Results of the War of 1812

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The War of 1812 happened between Great Britain and the United States in 1812. It caused no geographical changes. The main result of the war was two centuries of peace between the United States and Britain. All the causes of the war had disappeared with the end of the war between Britain and France and with the destruction of the power of Indians to block American expansion into the Northwest. American fears of the Native Americans ended, as did British plans to create a buffer Native American state. The American quest for honor after its humiliations by the British were satisfied. The final collapse of the opposition Federalist Party opened an "Era of good feelings" with lessened partisanship and an exuberant spirit. The British paid little attention to the war, concentrating instead on their final defeat of Napoleon in 1815. The U.S. failed to gain any territory from British North America, contrary to many American politicians' land from Spain.[1]

After Napoleon's defeat in 1814, Britain was no longer at war with France and there were no restrictions on trade; the British suspended their policy of impressment of American sailors as there was a need to resume it. Americans believed they had regained their honour[2] and proclaimed victory in what they called a "second war of independence" for the decisive defeat of the British invaders at New Orleans seemed to prove that Britain could never regain control of America (although this had at no time during the war been either plausible or a British intention).[3] The threat of secession by New England ended with the failure of the Hartford Convention.

In Britain, the importance of the conflict was totally overshadowed by European triumphs: Napoleon had returned from exile in March 1815, and was finally defeated at Waterloo 100 days later.

Upper Canada emerged from the war with a sense of unity and pride as part of the British Empire. Anglophone Canadians claimed the war as a victory for their freedom from American control and credited their militia for the repulse of American invasions. Francophone Canadians largely ignore the war.

Efforts to end the war[edit]

Efforts to end the war began in 1812 when the chief U.S. diplomat in London proposed an armistice in return for a renunciation of impressments; the British refused. Later, in 1812, when the British captured Detroit and news of the repeal of the Orders reached Washington, Sir George Prevost arranged an armistice with his counterpart Henry Dearborn. The British Frigate HMS Junon was sent to relay The American’s response to the British squadrons on the North American Station. However, President James Madison decided to continue the war. In 1813, Russia offered to mediate a peace, but London rejected the offer, because it might compromise British interests in Europe.[4] Finally, Great Britain and the United States agreed to commence peace negotiations in January 1814: the talks were delayed.

Negotiations[edit]

At last in August 1814, peace discussions began in the neutral city of Ghent. Both sides began negotiations with unrealistic demands. The U.S. wanted an end to all British maritime practices it deemed objectionable and also demanded cessions of Canadian territory and guaranteed fishing rights off Newfoundland. The British announced as an essential element of the peace treaty their long-standing goal of creating an Indian barrier state, a large "neutral" Indian state that would cover most of the Old Northwest. It would be independent of the United States and under the tutelage of the British, who would use it to block American expansion and to build up their control of the fur trade.[5] London dropped the demand when the Americans adamantly refused and indicated it would end the negotiations. The British had been weakened by the collapse of Tecumseh's Confederacy after the Battle of the Thames in 1813 and no longer controlled adequate supply lines to support an Indian barrier state.[6] Britain also wanted to keep the far-northeastern parts of Maine that had been captured to provide a land corridor to Quebec from the maritime colonies.

After months of negotiations, against the background of changing military victories, defeats and losses, the parties finally realized that their nations wanted peace and there was no real reason to continue the war. Now each side was tired of the war. Export trade was all but paralyzed and after Napoleon fell in 1814 France was no longer an enemy of Britain, so the Royal Navy no longer needed to stop American shipments to France, and it no longer needed more seamen. The British were preoccupied in rebuilding Europe after the apparent final defeat of Napoleon. The negotiators agreed to return to the status quo ante bellum with no changes in boundaries. Both sides signed the Treaty of Ghent on December 24, 1814. The next and final step would be formal ratification by each government.[7]

The British—but not the Americans—knew, when they signed, that a battle was imminent at New Orleans (it was fought on January 8, 1815).[8] This treaty finally went into effect when it was formally ratified by both sides in February 1815.

