Human skulls at the Nyamata Genocide Memorial
|Date||7 April – 15 July 1994|
|Genocide, mass murder|
|Perpetrators||Hutu-led government, Interahamwe and Impuzamugambi militias|
The Rwandan genocide, known officially in Rwanda as the genocide against the Tutsi, was a genocidal mass slaughter of Tutsi and moderate Hutu in Rwanda by members of the Hutu majority government. An estimated 500,000–1,000,000 Rwandans were killed during the 100-day period from April 7 to mid-July 1994, constituting as many as 70% of the Tutsi and 20% of Rwanda's total population. The genocide was planned by members of the core political elite, many of whom occupied positions at top levels of the national government. Perpetrators came from the ranks of the Rwandan army, the Gendarmerie, government-backed militias including the Interahamwe and Impuzamugambi, as well as countless ordinary civilians.
The genocide took place in the context of the Rwandan Civil War, an ongoing conflict beginning in 1990 between the Hutu-led government and the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), which was largely composed of Tutsi refugees whose families had fled to Uganda following earlier waves of Hutu violence against the Tutsi. International pressure on the Hutu-led government of Juvénal Habyarimana resulted in a ceasefire in 1993, with a roadmap to implement the Arusha Accords that would create a power-sharing government with the RPF. This agreement displeased many conservative Hutu, including members of the Akazu, who viewed it as conceding to enemy demands. Among the broader Hutu populace, the RPF military campaign had also intensified support for the so-called "Hutu Power" ideology, which portrayed the RPF as an alien force intent on reinstating the Tutsi monarchy and enslaving Hutus, a prospect met with extreme opposition.
On April 6, 1994, an airplane carrying Habyarimana and Burundian president Cyprien Ntaryamira was shot down on its descent into Kigali, killing all on board and injuring one who received fatal wounds and died later en-route to the hospital.
Genocidal killings began the following day; soldiers, police, and militia quickly executed key Tutsi and moderate Hutu leaders, then erected checkpoints and barricades and used Rwandans' national identity cards to systematically kill Tutsi. These forces recruited or pressured Hutu civilians to arm themselves with machetes, clubs, blunt objects, and other weapons to rape, maim, and kill their Tutsi neighbors and to destroy or steal their property. The breach of the peace agreement led the RPF to restart its offensive and rapidly seize control of the northern part of the country before capturing Kigali in mid-July, bringing an end to the genocide. During these events and in their aftermath, the United Nations (UN) and countries including the United States, the United Kingdom, and Belgium were criticized for their inaction, including failure to strengthen the force and mandate of the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) peacekeepers, while observers criticized the government of France for alleged support of the Hutu-led government after the genocide had begun.
The genocide had a lasting and profound impact on Rwanda and its neighboring countries. The pervasive use of war rape caused a spike in HIV infection, including babies born of rape to newly infected mothers; many households were headed by orphaned children or widows. The destruction of infrastructure and the severe depopulation of the country crippled the economy, challenging the nascent government to achieve rapid economic growth and stabilization. The RPF military victory and installation of an RPF-dominated government prompted many Hutus to flee to neighboring countries, particularly in the eastern portion of Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo), where the Hutu genocidaires began to regroup in refugee camps along the border with Rwanda. Declaring a need to avert further genocide, the RPF-led government led military incursions into Zaire, including the First (1996–97) and Second (1998–2003) Congo Wars. Armed struggles between the Rwandan government and their opponents in DRC have continued to play out through proxy militias in the Goma region, including the M23 rebellion (2003–2013). Large Rwandan Hutu and Tutsi populations continue to live as refugees throughout the region.
Today, Rwanda has two public holidays mourning the genocide. The national mourning period begins with Kwibuka, the national commemoration, on April 7 and concludes with Liberation Day on July 4. The week following April 7 is an official week of mourning, known as Icyunamo. The genocide served as an impetus for creating the International Criminal Court to eliminate the need for ad hoc tribunals to prosecute genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes.
- 1 Background
- 2 Prelude
- 3 Genocide
- 4 Rwandan Patriotic Front military campaign and victory
- 5 International involvement
- 6 Aftermath
- 7 Media and popular culture
- 8 Revisionist accounts
- 9 See also
- 10 Notes
- 11 References
- 12 External links
Pre-colonial kingdoms and origins of Hutu, Tutsi and Twa
The earliest inhabitants of what is now Rwanda were the Twa, a group of aboriginal pygmy hunter-gatherers who settled in the area between 8000 BC and 3000 BC and remain in Rwanda today. Between 700 BC and 1500 AD, a number of Bantu groups migrated into Rwanda, and began to clear forest land as a way to gain wood for housing and space for their farming/living area's. Historians have several theories regarding the nature of the Bantu migrations: one theory is that the first settlers were Hutu, while the Tutsi migrated later and formed a distinct racial group, possibly of Cushitic origin. An alternative theory is that the migration was slow and steady from neighboring regions, with incoming groups bearing high genetic similarity to the established ones and integrating into rather than conquering the existing society. Under this theory, the Hutu and Tutsi distinction arose later and was not a racial one, but principally a class or caste distinction in which the Tutsi herded cattle while the Hutu farmed the land. It is worthwhile to mention that the word Tutsi was originally used to describe the status of "a person rich in cattle’", and later progressed to become "the term that referred to the elite group as a whole’". The Hutu, Tutsi and Twa of Rwanda share a common language and are collectively known as the Banyarwanda.
