Russo-Turkish War (1877–78)
The Russo-Turkish War of 1877–78 was a conflict between the Ottoman Empire and the Eastern Orthodox coalition led by the Russian Empire and composed of several Balkan countries. Fought in the Balkans and in the Caucasus, it originated in emerging 19th-century Balkan nationalism. Additional factors included Russian hopes of recovering territorial losses suffered during the Crimean War, re-establishing itself in the Black Sea and supporting the political movement attempting to free Balkan nations from the Ottoman Empire.
As a result of the war, Russia succeeded in claiming several provinces in the Caucasus, namely Kars and Batumi. The principalities of Romania (which was also forced by Russia to cede the Budjak region of the Danube Delta, in spite of an existing treaty of alliance between the two countries), Serbia and Montenegro, each of which had had de facto sovereignty for some time, formally proclaimed independence from the Ottoman Empire. After almost five centuries of Ottoman domination (1396–1878), the Bulgarian state was re-established as the Principality of Bulgaria, covering the land between the Danube River and the Balkan Mountains (except Northern Dobrudja which was given to Romania) as well as the region of Sofia, which became the new state's capital. The Congress of Berlin also allowed Austria to occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina and Great Britain to take over Cyprus.
- 1 Conflict pre-history
- 2 Balkan crisis of 1875–1876
- 3 Course of the war
- 4 Civilian government in Bulgaria during the war
- 5 Aftermath
- 6 Lasting impact
- 7 Gallery
- 8 See also
- 9 Notes
- 10 References
- 11 Bibliography
- 12 Further reading
- 13 External links
Treatment of Christians in the Ottoman Empire
Article 9 of the 1856 Paris Peace Treaty, concluded at the end of the Crimean War, obliged the Ottoman Empire to grant Christians equal rights with Muslims. Before the treaty was signed, the Ottoman government issued an edict, the Edict of Gülhane, which proclaimed the principle of the equality of Muslims and non-Muslims, and produced some specific reforms to this end. For example, the jizya tax was abolished and non-Muslims were allowed to join the army.
However, some key aspects of dhimmi status were retained, including that the testimony of Christians against Muslims was not accepted in courts, which granted Muslims effective immunity for offenses conducted against Christians. Although local level relations between communities were often good, this practice encouraged exploitation. Abuses were at their worst in regions with a predominantly Christian population, where local authorities often openly supported abuse as a means to keep Christians subjugated.[page needed]
Crisis in Lebanon, 1860
In 1858, the Maronite peasants, stirred by the clergy, revolted against their Druze feudal overlords and established a peasant republic. In southern Lebanon, where Maronite peasants worked for Druze overlords, Druze peasants sided with their overlords against the Maronites, transforming the conflict into a civil war. Although both sides suffered, about 10,000 Maronites were massacred at the hands of the Druze.
Under the threat of European intervention, Ottoman authorities restored order. Nevertheless, French and British intervention followed. Under further European pressure, the Sultan agreed to appoint a Christian governor in Lebanon, whose candidacy was to be submitted by the Sultan and approved by the European powers.
On May 27, 1860 a group of Maronites raided a Druze village. Massacres and reprisal massacres followed, not only in the Lebanon but also in Syria. In the end, between 7,000 and 12,000 people of all religions, had been killed, and over 300 villages, 500 churches, 40 monasteries, and 30 schools were destroyed. Christian attacks on Muslims in Beirut stirred the Muslim population of Damascus to attack the Christian minority with between 5,000 and 25,000 of the latter being killed, including the American and Dutch consuls, giving the event an international dimension.
Ottoman foreign minister Mehmed Fuad Pasha came to Syria and solved the problems by seeking out and executing the culprits, including the governor and other officials. Order was restored, and preparations made to give Lebanon new autonomy to avoid European intervention. Nevertheless, in September 1860 France sent a fleet, and Britain joined to prevent a unilateral intervention that could help increase French influence in the area at Britain's expense.
The revolt in Crete, 1866–1869
The Cretan Revolt, which began in 1866, resulted from the failure of the Ottoman Empire to apply reforms for improving the life of the population and the Cretans' desire for enosis — union with Greece. The insurgents gained control over the whole island, except for five cities where the Muslims were fortified. The Greek press claimed that Muslims had massacred Greeks and the word was spread throughout Europe. Thousands of Greek volunteers were mobilized and sent to the island.
The siege of Moni Arkadiou monastery became particularly well known. In November 1866, about 250 Cretan Greek combatants and around 600 women and children were besieged by about 23,000 mainly Cretan Muslims aided by Ottoman troops, and this became widely known in Europe. After a bloody battle with a large number of casualties on both sides, the Cretan Greeks finally surrendered when their ammunition ran out but were killed upon surrender.
By early 1869, the insurrection was suppressed, but the Porte offered some concessions, introducing island self-rule and increasing Christian rights on the island. Although the Cretan crisis ended better for the Ottomans than almost any other diplomatic confrontation of the century, the insurrection, and especially the brutality with which it was suppressed, led to greater public attention in Europe to the oppression of Christians in the Ottoman Empire.
Small as the amount of attention is which can be given by the people of England to the affairs of Turkey… enough was transpiring from time to time to produce a vague but a settled and general impression that the Sultans were not fulfilling the “solemn promises” they had made to Europe; that the vices of the Turkish government were ineradicable; and that whenever another crisis might arise affecting the “independence” of the Ottoman Empire, it would be wholly impossible to afford to it again the support we had afforded in the Crimean war.