The Treaty of Ghent failed to secure official British acknowledgment of American maritime rights, but in the century of peace between the worlds naval powers from 1815 until World War I these rights were not seriously violated. The British navy ended the practices that angered Americans, for they were no longer needed after Napoleon. American pride and honor was built as a result of the Indian threat being ended, and through rejoicing surrounding American victory at New Orleans.[9] In doing so, the United States had successfully created sense of becoming fully independent from Britain.[10]

Native American affairs[edit]

A key reason that American frontiersmen were so much in favor of the war in the first place was the threat posed to their continued settlement of Native American-inhabited territory by various tribes, which they blamed on the arms and supplies provided by British agents in Canada. In addition, they wanted access to lands that the British acknowledged belonged to the U.S. but that the British were blocking expansion into by inciting and arming the Native Americans. The death of Tecumseh in battle in 1813 removed a powerful obstacle to expansion, although Native American involvement in the war continued, as did their resistance to American westward expansion after the war's end. The natives were the main losers in the war, losing British protection, and never regained their influence.[11]

In the Southeast, Andrew Jackson's destruction of Britain's allies, the Creek Indians at the Battle of Horseshoe Bend in 1814, ended the threat of Native American hostilities in that region. It opened vast areas in Georgia and Alabama for settlement as plantations and farmlands. The U.S. occupied all of West Florida during the war and in 1819 purchased the rest of Florida from Spain, thus preventing the Spanish from arming hostile tribes there. Creek Indians who escaped to Spanish Florida joined the Seminoles there, and put up a long resistance known as the Seminole Wars.[12]

In the treaty, the British promised not to arm the Native Americans in the U.S. from Canada (nor even trade with them), and the U.S.-Canada border was largely pacified. However, some Americans assumed that the British continued to conspire with their former Native American allies in an attempt to forestall U.S. hegemony in the Great Lakes region. Such perceptions were faulty, argues Calloway (1987). After the Treaty of Ghent, the Native Americans in the Great Lakes region became an undesirable burden to British policymakers.[13]

Canada[edit]

Some in Washington had expected the largely American population of Upper Canada to throw off the "British yoke", but that did not happen. After 1815, British officials, Anglican clergy and Canadians loyal to the Empire tried to spot and root out American ideals, such as democracy and republicanism. Thus, the British and Loyalist elite were able to set the different colonies, of what would later become Canada, on a different course from that of their former enemy. Canada discouraged further American immigration.[14]

When the United States attacked British North America, most of the British forces were engaged in the Napoleonic Wars. Thus, British North America had minimal troops to defend against the United States, who had a much larger (though initially poorly trained) military force. For most of the war, British North America stood alone against a much stronger American force. Reinforcements from the United Kingdom did not arrive until 1814, the final year of the war. The repelling of the American force helped to foster British loyalties in the colonies that later became Canada.

The nationalistic sentiment caused a suspicion of such American ideas as republicanism, which would frustrate political reform in Upper and Lower Canada until the Rebellions of 1837. However, the War of 1812 started the process that ultimately led to Canadian Confederation in 1867. Canadian writer Pierre Berton has written that, although later events such as the rebellions and the Fenian raids of the 1860s were more important, Canada would have become part of the United States if the War of 1812 had not taken place, because more and more American settlers would have arrived and Canadian nationalism would not have developed.

The War of 1812 was highly significant in Britain's North American colonies. After the war, British sympathizers portrayed the war as a successful fight for national survival against an American democratic force that threatened the peace and stability the Canadians desired. Throughout the war, most of Canada's inhabitants assigned the war to an American desire to annex the British colonies, a perception reinforced by American Generals like William Hull, who issued proclamations stating that Canada would be annexed.[15]

An alleged Canadian myth from the war was that Canadian militiamen had performed admirably, while the British officers were largely ineffective. Jack Granatstein has termed this the "militia myth", and he feels it has had a deep effect on Canadian military thinking, which placed more stress on a citizens' militia than on a professional standing army. The United States suffered from a similar "frontiersman myth" at the start of the war, believing falsely that individual initiative and marksmanship could be effective against a well-disciplined British battle line. Granatstein argues that the militia was not particularly effective in the war and that any British military success was the work of British regular forces and the result of British domination over the sea. Isaac Brock, for example, was reluctant to trust the militia with muskets.[16]

Others argue that, in fact, the Canadian militia played important roles in several key engagements, including at the Battle of Chateauguay where they were central to defeating the American advance on Montreal in the fall of 1813.[17][18] Historian Robert Henderson has referred to this as "The myth of the Militia myth".[19] See: Canadian Units of the War of 1812

