Clockwise from top: Russian cruiser Pallada under fire at Port Arthur, Russian cavalry at Mukden, Russian cruiser Varyag and gunboat Korietz at Chemulpo Bay, Japanese dead at Port Arthur, Japanese infantry crossing the Yalu River
|Commanders and leaders|
|Casualties and losses|
The Russo-Japanese War (8 February 1904 – 5 September 1905) was fought between the Russian Empire and the Empire of Japan over rival imperial ambitions in Manchuria and Korea. The major theatres of operations were the Liaodong Peninsula and Mukden in Southern Manchuria, and the seas around Korea, Japan, and the Yellow Sea.
Russia sought a warm-water port on the Pacific Ocean for their navy and for maritime trade. Vladivostok was operational only during the summer, whereas Port Arthur, a naval base in Liaotung Province leased to Russia by China, was operational all year. Since the end of the First Sino-Japanese War in 1895, negotiations between Russia and Japan had proved impractical.[clarification needed] Russia had demonstrated an expansionist policy in Manchuria dating to the reign of Ivan the Terrible in the 16th century. Through threat of Russian expansion, Japan offered to recognize Russian dominance in Manchuria in exchange for recognition of Korea as within the Japanese sphere of influence. Russia refused and demanded Korea north of the 39th parallel to be a neutral buffer zone between Russia and Japan. The Japanese government perceived a Russian threat to its strategic interests and chose to go to war. After negotiations broke down in 1904, the Japanese Navy opened hostilities by attacking the Russian Eastern Fleet at Port Arthur in a surprise attack.
Russia suffered numerous defeats to Japan, but Tsar Nicholas II was convinced that Russia would win and chose to remain engaged in the war; at first, to await the outcomes of certain naval battles, and later to preserve the dignity of Russia by averting a "humiliating peace". The war concluded with the Treaty of Portsmouth, mediated by US President Theodore Roosevelt. The complete victory of the Japanese military surprised world observers. The consequences transformed the balance of power in East Asia, resulting in a reassessment of Japan's recent entry onto the world stage. Scholars continue to debate the historical significance of the war.
- 1 Background
- 2 Declaration of war
- 3 Campaign of 1904
- 4 Campaign of 1905
- 5 Peace and aftermath
- 6 Military attachés and observers
- 7 Anglo-Japanese intelligence co-operation
- 8 Financing
- 9 List of battles
- 10 Cultural legacy
- 11 Filmography
- 12 See also
- 13 References
- 14 Bibliography
- 15 Further reading
- 16 External links
In 1853 Commodore Perry of the US Navy arrived in Japan and brought an end to Japan's policy of self-isolation by forcing the Tokugawa shogunate to sign the Convention of Kanagawa the following year. This encounter with a modern Western power served to portray the West as having a confrontational and imperialist political agenda, which Japan viewed with respect through World War II. Japan sought to maintain its autonomy and resisted colonialism by Western nations. The Meiji Restoration in 1868 served as an early Japanese response to the challenges of the modern world.
After the Meiji Restoration in 1868, the Meiji government endeavored to assimilate Western ideas, technological advances and customs. By the late 19th century, Japan had transformed itself into a modernized industrial state. The Japanese wanted to preserve their sovereignty and be recognized as equal with the Western powers.
Tsarist Russia, as a major imperial power, had ambitions in the East. By the 1890s it had extended its realm across Central Asia to Afghanistan, absorbing local states in the process. The Russian Empire stretched from Poland in the west to the Kamchatka Peninsula in the east. With its construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway to the port of Vladivostok, Russia hoped to further consolidate its influence and presence in the region. In the Tsushima incident of 1861 Russia had directly assaulted Japanese territory. Fearing Russian expansion, Japan regarded Korea (and to a lesser extent Manchuria) as a protective buffer.
Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895)
Between the Meiji Restoration and its participation in World War I, the Empire of Japan fought in two significant wars. The first was the First Sino-Japanese War, fought in 1894 and 1895. The war revolved around the issue of control and influence over Korea under the rule of the Joseon dynasty. A peasant rebellion led to a request by the Korean government for the Qing dynasty to send in troops to stabilize the country. The Empire of Japan responded by sending their own force to Korea and installing a puppet government in Seoul. China objected and war ensued. Hostilities proved brief, with Japanese ground troops routing Chinese forces on the Liaodong Peninsula and nearly destroying the Chinese Navy in the Battle of the Yalu River. Japan and China signed the Treaty of Shimonoseki, which ceded the Liaodong Peninsula and the island of Taiwan to Japan. After the peace treaty, Russia, Germany, and France forced Japan to withdraw from the Liaodong Peninsula. Soon after, Russia occupied the Liaodong Peninsula, built the Port Arthur fortress, and based the Russian Pacific Fleet in the port. Germany occupied Jiaozhou Bay, built the Tsingtao fortress, and based the German East Asia Squadron in this port.
In December 1897 a Russian fleet appeared off Port Arthur. After three months, in 1898, China and Russia negotiated a convention by which China leased (to Russia) Port Arthur, Talienwan and the surrounding waters. The two parties further agreed that the convention could be extended by mutual agreement. The Russians clearly expected such an extension, for they lost no time in occupying the territory and in fortifying Port Arthur, their sole warm-water port on the Pacific coast and of great strategic value. A year later, to consolidate their position, the Russians began to build a new railway from Harbin through Mukden to Port Arthur. The development of the railway became a contributory factor to the Boxer Rebellion, when Boxer forces burned the railway stations.
The Russians also began to make inroads into Korea. By 1898 they had acquired mining and forestry concessions near the Yalu and Tumen rivers, causing the Japanese much anxiety. Japan decided to attack before the Russians completed the Trans-Siberian Railway.
The Russians and the Japanese both contributed troops to the eight-member international force sent in 1900 to quell the Boxer Rebellion and to relieve the international legations under siege in the Chinese capital, Beijing. Russia had already sent 177,000 soldiers to Manchuria, nominally to protect its railways under construction. The troops of the Qing Empire and the participants of the Boxer Rebellion could do nothing against such a massive army and were ejected from Manchuria. The Russian troops settled in and despite assurances they would vacate the area after the crisis, by 1903 the Russians had not established a timetable for withdrawal and had actually strengthened their position in Manchuria.
The Japanese statesman Itō Hirobumi started to negotiate with the Russians. He regarded Japan as too weak to evict the Russian militarily, so he proposed giving Russia control over Manchuria in exchange for Japanese control of northern Korea. Meanwhile, Japan and Britain had signed the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1902, the British seeking to restrict naval competition by keeping the Russian Pacific seaports of Vladivostok and Port Arthur from their full use. The alliance with the British meant, in part, that if any nation allied itself with Russia during any war against Japan, then Britain would enter the war on Japan's side. Russia could no longer count on receiving help from either Germany or France without there being a danger of British involvement in the war. With such an alliance, Japan felt free to commence hostilities, if necessary.
On 28 July 1903, the Japanese minister in St. Petersburg was instructed to present his country's view opposing Russia's consolidation plans in Manchuria. On 12 August, the Japanese minister handed in the following document (quoted verbatim) to serve as the basis for further negotiations:
- Mutual engagement to respect the independence and territorial integrity of the Chinese and Korean empires and to maintain the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations in those countries.
- Reciprocal recognition of Japan's preponderating interests in Korea and Russia's special interests in railway enterprises in Manchuria, and of the right of Japan to take in Korea and of Russia to take in Manchuria such measures as may be necessary for the protection of their respective interests as above defined, subject, however, to the provisions of article I of this agreement.
- Reciprocal undertaking on the part of Russia and Japan not to impede development of those industrial and commercial activities respectively of Japan in Korea and of Russia in Manchuria, which are not inconsistent with the stipulations of article I of this agreement. Additional engagement on the part of Russia not to impede the eventual extension of the Korean railway into southern Manchuria so as to connect with the East China and Shan-hai-kwan-Newchwang lines.
- Reciprocal engagement that in case it is found necessary to send troops by Japan to Korea, or by Russia to Manchuria, for the purpose either of protecting the interests mentioned in article II of this agreement, or of suppressing insurrection or disorder calculated to create international complications, the troops so sent are in no case to exceed the actual number required and are to be forthwith recalled as soon as their missions are accomplished.
- Recognition on the part of Russia of the exclusive right of Japan to give advice and assistance in the interest of reform and good government in Korea, including necessary military assistance.
- This agreement to supplant all previous arrangements between Japan and Russia respecting Korea.
- Mutual engagement to respect the independence and territorial integrity of the Korean Empire.
