Rookmangud Katawal

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General
Rookmangud Katawal
Born (1948-12-12) December 12, 1948 (age 66)
Okhaldhunga District
Allegiance    Nepal
Service/branch Nepali Army
Years of service 1969-2009
Rank General
Commands held Shree Kalidhoj Battalion (1976-1977)
United Nation Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) (1988)
Shree Pashupati Prashad Battalion (1990-1993)
Commandant of the Royal Nepalese Military Academy (1993)
Adjutant General (AG) of the Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI) (1999)
Awards Birendra Prajatantra Bhaskar Class II
Gorkha Dakshin Bahu
Relations Uma Katawal (wife)

General Rookmangud Katawal is a former Nepalese Army General, who served as the Chief of Army Staff of the Nepal Army from September 10, 2006 to August, 2009. [1] [2] [3] General Katawal had come into controversy after the then Prime Minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal (Prachanda) had unilaterally decided to "relieve" Katawal of his duties on May 3, 2009 [4] [5]

Early life and education[edit]

General Rookmangud Katawal was born in Okhaldhunga District, in the mountainous Eastern Region of Nepal, on December 12, 1948 to Mr, and Mrs. Khadgadhoj Katawal. After "impressing" the then King Mahendra by reciting a poem of the National Poet Madhav Prasad Ghimire during the monarch's official visit to the Eastern Development Region, Katawal was then personally brought to Kathmandu at the age of 8 years and looked after under King Mahendra's direction. After residing at the then COAS General Toran Shumsher's residence for about 15 days along with Late King Mahendra's other 'adopted sons', at the age of 10 years, he was enrolled at the Pharping Boarding School, which was affiliated to the Tribhuwan University. After completing the 5th grade, he got a double promotion to the 7th grade due to his impressive academics. However, upon being involved in a protest against the 'corporal punishment' given by the school's authorities to the students, Katawal, along with several other students were 'kicked out' of the Pharping Boarding High School. Later, after being enrolled in another school with the help of the same teacher who had played a dominant rule in Katawal's removal from Pharping, he completed his high school and gave his SLC Examination from the same school. [6]

Military Career[edit]

Junior Officer[edit]

Commissioned into Shree Shreenath Battalion (Infantry) of the then Royal Nepalese Army (RNA) on December 20, 1969 after graduating from the Indian National Defense Academy, Katawal holds a Bachelor of Arts Degree from Tribhuwan University, and a Master Degree in National Defense from the Qaeda Azam University,Pakistan. Gen. Katawal was the Distinguished International Honour Graduate of the US Special Forces Course and earned the coveted Gideon in the US Ranger Course. He is also a graduate of the Army Command and Staff College, Camberley, UK, the Senior Command Course, India and the National Defense College, Pakistan. He has held commands and staff billets at virtually every level. In 1973, he served as an instructor at the Royal Nepalese Army School. In the same year, he donned the blue beret to serve in the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) in the Suez Canal area. [7]

Senior Officer[edit]

Between 1976 and 1977, Katawal commanded the Independent Company- Shree Kalidhoj (Currently a battalion).Following several key staff appointments, he served as the Nepalese Government's Liaison Officer to the Brigade of Gurkhas of the British Army and Government of Hong Kong between 1983 and 1986.

In 1988, he was appointed the Chief Military Personnel Officer of the United Nation Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). [8] He took over command of Shree Pashupati Prashad Battalion in 1990. Following Service in the Research and Development Wing at the Army HQ, he took post as the Commandant of the Royal Nepalese Military Academy in 1993.

Promoted to Brigadier General in 1996, he holds the distinction of having commanded three consecutive Brigades, two infantry and one Special Forces. In 1999, he was appointed as Director of Military Intelligence. Upon promotion to Major General in 2001, he took over as Adjutant General (AG) of the Nepalese Army. On December 29, 2001, General Katawal was appointed the first co-coordinator of the National Security Council Secretariat. He has participated widely in national and International conferences and seminars at senior level, particularly in the security, peacekeeping and planning fields, such as Multilateral Planner’s conference in Romania and the International Symposium Course on Asian Pacific Security in China.