During the war, British officers constantly worried that the Americans would block the St. Lawrence River, which forms part of the Canada–U.S. border. If the U.S. military had done so, there would have been no British supply route for Upper Canada, where most of the land battles took place, and British forces would likely have had to withdraw or surrender all western British territory within a few months. British officers' dispatches after the war exhibited astonishment that the Americans never took such a simple step, but the British were not willing to count on the enemy repeating the mistake: as a result, Britain commissioned the Rideau Canal, an expensive project connecting Kingston, on Lake Ontario, to the Ottawa River, providing an alternative supply route that bypassed the part of the St. Lawrence River along the U.S. border. The settlement at the northeastern end of the canal, where it joins the Ottawa River, later became the city of Ottawa, Canada's fourth-largest city and its capital (placed inland to protect it from U.S. invasion—known then as the 'defensible back-country'). Because population away from the St. Lawrence shores was negligible, the British, in the years following the war, took great lengths to ensure that back-country settlement was increased. They settled soldiers and initiated assisted-immigration schemes, offering free land to farmers, mostly tenants of estates in the south of Ireland. The canal project was not completed until 1832 and was never used for its intended purpose.[20]

Britain[edit]

In contrast to Canada, the War of 1812 is seldom remembered in Britain today, as the conflict was quickly forgotten by the British public. Chiefly, this is because it was overshadowed by the dramatic events of the contemporary Napoleonic wars, and because Britain herself neither gained nor lost anything by the peace settlement, except for the fact that it kept control of Canada.[21]

The Royal Navy was acutely conscious that the United States Navy had won single-ship duels during the war, even though they had no strategic effect. Particular attention was given these battles because American propaganda had projected them as battles of equal force, when actually the only single ship duel where the forces were equal was the Battle of Boston Harbor which the British won. Furthermore, Britain had effectively won the war on the ocean as almost the entire US Navy was blockaded and unable to fight. British honor was restored when the USS President was captured and taken to Britain for all to see that the American ships that participated in battles of so-called equal force where actually much larger than the British ships they were engaged with.[22]

American privateers and commerce raiders had captured approximately 1200 British merchant ships, sending insurance rates up and embarrassing the Admiralty. Nevertheless, 50% of all American privateers were captured by the British while the privateers only captured 5% to 7% of British commerce. Meanwhile, for every 14 American merchant ships that traded before the start of the war only 1 ship dared leave port during the war despite the American effort to double maritime trade. Furthermore, of the few ships that left port, a total 1400 were captured. In addition, Britain did win many sea battles. The Royal Navy had been able to deploy overwhelming strength to American waters, annihilating rather than merely denting American maritime trade, and driving the American economy close to bankruptcy. The Royal Navy would emerge unchecked from the conflict.[23]

The British Army regarded the 1812-15 conflict in Canada and America as a sideshow. Only one regiment, the 41st, was awarded a battle honor (Detroit) from the war. The army was more interested in the lessons of the Peninsular War in Spain. The battle New Orleans could be conveniently attributed to poor leadership or insuperable physical obstacles and British attention was given to the Royal Navy's successful capture of the American flagship which the Americans conveniently overlooked.[24] If generalship had been better, it was believed, then British would have been successfully at New Orleans. Due to the huge, overwhelming success and pre-eminence of the Duke of Wellington in Europe, the British army was to make no change to its systems of recruitment, discipline and awards of commissions for more than half a century.

The British suffered 5,000 killed or wounded soldiers and sailors in the war.

United States[edit]

The gloom in New England, which staunchly opposed the war, culminated in December 1814, as delegates from five states met secretly in the Hartford Convention. It demanded constitutional amendments to protect New England's interests against the West and the South. Secession talk was rife and the region might have threatened to secede from the Union, if their demands had been ignored, but the news of peace ended the movement.

