Romanian general election, 1946

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Results for the BPD and UPM per county, according to the Romanian Communist Party report cited by Petre Ţurlea.
  60% and over
  50 to 60%
  30 to 50%
  15 to 30%
  0 to 15%
  unknown or undisclosed

General elections were held in Romania on 19 November 1946. The official results gave a victory to the Romanian Communist Party (PCR), its allies inside the Bloc of Democratic Parties (Blocul Partidelor Democrate, BPD), together with its associates, the Hungarian People's Union (UPM or MNSz) and the Democratic Peasants' Party–Lupu.[1] The event marked a decisive step towards the disestablishment of the Romanian monarchy and the proclamation of a Communist regime at the end of the following year. Breaking with the traditional universal male suffrage confirmed by the 1923 Constitution, it was the first national election to feature women's suffrage, and the first to allow active public officials and army personnel the right to vote.[2] The BPD, representing the incumbent leftist government formed around Prime Minister Petru Groza, was an electoral alliance comprising the PCR, the Social Democratic Party (PSD), the Ploughmen's Front, the National Liberal Party–Tătărescu, the National Peasants' Party–Alexandrescu and the National Popular Party.[1]

In general, commentators agree that the grouping carried the vote through widespread intimidation tactics and electoral fraud, to the detriment of both the National Peasants' Party (PNŢ) and the National Liberal Party (PNL). While there is disagreement over the exact results, it is contended that the BPD and its allies did not receive more than 48% of the total (according to several estimates, the actual votes for the PNŢ should have allowed it to form government, either on its own or as part of a coalition).[3] Instead, the elections awarded the BPD a crushing majority inside the new unicameral Parliament—it had 348 seats on its own (379 with its allies), whereas the PNŢ was awarded 32 seats and the PNL only 3.[4]

Carried out upon the close of World War II, under Romania's occupation by Soviet troops,[4] the elections have drawn comparisons to the similarly flawed elections held at the time in most of the emerging Eastern Bloc (in Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and Poland),[5] being considered, in respect to its formal system of voting, among the most permissive of the latter.[5]

Background[edit]

Following its exit from the Axis in late 1944, Romania became subject to Allied supervision (see Romania during World War II, Allied Commission). After the Yalta Conference in February 1945, Soviet authorities had increased their presence in Romania, as Western Allied governments resorted to expressing largely inconsequential criticism of new procedures in place.[6] After the Potsdam Conference, the latter group initially refused to recognize Groza's administration,[7] which had been imposed after Soviet pressure.[8]

Consequently, King Michael I refused to sign legislation advanced by the cabinet (this was the so-called Greva regală, "Royal strike"). On 8 November 1945, authorities repressed a spontaneous gathering of Bucharesters in front of the Royal Palace—demonstrators flocked to the plaza in front of the palace as a means to express their solidarity with the monarch (on the Orthodox liturgics Saint Michael's Day).[9] Depicting the event as a coup d'état attempt, authorities fired on the crowd, killing around 10 people.[10] In January 1946, the "Royal strike" itself ended with Groza agreeing to include politicians from outside his electoral alliance, appointing two members of opposition parties (the National Liberal Mihail Romaniceanu and the National Peasants' Emil Haţieganu) as Ministers without Portfolio (the gesture also brought it Western Allied recognition).[11]

In mid-December 1945, the representatives of the three major Allied Powers—Andrey Vyshinsky from the Soviet Union, W. Averell Harriman from the United States, and Archibald Clerk-Kerr from the United Kingdom—visited the capital Bucharest and agreed for elections to be convened in May 1946, on the basis of the Yalta Agreements.[12] Nevertheless, and despite opposition protests,[13] the pro-Soviet Groza cabinet took the liberty to prolong the term, passing the required new electoral procedure on June 17.[14]

On the same day, Groza signed a decree to disestablish the Senate, turning the Parliament into a unicameral legislature, the Assembly of Deputies (Adunarea Deputaţilor).[2] The new legislation, breaking with the provisions of the 1923 Constitution, was made possible by the fact that Groza was governing without a parliament (the last legislature to have functioned, that of the National Renaissance Front, had been dissolved in 1941).[13] The Senate was traditionally considered reactionary by the PCR,[15] and its end was arguably meant to facilitate control over the legislative process.[15] The BPD government also removed the majority bonus, traditionally awarded to the party that had obtained more than 40% of the total suffrage.[13]

