.
Trade relations between the two countries have witnessed rapid developments in recent years. Qatar has signed agreements with Turkey to export LNG, while several Turkish construction companies have agreements with the Qatari government, many of which are involved in 2022 FIFA World Cup projects. In September 2017, a new trade line route between Qatar and Turkey via Iran was announced, and at the same time a shipping service between Turkey's Port of Mersin and Qatar's Hamad Port was also launched.
- 1 Relations during the Ottoman period
- 2 Political relations
- 3 Military relations
- 4 Economic relations
- 5 Cultural relations
- 6 Educational and medical relations
- 7 See also
- 8 References
- 9 External links
Relations during the Ottoman period
Beginning in the late 19th century, the Ottoman Empire started campaigning to incorporate the provinces of Eastern Arabia into their empire. After establishing themselves on Al-Hasa coast, they advanced towards Qatar, which had come to serve as a base of operations for Bedouins who opposed Ottoman rule. In 1871, in an attempt to secure a landing for Ottoman troops, they sent an envoy bearing an Ottoman flag to the proclaimed ruler of the Qatari Peninsula, Jassim bin Mohammed Al Thani. He accepted and flew the flag, and by December of that year had authorised the Ottomans to send military equipment and 100 troops to Al Bidda. In January 1872, Qatar was formally incorporated into the Ottoman Empire as a province in Najd with Al Thani being appointed its kaymakam (sub-governor). Most Qataris were allowed to retain their previous positions in the new administration. The arrival of the Ottomans came three years after the end of the Qatari–Bahraini War.
In 1890, the Ottomans attempted to further consolidate their influence over Qatar by imposing numerous administrative reforms, increasing taxes and stationing additional troops in their garrison at Al Bidda. This eventually led Jassim Al Thani to rebel against the Ottomans, who he believed were seeking to usurp control of the peninsula. He resigned as kaymakam and stopped paying taxes in August 1892. This, along with the March 1893 imprisonment of more than a dozen members of Qatari tribal leaders by the governor of Basra, Mehmed Hafiz Pasha, culminated in the Battle of Al Wajbah. After the Qataris defeated the Ottomans in that battle, Sultan Abdul Hamid II granted Jassim Al Thani a full pardon.
After the Young Turks assumed power in the Ottoman Empire in 1908, they declared they were renouncing their claims on Qatar on 29 July 1913. The last of the Ottoman troops in Qatar peacefully evacuated in August 1915. This move was seen as an attempt of currying the United Kingdom's favor.
The history of bilateral relations between Qatar and Turkey date back to the 1970s. In the 1980s, the two nations began signing bilateral agreements with one another. Bilateral relations gained further traction in the 2000s with the signing of several additional agreements. Their coordination in regional politics, particularly in the Syrian Civil War and the Egyptian Crisis has led their relation to be described as an alliance. Both countries have rejected the designation of Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood as terrorist entities.
While commenting on the turmoil in the Middle East during a joint press conference held with Qatar in December 2014, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan stated that "together with Qatar, we always side with oppressed people around the world". Both countries have several common regional threat-perception, patronize the same regional non-state actors (including in Syria) and share similar agendas in Syria, Libya, Egypt and elsewhere.
Qatar and Turkey's alliance have translated into closer cooperation in international organizations such as the UN and OIC. It was announced that Turkey and Qatar agreed to establish a cooperation council called 'High-level Strategic Cooperation Council' on 19 January 2015. This decision was revealed after a meeting between the countries' foreign ministers Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu and Khalid bin Mohammad Al Attiyah concerning the recent mutual diplomatic shifts away from Egypt since Abdel Fattah el-Sisi rose to power in 2014. The first meeting of the council took place in Doha that December, during a visit by President Erdoğan.
Following Turkish air strikes conducted in August 2015 over fighters of the PKK group in north Iraq, the Arab League released a statement denouncing Turkey's actions. However, Qatar, a member of the organization, dissociated itself from this position, and instead proclaimed its support for Turkey.
Both countries have been diplomatically involved in the Egyptian Crisis, where they mutually opposed Abdel Fattah el-Sisi's leadership. Following pro-Islamist candidate Mohammed Morsi's election victory in 2012, Turkey and Qatar supported his presidency, whereas the other five GCC nations were against his presidency. Morsi was ousted eventually in a coup d'état in 2013, provoking condemnation by Turkey. Qatar, on the other hand, while not directly criticizing the coup d'état, was the only GCC nation to denounce the excessive use of force against civilians.