The United States had faced near-disaster in 1814, but the victories at the Battle of New Orleans and the Battle of Baltimore and what seemed to be a successful fight against the United Kingdom increased to unite the United States into one nation. Meanwhile, the loss of the American flagship USS President was conveniently overlooked by the public. The best-known patriotic legacy of the war was The Star Spangled Banner. The words are by Francis Scott Key, who after the bombardment of Fort McHenry set them to the music of a British drinking song, "To Anacreon in Heaven." In 1889 the U.S. Navy began using The Star Spangled Banner at flag-raising ceremonies, a practice copied by the Army. In 1931, Congress made it the U.S. National Anthem.[25]

Although all of the original objectives of the war had failed, the American people saw the War of 1812 as evidence of the success of the democratic experiment. The war ushered in a period of American history that has frequently been called "the Era of Good Feelings," a time when, at least on the surface, most Americans felt unified behind a common purpose. The War of 1812 convinced the country that it could fend off any foreign threats and that its focus should be on expansion at home.

With the collapse of the Hartford Convention and news of the triumph at the Battle of New Orleans, Americans had cause for celebration. In February, President James Madison sent Congress the treaty of peace. He congratulated the nation on the close of a war "waged with the success which is the natural result of the wisdom of the legislative councils, of the patriotism of the people, of the public spirit of the militia, and of the velour of the military and naval forces of the country." The spirit of nationalism and pride led to the collapse of the nay-sayer Federalist Party and the new Era of Good Feelings.[26]

One indirect result of the War of 1812 was the later election to the presidency of war heroes Andrew Jackson and of William Henry Harrison. Both of these men won military fame which had much to do with their elections. Another indirect result was the decline of Federalist power.

Impact on U.S. military[edit]

During the war a total of 2,260 American soldiers and sailors were killed. The war cost the United States about $200 million. Neither the United States nor Great Britain gained any military advantage. Indirectly the United States made some gains.[27]

A significant military development was the increased emphasis by General Winfield Scott on professionalism in the U.S. Army officer corps and in particular, the training of officers at the United States Military Academy ("West Point"). This new professionalism would become apparent during the Mexican–American War (1846–1848). After the Texas Annexation by the U.S., the term Manifest Destiny became a widely used political term for those who propagated American expansionism and military pride.[28]

In a related development, the United States officially abandoned its reliance on the militia for its defense. Moreover, Army Corps of Engineers (which at that time controlled West Point), began building fortifications around New Orleans as a response to the British attack on the city during the war. This effort then grew into numerous civil river works, especially in the 1840s and 1850s under General Pierre Beauregard. The Corps remains the authority over Mississippi (and other) river works.

The embarrassing defeat of Fort Madison in what is now Iowa and Fort McKay in Prairie du Chien led to the fortification of the Mississippi, with the expansion of Fort Belle Fontaine near St. Louis, and the construction of Fort Armstrong (1816) and Fort Edwards (1816) in Illinois, Fort Crawford (1816) in Prairie du Chien, and Fort Snelling (1819) in Minnesota. Removal of all Indians from the Mississippi Valley became a top priority for the U.S. government.[29]

Honor[edit]

Historian Norman Risjord has emphasized the central importance of honour as a cause the war.[30] Americans of every political stripe saw the need to uphold national honour, and to reject the treatment of the United States by Britain as a third class nonentity. Americans talked incessantly about the need for force in response.[31] This quest for honour was a major cause of the war in the sense that most Americans who were not involved in mercantile interests or threatened by Indian attack strongly endorsed the preservation of national honour.[32] Chesapeake–Leopard Affair in which the HMS Leopard attacked the USS Chesapeake in June 1807 was a decisive event.[33] Historians have documented the importance of honour in shaping public opinion in a number of states, including Massachusetts,[34] Ohio,[35] Pennsylvania,[36][37] and Tennessee,[38] as well as the territory of Michigan.[39] Americans widely celebrated the conclusion of the war as successful, especially the spectacular defeat of the main British invasion army at New Orleans, while conveniently overlooking the loss of their flagship the very next week. For the next century it was often called "the Second American War for Independence" and it propelled Andrew Jackson and William Henry Harrison to the White House.[40] Americans felt they had restored their sense of honour.