- Recognition by Russia of Japan's preponderating interests in Korea and of the right of Japan to give advice and assistance to Korea tending to improve the civil administration of the empire without infringing the stipulations of article I.
- Engagement on the part of Russia not to impede the commercial and industrial undertakings of Japan in Korea, nor to oppose any measures taken for the purpose of protecting them so long as such measures do not infringe the stipulations of article I.
- Recognition of the right of Japan to send for the same purpose troops to Korea, with the knowledge of Russia, but their number not to exceed that actually required, and with the engagement on the part of Japan to recall such troops as soon as their mission is accomplished.
- Mutual engagement not to use any part of the territory of Korea for strategical purposes nor to undertake on the coasts of Korea any military works capable of menacing the freedom of navigation in the Straits of Korea.
- Mutual engagement to consider that part of the territory of Korea lying to the north of the 39th parallel as a neutral zone into which neither of the contracting parties shall introduce troops.
- Recognition by Japan of Manchuria and its littoral as in all respects outside her sphere of interest.
- This agreement to supplant all previous agreements between Russia and Japan respecting Korea.
Negotiations then followed; although by early January 1904, the Japanese government had realised that Russia was neither interested in settling the Manchurian nor Korean issues. Instead, Russia's goal was buying time - via diplomacy - to further buildup militarily. Nevertheless, on 13 January 1904, Japan proposed a formula by which Manchuria would be outside the Japanese sphere of influence and, reciprocally, Korea outside Russia's. By 4 February 1904, no formal reply had been received and on 6 February Kurino Shinichiro, the Japanese minister, called on the Russian foreign minister, Count Lambsdorff, to take his leave. Japan severed diplomatic relations with Russia on 6 February 1904.
Potential diplomatic resolution of territorial concerns between Japan and Russia failed; historians have argued that this directly resulted from the actions of Tsar Nicholas II. One crucial error of Nicholas was his mismanagement of government. Although certain scholars contend the situation arose from the determination of Tsar Nicholas II to use the war against Japan to spark a revival in Russian patriotism, no historical evidence supports this claim. The Tsar's advisors did not support the war, foreseeing problems in transporting troops and supplies from European Russia to the East. Convinced that his rule was divinely ordained and that he held responsibility to God, Nicholas II held the ideals of preserving the autocracy and defending the dignity, honor, and worth of Russia. This attitude by the Tsar led to repeated delays in negotiations with the Japanese government. The Japanese understanding of this can be seen from a telegram dated 1 December 1903 from Japanese minister of foreign affairs, Komura, to the minister to Russia, in which he stated:
"...the Japanese government have at all times during the progress of the negotiations made it a special point to give prompt answers to all propositions of the Russian government. The negotiations have now been pending for no less than four months, and they have not yet reached a stage where the final issue can with certainty be predicted. In these circumstances the Japanese government cannot but regard with grave concern the situation for which the delays in negotiations are largely responsible".
Errors by Nicholas II in managing the Russian government also led to his misinterpreting the type of situation in which Russia was to become involved in with Japan. Some scholars have suggested that Tsar Nicholas II dragged Japan into war intentionally, in hopes of reviving Russian nationalism. This notion is disputed by a comment made by Nicholas to Kaiser William of Germany, saying there would be no war because he "did not wish it". This does not reject the claim that Russia played an aggressive role in the East, which it did, rather that Russia unwisely calculated that Japan would not go to war against its far larger and seemingly superior navy and army. Evidence of Russia's false sense of security and superiority to Japan is seen by Russian reference to Japan as a big mistake.
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Declaration of war
Japan issued a declaration of war on 8 February 1904. However, three hours before Japan's declaration of war was received by the Russian government, the Japanese Imperial Navy attacked the Russian Far East Fleet at Port Arthur. Tsar Nicholas II was stunned by news of the attack. He could not believe that Japan would commit an act of war without a formal declaration, and had been assured by his ministers that the Japanese would not fight. When the attack came, according to Cecil Spring Rice, first secretary at the British Embassy, it left the Tsar "almost incredulous". Russia declared war on Japan eight days later. Japan, in response, made reference to the Russian attack on Sweden in 1809 without declaration of war, and the requirement to declare war before commencing hostilities was not made international law until the Second Hague Peace Conference was held in October 1907.
The Qing Empire favoured the Japanese position and even offered military aid, but Japan declined it. However, Yuan Shikai sent envoys to Japanese generals several times to deliver foodstuffs and alcoholic drinks. Native Manchurians joined the war on both sides as hired troops.
Campaign of 1904
Port Arthur, on the Liaodong Peninsula in the south of Manchuria, had been fortified into a major naval base by the Russian Imperial Army. Since it needed to control the sea in order to fight a war on the Asian mainland, Japan's first military objective was to neutralize the Russian fleet at Port Arthur.
Battle of Port Arthur
On the night of 8 February 1904, the Japanese fleet under Admiral Togo Heihachiro opened the war with a surprise torpedo boat destroyer attack on the Russian ships at Port Arthur. The attack heavily damaged the Tsesarevich and Retvizan, the heaviest battleships in Russia's far Eastern theater, and the 6,600 ton cruiser Pallada. These attacks developed into the Battle of Port Arthur the next morning. A series of indecisive naval engagements followed, in which Admiral Togo was unable to attack the Russian fleet successfully as it was protected by the shore batteries of the harbour, and the Russians were reluctant to leave the harbour for the open seas, especially after the death of Admiral Stepan Osipovich Makarov on 13 April 1904. Although the actual Battle of Port Arthur was indecisive, the initial attacks had a devastating psychological effect on Russia, which had been confident about the prospect of war. The Japanese had seized the initiative while the Russians waited in port.
These engagements provided cover for a Japanese landing near Incheon in Korea. From Incheon the Japanese occupied Seoul and then the rest of Korea. By the end of April, the Japanese Imperial Army under Kuroki Itei was ready to cross the Yalu River into Russian-occupied Manchuria.
Blockade of Port Arthur
The Japanese attempted to deny the Russians use of Port Arthur. During the night of 13–14 February, the Japanese attempted to block the entrance to Port Arthur by sinking several cement-filled steamers in the deep water channel to the port, but they sank too deep to be effective. A similar attempt to block the harbour entrance during the night of 3–4 May also failed. In March, the charismatic Vice Admiral Makarov had taken command of the First Russian Pacific Squadron with the intention of breaking out of the Port Arthur blockade.
On 12 April 1904, two Russian pre-dreadnought battleships, the flagship Petropavlovsk and the Pobeda, slipped out of port but struck Japanese mines off Port Arthur. The Petropavlovsk sank almost immediately, while the Pobeda had to be towed back to port for extensive repairs. Admiral Makarov, the single most effective Russian naval strategist of the war, perished on the battleship Petropavlovsk.
On 15 April 1904, the Russian government made overtures threatening to seize the British war correspondents who were taking the ship Haimun into warzones to report for the London-based Times newspaper, citing concerns about the possibility of the British giving away Russian positions to the Japanese fleet.
The Russians quickly learned, and soon employed, the Japanese tactic of offensive minelaying. On 15 May 1904, two Japanese battleships, the Yashima and the Hatsuse, were lured into a recently laid Russian minefield off Port Arthur, each striking at least two mines. The Hatsuse sank within minutes, taking 450 sailors with her, while the Yashima sank while under tow towards Korea for repairs. On 23 June 1904, a breakout attempt by the Russian squadron, now under the command of Admiral Wilgelm Vitgeft, failed. By the end of the month, Japanese artillery was firing shells into the harbour.
Siege of Port Arthur
The Siege of Port Arthur commenced in April 1904. Japanese troops tried numerous frontal assaults on the fortified hilltops overlooking the harbour, which were defeated with Japanese casualties in the thousands. Eventually, though, with the aid of several batteries of 11-inch (280 mm) Krupp howitzers, the Japanese were able to capture the key hilltop bastion in December 1904. From this vantage point, the long-range artillery was able to shell the Russian fleet, which was unable to retaliate effectively against the land-based artillery and was unable or unwilling to sail out against the blockading fleet. Four Russian battleships and two cruisers were sunk in succession, with the fifth and last battleship being forced to scuttle a few weeks later. Thus, all capital ships of the Russian fleet in the Pacific were sunk. This is probably the only example in military history when such a scale of devastation was achieved by land-based artillery against major warships.
