This article may be expanded with text translated from the corresponding article in Russian. (October 2013) Click [show] for important translation instructions.
View a machine-translated version of the Russian article.
Google's machine translation is a useful starting point for translations, but translators must revise errors as necessary and confirm that the translation is accurate, rather than simply copy-pasting machine-translated text into the English Wikipedia.
Do not translate text that appears unreliable or low-quality. If possible, verify the text with references provided in the foreign-language article.
In 1999, the regions of the "red zone", according to the analyst Rostislav Turovsky, included the Smolensk, Bryansk, Kaluga, Orel, Kursk, Belgorod, Ryazan, Lipetsk, Tambov, Voronezh, Penza, Ulyanovsk, Saratov, Volgograd and Astrakhan regions. In these areas, featuring a high proportion of rural population with the appropriate mentality,[clarification needed] voters increased inherent conservatism. However, with the economic development of different regions, they are not among the most depressed. Turov noted strong support for the Communist Party in the North Caucasus (except in Ingushetia). In the territories and regions of the North Caucasus, a predominantly Russian population of this area support Communist candidates, in his opinion, due to the same reasons as in the rest of the "red zone". In the national republics (Karachay-Cherkessia, Dagestan and North Ossetia) support is due to nostalgia for the Soviet era, when these poor areas experienced ethno-political and socio-economic stability. In the Urals, and to the east of them, Turovskii notes strong pro-communist sentiment in regions such as Orenburg, Kurgan, Omsk, Novosibirsk, Chita Oblast and Altai Krai, as well as in agricultural areas and in districts of mostly Russian national composition (the Altai Republic, the Ust-Orda Buryat AO and the Jewish AO). According to political scientist Alexander Kanev, "in fact the so-called red zone of the 1990s was no more than a residual support for the former communist government. As soon as the new government is "well established" and returned to the familiar (Soviet) rhetoric and behavior, it has become an electoral power base inherit the previous."