In a 2016 interview with Al Jazeera, President Erdoğan strongly condemned Egypt's leader Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, saying that he has "killed thousands of his own people". Qatar and Turkey have both been pressed by the other GCC states to improve their ties with Egypt. Sisi declared on 14 June 2017, just 9 days after the start of the 2017 Qatari diplomatic crisis, that the group of countries boycotting Qatar should also target Turkey.
Qatar and Turkey share similar positions on the Syrian Civil War. The two formed a single bloc in the Civil War and supported the same rebel groups. One prominent opposition group funded by both Turkey and Qatar is the pro-Islamist Syrian National Council.
Turkey and Qatar both backed the pro-Islamist General National Congress in Libya. In January 2015, a Libyan army official accused Turkey and Qatar of funneling arms to Islamist political factions in Libya via Sudan.
Muslim Brotherhood factor
Both Qatar and Turkey overtly provides region-wide support for Muslim Brotherhood. Muslim Brotherhood's web of network in the region is something Qatar is using to project its influence internationally and compete with other regional players, while Turkey's ruling Justice and Development Party (otherwise known as AK Party) promotes a mix of democracy and Islam like that of the Brotherhood. In 2014, when Doha asked several Brotherhood exiles to leave Qatar due to the pressure from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States, Turkey decided to host these exiles.
2016 Turkish coup d'état attempt
When elements of the Turkish military attempted a military coup in July 2016, Qatar became the first country whose leader called President Erdoğan in a show of solidarity. Qatar also strongly denounced the coup, saying it breached Turkey's constitutional legitimacy. It was claimed by some media outlets that 150 Qatari elite special forces troops were deployed in Turkey shortly after the attempt to watch over the president.
2017 Qatari diplomatic crisis
Turkey supported Qatar in its diplomatic confrontation with a Saudi and Emirati-led bloc of countries that severed ties with and imposed sanctions on Qatar on 5 June 2017. Turkish President Erdoğan criticized the list of demands released by the countries on 22 June, stating that they undermine Qatar's sovereignty. Because the boycotting nations highlight Qatar's support for the Muslim Brotherhood as one of the primary reasons for their sanctions, siding with Qatar was the most logical choice for Turkey's leadership, which also supports the Muslim Brotherhood.
On August 26, Turkey said that it had intercepted five hackers suspected of engineering the diplomatic crisis by inserting false and provocative statements on Qatar News Agency's website in late-May.
Turkish opposition to political cooperation
Qatar and Turkey's bilateral relations have proven to be a contentious issue in Turkish politics. Some members of the Turkish political society oppose Turkey's and Qatar's mutual position of arming Syrian rebel groups, and believe that maintaining this stance will harm Turkey's international reputation. Another issue taken up by some in the political community is the perceived damage afflicted to Turkey's image as a neutral regional mediator. Other controversial points include criticism of Qatar's human rights and their non-acceptance of Syrian refugees.
High level visits have given a new momentum to the bilateral relations between the two countries. The visit of Qatari emir Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani to Turkey on 25–26 December 2001 paved the way drawing the legal framework of economic and military cooperation through the signing of a number of protocols. These protocols included the Agreement on Prevention of Double Taxation, the Agreement on Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, and the Cooperation Agreement on Military Fields.
Turkey's President Abdullah Gül, accompanied by the Minister of Finance, Minister of Energy, Minister of Public Work and Settlement, and a large group of businessmen, paid official visits to Qatar in February and April 2008. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan also visited Qatar in April 2008, and gave a key speech at the Doha Forum on Democracy, Development and Free Trade. He also held talks with Qatar's Emir, Prime Minister and Foreign Minister concerning economic agreements. The Foreign Minister and Prime Minister of Qatar paid return visits to Turkey in 2008, during which the 1st Turkish-Qatari Business Forum was held.
In 2008, Foreign Minister Ali Babacan visited Qatar to attend “The US-Islamic World Forum” as a keynote speaker organized by Qatari Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the US based Brookings Institution, as well as to have a bilateral meeting with his colleague Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim Al Thani.
In February 2016 Turkish President Erdoğan met with Qatari emir Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani in Istanbul to discuss military cooperation in Syria. One year later, in February 2017, President Erdoğan traveled to Doha on an official visit.