Changing balance of power in Europe
|This section needs additional citations for verification. (March 2011)|
Although on the winning side in the Crimean War, the Ottoman Empire continued to decline in power and prestige. The financial strain on the treasury forced the Ottoman government to take a series of foreign loans at such steep interest rates that, despite all the fiscal reforms that followed, pushed it into unpayable debts and economic difficulties. This was further aggravated by the need to accommodate more than 600,000 Muslim Circassians, expelled by the Russians from the Caucasus, to the Black Sea ports of north Anatolia and the Balkan ports of Constanţa and Varna, which cost a great deal in money and in civil disorder to the Ottoman authorities.
The New European Concert
The Concert of Europe established in 1856 was shaken in 1859 when France and Austria fought over Italy. It came apart completely as a result of the wars of German Unification, when the Kingdom of Prussia, led by Chancellor Otto von Bismarck, defeated Austria in 1866 and France in 1870, replacing Austria-Hungary as the dominant power in Central Europe. Britain, worn out by its participation in the Crimean War and diverted by the Irish question and the social problems created by the Industrial Revolution, chose not to intervene again to restore the European balance. Bismarck did not wish the breakup of the Ottoman Empire to create rivalries that might lead to war, so he took up the Tsar's earlier suggestion that arrangements be made in case the Ottoman Empire fell apart, creating the Three Emperors' League with Austria and Russia to keep France isolated on the continent.
France responded by supporting self-determination movements, particularly if they concerned the three emperors and the Sultan. Thus revolts in Poland against Russia and national aspirations in the Balkans were encouraged by France. Russia worked to regain its right to maintain a fleet on the Black Sea and vied with the French in gaining influence in the Balkans by using the new Pan-Slavic idea that all Slavs should be united under Russian leadership. This could be done only by destroying the two empires where most non-Russian Slavs lived, the Habsburg and the Ottoman Empires. The ambitions and the rivalries of the Russians and French in the Balkans surfaced in Serbia, which was experiencing its own national revival and had ambitions that partly conflicted with those of the great powers.
Russia after the Crimean War
Russia ended the Crimean War with minimal territorial losses, but was forced to destroy its Black Sea Fleet and Sevastopol fortifications. Russian international prestige was damaged, and for many years revenge for the Crimean War became the main goal of Russian foreign policy.
This was not easy however—the Paris Peace Treaty included guarantees of Ottoman territorial integrity by Great Britain, France and Austria; only Prussia remained friendly to Russia.
It was on alliance with Prussia and its chancellor Bismarck that the newly appointed Russian chancellor, Alexander Gorchakov, depended. Russia consistently supported Prussia in her wars with Denmark (1864), Austria (1866) and France (1870). In March 1871, using the crushing French defeat and the support of a grateful Germany, Russia achieved international recognition of its earlier denouncement of Article 11 of the Paris Peace Treaty, thus enabling it to revive the Black Sea Fleet.
Other clauses of the Paris Peace Treaty, however, remained in force, specifically Article 8 with guarantees of Ottoman territorial integrity by Great Britain, France and Austria. Therefore, Russia was extremely cautious in its relations with the Ottoman Empire, coordinating all its actions with other European powers. A Russian war with Turkey would require at least the tacit support of all other Great Powers and Russian diplomacy was waiting for a convenient moment.
Balkan crisis of 1875–1876
The state of Ottoman administration in the Balkans continued to deteriorate throughout the 19th century, with the central government occasionally losing control over whole provinces. Reforms imposed by European powers did little to improve the conditions of the Christian population, while managing to dissatisfy a sizable portion of the Muslim population. Bosnia and Herzegovina suffered at least two waves of rebellion by the local Muslim population, the most recent in 1850.
Austria consolidated after the turmoil of the first half of the century and sought to reinvigorate its longstanding policy of expansion at the expense of the Ottoman Empire. Meanwhile, the nominally autonomous, de facto independent principalities of Serbia and Montenegro also sought to expand into regions inhabited by their compatriots. Nationalist and irredentist sentiments were strong and were encouraged by Russia and her agents. At the same time, a severe drought in Anatolia in 1873 and flooding in 1874 caused famine and widespread discontent in the heart of the Empire. The agricultural shortages precluded the collection of necessary taxes, which forced the Ottoman government to declare bankruptcy in October, 1875 and increase taxes on outlying provinces including the Balkans.
An uprising against Ottoman rule began in Herzegovina in July 1875. By August almost all of Herzegovina had been seized and the revolt had spread into Bosnia. Supported by nationalist volunteers from Serbia and Montenegro, the uprising continued as the Ottomans committed more and more troops to suppress it.
The revolt of Bosnia and Herzegovina spurred Bucharest-based Bulgarian revolutionaries into action. In 1875, a Bulgarian uprising was hastily prepared to take advantage of Ottoman preoccupation, but it fizzled before it started. In the spring of 1876, another uprising erupted in the south-central Bulgarian lands. That event was even more haphazardly planned than the previous one.
However, the Ottomans, lacking adequate regular troops because of the problems in Bosnia and Herzegovina, were compelled to use irregular Bashi-bazouks to quell the Bulgarians (May 11 – June 9, 1876). Those irregulars were mostly drawn from the Muslim inhabitants of the Bulgarian regions, many of whom were Circassian refugees expelled from the Caucasus or Crimean Tatar refugees expelled during the Crimean War. The bashi-bazouks brutally suppressed the revolt, massacring up to 15,000 people in the process. Between a thousand and twelve hundred people, mostly women and children, took refuge in a church at Batak and were then burnt alive. Five thousand out of the seven thousand villagers of Batak "were put to death" According to some sources, both Batak and Perushtitsa, where the majority of the population was also massacred, had not participated in the rebellion. Many of the perpetrators of those massacres were later decorated by the Ottoman high command. Modern historians have estimated the number killed suppressing the uprising as between 30,000 to 100,000.