He commanded the then Western Division on combat operation in the peak of the counter insurgency effort between December 2003 and August 2004. He was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant General on September 10, 2004 and took over as Chief of General Staff. He is also ‘Colonel Commandant’ of his old battalion, Shree Pashupati Prashad. [9]

Maoist Insurgency in Nepal[edit]

Major General of the Nepal Army[edit]

In a telephone conversation with the then Ambassador Michael E. Malinowski in 2003, the then Major General Rookmangud Katawal, ranking military member of Nepal's National Security Council, reported that the Cabinet was deliberating over how to respond to the morning incidents. He indicated that, with the King's support, the government would likely re-declare the Maoists as a terrorist group, resurrect the now-suspended anti-terrorist act, and request Interpol blue-corner notices for Maoist leaders. Although the ministers had discussed the possibility of declaring a nation-wide state of emergency, it would likely not make that declaration at this time, he said. Katawal sought support from the international community for the government's efforts to combat the insurgency. The Ambassador counseled against the declaration of a state of emergency or imposition of martial law at this time. [10]

In 2003, Major General Rookmangud Katawal, Nepal's National Security Advisor, had told the then Ambassador Michael E. Malinowski that the Maoist leadership twice had contacted DFID's Wood to ask for details of DFID's ongoing and future programs and plans in Nepal. On both occasions Wood refused to comply with the Maoist request. Katawal did not provide the source of his information. [11]

Mission Kotwada[edit]

Then then Major General Rookmangud Katawal had been appointed as the 'Commander' to lead the Unified Armed Forces of Nepal during "Mission Kotwada" by "tricking" the then Chief of Army Staff Pyar Jung Thapa and the then King of Nepal, Gyanendra Shah. The mission was very important, as it ensured the successful tour of the then King Gyanendra Shah. Being accompanied by another senior army officer and several other military and police personnel, he had ordered mortars to be fired consecutively during the mission several times to scare the Maoist rebels into retreating and ceasing fire, but to no avail. However, upon requesting air support (choppers) from a nearby military unit, the mission was successful after successive missiles fired from the helicopter forced the rebels to escape. After a two-hour march up the hill in Kotwada, the unit lead by Katawal had found the place deserted. [12]


Lieutenant General of Nepal Army[edit]

Civilian Leadership Should Explain Counter-Insurgency Plan[edit]

On January 20, Lt. General Katawal, Royal Nepalese Army (RNA) Chief of General Staff, told Ambassador James F. Moriarty that he was worried that the government did not have a unified strategy for tackling the Maoist insurgency. Katawal reiterated that there was no purely military solution to the insurgency; the RNA could only work to create space for a negotiated political solution. He noted that the civilian government should lead the effort to inform its citizens about Nepal's overall plan to tackle the insurgency. Katawal stressed that a civilian government needed to explain to the people what the military was doing and why, especially why the government needed to restrict civil liberties.

Katawal had explained that the then Home Minister Kamal Thapa had tried to work with the political parties on January 19 to avert the need for a day long curfew on January 20, the day Parties planned to hold mass demonstrations in Kathmandu. Katawal noted that the government had clear evidence that the Maoists intended to infiltrate the Parties' demonstration; the Maoists had already brought automatic weapons into the Kathmandu Valley, and had attacked police stations here. He pointed out that, during their rule, the Parties had placed restrictions on citizens for security reasons but now were unwilling to accept the need for such restrictions. The Ambassador agreed that Nepal needed a national consensus on how to address the insurgency. The Ambassador told Katawal that he had met with the Foreign Minister, Home Minister and Vice Chairman to urge the government to postpone elections, reach out to the parties, and declare a cease-fire to create space for the legitimate democratic forces to discuss a counter-insurgency plan.

