Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Washington
|Regan v. Taxation with Representation|
|Argued March 22, 1983
Decided May 23, 1983
|Full case name||Regan v. Taxation with Representation|
|Citations||461 U.S. 540 (more)
103 S. Ct. 1997; 76 L. Ed. 2d 129; 51 U.S.L.W. 4583; 83-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) P9365; 51 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 1294
|Prior history||676 F.2d 715 (reversed)|
|Majority||Rehnquist, joined by a unanimous Court|
|Concurrence||Blackmun, joined by Brennan and Marshall|
|U.S. Const. amend. I; Internal Revenue Code|
In the Internal Revenue Code of 1954:
- Section 501(c)(3) grants tax exemption to certain nonprofit organizations "no substantial part of the activities of which is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting to influence legislation."
- Section 170(c)(2) permits taxpayers who contribute to § 501(c)(3) organizations to deduct the amount of their contributions on their federal income tax returns.
- Section 501(c)(4) grants tax-exempt status to certain nonprofit organizations but contributions to these organizations are not deductible. 26 U.S.C.S. § 501(c)(4) organizations, but not § 501(c)(3) organizations, are permitted to engage in substantial lobbying to advance their exempt purposes. 26 U.S.C.S. § 501(c)(4) grants exemption to civic leagues or organizations not organized for profit but operated exclusively for the promotion of social welfare, and the net earnings of which are devoted exclusively to charitable, educational, or recreational purposes.
A non-profit corporation organized to promote certain interests in the field of federal taxation, formed to take over the operation of two other nonprofit organizations, one of which had tax-exempt status under § 501(c)(3) and the other under § 501(c)(4), applied for tax-exempt status under 26 USCS 501(c)(3).
The Internal Revenue Service denied the application under § 501(c)(3), because it appeared that a substantial part of the corporation's activities would consist of attempting to influence legislation, which is not permitted by 501(c)(3).
TWR then brought suit in Federal District Court for the District of Columbia against the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the United States.
Plaintiffs challenged the prohibition against substantial lobbying as violative of the First Amendment and the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment's due process clause, and sought declaratory judgment that it qualified for the exemption granted by § 501(c)(3), claiming that § 501(c)(3)'s prohibition against substantial lobbying is unconstitutional under the First Amendment by imposing an "unconstitutional burden" on the receipt of tax-deductible contributions, and is also unconstitutional under the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause because the Code permits taxpayers to deduct contributions to veterans' organizations that qualify for tax exemption under § 501(c)(19).
The District Court granted summary judgment against the corporation.
DC Court of Appeals
On appeal, the en banc United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed, holding that 26 U.S.C.S. 501(c)(3) did not violate the First Amendment, but did violate the Fifth Amendment (676 F2d 715).
Certiorari and arguments
Appellants, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the United States, challenged the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.
Opinion of the court
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court reversed. In an opinion by Rehnquist, expressing the unanimous view of the court, it was held that
- (1) congress was not required to provide appellant with public money with which it was to lobby; the prohibition against lobbying in 501(c)(3) did not violate the First Amendment, since Congress, pursuant to 501(c)(3), had not infringed on any First Amendment rights or regulated any First Amendment activity, and
- (2) the prohibition against lobbying in 501(c)(3) did not violate the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment, even though veteran's organizations were allowed under 501(c)(19) to carry on substantial lobbying and still qualify to receive tax deductible contributions, since qualified veteran's organizations were entitled to receive tax deductible contributions regardless of the content of the speech they used, and it was not irrational for Congress to decide that taxpayers should not subsidize the lobbying of tax exempt charities, or to decide that although it would not subsidize substantial lobbying by charities in general, it would subsidize the lobbying of veterans' organizations. The Court concluded that §501(c)(3) did not employ any suspect classification, and the lower appellate court erred in applying strict scrutiny to it. The Court concluded that congress could have granted funds to an organization, but conditioned the grant by providing that none of the money received from congress be used to lobby state legislatures.
1. Section 501(c)(3) does not violate the First Amendment. Congress has not infringed any First Amendment rights or regulated any First Amendment activity but has simply chosen not to subsidize TWR's lobbying out of public funds. Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498. pp. 545–546.
2. Nor does § 501(c)(3) violate the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment. The sections of the Code at issue do not employ any suspect classification. A legislature's decision not to subsidize the exercise of a fundamental right does not infringe that right and thus is not subject to strict scrutiny. It was not irrational for Congress to decide that tax-exempt organizations such as TWR should not further benefit at the expense of taxpayers at large by obtaining a further subsidy for lobbying. Nor was it irrational for Congress to decide that, even though it will not subsidize lobbying by charities generally, it will subsidize lobbying by veterans' organizations. pp. 546–551.
Blackmun, joined by Brennan and Marshall, concurred: While he joined the court's opinion, the holding that 501(c)(3) did not violate the First Amendment depended entirely on the court's necessary assumption that the Internal Revenue Service, in enforcing the lobbying restrictions, required an organization qualified under 501(c)(3), and its lobbying affiliate with tax exempt status under 501(c)(4), only to be separately incorporated and to keep records adequate to show that the tax deductible contributions were not used to pay for lobbying.
- Text of Regan v. Taxation With Representation, 461 U.S. 540 (1983) is available from: Findlaw Justia