More than a month after the 2017 Qatari diplomatic crisis erupted on 5 June, President Erdoğan visited Qatar, along with Saudi Arabia and Kuwait in late July in a bid to allay the crisis. Qatari emir Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani visited Turkey to discuss the diplomatic crisis with President Erdoğan in September 2017. Both of them emphasized the importance of resolving the crisis by negotiations.
Qatar and Turkey signed an agreement in July 2002 which involved cooperation in military training and arms sales. A cooperation agreement involving both countries' defense industries was formalized in 2007. In March 2012, Qatar acquired its first-ever drones from Turkey in the form of ten mini-drones worth $2.5 million. This sale was part of a deal formed in May 2011 in which Turkey would sell $120 million worth of military equipment to Qatar in the span of a year. The two states signed a military cooperation agreement in July 2012, but details of the agreement were not disclosed.
In March 2015, both countries signed a military agreement which entailed mutual military deployment and the exchange of military training. However, the reasons behind this military agreement have not been officially explained, therefore raising suspicions in Turkey over whether Turkish military personnel stationed in Qatar would help train Syrian opposition groups. An event showcasing products from 67 Turkish defense companies was held in Doha in October 2015.
Qatar's government owns a 50% stake in BMC, a Turkish military vehicle manufacturer. It was reported in April 2017 that BMC received an order for 1,500 Amazon 4x4 armored vehicles from Qatar's military and police force.
Turkish military presence in Qatar
On 2 December 2015, during a Turkish presidential visit to Qatar, Tamim bin Hamad and Tayyip Erdoğan jointly announced the planned creation of a Turkish military base in Qatar; a first for Turkey in the Persian Gulf. On December 16, 2016 Turkey's Ambassador to Qatar Ahmet Demirok declared that the establishment of the base was part of a broader defence agreement between the two countries to help them confront “common enemies.” According to Eyup Ersoy, a Gulf politics expert teaching at Bilkent University, the military base exemplifies Turkey and Qatar's willingness to overcome their strategic isolation in the region. The agreement also stipulates that Qatar may set up a military base in Turkey if it desires.
The agreement was first signed in 2014 and ratified by the Turkish Parliament in June 2015. The base was expected to be completed in two years. According to Ambassador Demirok, air and naval units, military trainers, special operations forces as well as 3,000 ground troops will be stationed at the base.
Two days after a number of countries led by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates severed ties with Qatar on 5 June 2017, Turkey's leading party proposed the fast-tracking of Turkish troop deployment in Qatar, and also proposed joint training programmes between the two countries' militaries. On 18 June, an armed Turkish contingent consisting of five military vehicles and twenty-three military personnel were sent to Qatar. They supplemented the existing 88-strong Turkish force stationed there. Turkish soldiers currently have their base of operations at an abandoned British base located 15 miles away from Doha.
A list of demands drafted by the blockading countries and handed to Qatar on 22 June included a demand that Turkey withdraws its troops from the country. Shortly after the list was made public, Turkish President Erdoğan rejected the removal of Turkish troops from Qatari soil, claiming that the list of demands violated international law. On 26 June, the foreign minister of Bahrain, one of Qatar's maritime neighbors who severed ties with it, blamed Qatar for "military escalations" by its hosting of Turkish troops. At the end of the month, Turkey sent more troops to Qatar, to participate in joint military drills. Additional Turkish troops were stationed in Qatar by 11 July, and more arrived on 17 July, bolstering the Turkish military presence in the country to about 150.
Currently, there are more than 3,000 Turkish soldiers in Qatar to help the Qatari citizens. The number of Turkish troops in Qatar could rise to 5,000 in the future. Turkey's ambassador to Qatar Fikret Özer confirmed in February 2018 that Turkish air and naval troops will eventually be stationed in Qatar after the necessary infrastructure is built, however, no date has been given. At the Doha International Maritime Defence Exhibition and Conference (DIMDEX) held in March 2018, both countries signed an agreement that would allow Turkey to construct a naval base in the north of Qatar which would include a training facility.
Economic relations witnessed substantial development in the 21st century. In the 2000, the total trade volume between the two countries was $38 million. By 2014, this number had increased to $739 million, according to the Turkish Statistical Institute. This figure is lower than the trade volume between Turkey and all of its other trade partners in the region, except for Bahrain.