Katawal asserted that the Maoists skillfully exploited the lack of government vision by using the political parties themselves to create tension among the legitimate democratic forces. Katawal admitted that the Maoists' strategy had been "successful to an extent," but added that the political parties should soon see their mistake in aligning with the Maoists through the 12-point understanding. He noted the irony of the Parties linking with the Maoists: it was the Parties themselves who first labeled the Maoists as "terrorists" when the Parties were in power. Katawal believed the Parties had entered into the understanding with the Maoists to pressure the King and the RNA. He stressed that the RNA had no political aims, saying that the RNA would "obey any constitutional government." Katawal opined that the parties, especially the Nepali Congress party, were beginning to feel trapped, but acknowledged that it was "hard for the Parties to back down publicly." He added it was "time for the state to take steps so political parties could come to the negotiating table." Katawal hoped that the international community could urge the leaders of the political parties "to understand the gravity of the situation" and to understand that the RNA was not the enemy of democracy. Nepal's monarchy and political parties have, over the past ten years, viewed the Maoist insurgency primarily as a chip to be played in their political games; at various times, each of the major Parties and the King have used the Maoists to advance their own interests vis-a-vis the other legitimate political actors. Thus, there has been no broad agreement on a counter-insurgency strategy. They have now reached the stage where, if the legitimate democratic forces do not stand together, there is a very real risk that the Maoists will succeed in their goal of a totalitarian state. Katawal's readiness to assure the Ambassador that the RNA had no political ambition might be an indication that some in the military understand that the King must reach out to the political parties in order to ensure implementation of an effective counter-insurgency plan. [13] [14] [15]

Chief of Army Staff (COAS) of the Nepal Army[edit]

The then Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala swore in Rookmangud Katawal as the new Chief of Army Staff on September 18, 2006. Katawal, who has repeatedly affirmed his intention to loyally serve the democratic Government of Nepal (GON) received cabinet approval on September 5, becoming the first Commander-in-chief of the Nepal Army of a common family, i.e. from one of the families that have traditionally the chief of army in Nepalese Army are (e.g. "Shah", "Basnet", "Thapa" or "Rana"). [16] After several unsuccessful political attempts from other influential political leaders to appoint Kul Bahadur Khadka as the Army Chief in Katawal's stead. Some had even conspired to bring back former Lt. General Chitra Bahadur (CB) Gurung (retired) and appoint him as the COAS in Katawal's stead. Earlier, he was Chief of General Staff from September 10, 2004 to September 10, 2006 as the Lieutenant General of the Nepal Army. [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] [28]

Human Rights Allegations[edit]

The government's decision to appoint Katawal as the Army Chief came in the face of complaints by human rights activists and some politicians that his human rights record made him unfit for the position. Their criticism focused on Katawal's tenure as commander of the mid-western division headquarters from December 2003 to September 2004 and his actions during the people's movement in April 2006. According to the Defense Secretary, there is no plan by the GON to issue a formal SIPDIS in response to the human rights accusations against Katawal. Whether the High-Level Probe Commission will issue any findings on the General's activities remains to be seen. [29]

Katawal proclaims his democratic bona fides[edit]

Since the people's movement in April, Katawal, like outgoing COAS Gen. Thapa, has been consistent in publicly affirming his loyalty to Nepal's democratic leadership. He reaffirmed the same to emboff in a conversation on September 19. He has appeared on several occasions before the State Affairs Committee, the parliamentary committee tasked with oversight of the Defense Ministry. The chairman of that committee told emboff recently that he had been completely satisfied with Katawal's cooperation. Katawal reports to Prime Minister Koirala on two accounts. The PM is the commander-in-chief and he is also as is customary in Nepal the Defense Minister. The Defense Ministry (MOD) is in the process, with U.S. and U.K. assistance, of building its capacity to manage and give direction to the NA. That responsibility previously fell to the Palace; the Defense Ministry was little more than a shell and remains so still. According to our MOD sources, Katawal and the soldiers under his command are making every effort to subordinate themselves to the MOD's civilian control.