The election coincided with the deterioration of relations between the Soviet Union and the West at the start of the Cold War, notably marked by Winston Churchill's "Iron Curtain" speech at Westminster College on 5 March 1946,[16] and the centering of Western Allied interest in turning the tide of the Civil War in Greece.[6] The intricate issues posed by the latter contributed to weakening ties between the Romanian opposition groups and their Western supporters, as the country appeared to be a lost cause for capitalism.[6]

The date of the election coincided with the fourth anniversary of Operation Uranus, the moment when Nazi Germany and Romania suffered a major defeat on the Eastern Front.[16] According to his private notes, General Constantin Sănătescu, an adversary of the PCR and former Premier, presumed that this had been done on purpose ("in order to mock us").[17]

BPD[edit]

Following Romania's exit from the war, left-wing parties had increased their membership several times. The PCR, which held its first open and legal conference on October 1945,[18] had begun a massive recruitment campaign,[19] benefited from an influx of former members of the fascist Iron Guard.[20] By 1947, it grew to over 700,000 members from an initial 1,000 in 1944[21] (the constant growth in membership was by far the highest of all Eastern Bloc countries).[22]

Similarly, the Ploughmen's Front, which Groza presided, was estimated to have 1,000,000–1,500,000 members[23] or just 800,000.[24] In early November 1946, Communist sources show that the BPD counted on 60 to 65% of its projected gains to be obtained from the Front's electorate (the poorest peasant categories).[25] By the time of the election, Groza's party had just been pressured into supporting Communist tenets, after it a brief conflict had erupted over the PCR's designs of collectivization.[26]

The Social Democratic Party (PSD), which had been drawn into close collaboration with the PCR as early as 1944 (as part of the Singular Workers' Front, Frontul Unic Muncitoresc), had also seen a steady growth in numbers;[27] the PSD was by then dominated by the pro-PCR wing of Ştefan Voitec and Lothar Rădăceanu, who purged the staunchly Reformist group of Constantin Titel Petrescu's in March 1946 (leading the latter to establish his as a minor independent group).[28] The Communist Ana Pauker noted with dissatisfaction that certain members of the PSD continued to remain hostile to her party (she cited the example of an unnamed intellectual and low-ranking member of the PSD who, during a BPD meeting, shouted a slogan in support of the PNŢ's Iuliu Maniu).[29]

As a representative of the middle class, the National Liberal Party–Tătărescu itself had an uneasy relation with the PCR, having declared its support for capitalism.[30]

According to a Communist report by the time of the election, the Hungarian People's Union (UPM or MNSz), which represented the Hungarian minority, was in relatively tense relations with the PCR (who suspected it of "chauvinism" over the issue of Northern Transylvania).[31] It was, however, instrumental in securing Transylvanian votes for the government coalition, as admitted by the PCR itself.[24] The other ethnic grouping inside the BPD, the Jewish Committee, was created on 22 April 1946, when PCR representatives organized an intrusion into the representative bodies of the Jewish-Romanian community.[32]

At the time, government-backed Communists had infiltrated the vast majority of the media and cultural institutions.[33] On one occasion, the Red Army general Ivan Susaykov warned Nicolae Carandino, editor-in-chief of the PNŢ's Dreptatea, to tone down his criticism of the BPD, and argued that "the Groza government is Soviet Russia itself".[34]

Electoral system[edit]

New legislation provided for the end of universal male suffrage, proclaiming the right to vote for all citizens over the age of 21, while restricting it for all persons who had held important office during the wartime dictatorship of Conducător Ion Antonescu.[15] The latter requirement facilitated abuse, as power to decide over who had been supporting the regime fell to "purging commissions", all of them controlled by the PCR,[15] and the Romanian People's Tribunals (investigating war crimes, and constantly supported by agitprop in the Communist press).[35]

The decision to allow military men and public officials to vote was also intended to secure a grip on elections.[36] At the time, Groza's cabinet exercised complete control over public administration at central and local levels, and had taken charge of all communications between these and the population.[36] Soviet sources cited PCR officials giving assurances that the respective categories were to provide as much as 1 million votes for the BPD.[37]