On 11 June 2008, Qatar Investment Authority and Turkey Investment Support and Promotion Agency signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) and it opened a comprehensive cooperation between two countries.
Qatar mainly imports from Turkey iron-steel products, electrical equipment, motor vehicles, home textile products, food and furniture, while Turkey's investments in the Gulf country are mostly focused in the consultancy and construction sectors. Petroleum and its derivatives, aluminum and plastic products are among the products mostly imported by Turkey from Qatar. From 2011 to 2015, Qatar's import of Turkish products increased by 126%, whereas Turkey's import of Qatari products decreased by 25%.
The cooperation between the two countries may soon extend into the field of infrastructure, as the World Cup Supreme Committee of Qatar, which will host the 2022 FIFA World Cup, has recently announced a collaboration agreement with the Turkish Football Federation.
The Qatar-Turkey pipeline was proposed by Qatar in 2009 in order to connect the two region's natural gas reserves. In fact, natural gas is one of Qatar's most important export products to Turkey.
Turkey reached an agreement with Qatar to purchase liquefied natural gas over a prolonged period in December 2015. It was opined by analysts that, owing to diplomatic hostilities between Turkey and Russia, the deal was made by Turkey with the intent of replacing Russia with Qatar as its major LNG supplier.
In terms of foreign direct investments, between 2003 and 2015, Turkey ranked as Qatar's 23rd largest investor, with 3 companies making investments worth $239 million. Qatar's outward investments during this same period reflected Turkey as the 17th most popular destination for Qatari foreign investments. More than $2.1 billion was invested in Turkey by two Qatari companies.
According to statements made by Mohammed bin Ahmed bin Towar Al Kuwari, vice-chairman of the Qatar Chamber, in May 2017, there were 205 Turkish companies operating out of Qatar; 186 of these were joint ventures between Turks and Qataris. These companies are mainly based in the contracting, engineering and construction industries. The value of investments made by the joint ventures amount to QR42 million, whereas the fully-Turkish companies have invested more than QR62 million. He stated that Qatar's foreign direct investments in Turkey over $20 billion, which would rank it second for foreign investment in Turkey. In late 2017, it was reported that Qatar agreed to invest another $19 billion in 2018, with the Qatar Investment Authority pledging $15 billion of investments and Q Invest accounting for the remaining $4 billion.
In September 2018, the Emir of Qatar Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani gave a Boeing 747-8 worth some $400 million to the Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Following that, Sheikh Tamim made an investment of $15 billion in the Turkish economy.
Economic relations during the 2017 Qatari diplomatic crisis
Turkey supported Qatar economically during the 2017 Qatari diplomatic crisis, when, on 5 June, several of Qatar's neighbors sealed off their air, land and sea borders to Qatar-flagged vessels and vessels arriving to and from Qatar. From 5 June to 25 June, Turkey's exports to Qatar tripled in value. Turkey mainly helped Qatar with food supplies, particularly dairy, poultry and fruit products. At one point, Turkey was exporting 200,000 tonnes of vegetables to Qatar daily, and was also helping Qatar meet the majority of its dairy supply.
In an effort to increase bilateral trade volume, fifteen separate trade and cooperation agreements were signed between the Turkish and Qatari governments in August 2017. It was also announced in August 2017 that a Qatar-Turkey Business Council would be established in October of that year.
On 6 September, a trade line route between Qatar and Turkey running through Iran was inaugurated, shortening the travel time of goods traded to under 2 days. Prior to the launch of this new trade route, transportation by land took 14 days, while transportation by sea took an additional 11 days. The final stop of the new route is from the Iranian Bushehr Port to Ar Ru'ays Port in Qatar, which can be traveled in under ten hours. In addition to this new trade route, a shipping service between Turkey's Port of Mersin and Qatar's Hamad Port was also announced. A report released the same month indicated that Turkey's exports to Qatar had increased by 84% since the onset of the Qatari diplomatic crisis on 5 June. Livestock and aquatic products accounted for the largest portion of exports.
Turkey's government has capitalized on the crisis by directing Turkish suppliers to raise their prices. Furthermore, Ankara has pressed Qatar into granting preferential selection for Turkish companies as well as formalizing more long-term agreements.