Although the volume of criticism of Katawal seems to have died down in recent days, a number of human rights activists and several Members of Parliament mostly on the far left began raising their voices as soon as Katawal's appointment became known. On September 4, a group of 16 leaders of various human rights organizations sent a letter to UN Secretary General Annan denouncing the appointment of Gen. Katawal as the new COAS. The letter alleged that Katawal had been involved in "documented gross human right violations." The letter claimed that Katawal had been involved in torture, extra-judicial executions, and forced disappearances. The Informal Sector Service Center (INSEC), a leading Nepali human rights NGO, subsequently shared detailed information with the Embassy about Katawal's alleged human rights abuses or those that may have occurred under his command. Only one involved allegations against Katawal personally. The rest were on a chain-of-command basis. The INSEC paper has been emailed to SCA/INS. [30]

INSEC Report[edit]

According to INSEC, Katawal allegedly threatened in April 2004 to kill a journalist who had reported on a deadly aerial attack on a school in the mid-Western region in which 7 people died and 30 people were injured. INSEC also listed 64 individual gross violations of human rights that Nepali security forces committed in the mid-Western region from December 29, 2003 to September 10, 2004 while Katawal was the regional divisional commander. The Nepal Armed Police Force and the Nepal Police were operating at that time under a unified command which the NA headed. Katawal is also facing unspecified charges of violating human rights for his role in April 2006 in attempting to suppress the people's movement. He testified to the High-Level Probe Commission about these charges in early August. The Commission has yet, however, to make any of its findings public. [31]

No government rebuttal planned[edit]

Nepal Army sources have told post that the NA has no intention of responding to the human rights allegations against Katawal. It would, in their view, be inappropriate. That task, Army sources believe, is one for the civilian leadership. Defense Secretary Upreti, the senior civil servant in the Ministry of Defense, who reports directly to PM and Defense Minister Koirala, told emboff September 18 that he is unaware of any intention by his Ministry or the PM to address these allegations against the COAS. [32]

Assessing the Allegations[edit]

Even if it is true that Katawal threatened to kill a journalist in April 2004, U.S. interests would not be best served by breaking off contact with the new Chief of Army Staff on that basis alone. Similarly, the unspecified charges against Katawal for his role in April 2006 do not yet appear to substantiate such drastic USG action in the absence of a Commission report. In our view, the most troubling accusations concern human rights abuses that occurred while Katawal was division commander in mid-Western Nepal during the first nine months of 2004. However, Embassy sources indicate he exercised maximum restraint in conducting operations, mindful of minimizing collateral damage.

Going forward, we will continue to urge the Government to address these allegations head on. In our view, it would ultimately strengthen the Nepal Army, including its public standing, to air and answer the charges against the country's senior soldier. Post will also carry on our ongoing dialogue with the GON more broadly on the central importance of human rights compliance by the NA and the other security forces. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) representatives told us on September 19 that it is generally pleased with the progress the NA has made in the past three years and that the biggest challenge remains cleaning up past mistakes. OHCHR also told emboff on September 19 that it does not plan to investigate Katawal. In spite of all its faults and failings, the GON maintains a genuine commitment to human rights which sets it apart from its Maoist opponents. [33]

Fear of Maoist Coup d'état[edit]

Katawal feared reprisals against his office once the Maoists were part of an interim government. He intimated that if the political parties or Maoists were to ‘’"touch"’’ him, elements within the NA would ‘’"revolt"’, referring to what would happen if the Maoists attempted extra-constitutional action against him. Katawal's senior aide, Brigadier General Pandey, later caveated Katawal's assertion, suggesting that elements within the NA would oppose such a move, but not revolt.

Katawal stated that as long as the Maoists came into mainstream political power by legitimate means, the Nepal Army would "nod and salute." If the Maoists were to seize power illegitimately, he implied, the army would not accept it and be forced to act.

Message to King Gyanendra[edit]

In the November of 2006, General Rookmangud Katawal had claimed the desire of the Former King Gyanendra to make a "comeback" as "suicidal," declaring, "as long as I am COAS, such an alliance between the Nepal Army and the King will not happen." [34]

Katawal had instructed the then Major General Dharmala to tell King Gyanendra to make amends with the Prime Minister and to acknowledge that there was no chance for a political comeback. Katawal also claimed that, through Dharmala, he had told the King that, if he was truly interested in retaining the monarchy as an institution, he should abdicate in favor of his grandson. Katawal also had Dharmala tell the King that Indian actors who were telling King Gyanendra the Government of India wanted to see a "royal comeback" were blowing smoke; the GOI was perfectly content to leave the future of the monarchy to the Nepali people. [35] [36]