A report of the Soviet Embassy in Bucharest, dated 15 August 1946, informed Andrey Vyshinsky of the legislative changes and made note of the fact that the two opposition leaders, Iuliu Maniu (leader of the PNŢ) and Dinu Brătianu (leader of the PNL), had asked King Michael I not to approve the new framework.[38] The two parties had not been allowed to take any part in drafting the new legal framework.[13]

Early estimates[edit]

Months before the election, Communist leaders expressed confidence in being able to carry the election by 70 or 80% (statements by the Minister of Justice Lucreţiu Pătrăşcanu and the Minister of the Interior Teohari Georgescu), or even 90% (Miron Constantinescu, head of the PCR's Scînteia newspaper).[39] As early as May, former Minister of Foreign Affairs Constantin Vişoianu complained to Adrian Holman, the British Ambassador to Romania, that the BPD had ensured a means to win the elections through fraud.[40] Writing in January, Archibald Clerk-Kerr assessed the results of his visit to Romania, arguing that no person he had met actually trusted that elections were going to be free, and that Vyshinsky himself believed that, on its own, the PCR was not capable of gathering more than 10% of the vote.[41]

According to the American diplomat Burton Y. Berry, Groza had admitted to this procedure during an alleged conversation with a third party, indicating that the fraudulent percentages were the goal of competition between two sides—him and the PCR's general secretary Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej formed one, while a "Cominternist section" around Emil Bodnăraş represented the other; according to Berry, Groza and Gheorghiu-Dej were satisfied with a less intrusive fraud and, thus, a more realistic result (60%), while Bodnăraş aimed for 90%.[39] W. Averell Harriman, recording his conversation with Vyshinsky, alleged that the latter backed the 70% estimate.[42] Nevertheless, the Soviet Ambassador Sergey Kavtaradze stated that, "through certain 'techniques'", the BPD could win by 90%.[43] A reference to "techniques" was also made by Ana Pauker in conversation with Soviet officials; she nevertheless expressed her belief that the overall result was not going to be upwards of 60% (Pauker also voiced concern that overall votes for the BPD coalition were not going to dissuade the public perception that the PCR was actually in a minority position).[44]

Historian Adrian Cioroianu assessed that the dissemination of optimistic rumors contributed to accustoming the public with the idea that the government could carry the vote, and made the ultimate result less questionable in the eyes of observers.[45]

Other Soviet documents, dated November 6 and 12, summarize a conversation with the Bodnăraş, who went on record indicating that a fraud was being prepared;[46] compared to the official results, the percentages he mentioned at the time had an error of as little as 1%.[47] Kavtaradze expressed concern that information on this topic had leaked to opposition parties in various locations, and that the PCR had thus failed to fully respect the "conspiratorial character" it had decided to use.[48]

Economic and social issues[edit]

An expectation shared by Groza and the PCR in postponing the elections was that outcome of harvests was to ensure the most favorable attitude from peasant voters[49] ("[Groza] has declared that the government will only organize elections «when the barns are filled with wheat»").[50] This tactic was consistently applied by parties in government during the interwar period.[13]

Instead, 1946 was witnessed to an exceptionally severe drought, turned into famine over some areas.[51] PCR officials claimed that this had been worsened by administrative incompetence, which had led to insufficient supplies of wheat and bread at the central level, and to various irregularities in transport over the national railway system (in turn attributed to sabotage).[52] Kavtaradze blamed the government itself for the confusing situation.[53]

During a meeting with the Soviet Embassy staff, PCR leader Ana Pauker mentioned that Communists were especially concerned about events related to the petroleum industry in Romania (centered on Prahova County), which was by then becoming much less lucrative.[29] Tudor Ionescu, the PSD's Minister of Mines and Petroleum, supported the initiative of American and British businessmen to withdraw their investments, but was virulently opposed by the PCR, who argued that theirs was a move to undermine support for the BPD government, by leaving thousands of people unemployed.[29] Pauker also alleged that a similar move was to be carried out by Ford's Bucharest branch.[29] Kavtaradze noted general dissatisfaction among workers, civil servants, and Romanian Army personnel over their low incomes.[54]