2018 Turkish currency and debt crisis
During the 2018 Turkish currency and debt crisis, in mid-August Qatar pledged $15 billion worth of direct investments into Turkey. A few days after announcing this, Qatar's Central Bank signed an agreement with the Turkish Central Bank for a $3 billion currency swap. Officials involved with the deal have stated it will drastically improve bilateral trade. Some analysts have cited Qatar's financial assistance to Turkey as a good example of the consistent advancement of bilateral relations in recent years. Another view is that Qatar is attempting to repay Turkey for its loyalty and military assistance during the Qatar diplomatic crisis.
On 4 December 2013, Erdoğan inaugurated the new headquarters of the country's embassy in Doha and announced the establishment of a Turkish cultural center in Qatar. The construction of a 'Turkish village' in Doha was launched in September 2014 in the midst of a visit by President Erdoğan. The village is set to occupy approximately 400,000 sq meters and will feature traditional Ottoman markets, hotels and other service facilities.
The Qatar–Turkey 2015 Year of Culture was implemented by the Qatari government in January as an initiative to improve cultural cooperation between the two countries. As a result of this cultural initiative, in December 2015 the Yunus Emre Institute opened a center in Doha. Aside from coordinating cultural activities with the Turkish embassy in Doha, the center will also host language classes, exhibitions and conferences.
Educational and medical relations
The first Turkish school to operate in Qatar, Türk Okulu, was inaugurated in October 2016. It was reported that the school would have a student capacity of 300 with a faculty count of 17 teachers. In February 2017, during a visit by President Erdoğan, the second school in Doha to follow a Turkish curriculum opened its doors. Constructed at a cost of roughly $5.5 million and able to accommodate 250 students, the school is directed by the Turkish embassy in Doha.
After an agreement was reached between the two countries for Turkey to establish a hospital to serve the needs of Qatar's population, the Turkish Hospital in Qatar opened its doors in January 2017 with a 100-bed capacity.
- "The Republic of Turkey". Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Qatar. Retrieved 30 July 2015.
- "Turkey, Qatar strengthen economic ties". Al Monitor. 9 May 2014. Retrieved 21 July 2015.
- Joseph Hammond and Suhaib Kebhaj (16 August 2017). "Qatar and Arab powers are already at war…in Libya". Washington Examiner. Retrieved 17 September 2017.CS1 maint: uses authors parameter (link)
- Cagri Özdemir (5 July 2017). "Turkey's high-stakes game supporting Qatar". Deutsch Welle. Retrieved 25 August 2017.
- Karagülle, Muhsin (18 April 2015). "Turkey-Qatar relations lack substance, analysts believe". Today's Zaman. Archived from the original on 1 January 2016.
- Ümit Enginsoy (13 March 2012). "Turkey sells mini drones to Qatar". Hurriyet Daily News. Retrieved 16 September 2017.
- "Turkish Company BMC will deliver 1,500 Amazon 4x4 armoured vehicles to Qatar Police and Army". Army Recognition. 15 April 2017. Retrieved 16 September 2017.
- "New batch of Turkish troops arrives in Qatar". Al Jazeera. 30 June 2017. Retrieved 25 August 2017.
- "Turkey to fast-track draft bill approving troop deployment in Qatar: Officials". cnbc.com. Reuters. 7 June 2017. Retrieved 16 September 2017.
- "Revealed: Secret details of Turkey's new military pact with Qatar". Middle East Eye. Retrieved 2016-04-29.
- Altay Atlı (27 December 2015). "Bank takeover to boost Turkey-Qatar ties". Asia Times. Retrieved 17 September 2017.
- "Qataris savor Iran land route in upset for Saudis". Press TV. 6 September 2017. Retrieved 16 September 2017.
- "Turkey-Qatar new weekly shipping service starts next week". Gulf Times. 6 September 2017. Retrieved 16 September 2017.
- Rahman, Habibur (2006). The Emergence Of Qatar. Routledge. p. 140. ISBN 978-0710312136.
- Ekrem Buğra Ekinci (16 June 2017). "Qatar's journey from past to present". Daily Sabah. Retrieved 17 September 2017.
- Rahman, Habibur (2006). The Emergence Of Qatar. Routledge. pp. 150–151. ISBN 978-0710312136.
- Fromherz, Allen (13 April 2012). Qatar: A Modern History. Georgetown University Press. p. 60. ISBN 978-1-58901-910-2.