National honour, the reputation of republican government, and the continuing supremacy of the Republican party had seemed to be at stake.... National honour had [now] been satisfied," says historian Lance Banning, "Americans celebrated the end of the struggle with a brilliant burst of national pride. They felt that they had fought a second war for independence, and had won.[41]

According to Historians such as Andrew Lambert and William James, British honor was challenged because deserters from the Royal Navy were granted citizenship in the United States. This led to the impressment of American citizens into the Royal Navy. In 1811, the Little Belt Affair would anger the Admiraly and embarrass the United States. This would lead to the British having a particular interest in capturing the United States flagship USS President. Although the British would effectively disable the vast majority of the United States Navy during the war by having the ships blockaded, the single ship actions that the American's won embarrassed the Admiralty. Specific attention was given to these battles as the American's claimed there were between ships of equal force.[42]

The British effectively restored their honor by capturing the sloop of war USS Frolic and more importantly the flagship USS President . Both ships were taken to Britain for all to see that the American ships of the so-called engagements of equal force were much larger than the British ships they had fought in single ship duels. Furthermore, the United States failed at abolishing impressment when the treaty was signed, but the British did not continue the practice as the Napoleonic Wars had ended so they no longer needed as many sailors. In doing so British honor was restored, only for the entire conflict to be overshadowed by the defeat of Napoleon.[43]

Economic impact[edit]

Although during the War of 1812 the United States' economy was severely damaged by the British blockade, the aftermath gave a dramatic boost to the manufacturing capabilities of the United States. The British blockade of the American coast created a shortage of cotton cloth in the United States, leading to the creation of a cotton-manufacturing industry, beginning at Waltham, Massachusetts by Francis Cabot Lowell. The war also spurred on construction of the Erie Canal project, which was built to promote commercial links yet was also perceived as having military uses should the need ever arise.[44] As the charter of the First Bank of the United States had been allowed to expire in 1811, the federal government was ill-prepared to finance the war and resorted to such expediencies as the suspension of specie payment and the issuance of Treasury Notes. These actions set a precedent for future Federal responses to financial crises. Also, this exposure of the nation's financial weaknesses explained in part the Congressional decision to charter the Second Bank of the United States in 1816. The readiness of Southern leaders especially John C. Calhoun to support such a measure also indicates a high degree of national feeling.[45] Perhaps the clearest sign of a new sense of national unity was the victorious Democratic-Republican Party, its long-time foes, the Federalists, vanishing from national politics. The result was an Era of Good Feelings with the lowest level of partisanship ever seen.[46]

Canadians, however, contrasted their post-war economic stagnation to the booming American economy, which Desmond Morton believes led to the Rebellions of 1837.[47] During the war, Bermudian privateers, with their fast Bermuda sloops, were to capture 298 ships (the total captures by all British naval or privateering vessels between the Great Lakes and the West Indies was 1,593 vessels).[48]

See also[edit]

References[edit]