Meanwhile, attempts to relieve the besieged city by land also failed, and, after the Battle of Liaoyang in late August, the northern Russian force that might have been able to relieve Port Arthur retreated to Mukden (Shenyang). Major General Anatoly Stessel, commander of the Port Arthur garrison, believed that the purpose of defending the city was lost after the fleet had been destroyed. In general, the Russian defenders were suffering disproportionate casualties each time the Japanese attacked. In particular, several large underground mines were exploded in late December, resulting in the costly capture of a few more pieces of the defensive line. Stessel, therefore, decided to surrender to the surprised Japanese generals on 2 January 1905. He made his decision without consulting either the other military staff present, or the Tsar and military command, who all disagreed with the decision. Stessel was convicted by a court-martial in 1908 and sentenced to death on account of an incompetent defense and for disobeying orders. He was later pardoned.
Battle of Yalu River
In contrast to the Japanese strategy of rapidly gaining ground to control Manchuria, Russian strategy focused on fighting delaying actions to gain time for reinforcements to arrive via the long Trans-Siberian railway, which was incomplete near Irkutsk at the time. On 1 May 1904, the Battle of Yalu River became the first major land battle of the war; Japanese troops stormed a Russian position after crossing the river. The defeat of the Russian Eastern Detachment removed the perception that the Japanese would be an easy enemy, that the war would be short, and that Russia would be the overwhelming victor. This battle was also the first battle in decades to be an Asian victory over a European power and marked Russia's inability to match Japan's military prowess. Japanese troops proceeded to land at several points on the Manchurian coast, and in a series of engagements, drove the Russians back towards Port Arthur. The subsequent battles, including the Battle of Nanshan on 25 May 1904, were marked by heavy Japanese losses largely from attacking entrenched Russian positions.
Battle of the Yellow Sea
With the death of Admiral Stepan Makarov during the siege of Port Arthur in April 1904, Admiral Wilgelm Vitgeft was appointed command of the battle fleet and was ordered to make a sortie from Port Arthur and deploy his force to Vladivostok. Flying his flag in the French-built pre-dreadnought Tsesarevich, Vitgeft proceeded to lead his six battleships, four cruisers, and 14 torpedo boat destroyers into the Yellow Sea in the early morning of 10 August 1904. Waiting for him was Admiral Togo and his fleet of four battleships, 10 cruisers, and 18 torpedo boat destroyers.
At approximately 12:15, the battleship fleets obtained visual contact with each other, and at 13:00 with Togo crossing Vitgeft's T, they commenced main battery fire at a range of about eight miles, the longest ever conducted up to that time. For about thirty minutes the battleships pounded one another until they had closed to less than four miles and began to bring their secondary batteries into play. At 18:30, a hit from one of Togo's battleships struck Vitgeft's flagship's bridge, killing him instantly.
With the Tsesarevich 's helm jammed and their admiral killed in action, she turned from her battle line, causing confusion among her fleet. However, Togo was determined to sink the Russian flagship and continued pounding her, being saved only by the gallant charge of the American-built Russian battleship Retvizan, whose captain successfully drew away Togo's heavy fire from the Russian flagship. Knowing of the impending battle with the battleship reinforcements arriving from Russia (the Baltic Fleet), Togo chose not to risk his battleships by pursuing his enemy as they turned about and headed back into Port Arthur, thus ending naval history's longest-range gunnery duel up to that time and the first modern clash of steel battleship fleets on the high seas.
Baltic Fleet redeploys
Meanwhile, the Russians were preparing to reinforce their Far East Fleet by sending the Baltic Fleet, under the command of Admiral Zinovy Rozhestvensky. After a false start caused by engine problems and other mishaps, the squadron finally departed on 15 October 1904, and sailed half way around the world from the Baltic Sea to the Pacific via the Cape of Good Hope in the course of a seven-month odyssey that was to attract worldwide attention. The fleet was forced to take this longer route after the Dogger Bank incident on 21 October 1904, where the Russian fleet fired on British fishing boats that they mistook for enemy torpedo boats. This caused the British to deny them access to the Suez Canal, thus forcing them around Africa, and nearly sparking a war with Great Britain (an ally of Japan, but neutral, unless provoked by a non-combatant nation).
Campaign of 1905
With the fall of Port Arthur, the Japanese 3rd Army could continue northward to reinforce positions south of Russian-held Mukden. With the onset of the severe Manchurian winter, there had been no major land engagements since the Battle of Shaho the previous year. The two sides camped opposite each other along 60 to 70 miles (110 km) of front lines south of Mukden.
Battle of Sandepu
The Russian Second Army under General Oskar Gripenberg, between 25 and 29 January, attacked the Japanese left flank near the town of Sandepu, almost breaking through. This caught the Japanese by surprise. However, without support from other Russian units the attack stalled, Gripenberg was ordered to halt by Kuropatkin and the battle was inconclusive. The Japanese knew that they needed to destroy the Russian army in Manchuria before Russian reinforcements arrived via the Trans-Siberian railroad.
Battle of Mukden
The Battle of Mukden commenced on 20 February 1905. In the following days Japanese forces proceeded to assault the right and left flanks of Russian forces surrounding Mukden, along a 50-mile (80 km) front. Approximately half a million men were involved in the fighting. Both sides were well entrenched and were backed by hundreds of artillery pieces. After days of harsh fighting, added pressure from the flanks forced both ends of the Russian defensive line to curve backwards. Seeing they were about to be encircled, the Russians began a general retreat, fighting a series of fierce rearguard actions, which soon deteriorated in the confusion and collapse of Russian forces. On 10 March 1905, after three weeks of fighting, General Kuropatkin decided to withdraw to the north of Mukden. The Russians lost 90,000 men in the battle.
The retreating Russian Manchurian Army formations disbanded as fighting units, but the Japanese failed to destroy them completely. The Japanese themselves had suffered heavy casualties and were in no condition to pursue. Although the Battle of Mukden was a major defeat for the Russians and was the most decisive land battle ever fought by the Japanese, the final victory still depended on the navy.
Battle of Tsushima
After a stopover of several weeks at the minor port of Nossi-Bé, Madagascar, that had been reluctantly allowed by neutral France in order not to jeopardize its relations with its Russian ally, the Russian Baltic fleet proceeded to Cam Ranh Bay in French Indochina passing on its way through the Singapore Strait between 7 and 10 April 1905. The fleet finally reached the Sea of Japan in May 1905. The logistics of such an undertaking in the age of coal power was astounding. The squadron required approximately 500,000 tons of coal to complete the journey, yet by international law, it was not allowed to coal at neutral ports, forcing the Russian authorities to acquire a large fleet of colliers to supply the fleet at sea. The weight of the ships' stores needed for such a long journey was to be another major problem. The Russian Second Pacific Squadron (the renamed Baltic Fleet) sailed 18,000 nautical miles (33,000 km) to relieve Port Arthur. The demoralizing news that Port Arthur had fallen reached the fleet while it was still at Madagascar. Admiral Rozhestvensky's only hope now was to reach the port of Vladivostok. There were three routes to Vladivostok, with the shortest and most direct passing through the Tsushima Straits between Korea and Japan. However, this was also the most dangerous route as it passed between the Japanese home islands and the Japanese naval bases in Korea.
Admiral Togo was aware of Russian progress and understood that, with the fall of Port Arthur, the Second and Third Pacific squadrons would try to reach the only other Russian port in the Far East, Vladivostok. Battle plans were laid down and ships were repaired and refitted to intercept the Russian fleet.
The Japanese Combined Fleet, which had originally consisted of six battleships, was now down to four (two had been lost to mines), but still retained its cruisers, destroyers, and torpedo boats. The Russian Second Pacific Squadron contained eight battleships, including four new battleships of the Borodino class, as well as cruisers, destroyers and other auxiliaries for a total of 38 ships.
By the end of May, the Second Pacific Squadron was on the last leg of its journey to Vladivostok, taking the shorter, riskier route between Korea and Japan, and travelling at night to avoid discovery. Unfortunately for the Russians, while in compliance with the rules of war, the two trailing hospital ships had continued to burn their lights, which were spotted by the Japanese armed merchant cruiser Shinano Maru. Wireless communication was used to inform Togo's headquarters, where the Combined Fleet was immediately ordered to sortie. Still receiving naval intelligence from scouting forces, the Japanese were able to position their fleet so that they would "cross the T" of the Russian fleet. The Japanese engaged the Russians in the Tsushima Straits on 27–28 May 1905. The Russian fleet was virtually annihilated, losing eight battleships, numerous smaller vessels, and more than 5,000 men, while the Japanese lost three torpedo boats and 116 men. Only three Russian vessels escaped to Vladivostok. After the Battle of Tsushima, a combined Japanese Army and Navy operation occupied Sakhalin Island to force the Russians to sue for peace.