Integration of Maoist Combatants in Nepal Army after disarmament of former rebels[edit]

COAS Rookmangud Katawal had stated that he opposed integrating Maoist combatants into the Nepal Army for a period of "five years." "Reintegration is disintegration," was how General Katawal had expressed his chief concern. [37] He estimated it would take that long for democracy to take root in Nepal. Five years would allow the Maoists time to turn in all their weapons and prove their democratic bona fides. He said he had stressed to Prime Minister G.P. Koirala on July 1, 2007, that integration would destroy the Army and deprive the political parties of an institution to fall back on if the Maoists attempted to seize power. He had warned Koirala, "Don't toss away the Army or you will have nothing to fall back on" if the Maoists try to seize power. In response, the Prime Minister had assured him he would do nothing to demoralize the Army. The COAS maintained that it only made sense to unify a national army after a conflict where the state, and the national army, had disintegrated. This was not Nepal's situation. Katawal pointed out that the NA remained a regular, disciplined, and professional army; integrating Maoist combatants, whom he described as "thugs, criminals and terrorists", into the Nepal Army would destroy the Army; He claimed it would also lead the United Nations to stop deploying Nepali soldiers as peacekeepers. [38] [39]

The then COAS Katawal had opted for an alternative method to provide lethal military assistance to the Nepal Army; that Nepali peacekeepers could go to their postings in Haiti or other places without weapons. Then, upon arrival, the U.S. could provide weapons and ammunition to the group for their peacekeeping duties. When the group returned to Nepal at the end of their tour, they could bring the weapons and ammunition back with them. Katawal noted that this solution would avoid upsetting the Maoists and would allow lethal support to arrive without the political complications involved with delivery inside Nepal. [40]

Sacking in May, 2006[edit]

General Katawal had been fiercely resisting group integration of Maoist rebels into the Nepal Army and has been at odds with Maoist government on several other issues. Controversy surrounding his relationship with the ruling government, largely focused on recruiting issues, the increase in tenure of 8 Nepalese generals and the boycotting odf the Nepal Army in the Sports Tournament led to his brief sacking on May 3, 2009. It was also rumored that he had a strong backing from Indian government [41] Protests in response to his sacking included the withdrawal of the Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist) from the ruling coalition government.[42] The CPN-Maoists at the head of the coalition then named the then Lt. General Kul Bahadur Khadka as a replacement COAS. Shortly afterwards, the President of Nepal overrode both decisions and ordered him to continue his service by sending a letter at 11:45 pm on the same day to make his decision official. [43] This resulted in Prime Minister Prachanda's resignation and a general collapse of the government.[44] [45] [46] [47] [48] [49] [50]

Personal Life[edit]

Athletically inclined and a keen sportsman, Gen. Katawal is particularly fond of basketball, racket games and golf. Widely traveled throughout the world, his hobbies include reading, hiking and riding. A keen social worker in his spare time, among his various projects, he is involved in the development of a high school (currently a campus) in his home village in Okhaldhunga District. Gen. Katawal has also penned many lyrics in the Nepalese folk, patriotic and popular song disciplines. Gen. Katawal is decorated with Birendra Prajatantra Bhaskar, Second Class and has been awarded a host of other decorations and medals in some 40 years of distinguished service. Gen. Katawal is married to Uma Katawal, a career graduate teacher who has taught at the Army Campus for the last 20 years. They are blessed with two children, Shubhangad and Nepolina Katawal. [51]

After Retirement[edit]

After retirement from the Nepalese Army in 2009, Katawal has been engaged in many public functions and private ceremonies. He has been traveling widely attending conferences, talk programs as quest of honor, chief guest and speaker in varied issues both inside and outside the country. He enjoys meeting peoples of all sectors and communities and interacting, discussing and debating with them in current and past issues related to societies, communities and nation. He traveled to different states of the US and Canada particularly interacting with Nepalese communities that included two interactions in Johns Hopkins’s university and Harvard. He attended international conference in Hiroshima university, attended a seminar in Seoul, China, traveled to UK for interaction, Many times visited India in the invitation of Vivekananda International foundation, India foundation and others. He went to Tel-Aviv to participate in the world summit for counter- terrorism. Thus he keeps himself fully engaged in his retirements and remains active and lively.