In this context, the government began handing out food supplies as a means to ensure votes. Pauker attested that, in several places, the state was frustrated in its attempt to purchase grain from peasants, who argued that the price was small and the supplies insufficient.[55] Eventually, the Central Committee took the decision to import grain (and especially maize) in large quantities, an action overseen by Gheorghiu-Dej.[44] According to Kavtardze, such measures were partly inefficient.[54]

Pauker's testimony stressed that, during the electoral campaign, much of the formerly landless peasantry was becoming suspicious of the BPD. She attested that, in several counties, the absentee ballot was becoming a widespread solution among members of the latter social category ("Asked whom they would vote for, peasants answer: «We'll think about it some more» or «We shall not be voting»").[29] According to Pauker, they predicted that the Groza cabinet had carried out a previous land reform only as a preliminary step to collectivization ("Peasants answer that in Russia as well, in the beginning the land was divided, then taken away and kolkhozy were set up. We have no convincing arguments against such objections from the peasants").[56]

The BPD took additional measures in regard to women voters in villages, especially illiterate ones. According to a Soviet report, several agitprop campaigns were aimed at them, during which Communist activists stressed the positive aspects of the Groza government.[44] Pauker stated: "a lot of things will depend on how the presidents of election bureaus treat women voters, since women have never voted, have never seen electoral laws and are not aware of voting procedures".[56] In one incident witnessed during the elections and occurring in Cluj, "there was an unexpected influence of Magyar women. Old women aged 70–80, carrying chairs, had queued, in rainy weather, awaiting their turn to vote. The slogan was: if one does not vote with the UPM, one does not receive sugar".[31]

The women's suffrage was regarded with a level of hostility by the PNŢ, and Dreptatea frequently ridiculed Pauker's visits to women in various villages.[13]

Conduct[edit]

General irregularities[edit]

The period of campaigning and the election itself were witness to widespread violence and intimidation, carried out by squads of the BPD.[57] In at least one instance, in Piteşti, BPD members killed the local leader of the PNŢ.[58]

Prior to the election, freedom of association had been severely curtailed through various laws; according to Burton Y. Berry, Groza had admitted to this, and had indicated that it came as an answer to the need for order in the country.[59] Expanding on this, he had stated that the cabinet was attempting to prevent "provocation" from both the far right and far left, and that chaos during the elections would have resulted in his own sidelining by the Communist Party.[60] In regard to the arrest of several Romanian employees of the American Embassy in Bucharest, Groza reportedly claimed that he had tried to set them free, but the PCR had opposed his move.[60] However, in a semi-official context, he had also stated (February 1946): "If the reaction wins, do you think we'll let it live for [another] 24 hours? We'll be getting our payback immediately. We'll get our hands on whatever we can and we'll strike".[61]

According to Berry, the Premier had stated that he assessed Romania's commitment to freedom of election in opposition to the Western Allied requirements, and based on "the Russian interpretation of «free and unfettered»".[60]

One effect of new legislative measures was that the intervention of judicial authorities as observers was much reduced; the task fell instead on local authorities, most of them controlled by Communist supporters.[13]

From the start, state resources were employed in campaigning for the BPD.[62] The numbers cited by Victor Frunză include, among other investments, over 4 million propaganda booklets, 28 million leaflets, 8.6 million printed caricatures, 2.7 million signs, and over 6.6 million posters.[63]

Army[edit]

There is evidence that the Army was a main agent of both political campaigning and the eventual fraud. As an answer to increasing malcontent in military ranks, the Groza cabinet increased their revenues and supplies preferentially[16] (arguably, their salaries remained weak when confronted to the Romanian leu's high rate of inflation).[16] In January, Army agitprop sections of the "Education, Culture and Propaganda" Directorate (Direcţia Superioară pentru Educaţie, Cultură şi Propagandă a Armatei, or ECP), already employed in channeling political messages inside military ranks, were authorized to carry out "educational activities" outside of the facilities and into the rural area.[64] PNŢ and PNL activists were barred entry on Army grounds, while the ECP closely supervised soldiers who supported the opposition,[65] and repeatedly complained about the "political backwardness" and "liberties in voting" of various Army institutions.[66] While several Army officials guaranteed that their subordinates were to vote for the BPD unanimously,[67] low-ranking members occasionally expressed criticism over the violent quelling of PNŢ and PNL activities inside Army units.[67]