  1. ^ Taylor, Alan (2010). The Civil War of 1812. Random House. pp. 137–139. ISBN 978-0-679-77673-4.
  2. ^ Bradford Perkins, ed. The Causes of the War of 1812: National Honor or National Interest? (1962)
  3. ^ Hickey p. 300; Barry Schwartz, "The Social Context of Commemoration: A Study in Collective Memory." Social Forces 61#2 (1982), p. 312 in JSTOR.
  4. ^ Benn (2002), p. 81.
  5. ^ Dwight L. Smith"A North American Neutral Indian Zone: Persistence of a British Idea." Northwest Ohio Quarterly 61#2-4 (1989): 46-63.
  6. ^ Francis M. Carroll (2001). A Good and Wise Measure: The Search for the Canadian-American Boundary, 1783-1842. U. of Toronto Press. p. 24.
  7. ^ Robert V. Remini, Henry Clay: Statesman for the Union (1992), pp. 94-122.
  8. ^ Pratt (1955), pp. 135-7.
  9. ^ Bertram Wyatt-Brown, "Andrew Jackson's Honor," Journal of the Early Republic, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Spring, 1997), pp. 1-36 in JSTOR
  10. ^ Watts (1989)
  11. ^ Walter R. Borneman, 1812: The War That Forged a Nation (2005), p. 269.
  12. ^ Robert Remini, Andrew Jackson and His Indian Wars (2002), pp. 277-82.
  13. ^ Colin G. Calloway, Crown and Calumet: British-Indian Relations, 1783-1815 (1987)
  14. ^ Alan Taylor, The Civil War of 1812 (2010), p. 443.
  15. ^ Taylor, Alan (2010). The Civil War of 1812. Random House. pp. 137–139. ISBN 978-0-679-77673-4.
  16. ^ J. L. Granatstein, Canada's army: waging war and keeping the peace (2004), p. 4.
  17. ^ http://www.warof1812.ca/lacolle1812.htm
  18. ^ http://www.warof1812.ca/chatgy.htm
  19. ^ Robert Henderson "The myth of the 'Militia Myth' Dorchester Review (Volume 3 No. 1 Spring/Summer 2013)
  20. ^ J. L. Granatstein, Canada's army: waging war and keeping the peace (2004), p. 15.
  21. ^ Jeremy Black, The War of 1812 in the Age of Napoleon (2009), pp. 221-32.
  22. ^ Lambert, Andrew: The Challege: Britain against America in The War of 1812, Kindle edition
  23. ^ Lambert, Andrew: The Challege: Britain against America in The War of 1812, Kindle edition
  24. ^ Lambert, Andrew: The Challege: Britain against America in The War of 1812, Kindle edition
  25. ^ Benn, p. 84.
  26. ^ George Dangerfield, The Era of Good Feelings (1952), ch 1.
  27. ^ War of 1812. (2006). Compton's by Britannica. Retrieved April 1, 2006, from Encyclopædia Britannica Online. (The Curious End of the War[permanent dead link])
  28. ^ Weigley (1973)
  29. ^ Prucha, Francis P. (1969) The Sword of the Republic: The United States Army on the Frontier 1783–1846. Macmillan, New York
  30. ^ Norman K. Risjord, "1812: Conservatives, War Hawks and the Nation's Honor." William and Mary Quarterly: A Magazine of Early American History (1961): 196-210. in JSTOR
  31. ^ Robert L. Ivie, "The metaphor of force in prowar discourse: The case of 1812." Quarterly Journal of Speech 68#3 (1982), pp. 240-253.
  32. ^ Bradford Perkins, The causes of the War of 1812: National honor or national interest? (1962).
  33. ^ Spencer Tucker, Injured Honor: The Chesapeake-Leopard Affair, June 22, 1807 (Naval Institute Press, 1996)
  34. ^ William Barlow and David O. Powell. "Congressman Ezekiel Bacon of Massachusetts and the Coming of the War of 1812." Historical Journal of Massachusetts 6#2 (1978): 28.
  35. ^ William R. Barlow, "Ohio's Congressmen and the War of 1812." Ohio History 72 (1963): 175-94.
  36. ^ Victor Sapio, Pennsylvania and the War of 1812 (University Press of Kentucky, 2015)
  37. ^ Martin Kaufman, "War Sentiment in Western Pennsylvania: 1812." Pennsylvania History (1964): 436-448.
  38. ^ William A. Walker, "Martial Sons: Tennessee Enthusiasm for the War of 1812." Tennessee Historical Quarterly 20.1 (1961): 20+
  39. ^ William Barlow, "The Coming of the War of 1812 in Michigan Territory." Michigan History 53 (1969): 91-107.
  40. ^ Andrew Robertson; et al. (2010). Encyclopedia of U.S. Political History. SAGE Publications. p. 372.
  41. ^ Lance Banning (1980). The Jeffersonian Persuasion: Evolution of a Party Ideology. Cornell UP. p. 295.
  42. ^ Lambert, Andrew: The Challege: Britain against America in The War of 1812, Kindle edition
  43. ^ Lambert, Andrew: The Challege: Britain against America in The War of 1812, Kindle edition
  44. ^ Stanley Engerman and Robert E. Gallman, eds. The Cambridge economic history of the United States: the colonial era: Volume 1 (2000), p. 372.
  45. ^ Wiltse (1944)
  46. ^ George Dangerfield, The Awakening of American Nationalism, 1815-1828 (1966), ch. 1.
  47. ^ Desmond Morton, A Military History of Canada (2007), p. 71.
  48. ^ Walter Brownell Hayward, Bermuda past and present (1910), pp. 58-66.