Bashibazouks held captive by the Russians.
Bashi-Bazouks, returning with the spoils from the Romanian shore of the Danube.
International reaction to atrocities in Bulgaria
Word of the bashi-bazouks' atrocities filtered to the outside world by way of American-run Robert College located in Constantinople. The majority of the students were Bulgarian, and many received news of the events from their families back home. Soon the Western diplomatic community in Constantinople was abuzz with rumours, which eventually found their way into newspapers in the West. In Britain, where Disraeli's government was committed to supporting the Ottomans in the ongoing Balkan crisis, the Liberal opposition newspaper Daily News hired American journalist Januarius A. MacGahan to report on the massacre stories firsthand.
MacGahan toured the stricken regions of the Bulgarian uprising, and his report, splashed across the Daily News's front pages, galvanized British public opinion against Disraeli's pro-Ottoman policy. In September, opposition leader, William Gladstone published his Bulgarian Horror and the Question of the East calling upon Britain to withdraw its support for Turkey and proposing that Europe demand independence for Bulgaria and Bosnia and Herzegovina. As the details became known across Europe, many dignitaries, including Charles Darwin, Oscar Wilde, Victor Hugo and Giuseppe Garibaldi publicly condemned the Ottoman abuses in Bulgaria.
The strongest reaction came from Russia. Widespread sympathy for the Bulgarian cause led to a nationwide surge in patriotism on a scale comparable with the one during the Patriotic War of 1812. From autumn 1875, the movement to support the Bulgarian uprising involved all classes of Russian society. This was accompanied by sharp public discussions about Russian goals in this conflict: Slavophiles, led by Dostoevsky, saw in the impending war the chance to unite all Orthodox nations under Russia's helm, thus fulfilling what they believed was the historic mission of Russia, while their opponents, westernizers, led by Turgenev, denied the importance of religion and believed that Russian goals should not be defense of Orthodoxy but liberation of Bulgaria.
Serbo-Turkish War and diplomatic manoeuvering
On June 30, 1876, Serbia, followed by Montenegro, declared war on the Ottoman Empire. In July and August, the ill-prepared and poorly equipped Serbian army helped by Russian volunteers failed to achieve offensive objectives but did manage to repulse the Ottoman offensive into Serbia. Meanwhile, Russia's Alexander II and Prince Gorchakov met Austria-Hungary's Franz Joseph I and Count Andrássy in the Reichstadt castle in Bohemia. No written agreement was made, but during the discussions, Russia agreed to support Austrian occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Austria-Hungary, in exchange, agreed to support the return of Southern Bessarabia—lost by Russia during the Crimean War—and Russian annexation of the port of Batumi on the east coast of the Black Sea. Bulgaria was to become autonomous (independent, according to the Russian records).
As the fighting in Bosnia and Herzegovina continued, Serbia suffered a string of setbacks and asked the European powers to mediate an end to the war. A joint ultimatum by the European powers forced the Porte to give Serbia a one-month truce and start peace negotiations. Turkish peace conditions however were refused by European powers as too harsh. In early October, after the truce expired, the Turkish army resumed its offensive and the Serbian position quickly became desperate. On October 31, Russia issued an ultimatum requiring the Ottoman Empire to stop the hostilities and sign a new truce with Serbia within 48 hours. This was supported by the partial mobilization of the Russian army (up to 20 divisions). The Sultan accepted the conditions of the ultimatum.
To resolve the crisis, on December 11, 1876, the Constantinople Conference of the Great Powers was opened in Constantinople (to which the Turks were not invited). A compromise solution was negotiated, granting autonomy to Bulgaria, Bosnia and Herzegovina under the joint control of European powers. The Ottomans, however, refused to sacrifice their independence by allowing international representatives to oversee the institution of reforms and sought to discredit the conference by announcing on December 23, the day the conference was closed, that a constitution was adopted that declared equal rights for religious minorities within the Empire. The Ottomans attempted to use this manoeuver to get their objections and amendments to the agreement heard. When they were rejected by the Great Powers, the Ottoman Empire announced its decision to disregard the results of the conference.
On January 15, 1877, Russia and Austria-Hungary signed a written agreement confirming the results of an earlier Reichstadt Agreement in July 1876. This assured Russia of the benevolent neutrality of Austria-Hungary in the impending war. These terms meant that in case of war Russia would do the fighting and Austria would derive most of the advantage. Russia therefore made a final effort for a peaceful settlement. After reaching an agreement with its main Balkan rival and with anti-Ottoman sympathies running high throughout Europe due to the Bulgarian atrocities and the rejection of the Constantinople agreements, Russia finally felt free to declare war.
Course of the war
Russia declared war on the Ottomans on 24 April 1877 and its troops entered Romania through the newly built Eiffel Bridge near Ungheni, on the Prut river. The Prussian king Frederick II had sarcastically remarked a century earlier that a war between the Ottoman Empire and Russia would be "a war between the one-eyed and the blind".
On April 12, 1877, Romania gave permission to the Russian troops to pass through its territory to attack the Turks, resulting in Turkish bombardments of Romanian towns on the Danube. On May 10, 1877, the Principality of Romania, which was under formal Turkish rule, declared its independence.
At the beginning of the war, the outcome was far from obvious. The Russians could send a larger army into the Balkans: about 300,000 troops were within reach. The Ottomans had about 200,000 troops on the Balkan peninsula, of which about 100,000 were assigned to fortified garrisons, leaving about 100,000 for the army of operation. The Ottomans had the advantage of being fortified, complete command of the Black Sea, and patrol boats along the Danube river. They also possessed superior arms, including new British and American-made rifles and German-made artillery.