- "Turkey, Qatar have constructive influence in region, says envoy". Daily Sabah. 8 May 2014. Retrieved 30 July 2015.
- "Turkey and Qatar look to be building a new alliance". Middle East Monitor. 15 March 2015. Retrieved 21 July 2015.
- Saeed Al-Haj (18 June 2017). "Analysis: The implications of the Qatar-Turkey alliance". Al Jazeera. Retrieved 17 September 2017.
- "Erdoğan: We side with Qatar to support oppressed people". Daily Sabah. 19 December 2014. Retrieved 14 September 2015.
- Foizee, Bahauddin (April 1, 2017). "Shared regional agendas are stimulating the rapid rise of Turkey-Qatar cooperation". Middle East Monitor. Retrieved October 1, 2018.
- "Turkey-GCC Relations: Trends and Outlook" (PDF). Oxford Gulf and Arabian Peninsula Studies Forum. 2015. pp. 20, 25. Retrieved 17 September 2017.
- "Turkey, Qatar agree to form cooperation council". Anadolu Agency.com. 20 January 2015. Retrieved 23 January 2015.
- "Turkish FM in Qatar visit amid Egypt split". Hürriyet Daily News. 20 January 2015. Retrieved 23 January 2015.
- Iyad Dakka (17 December 2015). "Turkey Doubles Down on De-Facto Alliance With Qatar". World Politics Review. Retrieved 17 September 2017.
- "Qatar breaks Arab League ranks to support Turkey bombing in Iraq". Middle East Eye. 5 August 2015. Retrieved 17 September 2017.
- Daniel Wagner, Giorgio Cafiero (29 December 2013). "Can Qatar Regain Influence In Egypt?". Huffington Post. Retrieved 17 September 2017.CS1 maint: uses authors parameter (link)
- "Erdogan blasts Egypt's 'putschist president' Sisi in al-Jazeera interview". Al-Araby Al-Jadeed. 22 July 2016. Retrieved 17 September 2017.
- "Egypt: Gulf siege against Qatar should include Turkey". Middle East Monitor. 14 June 2017. Retrieved 17 September 2017.
- "Are Saudi Arabia and Turkey About to Intervene in Syria?". Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 24 April 2015. Retrieved 21 July 2015.
- Ribal Al-Assad (18 October 2013). "Islamism: Syria's Growing Cancer". Huffington Post. Retrieved 17 September 2017.
- Jonathan Schanzer (17 March 2015). "Turkey's Secret Proxy War in Libya?". The National Interest. Retrieved 17 September 2017.
- Kingsley, Patrick (July 15, 2017). "Decimated Muslim Brotherhood Still Inspires Fear. Its Members Wonder Why". The New York Times. Retrieved October 1, 2018.
- Selin Girit (14 June 2017). "Why is Turkey standing up for Qatar?". BBC. Retrieved 16 September 2017.
- "Qatar denounces military coup attempt in Turkey". Reuters. 16 July 2016. Retrieved 17 September 2017.
- Tom Wheeldon (26 June 2017). "Why Turkey is backing Qatar in Gulf diplomatic crisis". France 24. Retrieved 16 September 2017.
- "Qatar says five suspects in news agency hacking detained in Turkey". Reuters. 26 August 2017. Retrieved 16 September 2017.
- Saeid Jafari (3 July 2017). "Saudi-led Qatar blockade brings Iran, Turkey together". Al Monitor. Retrieved 17 September 2017.
- Nur Çetinoğlu Harunoğlu (25 December 2016). "Turkey's Intensifying Partnership With Qatar and its Implications for Turkish-American Relations". MERIA Journal. Rubin Center. 20 (3). Retrieved 17 September 2017.
- Funda Basaran Yavaslar. "Exchange of information versus tax solution of equivalent effect – Turkey's National Report" (PDF). European Association of Tax Law Professors. Retrieved 30 July 2015.
- "Agreement between the government of the State of Qatar and the government of the Republic of Turkey concerning the reciprocal promotion and protection of investments" (PDF). World Intellectual Property Organization. 25 December 2001. Retrieved 30 July 2015.
- "Questionnaire on the code of conduct on politico-military aspects of security". Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. p. A-3. Retrieved 30 July 2015.