Further reading[edit]

  • Berton, Pierre; The Invasion of Canada: 1812-1813 (1980). ISBN 0-7710-1244-6; Flames Across the Border: 1813-1814 (1981); reissued as Pierre Berton's War of 1812 (Toronto: Anchor Canada, 2011); popular Canadian narrative; 928pp
  • Bickham, Troy, The Weight of Vengeance: The United States, The British Empire, and the War of 1812 (Oxford University Press, 2012) ISBN 978-0195391787
  • Black, Jeremy. The War of 1812 in the Age of Napoleon (2009) by English military historian
  • Borneman, Walter R. 1812: The War That Forged a Nation (2004), popular American version
  • Burt, A. L. The United States, Great Britain and British North America from the Revolution to the Establishment of Peace after the War of 1812. (1940) online edition
  • Heidler, Donald & Jeanne T. Heidler (eds) Encyclopedia of the War of 1812 (2nd ed 2004) 636pp; most comprehensive guide; 500 entries by 70 scholars from several countries
  • Hickey, Donald R. Don't Give Up the Ship! Myths of the War of 1812. (2006) ISBN 0-252-03179-2
  • Hickey, Donald R. The War of 1812: A Forgotten Conflict. ISBN 0-252-06059-8 (1990), standard scholarly history.
  • Hickey, Donald R. 187 Things You Should Know about the War of 1812 (Baltimore: Maryland Historical Society, 2012), 170 pp.
  • Hitsman, J. M. The Incredible War of 1812 (1965), survey by Canadian scholar
  • Jensen, Richard. "Military History on the Electronic Frontier: Wikipedia Fights the War of 1812," The Journal of Military History 76#4 (October 2012): 523-556; online version; the debate here on Wikipedia
  • Langguth, A. J. Union 1812: The Americans Who Fought the Second War of Independence (2006) 495pp, popular history
  • Latimer, Jon, 1812: War with America (Harvard, 2007). A British naval perspective.
  • Perkins, Bradford. Castelereagh and Adams: England and the United States, 1812-1823. (1964), the standard scholarly diplomatic history
  • Remini, Robert Vincent, Henry Clay: Statesman for the Union (1991), pp. 94–122.
  • Stagg, J.C.A. The War of 1812: Conflict for a Continent (Cambridge Essential Histories, 2012) brief overview by New Zealand scholar
  • Taylor, Alan. The Civil War of 1812: American Citizens, British Subjects, Irish Rebels, & Indian Allies (2010) by Pulitzer Prize winner
  • Tucker, Spencer C., ed. The Encyclopedia of the War of 1812 (3 vol: ABC-CLIO, 2012), 1034pp.
  • Zuehlke, Mark. For Honour's Sake: The War of 1812 and the Brokering of an Uneasy Peace. (2007) by Canadian military historian.

Memory of the war[edit]

  • Austen, Ian. "Canada Puts Spotlight on War of 1812, With USA as Villain." New York Times 7 October 2012. online
  • Coates, Colin M., and Cecilia Morgan. Heroines and History: Representations of Madeleine de Verchères and Laura Secord (U of Toronto Press, 2002).
  • Eamon, Michael. "The War Against Public Forgetfulness: Commemorating 1812 in Canada" London Journal of Canadian Studies (2014) 29#1 pp. 134–185 online
  • Forest, Timothy S. "Epic Triumph, Epic Embarrassment or Both? Commemorations of the War of 1812 Today in Niagara Region," Ontario History 104#1 (2012), pp. 96+.
  • Hammack Jr., James W. (1976). Kentucky and the Second American Revolution: The War of 1812. University Press of Kentucky. pp. 107–112.
  • Knowles, Norman. Inventing the Loyalists: the Ontario Loyalist Tradition and the Creation of Usable Pasts (U of Toronto Press, 1997)
  • MacDonald, Heather. "Heroes and Identity: Two-Hundred Years in the Making," The Great Lakes Journal of Undergraduate History (2013) 1#1 Article 6 online
  • Morgan, Cecilia. ""Remembering 1812 in the 1840s: John Richardson and the Writing of the War", London Journal of Canadian Studies (2014) 29#1 pp. 39–69 online
  • Robertson, James Tyler. "For God, King, and Country: Nineteenth-Century Methodist Interpretations of the War of 1812" London Journal of Canadian Studies (2014) 29#1 pp. 1–38; Canadian Methodists online
  • Sheppard, George. Plunder, Profit, and Paroles: A Social History of the War of 1812 in Upper Canada (McGill-Queen's University Press, 1994)
  • Tiro, Karim M. "Now You See It, Now You Don't: The War of 1812 in Canada and the United States in 2012." Public Historian 35#1 (2013): 87-97. in JSTOR
  • Wasson, Jeffrey. "Inventing a Foundation Myth: Upper Canada in the War of 1812" (Clark University, 2014) online

External links[edit]