In the event, however, the Ottomans usually resorted to passive defense, leaving the strategic initiative to the Russians who, after making some mistakes, found a winning strategy for the war.
The Ottoman military command in Constantinople made poor assumptions of Russian intentions. They decided that Russians would be too lazy to march along the Danube and cross it away from the delta, and would prefer the short way along the Black Sea coast. This would be ignoring the fact that the coast had the strongest, best supplied and garrisoned Turkish fortresses. There was only one well manned fortress along the inner part of the river Danube, Vidin. It was garrisoned only because the troops, led by Osman Pasha, had just taken part in defeating the Serbs in their recent war against the Ottoman Empire.
The Russian campaign was better planned, but it relied heavily on Turkish passivity. A crucial Russian mistake was sending too few troops initially; the Danube was crossed in June by an expeditionary force of about 185,000, which was slightly less than the combined Turkish forces in the Balkans (about 200,000). After setbacks in July (at Pleven and Stara Zagora), the Russian military command realized it did not have the reserves to keep the offensive going and switched to a defensive posture. The Russians did not even have enough forces to blockade Pleven properly until late August, which effectively delayed the whole campaign for about two months.
At the start of the war, Russia and Romania destroyed all vessels along the Danube and mined the river, thus ensuring that Russian forces could cross the Danube at any point without resistance from the Ottoman navy. The Ottoman command did not appreciate the significance of the Russians' actions. In June, a small Russian unit crossed the Danube close to the delta, at Galați, and marched towards Ruschuk (today Ruse). This made the Ottomans even more confident that the big Russian force would come right through the middle of the Ottoman stronghold.
Under the direct command of Major-General Mikhail Ivanovich Dragomirov, on the night of 27/28 June 1877 (NS) the Russians constructed a pontoon bridge across the Danube at Svishtov. After a short battle in which the Russians suffered 812 killed and wounded, the Russian secured the opposing bank and drove off the Ottoman infantry brigade defending Svishtov. At this point the Russian force was divided into three parts: the Eastern Detachment under the command of Tsarevich Alexander Alexandrovich, the future Tsar Alexander III of Russia, assigned to capture the fortress of Ruschuk and cover the army's eastern flank; the Western Detachment, to capture the fortress of Nikopol, Bulgaria and cover the army's western flank; and the Advance Detachment under Count Joseph Vladimirovich Gourko, which was assigned to quickly move via Veliko Tarnovo and penetrate the Balkan Mountains, the most significant barrier between the Danube and Constantinople.
Responding to the Russian crossing of the Danube, the Ottoman high command in Constantinople ordered Osman Nuri Paşa to advance east from Vidin occupy the fortress of Nikopol, just west of the Russian crossing. On his way to Nikopol, Osman Pasha learned that the Russians had already captured the fortress and so moved to the crossroads town of Plevna (now known as Pleven), which he occupied with a force of approximately 15,000 on 19 July (NS). The Russians, approximately 9,000 under the command of General Schilder-Schuldner, reached Plevna early in the morning. Thus began the Siege of Plevna.
Osman Pasha organized a defense and repelled two Russian attacks with huge casualties on the Russian side. At that point, the sides were almost equal in numbers and the Russian army was very discouraged. Most analysts agree that a counter-attack would have allowed the Ottomans to gain control of, and destroy, the Russians' bridge.[who?] However, Osman Pasha had orders to stay fortified in Plevna, and so he did not leave that fortress.
Russia had no more troops to throw against Plevna, so the Russians besieged it, and subsequently asked the Romanians to provide extra troops. On August 9, Suleiman Pasha made an attempt to help Osman Pasha with 30,000 troops, but he was stopped by Bulgarians at the Battle of Shipka Pass. After three days of fighting, the volunteers were relieved by a Russian force led by General Radezky, and the Turkish forces withdrew. Soon afterwards, Romanian forces crossed the Danube and joined the siege. On August 16, at Gorni-Studen, the armies (West Army group) around Plevna were placed under the command of the Romanian Prince Carol, aided by the Russian general Pavel Dmitrievich Zotov and the Romanian general Alexandru Cernat.
The Turks maintained several fortresses around Pleven which the Russian and Romanian forces gradually reduced.[page needed] The Romanian 4th Division led by General George Manu took the Grivitsa redoubt after four bloody assaults and managed to keep it until the very end of the siege. The siege of Plevna (July–December 1877) turned to victory only after Russian and Romanian forces cut off all supply routes to the fortified Ottomans. With supplies running low, Osman Pasha made an attempt to break the Russian siege in the direction of Opanets. On December 9, in the middle of the night the Ottomans threw bridges over the Vit River and crossed it, attacked on a 2-mile (3.2 km) front and broke through the first line of Russian trenches. Here they fought hand to hand and bayonet to bayonet, with little advantage to either side. Outnumbering the Ottomans almost 5 to 1, the Russians drove the Ottomans back across the Vit. Osman Pasha was wounded in the leg by a stray bullet, which killed his horse beneath him. Making a brief stand, the Ottomans eventually found themselves driven back into the city, losing 5,000 men to the Russians' 2,000. The next day, Osman surrendered the city, the garrison, and his sword to the Romanian colonel, Mihail Cerchez. He was treated honorably, but his troops perished in the snows by the thousand as they straggled off into captivity. The more seriously wounded were left behind in their camp hospitals, only to be murdered by the Bulgarians.[dubious ]
At this point Serbia, having finally secured monetary aid from Russia, declared war on the Ottoman Empire again. This time there were far fewer Russian officers in the Serbian army but this was more than offset by the experience gained from the 1876–77 war. Under nominal command of prince Milan Obrenović (effective command was in hands of general Kosta Protić, the army chief of staff), the Serbian Army went on offensive in what is now eastern south Serbia. A planned offensive into the Ottoman Sanjak of Novi Pazar was called off due to strong diplomatic pressure from Austria-Hungary, which wanted to prevent Serbia and Montenegro from coming into contact, and which had designs to spread Austria-Hungary's influence through the area. The Ottomans, outnumbered unlike two years before, mostly confined themselves to passive defence of fortified positions. By the end of hostilities the Serbs had captured Ak-Palanka (today Bela Palanka), Pirot, Niš and Vranje.