Peace and aftermath
Treaty of Portsmouth
The defeats of the Russian Army and Navy shook up Russian confidence. Throughout 1905, the Imperial Russian government was rocked by revolution. The population was against escalation of the war. The empire was certainly capable of sending more troops, but the poor state of the economy, the embarrassing defeats of the Russian Army and Navy by the Japanese, and the relative unimportance of the disputed land to Russia made the war extremely unpopular. Tsar Nicholas II elected to negotiate peace so he could concentrate on internal matters after the disaster of Bloody Sunday on 22 January 1905.
Both sides accepted the offer of American president, Theodore Roosevelt, to mediate; meetings were held in Portsmouth, New Hampshire, with Sergius Witte leading the Russian delegation and Baron Komura, a graduate of Harvard, leading the Japanese delegation. The Treaty of Portsmouth was signed on 5 September 1905 at the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard on Seavey's Island, Kittery, Maine, while the delegates stayed in Portsmouth, New Hampshire. Witte became Russian Prime Minister the same year.
After courting the Japanese, Roosevelt decided to support the Tsar's refusal to pay indemnities, a move that policymakers in Tokyo interpreted as signifying that the United States had more than a passing interest in Asian affairs. Russia recognized Korea as part of the Japanese sphere of influence and agreed to evacuate Manchuria. Japan would annex Korea in 1910 (Japan–Korea Treaty of 1910), with scant protest from other powers.
Russia also signed over its 25-year leasehold rights to Port Arthur, including the naval base and the peninsula around it, and ceded the southern half of Sakhalin Island to Japan. Sakhalin would be taken back by the Soviet Union following the defeat of the Japanese in World War II.
Roosevelt earned the Nobel Peace Prize for his effort. George E. Mowry concludes that Roosevelt handled the arbitration well, doing an "excellent job of balancing Russian and Japanese power in the Orient, where the supremacy of either constituted a threat to growing America."
Sources do not agree on a precise number of deaths from the war because of a lack of body counts for confirmation. The number of Japanese Army dead in combat is put at around 47,000 with around 27,000 additional casualties from disease, and between 6,000 and 12,000 wounded. Estimates of Russian Army dead range from around 40,000 to around 70,000 men. The total number of army dead is generally stated as around 130,000 to 170,000. China suffered 20,000 civilian deaths, and financially the loss amounted to over 69 million taels' worth of silver.
During many of the battles at sea, several thousand soldiers being transported drowned after their ships went down. There was no consensus about what to do with transported soldiers at sea, and as a result, many of the ships failed or refused to rescue soldiers that were left shipwrecked. This led to the creation of the second Geneva Convention in 1906, which gave protection and care for shipwrecked soldiers in armed conflict.
This was the first major military victory in the modern era of an Asian power over a European nation. Russia's defeat was met with shock in the West and across the Far East. Japan's prestige rose greatly as it came to be seen as a modern nation. Concurrently, Russia lost virtually its entire Pacific and Baltic fleets, and also much international esteem. This was particularly true in the eyes of Germany and Austria-Hungary before World War I. Russia was France's and Serbia's ally, and that loss of prestige had a significant effect on Germany's future when planning for war with France, and Austria-Hungary's war with Serbia.
In the absence of Russian competition, and with the distraction of European nations during World War I, combined with the Great Depression that followed, the Japanese military began efforts to dominate China and the rest of Asia, which eventually led to the Second Sino-Japanese War and the Pacific War theatres of World War II.
Effects in Russia
Although popular support for the war had existed following the Japanese attack on Port Arthur in 1904, discontent occurred following continued defeats at the hands of Japan. For many Russians, the immediate shock of unexpected humiliation at the hands of Japan, caused the conflict to be viewed as a metaphor for the shortcomings of the Romanov autocracy. Popular discontent in Russia after the war added more fuel to the already simmering Russian Revolution of 1905, an event Nicholas II had hoped to avoid entirely by taking intransigent negotiating stances prior to coming to the table. Twelve years later, that discontent boiled over into the February Revolution of 1917. In Poland, which Russia partitioned in the late 18th century, and where Russian rule already caused two major uprisings, the population was so restless that an army of 250,000–300,000—larger than the one facing the Japanese—had to be stationed to put down the unrest. Some political leaders of the Polish insurrection movement (in particular, Józef Piłsudski) sent emissaries to Japan to collaborate on sabotage and intelligence gathering within the Russian Empire and even plan a Japanese-aided uprising.
In Russia, the defeat of 1905 led in the short term to a reform of the Russian military that allowed it to face Germany in World War I. However, the revolts at home following the war planted the seeds that presaged the Russian Revolution of 1917. This was because Tsar Nicholas II issued the October Manifesto, which included only limited reforms such as the Duma and failed to address the societal problems of Russia at the time.
Effects on Japan
Japan had become the rising Asian power and had proven that its military could combat the major powers in Europe with success. Most Western powers were stunned that the Japanese not only prevailed but decisively defeated Russia. In the Russo-Japanese War, Japan had also portrayed a sense of readiness in taking a more active and leading role in Asian affairs, which in turn had led to widespread nationalism throughout the region.
Although the war had ended in a victory for Japan, Japanese public opinion was shocked by the very restrained peace terms which were negotiated at the war's end. Widespread discontent spread through the populace upon the announcement of the treaty terms. Riots erupted in major cities in Japan. Two specific requirements, expected after such a costly victory, were especially lacking: territorial gains and monetary reparations to Japan. The peace accord led to feelings of distrust, as the Japanese had intended to retain all of Sakhalin Island, but were forced to settle for half of it after being pressured by the United States, with President Roosevelt opting to support Nicholas II’s stance on not ceding territory or paying reparations. The Japanese had wanted reparations to help families recover from lost fathers and sons as well as heavy taxation from the government. Without them, they were at a loss.
The U.S held strength in the Asian region from aggravating European imperialist encroachment. To Japan, this represented a developing threat to the autonomy of the region. U.S.-Japanese relations would recover a bit in the early 20th century, but by the early 1920s, few in Japan believed that the United States meant anything positive for the future of Asia. By the 1930s, the U.S. presence in Asian affairs, along with the instability in China and the collapse of the Western economic order, Japan would act aggressively with respect to China, setting the precedent that would ultimately culminate in the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere. Some scholars suggest that Japan's road to World War II had begun not upon winning the Russo-Japanese War, but when it lost the peace.
The effects and impact of the Russo-Japanese War introduced a number of characteristics that came to define 20th century politics and warfare. Many of the technological innovations brought on by the Industrial Revolution first became present on the battlefield in the Russo-Japanese War. Weapons and armaments were more technological than ever before. Technological developments of modern armaments, such as rapid firing artillery and machine guns, as well as more accurate carbine rifles, were first used on a mass scale in the Russo-Japanese War. The improved capability of naval forces was also demonstrated. Here was the introduction of iron-clad, steam driven boats, equipped with large and heavy guns. Military operations on both sea and land demonstrated that warfare in a new age of technology had undergone a considerable change since the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71. Most army commanders had previously envisioned using these weapon systems to dominate the battlefield on an operational and tactical level but, as events played out, these technological advancements forever altered the capacity in which mankind would wage war. For East Asia it was the first confrontation after thirty years involving two modern armed forces.
The advanced weaponry led to massive casualty counts. Neither Japan nor Russia had prepared for the number of deaths that would occur in this new kind of warfare, or had the resources to compensate for these losses. This also left its impression on society at large, with the emergence of transnational and nongovernmental organizations, like the Red Cross, becoming prominent after the war. The emergence of such organizations can be regarded as the beginning of a meshing together of civilizations through the identification of common problems and challenges; a slow process dominating much of the 20th century.
Debate with respect to the Russo-Japanese War preluding World War II is a topic of interest to scholars today. Arguments that are favorable toward this perspective consider characteristics specific to the Russo-Japanese War to the qualities definitive of "total war". Numerous aspects of total war characterize the Russo-Japanese War. Encompassed on both ends was the mass mobilization of troops into battle. For both Russia and Japan, the war required extensive economic support in the form of production of equipment, armaments, and supplies at such a scale that required both domestic support as well as foreign aid. The conclusion of the Russo-Japanese War also demonstrated the need for world leaders to regard domestic response to foreign policy, which is argued by some scholars as setting in motion the dissolution of the Romanov dynasty by demonstrating the inefficiencies of tsarist Russia's government.
