Reinsurance Treaty

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Jump to navigation Jump to search

The Reinsurance Treaty, (June 18, 1887), a secret agreement between Germany and Russia arranged by the German chancellor Otto von Bismarck after the German-Austrian-Russian Dreikaiserbund or League of the Three Emperors, collapsed in 1887, because of competition between Austria-Hungary (Franz Joseph I) and Russia (Alexander III) for spheres of influence in the Balkans. The treaty provided that each party would remain neutral if the other became involved in a war with a third great power, though this would not apply if Germany attacked France or if Russia attacked Austria. Bismarck showed the Russian ambassador the text of the German-Austrian alliance of 1879 to drive home the last point. Germany paid for Russian friendship by agreeing to the Russian sphere of influence in Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia (now part of southern Bulgaria) and by agreeing to support Russian action to keep the Black Sea as its own preserve. When the treaty was not renewed in 1890, a Franco-Russian alliance rapidly began to take shape.[1].

Facing the competition between Russia and Austria–Hungary over the Balkans, Bismarck felt that this agreement was essential to prevent a Russian convergence toward France and to continue the diplomatic isolation of the French to guarantee German security against a potential two-front war against France and Russia. Bismarck risked the expansion of the Russian sphere of influence toward the Mediterranean and diplomatic tensions with Vienna.

The secret treaty signed by Bismarck and the Russian Foreign Minister Nikolay Girs was in two parts

  1. Germany and Russia agreed to observe benevolent neutrality, should the other be involved in a war with a third country. If Germany attack France or Russia attack Austria-Hungary, this provision would not apply. In those cases, the distinguished bilateral alliances could come into effect. The Reinsurance Treaty only applied when France or Austria-Hungary were the aggressors.
  2. In the most secret completion protocol, Germany would declare neutrality in the event of a Russian intervention in the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles.

As part of Bismarck's system of "periphery diversion", the treaty was highly dependent on his prestige. After the dismissal of Bismarck, his successor Leo von Caprivi felt unable to keep this policy, while the German Foreign Office under Friedrich von Holstein had already prepared a renunciation toward the Dual Alliance with Austria–Hungary.

When in 1890, Russia asked for a renewal of the treaty, Germany refused. Kaiser Wilhelm II believed his relationship with Tsar Alexander III would be sufficient to ensure further genial diplomatic ties and felt that maintaining a close bond with Russia would act to the detriment of his aims to attract Britain into the German sphere. Like the Austro-Russian antagonism, Anglo-Russian relations too were strained due to Russia gaining influence in the Balkans. The Russian aim of controlling the Straits of the Dardanelles, would threaten British colonial interests in the Middle East. Having become alarmed at its growing isolation, Saint Petersburg, as Bismarck had feared, entered into the Franco-Russian Alliance in 1894, ending French isolation. The dismissal of Bismarck, the erratic temper of Wilhelm II and the uncertain policy of the men who succeeded Bismarck (partly out of consideration for England, they failed to renew the Reinsurance Treaty with Russia but did renew the Triple Alliance), were joint causes of a period of fundamental change.[2]

In 1896 the treaty was exposed by a German newspaper, the Hamburger Nachrichten, which caused an outcry in Germany and Austria-Hungary. The failure of the treaty is seen as one of the causes of the First World War, due to German diplomatic isolation.


  1. ^ "Reinsurance Treaty" Encyclopædia Britannica Online.
  2. ^ Bury, J. P. T. (1968). The New Cambridge Modern History: The Shifting Balance of World Forces 1898–1945. XII (2nd ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 112. ISBN 978-0-521-04551-3.