Russians under Field Marshal Joseph Vladimirovich Gourko succeeded in capturing the passes at the Stara Planina mountain, which were crucial for maneuvering. Next, both sides fought a series of battles for Shipka Pass. Gourko made several attacks on the Pass and eventually secured it. Ottoman troops spent much effort to recapture this important route, to use it to reinforce Osman Pasha in Pleven, but failed. Eventually Gourko led a final offensive that crushed the Ottomans around Shipka Pass. The Ottoman offensive against Shipka Pass is considered one of the major mistakes of the war, as other passes were virtually unguarded. At this time a huge number of Ottoman troops stayed fortified along the Black Sea coast and engaged in very few operations.
Besides the Romanian Army (which mobilized 130,000 men, losing 10,000 of them to this war), a strong Finnish contingent and more than 12,000 volunteer Bulgarian troops (Opalchenie) from the local Bulgarian population as well as many hajduk detachments fought in the war on the side of the Russians. To express his gratitude to the Finnish battalion, the Tsar elevated the battalion on their return home to the name Old Guard Battalion.
Stationed in the Caucasus in Georgia and Armenia was the Russian Caucasus Corps, composed of approximately 50,000 men and 202 guns under the overall command of Grand Duke Michael Nikolaevich, Governor General of the Caucasus. The Russian force stood opposed an Ottoman Army of 100,000 men led by General Ahmed Muhtar Pasha. While the Russian army was better prepared for the fighting in the region, it lagged behind technologically in certain areas such as heavy artillery and was outgunned, for example, by the superior long-range Krupp artillery that Germany had supplied to the Ottomans.
The Caucasus Corps was led by a quartet of Armenian commanders: Generals Mikhail Loris-Melikov, Arshak Ter-Gukasov (Ter-Ghukasov/Ter-Ghukasyan), Ivan Lazarev and Beybut Shelkovnikov. It was the forces under Lieutenant-General Ter-Gukasov, stationed near Yerevan, that commenced the first assault into Ottoman territory by capturing the town of Bayazid on April 27, 1877. Capitalizing on Ter-Gukasov's victory there, Russian forces advanced, taking the region of Ardahan on May 17; Russian units also besieged the city of Kars in the final week of May, although Ottoman reinforcements lifted the siege and drove them back. Bolstered by reinforcements, in November 1877 General Lazarev launched a new attack on Kars, suppressing the southern forts leading to the city and capturing Kars itself on November 18. On February 19, 1878 the strategic fortress town of Erzerum was taken by the Russians after a lengthy siege. Although they relinquished control of Erzerum to the Ottomans at the end the war, the Russians acquired the regions of Batumi, Ardahan, Kars, Olti, and Sarikamish and reconstituted them into the Kars Oblast.
Civilian government in Bulgaria during the war
Liberated by the Imperial Russian Army during the war, Bulgarian territories since April 1877 were under temporal ruling of The Temporary Russian Governance in Bulgaria. This administration was established in the beginning of the war. The Treaty of Berlin (1878) provided for the termination of the Temporary Russian Governance activity since the establishment of the Principality of Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia, in connection with which it was abolished in May 1879. The main objectives of the Temporary Russian administration was to establish peaceful life and preparation for a revival of the Bulgarian state.
Intervention by the Great Powers
Under pressure from the British, Russia accepted the truce offered by the Ottoman Empire on January 31, 1878, but continued to move towards Constantinople.
The British sent a fleet of battleships to intimidate Russia from entering the city, and Russian forces stopped at San Stefano. Eventually Russia entered into a settlement under the Treaty of San Stefano on March 3, by which the Ottoman Empire would recognize the independence of Romania, Serbia, Montenegro, and the autonomy of Bulgaria.
Alarmed by the extension of Russian power into the Balkans, the Great Powers later forced modifications of the treaty in the Congress of Berlin. The main change here was that Bulgaria would be split, according to earlier agreements among the Great Powers that precluded the creation of a large new Slavic state: the northern and eastern parts to become principalities as before (Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia), though with different governors; and the Macedonian region, originally part of Bulgaria under San Stefano, would return to direct Ottoman administration. At the Congress of Berlin, Bismarck said that he was fighting for peace in Europe. However, his decision to split Bulgaria would start a war in the Balkans 34 years later and would eventually lead to World War I.
Effects on Bulgaria's Muslim and Christian population
The estimates of Muslim civilian casualties during the war are often estimated in the tens of thousands. The perpetrators of those massacres are also disputed, with American historian Justin McCarthy, claiming that they were carried out by Russian soldiers, Cossacks as well as Bulgarian volunteers and villagers, though there were few civilian casualties in battle. while James J. Reid claims that Circassians were significantly responsible for the refugee flow, that there were civilian casualties from battle and even that the Ottoman army was responsible for casualties among the Muslim population. According to John Joseph the Russian troops made frequent massacres of Turkish peasants to prevent them distrupting their supply and troop movements. During the Harmanli Massacre, it was reported that a huge group of Muslim refugees were attacked by the Russian army, as a result that thousands of Muslim refugees died and their goods plundered. The correspondent of the Daily News describes as an eyewitness the burning of 4 or 5 Turkish villages by the Russian troops in response of the Turks firing at the Russians from the villages, instead of behind rocks or trees.