Reception around the world
To the Western powers, Japan's victory demonstrated the emergence of a new Asian regional power. With the Russian defeat, some scholars have argued that the war had set in motion a change in the global world order with the emergence of Japan as not only a regional power, but rather, the main Asian power. Rather more than the possibilities of diplomatic partnership were emerging, however. The Japanese success returned self-confidence to the colonised Asian peoples – Vietnamese, Indonesians, Indians and Filipinos – and to those countries like Turkey and Iran in immediate danger of being absorbed by the Western powers. It also encouraged the Chinese who, despite having been at war with the Japanese only a decade before, still considered Westerners the greater threat. “We regarded that Russian defeat by Japan as the defeat of the West by the East. We regarded the Japanese victory as our own victory,” declared Sun Yat-sen. And Jawaharlal Nehru, “Japan's victory lessened the feeling of inferiority from which most of us suffered. A great European power had been defeated, thus Asia could still defeat Europe as it had done in the past.”
In Europe too, subject populations were similarly encouraged. James Joyce's novel Ulysses, set in Dublin in 1904, contains hopeful Irish allusions as to the outcome of the war. And in partitioned Poland the artist Józef Mehoffer chose 1905 to paint his “Europa Jubilans” (Europe rejoicing), which portrays an aproned maid taking her ease on a sofa against a background of Eastern artefacts. Executed following demonstrations against the war and Russian cultural suppression, and in the year of Russia’s defeat, its subtly coded message looks forward to a time when the Tsarist masters will be defeated in Europe as they had been in Asia.
The significance of the war for oppressed classes as well as subject populations was clear too to the Socialist thinker Rosa Luxemburg: “The Russo-Japanese War now gives to all an awareness that even war and peace in Europe – its destiny – isn’t decided between the four walls of the European concert, but outside it, in the gigantic maelstrom of world and colonial politics. And it’s in this that the real meaning of the current war resides for social-democracy, even if we set aside its immediate effect: the collapse of Russian absolutism. This war brings the gaze of the international proletariat back to the great political and economic connectedness of the world, and violently dissipates in our ranks the particularism, the pettiness of ideas that form in any period of political calm.” It was this realisation of the universal significance of the war that underlines the historical importance of the conflict and its outcome.
Assessment of war results
Russia had lost two of its three fleets. Only its Black Sea Fleet remained, and this was the result of an earlier treaty that had prevented the fleet from leaving the Black Sea. Japan became the sixth-most powerful naval force, while the Russian Navy declined to one barely stronger than that of Austria–Hungary. The actual costs of the war were large enough to affect the Russian economy and, despite grain exports, the nation developed an external balance of payments deficit. The cost of military re-equipment and re-expansion after 1905 pushed the economy further into deficit, although the size of the deficit was obscured.
The Japanese were on the offensive for most of the war and used massed infantry assaults against defensive positions, which would later become the standard of all European armies during World War I. The battles of the Russo-Japanese War, in which machine guns and artillery took a heavy toll on Russian and Japanese troops, were a precursor to the trench warfare of World War I. A German military advisor sent to Japan, Jakob Meckel, had a tremendous impact on the development of the Japanese military training, tactics, strategy, and organization. His reforms were credited with Japan's overwhelming victory over China in the First Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895. However, his over-reliance on infantry in offensive campaigns also led to a large number of Japanese casualties.
Military and economic exhaustion affected both countries. Japanese historians regard this war as a turning point for Japan, and a key to understanding the reasons why Japan may have failed militarily and politically later. After the war, acrimony was felt at every level of Japanese society and it became the consensus within Japan that their nation had been treated as the defeated power during the peace conference. As time went on, this feeling, coupled with the sense of "arrogance" at becoming a Great Power, grew and added to growing Japanese hostility towards the West, and fueled Japan's military and imperial ambitions. Only five years after the war, Japan de jure annexed Korea as part of its colonial empire. In 1931, 21 years later, Japan invaded Manchuria in the Mukden Incident. This culminated in the invasion of East, Southeast and South Asia in World War II, in an attempt to create a great Japanese colonial empire, the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. As a result, most Chinese historians consider the Russo-Japanese War as a key development of Japanese militarism.
Following the victory of the Battle of Tsushima, Japan's erstwhile English ally presented a lock of Admiral Nelson's hair to the Imperial Japanese Navy, judging its performance then as on a par with Britain's victory at Trafalgar in 1805. It is still on display at Kyouiku Sankoukan, a public museum maintained by the Japan Self-Defense Force. Nevertheless, there was a consequent change in English strategic thinking, resulting in enlargement of its naval docks at Auckland, New Zealand; Bombay, British India; Fremantle and Sydney, Australia; Simon's Town, Cape Colony; Singapore and British Hong Kong. The naval war confirmed the direction of the British Admiralty's thinking in tactical terms even as it undermined its strategic grasp of a changing world. Tactical orthodoxy, for example, assumed that a naval battle would imitate the conditions of stationary combat and that ships would engage in one long line sailing on parallel courses; but more flexible tactical thinking would now be required as a firing ship and its target maneuvered independently.
The US reaction to the war had also been mixed, with fears of a Yellow Peril eventually shifting from China to Japan. American figures such as W. E. B. Du Bois and Lothrop Stoddard saw the victory as a challenge to white supremacy.
Military attachés and observers
Military and civilian observers from every major power closely followed the course of the war. Most were able to report on events from the perspective of embedded positions within the land and naval forces of both Russia and Japan. These military attachés and other observers prepared first-hand accounts of the war and analytical papers. In-depth observer narratives of the war and more narrowly focused professional journal articles were written soon after the war; and these post-war reports conclusively illustrated the battlefield destructiveness of this conflict. This was the first time the tactics of entrenched positions for infantry defended with machine guns and artillery became vitally important. Both would become dominant factors in World War I. Even though entrenched positions had already been a significant part of both the Franco-Prussian War and the American Civil War, it is now apparent that the high casualty counts, and the tactical lessons readily available to observer nations, were completely disregarded in preparations for war in Europe, and during much of the course of World War I.
In 1904–1905, Ian Standish Monteith Hamilton was the military attaché of the British Indian Army serving with the Japanese Army in Manchuria. As one of the several military attachés from Western countries, he was the first to arrive in Japan after the start of the war. He therefore would be recognized as the dean of multi-national attachés and observers in this conflict, although out-ranked by British field marshal, William Gustavus Nicholson, 1st Baron Nicholson, who was later to become chief of the Imperial General Staff.
Anglo-Japanese intelligence co-operation
Even before the war, British and Japanese intelligence had co-operated against Russia. Indian Army stations in Malaya and China often intercepted and read wireless and telegraph cable traffic relating to the war, which was shared with the Japanese. In their turn, the Japanese shared information about Russia with the British with one British official writing of the "perfect quality" of Japanese intelligence. In particular, British and Japanese intelligence gathered much evidence that Germany was supporting Russia in the war as part of a bid to disturb the balance of power in Europe, which led to British officials increasingly perceiving that country as a threat to the international order.
Despite its gold reserves of 106.3 million pounds, Russia's pre-war financial situation was not enviable. The country had large budget deficits year after year, and was largely dependent on borrowed money.
Russia's war effort was funded primarily by France, in a series of loans totalling 800 million francs (30.4 million pounds); another loan in the amount of 600 million francs was agreed upon, but later cancelled. These loans were extended within a climate of mass bribing of the French press (made necessary by Russia's precarious economic and social situation and poor military performance). Although initially reluctant to participate in the war, the French government and major banks were co-operative since it became clear that Russian and French economic interests were tied. In addition to French money, Russia secured a German loan in the amount of 500 million marks (24.5 million pounds).
Conversely, Japan's pre-war gold reserves were a modest 11.7 million pounds; a major portion of the total cost of the war was covered by money borrowed from the United Kingdom, Canada, and the United States.
During his canvassing expedition in London, the Japanese vice-governor of the Bank of Japan met Jacob Schiff, an American banker and head of Kuhn, Loeb & Co., Schiff was sympathetic to Japan's cause, and extended a critical series of loans to the Empire of Japan, in the amount of 200 million dollars (41.2 million pounds).