References[edit]

  1. ^ "रुक्मांगद कटवालसंग-13.08.14". 
  2. ^ "Interview with Former Nepal Army Chief Rookmangud Katawal". 
  3. ^ "Rookmangud_Katawal". 
  4. ^ "Key party quits Nepal's coalition govt in protest over Katawal's sacking". Indian Express. 2009-05-03. Retrieved July 25, 2015. 
  5. ^ "General state of uncertainty...Nepal's Maoist government falls as the army flexes its muscles". The Economist. 2009-05-05. Retrieved July 25, 2015. 
  6. ^ Rookmangud Katawal Autobiography 2014
  7. ^ Rookmangud Katawal Autobiography 2014
  8. ^ http://www.nepalnews.com/archive/2008/aug/aug19/news15.php
  9. ^ Rookmangud Katawal Autobiography 2014
  10. ^ "NEPAL: MAOIST HIT TEAMS SHOOT TWO ARMY COLONELS IN KATHMANDU Date:2003 August 28, 09:37 (Thursday)". 
  11. ^ "NEPAL: HEAD OF BRITISH AID IN KATHMANDU TALKS WITH MAOIST LEADER Date:2003 December 3, 23:50 (Wednesday)". 
  12. ^ Rookmangud Katawal Autobiography 2014
  13. ^ "RNA WORRIED THE GOVERNMENT HAS NO CONSENSUS ON HOW TO TACKLE INSURGENCY". 
  14. ^ "FOLLOW-ON TO THE CONFERENCE ON NEPAL IN LONDON: DONOR REPS IN KATHMANDU ENDORSE CONTINUING SUPPORT DESIPITE MAOIST CRISIS Date:2002 October 27, 08:42 (Sunday)". 
  15. ^ "GOVERNMENT ARRESTS FORMER MINISTERS, SUSPENDS SECURITY CHIEFS Date:2006 May 15, 10:39 (Monday)". 
  16. ^ "CHIEF OF ARMY STAFF TO RETIRE...Date:2006 June 13, 08:43 (Tuesday)". 
  17. ^ Rookmangud Katawal Autobiography 2014
  18. ^ "PRIME MINISTER PLANS TO APPOINT NEW HOME MINISTER AS MAOISTS OVERREACH...Date:2006 September 8, 11:58 (Friday)". 
  19. ^ "DPM OLI WORRIED, BUT WILLING TO STAND UP TO THE MAOISTS Date:2006 September 11, 13:04 (Monday)". 
  20. ^ "SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ASSERTS MINISTRY'S CONTROL OF ARMY Date:2006 September 22, 11:39 (Friday)". 
  21. ^ "MBASSADOR UNDERSCORES SERIOUSNESS OF SITUATION FOR BRITISH STATE MINISTER...Date:2006 September 27, 10:26 (Wednesday)". 
  22. ^ "OCTOBER 15 PEACE AGREEMENT LIKELY Date:2006 October 13, 13:31 (Friday)". 
  23. ^ "PEACE PROCESS OBSTRUCTED BUT ONGOING...Date:2006 October 16, 11:27 (Monday)". 
  24. ^ "NEPAL ARMY PUNISHES SOLDIERS WHO ABUSED POLICE Date:2006 November 6, 11:11 (Monday)". 
  25. ^ "KATAWAL CONFIRMS NEPAL ARMY'S COMMITMENT TO DEMOCRACY Date:2007 June 6, 10:41 (Wednesday)". 
  26. ^ "NEPAL: ARMY CHIEF RULES OUT COUP Date:2007 July 6, 08:36 (Friday)". 
  27. ^ "NEPAL: ARMS MONITORING TO START, POLICE MONITORS A POSSIBILITY...Date:2007 January 5, 07:38 (Friday)". 
  28. ^ "CHIEF OF ARMY STAFF COMMENTS ON ARMS MANAGEMENT, MAOISTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS...Date:2006 December 18, 09:41 (Monday)". 
  29. ^ "NEWLY APPOINTED ARMY CHIEF STILL FACING HUMAN RIGHTS ACCUSATIONS...Date:2006 September 20, 12:42 (Wednesday)". 