The number of Muslim refugees is estimated by RJ Crampton as 130,000. Richard C. Frucht estimates that only half (700,000) of the prewar Muslim population remained after the war, 216,000 had died and the rest emigrated. Douglas Arthur Howard estimates that half the 1.5 million Muslims, for the most part Turks, in prewar Bulgaria had disappeared by 1879. 200,000 had died, the rest became permanently refugees in Ottoman territories. However, it should be noted that according to one estimate, the total population of Bulgaria in its postwar borders was about 2.8 million in 1871, while according to official censuses, the total population was 2.823 million in 1880/81.
During the conflict a number of Muslim buildings and cultural centres were destroyed. A large library of old Turkish books was destroyed when a mosque in Turnovo was burned in 1877. Most mosques in Sofia perished, seven of them destroyed in one night in December 1878 when a thunderstorm masked the noise of the explosions arranged by Russian military engineers."
Тhe Christian population, especially in the initial stages of the war, that found itself in the path of the Ottoman armies also suffered greatly.
This was particularly true after the July battle around Stara Zagora when Gurko's forces had to retreat back to the Shipka pass. In the aftermath of the battle Suleiman Pasha burned down the town of Stara Zagora which by that time was one of the largest towns in the Bulgarian lands. He also established in the whole valley of the Maritsa river a system of hanging at the street corners of every Bulgarian who had in any way assisted the Russians, but even villages that had not assisted the Russians were destroyed and their inhabitants massacred As a result, as many as 100,000 civilian Bulgarians fled north to the Russian occupied territories. Later on in the campaign the Ottoman forces planned to burn the town of Sofia after Gurko had managed to overcome their resistance in the passes of Western part of the Balkan Mountains. Bulgarian historians claim that 30,000 civilian Bulgarians were killed during the war, of which two thirds in the Stara Zagora area Only the refusal of the Italian Consul Vito Positano, the French Vice Consul Léandre François René le Gay and the Austro–Hungarian Vice Consul to leave Sofia prevented that from happening. After the Ottoman retreat, Positano even organized armed detachments to protect the population from marauders (regular Ottoman Army deserters, bashi-bazouks and Circassians).
Effects on Bulgaria's Jewish population
Many Jewish communities in their entirety were forced to flee with the retreating Turks as their protectors. The Bulletins de l'Alliance Israélite Universelle reported that thousands of Bulgarian Jews found refuge at the Ottoman capital of Constantinople.
Internationalization of the Armenian Question
The conclusion of the Russo-Turkish war also led to the internationalization of the Armenian Question. Many Armenians in the eastern provinces (Turkish Armenia) of the Ottoman Empire greeted the advancing Russians as liberators. Violence and instability directed at Armenians during the war by Kurd and Circassian bands had left many Armenians looking toward the invading Russians as the ultimate guarantors of their security. In January 1878, Armenian Patriarch of Constantinople Nerses II Varzhapetian approached the Russian leadership with the view of receiving assurances that the Russians would introduce provisions in the prospective peace treaty for self-administration in the Armenian provinces. Though not as explicit, Article 16 of the Treaty of San Stefano read:
As the evacuation of the Russian troops of the territory they occupy in Armenia, and which is to be restored to Turkey, might give rise to conflicts and complications detrimental to the maintenance of good relations between the two countries, the Sublime Porte engaged to carry into effect, without further delay, the improvements and reforms demanded by local requirements in the provinces inhabited by Armenians and to guarantee their security from Kurds and Circassians.
Great Britain, however, took objection to Russia holding on to so much Ottoman territory and forced it to enter into new negotiations with the convening of the Congress of Berlin in June 1878. An Armenian delegation led by prelate Mkrtich Khrimian traveled to Berlin to present the case of the Armenians but, much to its chagrin, was left out of the negotiations. Article 16 was modified and watered down, and all mention of the Russian forces remaining in the provinces was removed. In the final text of the Treaty of Berlin, it was transformed into Article 61, which read:
The Sublime Porte undertakes to carry out, without further delay, the improvements and reforms demanded by local requirements in the provinces inhabited by Armenians, and to guarantee their security against the Circassians and Kurds. It will periodically make known the steps taken to this effect to the powers, who will superintend their application.
As it turned out, the reforms were not forthcoming. Khrimian returned to deliver a famous speech in Constantinople. where he likened the peace conference to a "'big cauldron of Liberty Stew' into which the big nations dipped 'iron ladles' for real results, while the Armenian delegation had the 'Paper Ladle.' 'Ah dear Armenian people,' Khrimian said, 'could I have dipped my Paper Ladle in the cauldron it would sog and remain there! Where guns talk and sabers shine, what significance do appeals and petitions have?'" With the lack of visible progress in the improvement of the plight of the Armenian community, a number of Armenians living in Europe and Russia in the 1880s and 1890s decided to form political parties and revolutionary societies which had the aim of bringing better conditions for their compatriots in Anatolia and other parts of the Ottoman Empire.
International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement
This war caused a division in the emblems of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement which continues to this day. Both Russia and the Ottoman Empire had signed the First Geneva Convention (1864), which made the Red Cross, a color reversal of the flag of neutral Switzerland, the sole emblem of protection for military medical personnel and facilities. However, during this war the cross instead reminded the Ottomans of the Crusades; so they elected to replace the cross with the Red Crescent instead. This ultimately became the symbol of the Movement's national societies in most Muslim countries, and was ratified as an emblem of protection by later Geneva Conventions in 1929 and again in 1949 (the current version).