List of battles
- 1904 Battle of Port Arthur, 8 February: naval battle inconclusive
- 1904 Battle of Chemulpo Bay, 9 February: naval battle Japanese victory
- 1904 Battle of Yalu River, 30 April to 1 May: Japanese victory
- 1904 Battle of Nanshan, 25 to 26 May, Japanese victory
- 1904 Battle of Telissu, 14 to 15 June, Japanese victory
- 1904 Battle of Motien Pass, 17 July, Japanese victory
- 1904 Battle of Ta-shih-chiao, 24 July, Japanese victory
- 1904 Battle of Hsimucheng, 31 July, Japanese victory
- 1904 Battle of the Yellow Sea, 10 August: naval battle Japanese victory strategically, tactically inconclusive
- 1904 Battle off Ulsan, 14 August: naval battle Japanese victory
- 1904–1905 Siege of Port Arthur, 19 August to 2 January: Japanese victory
- 1904 Battle of Liaoyang, 25 August to 3 September: inconclusive
- 1904 Battle of Shaho, 5 to 17 October: inconclusive
- 1905 Battle of Sandepu, 26 to 27 January: inconclusive
- 1905 Battle of Mukden, 21 February to 10 March: Japanese victory
- 1905 Battle of Tsushima, 27 to 28 May naval battle: Japanese victory
The Russo-Japanese War was covered by dozens of foreign journalists who sent back sketches that were turned into lithographs and other reproducible forms. Propaganda images were circulated by both sides, often in the form of postcards and based on insulting racial stereotypes. These were produced not only by the combatants but by those from European countries who supported one or the other side or had a commercial or colonial stake in the area. War photographs were also popular, appearing in both the press and in book form.
In Russia, the war was covered by anonymous satirical graphic luboks for sale in markets, recording the war for the domestic audience. Around 300 were made before their creation was banned by the Russian government. Their Japanese equivalents were woodblock prints. These had been common during the Sino-Japanese war a decade earlier and celebrations of the new conflict tended to repeat the same imagery and situations. But by this time in Japan postcards had become the commonest form of communication and they soon replaced prints as a medium for topographical imagery and war reportage. In some ways, however, they were still dependent on the print for their pictorial conventions, not least in issuing the cards in series that assembled into a composite scene or design, either as diptychs, triptychs or even more ambitious formats. However, captioning swiftly moved from the calligraphic side inscription to a printed title below, and not just in Japanese but in English and other European languages. There was a lively sense that these images served not only as mementoes but also as propaganda statements.
War artists were to be found on the Russian side and even figured among the casualties. Vasily Vereshchagin went down with the Petropavlovsk, Admiral Makarov’s flagship, when it was sunk by mines. However, his last work, a picture of a council of war presided over by the admiral, was recovered almost undamaged. Another artist, Mykola Samokysh, first came to notice for his reports during the war and the paintings worked up from his diary sketch-books. Other depictions appeared after the event. The two by the Georgian naïve painter Niko Pirosmani from 1906 must have been dependent on newspaper reports since he was not present. Then Yury Repin made an episode during the Battle of Yalu River the subject of a broad heroic canvas in 1914 at the outset of World War I.
On either side, there were lyrics lamenting the necessity of fighting in a foreign land, far from home. One of the earliest of several Russian songs still performed today was the waltz "Amur's Waves" (Amurskie volny), which evokes the melancholy of standing watch on the frontier between Russia and Manchuria.
Two others grew out of incidents during the war. "On the hills of Manchuria" (Na sopkah Manchzhurii) (1906) is another waltz composed by Ilya Shatrov, a decorated military musician whose regiment suffered badly in the battle of Mukden. Originally only the music was published, under the longer title "The Mokshansky Regiment on the Hills of Manchuria"; the words by Stepan Petrov were added later. These lyrics mourned the fallen lying in their graves and threatened revenge. Another song, Variag, commemorates the Battle of Chemulpo Bay in which that cruiser and the gunboat Korietz steamed out to confront an encircling Japanese squadron rather than surrender. That act of heroism was first celebrated in a German song by Rudolf Greintz in 1907 but was quickly translated into Russian and sung to a martial accompaniment.
Nikolai Rimsky-Korsakov also reacted to the war by composing the satirical opera The Golden Cockerel, completed in 1907. Although it was ostensibly based on a verse fairy tale by Alexander Pushkin written in 1834, the authorities quickly realised its true target and immediately banned it from performance.
Some Japanese poetry dealing with the war still has a high profile. General Nogi Maresuke’s “Outside the Goldland fortress” was learned by generations of schoolchildren and valued for its bleak stoicism. The army surgeon Mori Ogai kept a verse diary which tackled such themes as racism, strategic mistakes and the ambiguities of victory which can now be appreciated in historical hindsight. Nowadays too there is growing appreciation of Yosano Akiko’s parting poem to her brother as he left for the war, which includes the critical lines.
- Never let them kill you, brother!
- His Imperial Majesty would not come out to fight ...
- How could He possibly make them believe
- that it is honourable to die? 
European treatments were similarly varied. Jane H. Oakley attempted an epic treatment of the conflict in the 86 cantos of her contemporary A Russo-Japanese War Poem (Brighton 1905). The French poet Blaise Cendrars was later to represent himself as on a Russian train on its way to Manchuria at the time in his La prose du Transsibérien et de la Petite Jehanne de France (1913) and energetically evoked the results of the war along the way:
- I saw the silent trains the black trains returning from the Far East and passing like phantoms…
- At Talga 100,000 wounded were dying for lack of care
- I visited the hospitals of Krasnoyarsk
- And at Khilok we encountered a long convoy of soldiers who had lost their minds
- In the pesthouses I saw gaping gashes wounds bleeding full blast
- And amputated limbs danced about or soared through the raucous air
Much later, the Scottish poet Douglas Dunn devoted an epistolary poem in verse to the naval war in The Donkey's Ears: Politovsky’s Letters Home (2000). This follows the voyage of the Russian Imperial Navy flagship Kniaz to its sinking at the battle of Tsushima.
Fictional coverage of the war began even before it was over. An early example was Allen Upward’s The International Spy, being the secret history of the Russo-Japanese War (1904). Set in both Russia and Japan, it ends with the Dogger Bank incident involving the Baltic Fleet. The political thinking displayed there is typical of the time. There is great admiration for the Japanese, who were English allies. Russia is in turmoil, but the main impetus towards war is not imperialism as such but commercial forces. “Every student of modern history has remarked the fact that all recent wars have been promoted by great combinations of capitalists. The causes which formerly led to war between nation and nation have ceased to operate” (p.40). The true villain plotting in the background, however, is the German Emperor, seeking to destabilise the European balance of power in his country’s favour. Towards the end of the novel, the narrator steals a German submarine and successfully foils a plot to involve the English in the war. The submarine motif reappeared in George Griffith’s science fiction novel, The Stolen Submarine (1904), although in this case it is a French super-submarine which its developer sells to the Russians for use against the Japanese in another tale of international intrigue.
Though most English-language fiction of the period took the Japanese side, the Rev. W. W. Walker’s Canadian novella, Alter Ego (1907), is an exception. It features a Canadian volunteer in the Russian army who, on his return, agrees to talk about his experiences to an isolated upcountry community and relates his part in the battle of Mukden. Though this incident only occupies two of the book’s six chapters, it is used to illustrate the main message there, that war is “anti-Christian and barbarous, except in a defensive sense” (Ch.3).
Various aspects of the war were also common in contemporary children’s fiction. Categorised as Boys Own adventure stories, they offer few insights into the conflict, being generally based on news articles and sharing unreflectingly in the contemporary culture of imperialism. Among these, Herbert Strang was responsible for two novels: Kobo: A Story of the Russo-Japanese War (1905), told from the Japanese side, and Brown of Moukden (1906), viewed from the Russian side. Three more were written by the prolific American author, Edward Stratemeyer: Under the Mikado's Flag, or Young Soldiers of Fortune (1904); At the Fall of Port Arthur, or a young American in the Japanese navy (1905);  and Under Togo for Japan, or Three Young Americans on Land and Sea (1906). Two other English stories begin with the action at Port Arthur and follow the events thereafter: A Soldier of Japan: a tale of the Russo-Japanese War by Captain Frederick Sadleir Brereton, and The North Pacific (1905) by Willis Boyd Allen (1855-1938). Two more also involve young men fighting in the Japanese navy: Americans in For the Mikado, a Japanese Middy in Action (1905) by Kirk Munroe, and a temporarily disgraced English officer in Under the Ensign of the Rising Sun (1916) by Harry Collingwood, the pen-name of William Joseph Cosens Lancaster (1851-1922), whose speciality was naval fiction.
Russian novelist Alexey Novikov-Priboy really did serve in the Baltic Fleet and wrote about the conflict on his return, but his early work was suppressed. It was not until the changed political climate under Soviet rule that he began writing his historical epic Tsushima, based on his personal experiences on board the battleship Orel as well as on testimonies of fellow sailors and government archives. The first part was published in 1932, the second in 1935, and the whole novel was later awarded the Stalin Prize. It describes the heroism of Russian sailors and certain officers whose defeat, in accordance with the new Soviet thinking, was due to the criminal negligence of the Imperial Naval command. A German novel by Frank Thiess, originally published as Tsushima in 1936 (and later translated as The Voyage of Forgotten Men), covered the same journey round the world to defeat.