Eventually, as the institution made use of its venues to campaign for the BPD,[68] it encountered hostility. At a time when planes of the Romanian Air Forces were used to drop pro-Groza leaflets over the city of Braşov, EPC activists were alarmed to find out that the manifestos had been secretly replaced with PNŢ propaganda.[68]

The Army was assigned its own Electoral Commission, placed under the leadership of two notoriously pro-Soviet generals, Nicolae Cambrea and Mihail Lascăr (both of whom had formerly served in Red Army units of Romanian voluntaries).[69] This drew unanswered protests from the opposition, who called for another Commission to be appointed.[70] By the time of the election, the Groza cabinet decided not to allow families of soldiers to vote at special Army stations, a measure which drew criticism for reducing the number of outside votes (and thus constituting a form of gerrymandering).[68] In one report from Cluj County, General Precup Victor stated that:

"An electoral section for the military in Cluj [...] almost declared the voting invalid, citing for reason that the election was declared over between 6 and 7 o'clock, instead of 8 o'clock, as was required by law. [...] It is only due to the immediate and energetic intervention of the prefect, [with] Major Nicolae Haralambie, and yours truly that the situation was saved.

In this section, where we believed we had the best comrade president, and thus expected the best result, we received the worst result of all voting stations for the military. [...]

All of this because of the attitude of Comrade Petrovici [the section president]. If this section had not existed or if Comrade Petrovici, as its president, had listened to us, the army would have yielded a 99% result and not 92.06, as it came to be in Cluj."[71]

Immediately after the elections, pro-Communist officers in Transylvania arrested General Drăgănescu of the Second Division of Vânători de Munte in Dej, alleging that, during the voting, he had spread false rumors that the local peasant population was engaged in Antisemitic and Anti-Hungarian violence, as a means to draw the interest of central authorities and Western Allied supervisors.[72] In a secret note released at the same time, General Precup Victor admitted that violent incidents had been occurring, and that the Army had been sent in to intervene.[73] He also admitted that the local population was upset with the official results.[74]

Other testimonies[edit]

Writing at the time, the academic Constantin Rădulescu-Motru, who had his electoral rights suspended due to wartime membership in the Romanian-German Association, stated that authorities had been arbitrarily preventing people from voting, that many voters were not asked for their documents, and that electoral lists marked with the Sun symbol of the BPD had been shoved into urns before voting began.[75] According to his testimony:

"Trucks filled with voters [of the BPD] traveled from one section to the other and voted in all sections, that is to say several times. After voting, blank forms of official reports [by observers] were sent to the central commission, and they were filled in by adding the number of votes desired by the government".[76]

According to Anton Raţiu and Nicolae Betea, two collaborators of Lucreţiu Pătrăşcanu, the elections in Arad County were forged by a group of 40 people (including Belu Zilber and Anton Golopenţia); the president of the county electoral commission collected the votes from local stations and was required to read them aloud—irrespective of the option expressed, he called out the names of BPD candidates (Pătrăşcanu and Ion Vincze, together with others).[77] Nicolae Betea stated that the overall results for the BPD in Arad County, officially recorded at 58%, were closer to 20%.[78]

Throughout the country, voting bulletins were set fire to immediately after the official counting was completed, an action which prevented all alternative investigation.[63]

Results[edit]

Party Votes % Seats
Bloc of Democratic Parties[a] 4,773,689 69.8 347
National Peasants' Party 881,304 12.9 33
Hungarian People's Union 568,862 8.3 29
National Liberal Party 259,068 3.8 3
Democratic Peasants' Party–Lupu 161,314 2.4 2
Social Democratic Party–Petrescu 65,528 1.0 0
Other parties 132,162 1.9 0
Invalid/blank votes 92,656
Total 6,934,583 100 414
Registered voters/turnout 7,792,542 89.0
Source: Nohlen & Stöver[79]

a Of the 347 seats won by the Bloc of Democratic Parties, the Romanian Social Democratic Party won 81, the National Liberal Party–Tătărescu 75, the Ploughmen's Front 70, the Romanian Communist Party 68, the National Popular Party 26, the National Peasants' Party–Alexandrescu 20 and independents 8.[80]