- "Turkey accelerates efforts for LNG purchase from Qatar". Today's Zaman. 15 April 2008. Retrieved 30 July 2015.
- "Turkish foreign minister Ali Babacan has highly highlighted the progressing Qatari-Turkish relations". Qatar Conferences. 17 February 2008. Retrieved 30 July 2015.
- "Erdoğan meets Qatari emir, discusses mutual strategies". Daily Sabah. 12 February 2016. Retrieved 9 June 2017.
- "Turkish president arrives in Doha". Gulf Times. 14 February 2017. Retrieved 17 September 2017.
- "Turkey's Erdogan concludes Gulf mediation tour in Qatar". Al-Araby Al-Jadeed. 24 July 2017. Retrieved 16 September 2017.
- "Qatar emir meets Merkel, Macron on first foreign tour since crisis". France 24. 15 September 2017. Retrieved 15 September 2017.
- Jaber Al Harmi & Yeni Şafak (10 September 2015). "Qatar and Turkey ... Relations that transcend traditional diplomatic frames". Yeni Şafak. Retrieved 11 August 2015.CS1 maint: uses authors parameter (link)
- Giorgio Cafiero and Daniel Wagner (6 June 2016). "Turkey and Qatar's Burgeoning Strategic Alliance". Middle East Institute. Retrieved 16 September 2017.CS1 maint: uses authors parameter (link)
- "Turkey and Qatar sign army cooperation deal". Hurriyet Daily News. 3 July 2012. Retrieved 16 September 2017.
- "Turkey-Qatar agree to military cooperation". Middle East Monitor. 6 March 2015. Retrieved 21 July 2015.
- Karagülle, Muhsin. "Motivation behind recent military agreement with Qatar remains a mystery". Today's Zaman. Archived from the original on 2015-12-05.
- Ali Kayalar (7 October 2015). "Turkish defense firms 'deployed' in Qatar for better trade". Hurriyet Daily News. Retrieved 17 September 2017.
- Mustafa Sonmez (31 May 2017). "Qatari money increasingly important for Turkey". Al Monitor. Retrieved 16 September 2017.
- "Turkey 'to establish military base in Qatar'". Gulf News. 2 December 2015. Retrieved 7 December 2015.
- "Turkey to set up Qatar military base to face 'common enemies'". Reuters. 2015-12-16. Retrieved 2016-04-29.
- Menekse Tokyay (19 December 2015). "Turkey diversifies allies with first Mideast military base in Qatar". Al Arabiya. Retrieved 16 September 2017.
- "Turkey Military Base in Qatar 'Completed' in Two Years". Defense News. Retrieved 2016-04-29.
- "New batch of Turkish troops arrives in Qatar". Al Jazeera. 30 June 2017. Retrieved 16 September 2017.
- Metin Gurcan (12 June 2017). "Turkish military will protect Qatari regime if necessary". Al Monitor. Retrieved 16 September 2017.
- Martin Chulov (25 June 2017). "Erdoğan rejects Saudi demand to pull Turkish troops out of Qatar". The Guardian. Retrieved 16 September 2017.
- Raf Sanchez (26 June 2017). "Bahrain accuses Qatar of 'military escalation' after Turkish tanks roll through Doha". The Telegraph. Retrieved 16 September 2017.
- "Qatar says more Turkish troops have arrived at military base". Reuters. 11 July 2011. Retrieved 16 September 2017.
- Selcan Hacaoglu, Dana Khraiche, and Glen Carey (17 July 2017). "Turkey Adds Troops in Qatar in Defiance of Saudi-Led Isolation". Bloomberg. Retrieved 17 September 2017.CS1 maint: uses authors parameter (link)
- Bekdil, Burak Ege (2017-12-18). "'Nothing more natural': Turkey-Qatar procurement business flourishes". Defense News. Retrieved 2018-03-29.
- "Qatar bolstered by Turkish air and navy, U.S. support". Ahval News. 1 February 2018. Retrieved 26 August 2018.
- "Qatar signs Turkey naval military base agreement". Middle East Monitor. 14 March 2018. Retrieved 26 August 2018.
- "Qatar investors see big-ticket new opportunities in Turkey". Gulf Times. 26 August 2015. Retrieved 4 October 2015.
- TurkStat. "Dış Ticaret İstatistikleri Veri Tabanı" (in Turkish). Retrieved 5 July 2015.