Iran, which neighbors both countries, considered them to be rivals, and probably considered the Red Crescent in particular to be an Ottoman symbol; except for the Red Crescent being centered and without a star, it is a color reversal of the Ottoman flag (and the modern Turkish flag). This appears to have led to their national society in the Movement being initially known as the Red Lion and Sun Society, using a red version of the Lion and Sun, a traditional Iranian symbol. After the Iranian Revolution of 1979, Iran switched to the Red Crescent, but the Geneva Conventions continue to recognize the Red Lion and Sun as an emblem of protection.
Muslim refugees inside the Hagia Sophia
Distribution Clothing to Turkish refugees in Shumen
Signing the treaty of San Stefano
Surrender of Osman Pasha in Plevna
Russian and Romanian troops marching past the Alexander II at Ploiești
Romanian troops taking Grivitsa strongpoint
Georgian militiamen in the Russian army
Finnish soldiers in the Russian Army during the Russo-Turkish war
The Shipka Monument
- Battles of the Russo-Turkish War (1877–1878)
- Ottoman fleet organisation during the Russo-Turkish War (1877–78)
- Batak massacre
- Romanian War of Independence
- Harmanli Massacre
- History of the Balkans
- Temporary Russian Governance in Bulgaria
- The Turkish Gambit
- Marche Slave
- This is the number of soldiers who took an active part in military engagements. The total size of the Russian regular army as of 1 January 1877 reached 1 005 828.
- Мерников, АГ (2005. – c. 376), Спектор А. А. Всемирная история войн (in Russian), Минск Check date values in:
- Борис Урланис, Войны и народонаселение Европы, Часть II, Глава II http://scepsis.net/library/id_2140.html
- Scafes, Cornel (2002), Armata Romania in Razboiul de Independenta 1877–1878 [The Romanian Army in the War of Independence 1877–1878] (in Romanian), et al., Bucuresti: Sigma, p. 149.
- Мерников А. Г., Спектор А. А. Всемирная история войн — Template:Мн.: Харвест, 2005. — ISBN 985-13-2607-0.
- Hatt-ı Hümayun (full text), Turkey: Anayasa.
- Vatikiotis, PJ (1997), The Middle East, London: Routledge, p. 217, ISBN 0-415-15849-4.
- Argyll 1879.
- "Lebanon", Country Studies, US: Library of Congress, 1994.
- Churchill, C (1862), The Druzes and the Maronites under the Turkish rule from 1840 to 1860, London: B Quaritch, p. 219.
- Shaw & Shaw 1977, pp. 142–43.
- The Historical Journal 3 (1), 1960: 38–55 Missing or empty
- Stillman, William James (March 15, 2004), The Autobiography of a Journalist (EBOOK) II, The Project Gutenberg, eBook#11594.
- Argyll 1879, p. 122.
- Finkel, Caroline (2005), The History of the Ottoman Empire, New York: Basic Books, p. 467.
- Shaw & Shaw 1977, p. 146.
- Hupchick 2002, p. 264.
- Jonassohn 1999, pp. 209–10.
- Eversley, Baron George Shaw-Lefevre (1924), The Turkish empire from 1288 to 1914, p. 319.
- Jonassohn 1999, p. 210.
- New Statesman 6: 202 Missing or empty
- Jelavich, Charles; Jelavich, Barbara (1986), The establishment of the Balkan national states, 1804–1920, p. 139.
- Gladstone 1876.
- Gladstone 1876, p. 64.
- "The liberation of Bulgaria", History of Bulgaria, US: Bulgarian embassy.
- Хевролина, ВМ, Россия и Болгария: "Вопрос Славянский — Русский Вопрос" (in Russian), RU: Lib FL.
- Potemkin, VP, History of world diplomacy 15th century BC – 1940 AD, RU: Diphis.
- Taylor, William Cooke; Henry, Caleb Sprague (1845), A Manual of Ancient and Modern History, New York: D Appleton & Co, p. 628.
- Chronology of events from 1856 to 1997 period relating to the Romanian monarchy, Ohio: Kent State University
- Schem, Alexander Jacob (1878), The War in the East: An illustrated history of the Conflict between Russia and Turkey with a Review of the Eastern Question.
- Menning, Bruce (2000), Bayonets before Bullets: The Imperial Russian Army, 1861–1914, Indiana University Press, p. 57.
- von Herbert 1895, p. 131.
- Reminiscences of the King of Roumania, Harper & Brothers, 1899, pp. 274–75.
- Reminiscences of the King of Roumania, Harper & Brothers, 1899, p. 275.
- Furneaux, Rupert (1958), The Siege of Pleven.
- von Herbert 1895.
- Lord Kinross (1977), The Ottoman Centuries, Morrow Quill, p. 522.
- Menning. Bayonets before Bullets, p. 78.
- Allen & Muratoff 1953, pp. 113–14.
- Allen & Muratoff 1953, p. 546.
- "Ռուս-Թուրքական Պատերազմ, 1877–1878", Armenian Soviet Encyclopedia [The Russo-Turkish War, 1877–1878] (in Armenian) 10, Yerevan: Armenian Academy of Sciences, 1984, pp. 93–94.
- Walker, Christopher J (2011), "Kars in the Russo-Turkish Wars of the Nineteenth Century", in Hovannisian, Richard G, Armenian Kars and Ani, UCLA Armenian History and Culture, Historic Armenian Cities and Provinces, 10, Costa Mesa, CA: Mazda Publishers, pp. 217–20.
- Melkonyan, Ashot, "The Kars Oblast’, 1878–1918", Armenian Kars and Ani, pp. 223–44.