Alternative results[edit]

Sometime after the elections, the PCR issued a confidential report called "Lessons from the Elections and the C[ommunist] P[arty]'s Tasks after the Victory of 19 November 1946" (Învăţămintele alegerilor şi sarcinile PC după victoria din 19 Noiembrie 1946, Arhiva MApN, fond Materiale documentare diverse, dosar 1.742, f.12–13). It was compared by historian Petre Ţurlea with the official version, and provides essentially different data on the results. Analyzing the report, Ţurlea contended that, overall, the BPD was awarded between 44.98% and 47% of the vote, which would contradict the claims of both the Groza government and the opposition (the latter having stated a claim to 80% of the actual votes).[81] In Ţurlea's interpretation, the result, although coming at the end of unfree elections,[81] could have allowed the three opposition parties to form a majority cabinet.[81]

The report also confirms that the BPD's popularity had been much higher in the urban areas than with the peasantry,[81] while, despite expectations, women in the villages preferred voting for the PNŢ.[24] While securing the votes of the state apparatus and the Jewish middle class, the BPD was not able to make notable gains inside the categories of traditional PNŢ supporters.[24]

Reactions[edit]

Later in the same month, the British government of Clement Attlee, represented by Adrian Holman, issued a note informing Foreign Minister Gheorghe Tătărescu that, due to the numerous infringements, it did not recognize the result of elections in Romania.[82]

In his 4 January 1947 conversation with the United States Secretary of State George Marshall, Romania's Ambassador Mihai Ralea received an official American reproach for having "broken the spirit and letter" of the Moscow Conference and the Yalta Agreement.[83] Although Ralea, a Ploughmen's Front member and conjectural ally of the Communists, expressed concern over the fact that the United States were reproving Romania, he also appealed to the United States not to allow the country to be left behind the Iron Curtain.[84] In August 1946, Berry attested that Groza intended to tighten connections with other countries occupied by the Red Army, as the basis for a customs union.[60] The plan, also advocated by Bulgaria's Georgi Dimitrov and Yugoslavia's Josip Broz Tito, was frustrated by the opposition of Joseph Stalin, and discarded altogether following the Tito-Stalin Split.[58]

Aftermath[edit]

The election results effectively confirmed Romania's adherence to the Eastern Bloc and Soviet camp in the erupting Cold War. On 19 November the three opposition parties (the National Peasants' Party, the National Liberal Party and Constantin Titel Petrescu's splinter group from the Social Democrats) issued a formal protest, accusing the Groza government of having falsified the vote.[85] Cabinet representatives of the two contender parties, the PNL's Mihail Romaniceanu and the PNŢ's Emil Haţieganu) withdrew in protest soon after results were announced.[45] Petre Ţurlea contends that the document was largely inconsequential due to the interwar tradition of similar protests for less problematic votes.[81]

On 1 December 1946, Premier Groza inaugurated the new unicameral Parliament. In his speech on the occasion, while expressing a hope that elections had voted in a new type of legislative, he stressed that it was important

"to eliminate the spectacle of useless blabber and personal issues from this Assembly and for these deputies to dedicate themselves, during the rather expensive session [...] to an intensive activity".[86]

According to Groza:

"it is not the Parliament of old politicians, it is not a luxurious habit, an entertainment, an exercise of political gymnastics or an excuse for quarreling with others".[86]

In following months, Communists concentrated on silencing opposition and ensuring a monopoly on power. In summer 1947, the Tămădău Affair saw the end of the PNŢ and the PNL, banned after Iuliu Maniu and others were prosecuted during a show trial.[87] The National Liberal Party-Tătărescu, which issued a critique of the Groza administration at around the same time, withdrew from the BPD only to be implicated in the Tămădău scandal and have its leadership replaced with ones more loyal to the PCR.[88] The PCR ultimately absorbed the PSD in late 1947, leading to the creation of a Romanian Workers' Party, which was in effect a new name for the PCR.[89]

In the last days of December 1947, King Michael I was pressured into abdication; a People's Republic was proclaimed instead, as the first stage of the Romanian Communist regime.[90]

Notes[edit]