- "From Rep. of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs". Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Retrieved 2016-04-29.
- "Turkey and Qatar ready to sign a deal for 2022 FIFA World Cup". DailySabah. Retrieved 2016-04-29.
- Tamsin Carlisle (26 August 2009). "Qatar seeks gas pipeline to Turkey". The National. Retrieved 3 August 2015.
- Serdar Karagöz (2 December 2015). "Turkey, Qatar sign liquefied natural gas agreement". Daily Sabah. Retrieved 7 December 2015.
- Olgu Okumuş (4 December 2015). "Will Turkey be able to replace Russian gas with Qatari imports?". Al Monitor. Retrieved 7 December 2015.
- "Qatar: Inward and Outward FDI [based on Financial Times]" (PDF). dhaman.net. Retrieved 17 September 2017.
- Şeyma Eraz (15 February 2017). "Gross FDI inflows in Turkey hit 17-month high in December". Daily Sabah. Retrieved 17 September 2017.
- Huda N V (12 May 2017). "Qatar's investments in Turkey reaches over $20bn". The Peninsula. Retrieved 17 September 2017.
- "Turkey and Qatar: Behind the strategic alliance". www.aljazeera.com. Retrieved 2017-10-24.
- "Qatar to invest $20 billion in Turkey in 2018". Yeni Safak. 10 October 2017. Retrieved 16 January 2018.
- "Qatar emir gifts Turkey's Erdoğan luxurious $400 million Boeing 747-8". Stockholm Center for Freedom. Retrieved 13 September 2018.
- "Turkish exports to Qatar triple during Gulf crisis: trade minister". Reuters. 23 June 2017. Retrieved 16 September 2017.
- Sigurd Neubauer (13 September 2017). "How Qatar Seeks To Establish New Trade Routes". The Washington Institute. Retrieved 17 September 2017.
- "Turkey, Qatar sign 15 new agreements to boost trade volume". Daily Sabah. 12 August 2017. Retrieved 16 September 2017.
- "الشرقي: تأسيس مجلس الأعمال القطري التركي أكتوبر المقبل" (in Arabic). Lusail News. 12 August 2017. Retrieved 12 August 2017.
- "200 trucks with food products reach Qatar through land route from Turkey via Bushehr port". The Peninsula. 5 September 2017. Retrieved 16 September 2017.
- "Turkey's exports to Qatar have seen 84 pct increase since beginning of Gulf crisis". Daily Sabah. 6 September 2017. Retrieved 16 September 2017.
- "Qatar's Emir pledges $15 billion direct investment in Turkey: Erdogan's office". Reuters. 15 August 2018. Retrieved 22 August 2018.
- Andrew England and Laura Pitel (20 August 2018). "Qatar agrees $3bn currency swap with Turkey". Financial Times. Retrieved 22 August 2018.CS1 maint: uses authors parameter (link)
- Dominic Dudley (16 August 2018). "Qatar Repays Diplomatic And Military Debt To Turkey With Offer Of $15B In Financial Support". Forbes. Retrieved 22 August 2018.
- ""أردوغان" يفتتح مبنى جديدا لسفارة تركيا في الدوحة" (in Arabic). Shoroukh News. 4 December 2013. Retrieved 30 July 2015.
- "Foundation stone laid for Turkish Village". Gulf Times. 16 September 2014. Retrieved 11 September 2015.
- "QM kicks off Qatar-Turkey 2015 Year of Culture". Qatar Tribune. 29 January 2015. Retrieved 17 September 2017.
- "First Turkish school set to open in Doha". Hurriyet Daily News. 16 October 2016. Retrieved 17 September 2017.
- Ramy Salama (3 December 2015). "Turkish Cultural Centre to deepen Qatar-Turkey ties". Qatar Tribune. Retrieved 17 September 2017.
- Nada Badawi (23 October 2016). "First Turkish School now open in Qatar". Doha News. Retrieved 17 September 2017.
- Sarp Ozer and Burcu Arik (15 February 2017). "Turkey opens second school in Qatar's Doha". Anadolu Agency. Retrieved 17 September 2017.CS1 maint: uses authors parameter (link)
- Fazeena Saleem (16 February 2017). "First Turkish Hospital with advanced facilities opens". The Peninsula Qatar. Retrieved 17 July 2018.