- Българските държавни институции 1879-1986. София: ДИ „Д-р Петър Берон“. 1987. pp. 54–55.
- Stavrianos, "Constantinople conference", The Balkans Since 1453.
- Levene, Mark (2005), Genocide in the Age of the Nation State: The rise of the West and the coming of genocide, p. 225.
- McCarthy, J (2001), The Ottoman Peoples and the end of Empire, Oxford University Press, p. 48.
- Reid 2000, pp. 42–43.
- Medlicott, William Norton, The Congress of Berlin and after, p. 157
- Joseph, John (1983), Muslim-Christian Relations and Inter-Christian Rivalries in the Middle East, p. 84.
- Reid 2000, p. 324.
- Crampton, RJ (1997), A Concise History of Bulgaria, Cambridge University Press, p. 426, ISBN 0-521-56719-X.
- Frucht, Richard C (2005), Eastern Europe, p. 641.
- Howard, Douglas Arthur (2001), The history of Turkey, p. 67
- "Bulgaric", Europe, Popul stat.
- Crampton, RJ (2007), Bulgaria, p. 424.
- Crampton 2006, p. 111.
- Crampton 2006, p. 114.
- Argyll 1879, p. 49.
- Greene, Francis Vinton (1879). Report on the Russian Army and its Campaigns in Turkey in 1877–1878. D Appleton & Co. p. 204.
- Dimitrov, Bozhidar (2002), Russian-Turkish war 1877–1878 (in Bulgarian), p. 75.
- Ivanov, Dmitri (2005-11-08). "Позитано. "Души в окови"" (in Bulgarian). Sega. Retrieved 2009-04-30.
- "Ulysses S. Grant's Comments on Refugees in Constantinople, 1878". Shapell Manuscript Collection. SMF.
- Tamir, V., Bulgaria and Her Jews: A dubious symbiosis, 1979, p. 94–95, Yeshiva University Press
- Hertslet, Edward (1891), The Map of Europe by Treaty 4, London: Butterworths, p. 2686.
- Hurewitz, Jacob C (1956), Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East: A Documentary Record 1535–1956 I, Princeton, NJ: Van Nostrand, p. 190.
- Balkian, Peter. The Burning Tigris: The Armenian Genocide and America's Response. New York: HarperCollins, 2003, p. 44.
- Hovannisian, Richard G (1997), "The Armenian Question in the Ottoman Empire, 1876–1914", in Hovannisian, Richard G, The Armenian People From Ancient to Modern Times, Volume II: Foreign Dominion to Statehood: The Fifteenth Century to the Twentieth Century, New York: St Martin's Press, pp. 206–12, ISBN 0-312-10168-6.
- Allen, William ED; Muratoff, Paul (1953), Caucasian Battlefields, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Argyll, George Douglas Campbell (1879), The Eastern question from the Treaty of Paris 1836 to the Treaty of Berlin 1878 and to the Second Afghan War 2, London: Strahan.
- Crampton, RJ (2006) , A Concise History of Bulgaria, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, ISBN 0-521-85085-1.
- Gladstone, William Ewart (1876), Bulgarian Horrors and the Question of the East, London: William Clowes & Sons.
- von Herbert (1895), Frederick William, London: Longmans, Green & Co.
- Jonassohn, Kurt (1999), Genocide and gross human rights violations: in comparative perspective.
- Reid, James J (2000), Crisis of the Ottoman Empire: Prelude to Collapse 1839–1878, Stuttgart: Steiner.
- Shaw, Stanford J; Shaw, Ezel Kural (1977), History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, 2, Reform, Revolution, and Republic: The Rise of Modern Turkey 1808–1975, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, ISBN 0-521-29166-6.
- Acar, Keziban (March 2004). "An examination of Russian Imperialism: Russian Military and intellectual descriptions of the Caucasians during the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–1878". Nationalities Papers 32 (1): 7–21. doi:10.1080/0090599042000186151.
- Glenny, Misha (2012), The Balkans: Nationalism, War, and the Great Powers, 1804–2011, New York: Penguin.
- (Russian) Kishmishev, Stepan I. (1884), Войнa вь Tурецкой Арменіи, Saint Petersburg: Voen Publication.
- Norman, Charles B. (1878), Armenia, and the Campaign of 1877, London: Cassell Petter & Galpin.
- Yavuz, M Hakan; Sluglett, Peter, eds. (2012), War and Diplomacy: The Russo-Turkish War of 1877–1878 and the Treaty of Berlin, Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press.
|Wikimedia Commons has media related to Russo-Turkish War (1877–1878).|
|Wikisource has the text of a 1911 Encyclopædia Britannica article about Russo-Turkish War (1877–78).|
- Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453, SUC[dead link].
- Seegel, Steven J, Virtual War, Virtual Journalism?: Russian Media Responses to 'Balkan' Entanglements in Historical Perspective, 1877–2001 (PDF), USA: Brown University.
- Military History: Russo-Turkish War (1877–1878), Digital book index.
- Sowards, Steven W, Twenty Five Lectures on Modern Balkan History, MSU[dead link].
- "Russo-Turkish War of 1877–1878 and the Exploits of Liberators", Grand war (in Russian), Kulichki.
- The Romanian Army of the Russo-Turkish War 1877–1878, AOL.
- Erastimes (image gallery) (in Bulgarian), 8M[dead link]
130 years Liberation of Pleven (Plevna)
- Zelenogorsky, Najden (3 March 2007), Mayor of Pleven (VIDEO) (speech), Google.
- Stanishev, Sergej (3 March 2007), Bulgarian Prime Minister (VIDEO) (speech), Google.
- Potapov (3 March 2007), Ambassador of Russia in Bulgaria (VIDEO) (speech), Google.