  1. ^ a b Ştefan, p. 9; Tismăneanu, p. 323
  2. ^ a b Ştefan, p. 10; Ţiu
  3. ^ Frunză, pp. 290–291; Giurescu, "«Alegeri» după model sovietic", p. 17; Tismăneanu, p. 113; Ţurlea, pp. 35, 36; Weiner & Özbudun, p. 386
  4. ^ a b Ştefan, p. 9
  5. ^ a b Ţârău, pp. 33–34
  6. ^ a b c Tismăneanu, p. 113
  7. ^ Cioroianu, pp. 61–64, 159–161
  8. ^ Cioroianu, pp. 156–157; Frunză, pp. 181–182; Weiner & Özbudun, p. 386
  9. ^ Cioroianu, Pe umerii..., pp. 61–64, 159–161; Frunză, p. 233
  10. ^ Cioroianu, Pe umerii..., p. 62; Frunză, p. 233
  11. ^ Cioroianu, Pe umerii..., pp. 63, 159–160; Macuc, p. 39; Ţiu
  12. ^ Cioroianu, p. 63; Ştefan, p. 10; Ţiu
  13. ^ a b c d e f g Ţiu
  14. ^ Cioroianu, p. 64; Ştefan, p. 10; Ţiu
  15. ^ a b c d Ştefan, p. 10
  16. ^ a b c d Macuc, p. 40
  17. ^ Sănătescu, in Macuc, p. 40
  18. ^ Barbu, pp. 190–191; Cioroianu, Pe umerii..., pp. 62, 91–93; Frunză, pp. 219–220; Ştefan, p. 10; Tismăneanu, p. 109
  19. ^ Cioroianu, Pe umerii..., p. 297; Frunză, pp. 201–212
  20. ^ Cioroianu, Pe umerii..., p. 297; Frunză, p. 208
  21. ^ Barbu, pp. 190–191; Ştefan, p. 10; PCR report, in Ţurlea, pp. 35. The Soviet Ambassador Sergey Kavtaradze placed the membership at 600,000 by the time of the election (Kavtaradze, Document 234, 20 November 1946, in Pokivailova, p. 14)
  22. ^ Barbu, pp. 190–191
  23. ^ Kavtaradze, Document 234, November 20, 1946, in Pokivailova, p. 14; Ştefan, p. 10
  24. ^ a b c d PCR report, in Ţurlea, p. 35
  25. ^ Pauker, quoted by D. Yakovlev, Soviet Embassy Document of 6 November 1945, in Pokivailova, pp. 12, 13
  26. ^ Cioroianu, pp. 161–162
  27. ^ Frunză, pp. 271–272
  28. ^ Cioroianu, pp. 93–94; Frunză, pp. 259–286
  29. ^ a b c d e Pauker, quoted by Shutov, Document 234, 20 November 1946, in Pokivailova, p. 13
  30. ^ Cioroianu, pp. 96–97
  31. ^ a b General Precup Victor, Nr.7 (23 November 1946), in Troncotă, p. 19
  32. ^ Wexler, p. 83
  33. ^ Cioroianu, Pe umerii..., pp. 77–93, 106–148; Macuc, p. 40; Frunză, pp. 240–258
  34. ^ Susaykov, in Macuc, p. 40
  35. ^ Frunză, pp. 228–232; Macuc, pp. 40, 41
  36. ^ a b Ştefan, p. 10; Ţârău, p. 34; Ţiu
  37. ^ D. Yakovlev, Soviet Embassy Document of 6 November 1946, in Pokivailova, p. 12
  38. ^ Susaikov, Soviet Embassy Telephonogram of 15 August 1946, in Pokivailova, p. 11
  39. ^ a b Giurescu, "Marea fraudă...", Part II
  40. ^ Berry, in Giurescu, "Marea fraudă...", Part II
  41. ^ Clark-Kerr, in Macuc, pp. 39–40
  42. ^ Harriman, in Cioroianu, p. 65
  43. ^ Kavtaradze, in Cioroianu, p. 65; Document 234, 20 November 1946, in Pokivailova, p. 15
  44. ^ a b c Pauker, quoted by Shutov, Document 234, 20 November 1946, in Pokivailova, p. 14
  45. ^ a b Cioroianu, p. 65
  46. ^ Giurescu, "Marea fraudă...", Part VI; Pokivailova, pp. 11–12
  47. ^ Giurescu, Part VI
  48. ^ Kavtaradze, in Giurescu, "Marea fraudă...", Part VI; Document 234, 20 November 1946, in Pokivailova, p. 15