Later there appeared a first-hand account of the siege of Port Arthur by Alexander Stepanov (1892–1965). He had been present there as the 12-year-old son of a battery commander and his novel, Port Arthur: a historical narrative (1944), is based on his own diaries and his father's notes. The work is considered one of the best historical novels of the Soviet period. A later novel in which the war appears is Valentin Pikul’s The Three Ages of Okini-San (1981). Centred on the life of Vladimir Kokovtsov, who rose through the ranks to admiral of the Russian fleet, it covers the period from the Russo-Japanese War through to the February and October Revolutions. A much later Russian genre novel uses the period of the war as background. This is Boris Akunin’s The Diamond Vehicle (2003), in the first part of which the detective Erast Fandorin is charged with protecting the Trans-Siberian Railway from Japanese sabotage.
The main historical novel dealing with the war from the Japanese side is Shiba Ryotaro’s immense Clouds above the hill, published serially in several volumes between 1968-72. The closely researched story spans the decade from the Sino-Chinese War to the Russo-Japanese War and went on to become the nation’s favourite book.
See also film list about Russo-Japanese war
- Port Arthur (1936)
- Kreiser Varyag (1946)
- Nichiro sensô shôri no hishi: Tekichû ôdan sanbyaku-ri (1957)
- Meiji tennô to nichiro daisenso (1958)
- The Battle of the Japan Sea (1969, 佐藤 勝: 日本海大海戦, Nihonkai-Kaisen) depicts the naval battles of the war, the attacks on the Port Arthur highlands, and the subterfuge and diplomacy of Japanese agents in Sweden. Admiral Togo is portrayed by Toshiro Mifune.
- The Battle of Tsushima (1975) [documentary], depiction of the naval Battle of Tsushima
- The Battle of Port Arthur (1980, sometimes referred as 203 Kochi) depiction of the Siege of Port Arthur
- Nihonkai daikaisen: Umi yukaba (1983)
- Reilly, Ace of Spies (1983). Russian-born British spy Sidney Reilly's role in providing intelligence that allowed the Japanese surprise attack that started the Siege of Port Arthur is dramatised in the second episode of this TV series
- Bogatstvo (2004)
- Saka no ue no kumo (2009)
- Kentaro Kaneko
- Baron Rosen
- Imperialism in Asia
- Liancourt Rocks
- List of wars
- List of warships sunk during the Russo-Japanese War
- Russian Imperialism in Asia and the Russo-Japanese War
- Sergius Witte
- "Montenegro, Japan to declare truce," United Press International (US); "Montenegro, Japan End 100 Years' War," History News Network (US). citing World Peace Herald, 16 June 2006; Montenegrina, digitalna biblioteka crnogorske kulture (Montegreina, digital library of Montenegrin culture), Istorija: Đuro Batrićević, citing Batrićević, Đuro. (1996). Crnogorci u rusko-japanskom ratu (Montegegrans in the Russo-Japanese War); compare Dr Anto Gvozdenović: general u tri vojske. Crnogorci u rusko-japanskom ratu (Dr. Anto Gvozdenovic: General in Three Armies; Montegegrans in the Russo-Japanese War)
- Samuel Dumas, Losses of Life Caused By War (1923)
- Erols.com, Twentieth Century Atlas – Death Tolls and Casualty Statistics for Wars, Dictatorships and Genocides.
- John Steinburg, Was the Russo-Japanese Conflict World War Zero?. p. 2.
- Rewriting the Russo-Japanese War: A Centenary Perspective, Schimmelpenninick van der Oye, p. 80.
- University of Texas: Growth of colonial empires in Asia
- Connaughton, pp. 19-20
- Paine, p. 317
- Example of Australian uniform of the period
- Connaughton, pp. 7–8.
- Paine, p. 320.
- Text in Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Correspondence Regarding Negotiations ... (1903–1904) pp. 7–9.
- Text in Correspondence Regarding Negotiations ... (1903–1904) pp. 23–24.
- Koda, Yoji (1 April 2005). "The Russo-Japanese War: Primary Causes of Japanese Success". Naval War College Review. Retrieved 6 April 2015 – via HighBeam. (subscription required (. ))
- Connaughton, p. 10.
- Raymond Esthus, “Nicholas II and the Russo-Japanese War,” Russian Review vol. 40, No. 4 (Oct., 1981), Accessed on 13 May 2014. http://www.jstor.org/stable/129919 , p. 411.
- Robert W. Tolf (1976). The Russian Rockfellers. Hoover Press. p. 156. ISBN 0-8179-6583-1.
- Esthus, p. 397.
- Text in Correspondence Regarding Negotiations ... (1903–1904) p. 38.
- David Schmmelpenninck van der Oye, "The Immediate Origins of the War", in David Wolff et al. (eds), The Russo-Japanese War in Global Perspective: World War Zero (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2005), 42.
- Jukes, The Russo-Japanese War, p. 21.
- Some scholarly researchers credit Enjiro Yamaza with drafting the text of the Japanese declaration of war – see Naval Postgraduate School (US) thesis: Na, Sang Hyung. "The Korean-Japanese Dispute over Dokdo/Takeshima," p. 62 n207 December 2007, citing Byang-Ryull Kim. (2006). Ilbon Gunbu'ui Dokdo Chim Talsa (The Plunder of Dokdo by the Japanese Military), p. 121.
- “Spring Rice to Robert H. M. Ferguson,” in Stephen Gwynn, The Letters, (March 2, 1904). and Friendships of Sir Cecil Spring Rice: A Record, 2 vols. (Boston, 1929), p. 402.
- Connaughton, p. 34.
- Yale University: Laws of War: Opening of Hostilities (Hague III); October 18, 1907, Avalon Project at Yale Law School.
- Grant, p. 12, 15, 17, 42
- Shaw, Albert (March 1904). "The Progress of the World – Japan's Swift Action". The American Monthly Review of Reviews (New York: The Review of Reviews Company) 29 (3): 260
- Grant, p. 48–50
- Connaughton, p. 65
- Connaughton, p. 86
- Forczyk p. 50
- Forczyk p. 53
- The Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser (1884–1942), 8 April 1905, Page 2, http://newspapers.nl.sg/Digitised/Article/singfreepressb19050408-1.2.6.aspx
- The Straits Times, 8 April 1905, Page 4, http://newspapers.nl.sg/Digitised/Article/straitstimes19050408-1.2.32.aspx
- Japan at War - An Encyclopedia, Louis G. Perez, editor; Santa Barbara, California, 2013, p. 345.
- Watts p. 22
- Mahan p. 455
- Mahan p. 456
- Connaughton, p. 109,342
- Connaughton, p. 272; "Text of Treaty; Signed by the Emperor of Japan and Czar of Russia," New York Times. 17 October 1905.
- Cox, Gary P. (2006). "Review of The Russo-Japanese War in Global Perspective: World War Zero". Journal of Military History 70 (1): 250–251. doi:10.1353/jmh.2006.0037.
- http://www.taiwandocuments.org/sanfrancisco01.htm , Chapter 2 Section C
- Eugene P. Trani, The Treaty of Portsmouth: An Adventure in American Diplomacy (1969).
- George E. Mowry, "The First Roosevelt," The American Mercury, (November 1946) quote at p 580 online
- Twentieth Century Atlas – Death Tolls and Casualty Statistics for Wars, Dictatorships and Genocides
- Schimmelpenninck van der Oye, p. 86.
- Abraham Ascher, The Revolution of 1905: Russia in Disarray, Stanford University Press, 1994, ISBN 0-8047-2327-3, Google Print, p.157–158
- For Polish–Japanese negotiations and relations during the war, see:Bert Edström, The Japanese and Europe: Images and Perceptions, Routledge, 2000, ISBN 1-873410-86-7, pp.126–133
Jerzy Lerski, "A Polish Chapter of the Russo-Japanese War", Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan, III/7 p. 69–96
- Warner, p. 575-76
- "Japan's Present Crisis and Her Constitution; The Mikado's Ministers Will Be Held Responsible by the People for the Peace Treaty – Marquis Ito May Be Able to Save Baron Komura," New York Times. 3 September 1905.
- Connaughton, p. 342
- Schimmelpenninck van der Oye, p. 86
- Steinburg, p. 7.
- Schimmelpenninck van der Oye, p. 84.
- Steinburg, p. 6.
- Steinburg, p. 3.
- Schimmelpenninck van der Oye, p. 83.