  30. ^ "NEWLY APPOINTED ARMY CHIEF STILL FACING HUMAN RIGHTS ACCUSATIONS...Date:2006 September 20, 12:42 (Wednesday)". 
  31. ^ "NEWLY APPOINTED ARMY CHIEF STILL FACING HUMAN RIGHTS ACCUSATIONS...Date:2006 September 20, 12:42 (Wednesday)". 
  32. ^ "NEWLY APPOINTED ARMY CHIEF STILL FACING HUMAN RIGHTS ACCUSATIONS...Date:2006 September 20, 12:42 (Wednesday)". 
  33. ^ "NEWLY APPOINTED ARMY CHIEF STILL FACING HUMAN RIGHTS ACCUSATIONS...Date:2006 September 20, 12:42 (Wednesday)". 
  34. ^ "COAS KATAWAL DOWNPLAYS RUMORS OF ROYAL RESURGENCE Date:2006 November 30, 09:01 (Thursday)". 
  35. ^ "NEPAL CHIEF OF ARMY STAFF FEELS BELEAGUERED, SEEKS ALLIES ...Date:2007 January 5, 10:31 (Friday)". 
  36. ^ "CHIEF OF ARMY STAFF COMMENTS ON THE KING Date:2006 December 18, 09:41 (Monday)". 
  37. ^ "NEPAL: ARMY CHIEF ASKS FOR AMBASSADOR'S HELP TO PROTECT THE ARMY Date:2007 August 21, 08:20 (Tuesday)". 
  38. ^ "NEPAL: ARMY CHIEF OPPOSES INTEGRATION OF MAOISTS INTO ARMY...Date:2007 July 6, 09:03 (Friday)". 
  39. ^ "U.S.-NEPAL POLICY AT THE CROSSROADS: SUPPORTING A SUSTAINABLE PEACE...Date:2006 November 7, 11:41 (Tuesday)". 
  40. ^ "BOUCHER DISCUSSES THE FUTURE OF THE NEPAL ARMY Date:2006 November 22, 07:43 (Wednesday)". 
  41. ^ http://english.aljazeera.net/news/asia/2009/05/200953112020764395.html
  42. ^ http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/8031622.stm
  43. ^ http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-05/03/content_11305143.htm
  44. ^ http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-05/04/content_11312598.htm
  45. ^ "HUMAN RIGHTS ALLEGATION...NEPAL: ALLEGATION OF MASS CREMATION SITE STILL UNCONFIRMED...Date:2007 December 31, 09:43 (Monday)". 
  46. ^ Gautam, Sarala (2014). "सिपाहीले कहेको सामाजिक इतिहास" [Social History in a soldier's perspective]. Himal Khabar (in Nepali). Retrieved July 25, 2015. 
  47. ^ Baral, Lok Raj (2014-08-20). "The general’s odyssey" [The general’s odyssey]. EKantipur (in Nepali). Retrieved July 25, 2015. 
  48. ^ "रुकमाङ्गदले भने, मैले माओवादीलाई सैनिक मञ्चमा छिर्न नदिएकै हुँ" [Rookmangud said, "I have not let the Maoist enter the Military Stage."]. Setopati (in Nepali). 2014. Retrieved July 25, 2015. 
  49. ^ Dhakal, Amit (2014). "कटवालको आत्मकथा पढ्दा" [While reading Katawal's autobiography]. Setopati (in Nepali). Retrieved July 25, 2015. 
  50. ^ "यसरी रोकियो रक्तपात:कटवाल" [In this way, bloodshed was avoided.]. Himal Khabar (in Nepali). 2014. Retrieved July 25, 2015. 
  51. ^ Rookmangud Katawal Autobiography 2014
Military offices
Preceded by
Pyar Jung Thapa
Chief of Army Staff of the Nepali Army
2006–2009
Succeeded by
Chhatra Man Singh Gurung