  49. ^ Cioroianu, p. 64; Kavtardaze, Document 234, 20 November 1946, in Pokivailova, p. 15
  50. ^ Kavtaradze, Document 234, 20 November 1946, in Pokivailova, p. 15. According to Burton Y. Berry, Groza had stated to Allied envoys that he was not going to organize elections before food supplies had been ensured (Berry, in Giurescu, "«Alegeri» după model sovietic", p. 18)
  51. ^ Cioroianu, p. 64; Kavtaradze, Document 234, 20 November 1946, in Pokivailova, p. 15
  52. ^ Pauker, quoted by Shutov, Document 234, in Pokivailova, p. 14
  53. ^ Kavtardaze, Document 234, 20 November 1946, in Pokivailova, p. 14
  54. ^ a b Kavtaradze, Document 234, 20 November 1946, in Pokivailova, p. 14
  55. ^ Pauker, quoted by Shutov, Document 234, 20 November 1946, in Pokivailova, p. 12
  56. ^ a b Pauker, quoted by Shutov, Document 234, 20 November 1946, in Pokivailova, p. 14
  57. ^ Giurescu, "«Alegeri» după model sovietic", p. 17 (citing Berry), 18 (citing Berry and note); Macuc, p. 40; Tismăneanu, p. 113
  58. ^ a b Giurescu, "«Alegeri» după model sovietic", p. 18
  59. ^ Groza, quoted by Berry, in Giurescu, "«Alegeri» după model sovietic", p. 17
  60. ^ a b c d Groza, quoted by Berry, in Giurescu, "«Alegeri» după model sovietic", p. 18
  61. ^ Groza, in Macuc, p. 40
  62. ^ Frunză, pp. 290–291; Macuc, p. 41
  63. ^ a b Frunză, p. 290
  64. ^ Macuc, pp. 40–41
  65. ^ Duţu, pp. 38; Macuc, pp. 40–41
  66. ^ ECP reports, in Macuc, p. 41
  67. ^ a b Duţu, p. 38
  68. ^ a b c Macuc, p. 41
  69. ^ Duţu, p. 37; Macuc, p. 41
  70. ^ Duţu, p. 37
  71. ^ General Precup Victor, Nr.8 (23 November 1946), in Troncotă, p. 19
  72. ^ General Precup Victor, Nr.8 (23 November 1946), in Troncotă, p. 20
  73. ^ General Precup Victor, Informative Synthesis for the Headquarters' VIth Territorial Command Office, in Troncotă, pp. 20–21
  74. ^ General Precup Victor, Informative Synthesis for the Headquarters' VIth Territorial Command Office, in Troncotă, p. 21
  75. ^ Rădulescu-Motru, in Cioroianu, p. 65
  76. ^ Rădulescu-Motru, in Cioroianu, pp. 65–66
  77. ^ N. Betea, Raţiu, in Betea, pp. 38–39
  78. ^ N. Betea, in Betea, pp. 38–39
  79. ^ Nohlen, D & Stöver, P (2010) Elections in Europe: A data handbook, pp1603–1610 ISBN 978-3-8329-5609-7
  80. ^ Nohlen & Stöver, p1610
  81. ^ a b c d e Ţurlea, p. 35
  82. ^ Ivanov, Telephonogram 36, 2 December 1946, in Pokivailova, pp. 15–16
  83. ^ Marshall, in Ştefan, p. 10
  84. ^ Ralea, in Ştefan, p. 10
  85. ^ Kavtaradze, Telephonogram 18, 19 November 1946, in Pokivailova, p. 15
  86. ^ a b Groza, in Ioan, p. 16
  87. ^ Cioroianu, pp. 95–96; Frunză, pp. 292–308; Tismăneanu, 114
  88. ^ Cioroianu, pp. 96–97; Frunză, p. 357
  89. ^ Cioroianu, pp. 93–94; Frunză, pp. 329–359; Tismăneanu, pp. 114–116
  90. ^ Cioroianu, pp. 97–101; Frunză, pp. 319–326

References[edit]

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