- Eishiro Ito, “United States of Asia, James Joyce and Japan”, in A Companion to James Joyce, Blackwell Publishing 2013, pp.195-6
- David Crowley, “Seeing Japan, Imagining Poland: Polish art and the Russo-Japanese war”, Faktografia July 4, 2012
- Le Socialiste, 1-8 May 1904
- Sondhaus, Lawrence, Naval Warfare, 1815–1914, p. 192
- Strachan, p. 844.
- Keegan p. 179, 229, 230
- Strachan, p. 384.
- Strachan, p. 386.
- Strachan, p. 388.
- Lyman, Stanford M. (Summer 2000). "The "Yellow Peril" Mystique: Origins and Vicissitudes of a Racist Discourse". International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society (Springer Publishing) 13 (4): 699. ISSN 0891-4486 – via JSTOR. (subscription required (. ))
- Heale, M. J. (April 2009). "Anatomy of a Scare: Yellow Peril Politics in America, 1980–1993". Journal of American Studies (Cambridge University Press on behalf of the British Association for American Studies) 43 (1): 21. ISSN 1469-5154 – via JSTOR. (subscription required (. ))
- Sisemore, James D. (2003). CDMhost.com, "The Russo-Japanese War, Lessons Not Learned." U.S. Army Command and General Staff College.
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- Chapman, John W.M. "Russia, Germany and the Anglo-Japanese Intelligence Collaboration, 1896–1906" pages 41–55 from Russia War, Peace and Diplomacy edited by Mark & Ljubica Erickson, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2004 page 55.
- Chapman, John W.M. "Russia, Germany and the Anglo-Japanese Intelligence Collaboration, 1896–1906" pages 41–55 from Russia War, Peace and Diplomacy edited by Mark & Ljubica Erickson, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2004. p. 54.
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- Sherman, A. J."German-Jewish Bankers in World Politics, The Financing of the Russo-Japanese War" Leo Baeck Institute Yearbook(1983) 28(1): 59–73 doi:10.1093/leobaeck/28.1.59
- "British Assistance to the Japanese Navy during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5". The Great Circle (Australian Association for Maritime History) 2 (1): 44. April 1980. Retrieved 9 March 2015 – via JSTOR. (registration required (. ))
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- John W. Dower, 2010
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- Dower, "Yellow Promise/ Yellow Peril"
- "State Historical Museum Opens 'The Year 1812 in the Paintings by Vasily Vereshchagin'," Art Daily, March 11, 2010; "War Lasted 18 Months ... Russian Miscalculation," New York Times, August 30, 1905.
- Wikiart and Wikiart
- Chuliengcheng. In a glorious death eternal life, Wikimedia
- Words at Armchair General; a performance on YouTube
- Editions Orphée
- There is a translation at Mudcat and a performance on YouTube
- The words and a description of the naval action is at Armchair General; there is a performance on YouTube
- War Poets Association
- Intersections issue 4
- See Janine Beichman’s 2006 lecture to the Asiatic Society of Japan
- Takashi Fujitani, Splendid Monarchy: Power and Pageantry in Modern Japan, University of California 1996, p.126
- Internet Archive
- Selected Writings of Blaise Cendrars, New Directions 1966, p,93
- David Wheatley gives an account in his article for The London Review of Books, 21 June 2001, pp.40-41
- E.F. and R. Bleiler, Science Fiction: The Early Years, Kent State University 1990, p.308
- ”The Russo-Japanese War and Boys Own Adventure Stories”, The Russo-Japanese War Research Society 2003
- Hathi Trust
- Internet Archive
- Details in the Russian 1978 edition, 'About Author' section
- Translated in 2013, introduction and excerpts on Google Books
- Hiroaki Sato, The Japan Times, 27 July 2013
- The Battle of Port Arthur (203 Koshi) in the Internet Movie Database
- Chapman, John W. M. (2004). "Russia, Germany and the Anglo-Japanese Intelligence Collaboration, 1896–1906". In Erickson, Mark; Erickson, Ljubica. Russia War, Peace and Diplomacy. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson. pp. 41–55. ISBN 0-297-84913-1.
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- Dower, John W., Throwing off Asia III, Woodblock prints of the Russo-Japanese War, 2008, MIT Visualizing Cultures
- Dower, John W., “Yellow Promise/Yellow Peril”, Foreign postcards of the Russo-Japanese War, 2008, MIT Visualizing Cultures
- Dower, John W., “Asia Rising, Japanese postcards of the Russo-Japanese War”, 2010, MIT Visualizing Cultures
- Forczyk, Robert (2009). Russian Battleship vs Japanese Battleship, Yellow Sea 1904–05. Osprey. ISBN 978-1-84603-330-8.
- Grant, R. Captain (1907). Before Port Arthur in a Destroyer; The Personal Diary of a Japanese Naval Officer. London: John Murray. First and second editions published in 1907.
- Keegan, John (1999). The First World War. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. ISBN 0-375-40052-4.
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- Olender, Piotr (2010). Russo-Japanese Naval War 1904–1905, Vol. 2, Battle of Tsushima. Sandomierz, Poland: Stratus s.c. ISBN 978-83-61421-02-3.
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- Simpson, Richard (2001). Building The Mosquito Fleet, The US Navy's First Torpedo Boats. South Carolina: Arcadia Publishing. ISBN 0-7385-0508-0.
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- Watts, Anthony J. (1990). The Imperial Russian Navy. London, Great Britain: Arms and Armour Press. ISBN 0-85368-912-1.
- Corbett, Sir Julian. Maritime Operations In The Russo-Japanese War 1904–1905. (1994) Originally classified, and in two volumes, ISBN 1-55750-129-7.
- Bay, Alexander. Beriberi in Modern Japan: The Making of a National Disease. University of Rochester Press (2012). ISBN 978-1-58046-427-7
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- Jukes, Geoffry. The Russo-Japanese War 1904–1905. Osprey Essential Histories. (2002). ISBN 978-1-84176-446-7.
- Kowner, Rotem (2006). Historical Dictionary of the Russo-Japanese War. Scarecrow. ISBN 0-8108-4927-5.
- Kowner, Rotem (2007). The Impact of the Russo-Japanese War. Routledge. ISBN 0-4155-4582X.
- Matsumura Masayoshi, Ian Ruxton (trans.), Baron Kaneko and the Russo-Japanese War (1904–05), Lulu Press 2009 ISBN 978-0-557-11751-2
- Morris, Edmund (2002). Theodore Rex, Books.Gooble.com. New York: Random House. 10-ISBN 0-8129-6600-7; 13-ISBN 978-0-8129-6600-8
- Novikov-Priboy, Aleksei. Tsushima. (An account from a seaman aboard the battleship Oryol, which was captured at Tsushima). London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. (1936).
- Nish, Ian Hill. (1985). The Origins of the Russo-Japanese War. London: Longman. 10-ISBN 0-582-49114-2; 13-ISBN 978-0-582-49114-4
- Okamoto, Shumpei (1970). The Japanese Oligarchy and the Russo-Japanese War. Columbia University Press.
- Pleshakov, Constantine. The Tsar's Last Armada: The Epic Voyage to the Battle of Tsushima. ISBN 0-465-05792-6. (2002).
- Saaler, Sven und Inaba Chiharu (Hg.). Der Russisch-Japanische Krieg 1904/05 im Spiegel deutscher Bilderbogen, Deutsches Institut für Japanstudien Tokyo, (2005).
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- Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Correspondence Regarding the Negotiations between Japan and Russia (1903–1904), Presented to the Imperial Diet, March 1904 (Tokyo, 1904)
|Wikimedia Commons has media related to Russo-Japanese War.|
|Wikisource has the text of the 1911 Encyclopædia Britannica article Russo-Japanese War.|
- RussoJapaneseWar.com, Russo-Japanese War research society.
- BFcollection.net, Database of Russian Army Jewish soldiers injured, killed, or missing in action from the war.
- BYU.edu, Text of the Treaty of Portsmouth:.
- Flot.com, Russian Navy history of war.
- Frontiers.loc.gov, Russo-Japanese Relations in the Far East. Meeting of Frontiers (Library of Congress)
- CSmonitor.com, Treaty of Portsmouth now seen as global turning point from the Christian Science Monitor, by Robert Marquand, 30 December 2005.
- "Russo-Japanese War, The". The New Student's Reference Work. 1914.
- Montenigrina.net, Montenegrins in the Russo-Japanese War (Montenegrin).
- Stanford.edu, Lyrics, translation and melody of the song "On the hills of Manchuria" (Na sopkah Manchzhurii).
- Google Map with battles of Russo-Japanese War and other important events.