The population coalesced, first into clans (ubwoko), and then, by 1700, into around eight kingdoms. One of the kingdoms, the Kingdom of Rwanda, ruled by the Tutsi Nyiginya clan, became increasingly dominant from the mid-eighteenth century and expanded through a process of conquest and assimilation, achieving its greatest extent under the reign of King Kigeli Rwabugiri. Rwabugiri expanded the kingdom west and north and initiated administrative reforms; these included ubuhake, in which Tutsi patrons ceded cattle, and therefore privileged status, to Hutu or Tutsi clients in exchange for economic and personal service, and uburetwa, a corvée system in which Hutu were forced to work for Tutsi chiefs. Rwabugiri's changes deepened the socio-economic and power divisions between the Hutu and Tutsi.
The Berlin Conference of 1884 assigned the territory to Germany and began a policy of ruling through the Rwandan monarchy; this system had the added benefit of enabling colonization with small European troop numbers. European colonists, convinced the Tutsi had migrated to Rwanda from Ethiopia, believed the Tutsi were more Caucasian than the Hutu and were therefore racially superior and better suited to carry out colonial administrative tasks. King Yuhi V Musinga welcomed the Germans, whom he used to strengthen his rule. Belgian forces took control of Rwanda and Burundi during World War I, and the country was formally passed to Belgian control by a League of Nations mandate in 1919.
The Belgians initially continued the German style of governing through the monarchy, but from 1926 began a policy of more direct colonial rule in line with the system used in the Belgian Congo. They simplified the chieftaincy system, reducing its numbers and concentrating it in the hands of Tutsi, extended the scale and scope of uburetwa, and oversaw a land reform process by the Tutsi chiefs, in which grazing areas traditionally under the control of Hutu collectives were seized and privatised, with minimal compensation. In the 1930s, the Belgians introduced large-scale projects in education, health, public works, and agricultural supervision. The country was thus modernised but Tutsi supremacy remained, leaving the Hutu disenfranchised and subject to large scale forced labour. In 1935, Belgium introduced identity cards labelling each individual as Tutsi, Hutu, Twa or Naturalised. While it had previously been possible for particularly wealthy Hutu to become honorary Tutsi, the identity cards prevented any further movement between classes. The Catholic Church became increasingly important in Rwanda, as the Belgian government relied on the clergy's local knowledge; many Rwandans became Catholics as a means of social advancement.
Revolution and Hutu-Tutsi relations after independence
After World War II, a Hutu emancipation movement began to grow in Rwanda, fuelled by increasing resentment of the inter-war social reforms, and also an increasing sympathy for the Hutu within the Catholic Church. Catholic missionaries increasingly viewed themselves as responsible for empowering the underprivileged Hutu rather than the Tutsi elite, leading rapidly to the formation of a sizeable Hutu clergy and educated elite that provided a new counterbalance to the established political order. The monarchy and prominent Tutsi sensed the growing influence of the Hutu and began to agitate for immediate independence on their own terms. In 1957, a group of Hutu scholars wrote the "Bahutu Manifesto". This was the first document to label the Tutsi and Hutu as separate races, and called for the transfer of power from Tutsi to Hutu based on what it termed "statistical law".
On 1 November 1959, a Hutu sub-chief, Dominique Mbonyumutwa, was attacked in Kigali by supporters of the pro-Tutsi party. Mbonyumutwa survived, but rumours began spreading that he had been killed. Hutu activists responded by killing Tutsi, both the elite and ordinary civilians, marking the beginning of the Rwandan Revolution. The Tutsi responded with attacks of their own, but by this stage the Hutu had full backing from the Belgian administration who wanted to overturn the Tutsi domination. In early 1960, the Belgians replaced most Tutsi chiefs with Hutu and organised mid-year commune elections which returned an overwhelming Hutu majority. The king was deposed, a Hutu dominated republic created, and the country became independent in 1962.
As the revolution progressed, Tutsi began leaving the country to escape the Hutu purges, settling in the four neighbouring countries Burundi, Uganda, Tanzania and Zaire. These exiles, unlike the Banyarwanda who migrated during the pre-colonial and colonial era, were regarded as refugees in their host countries, and began almost immediately to agitate for a return to Rwanda. They formed armed groups, known as inyenzi (cockroaches), who launched attacks into Rwanda; these were largely unsuccessful, and led to further reprisal killings of Tutsi and further Tutsi exiles. By 1964, more than 300,000 Tutsi had fled, and were forced to remain in exile for the next three decades. Pro-Hutu discrimination continued in Rwanda itself, although the indiscriminate violence against the Tutsi did reduce somewhat following a coup in 1973, which brought President Juvenal Habyarimana to power.
At 408 inhabitants per square kilometre (1,060/sq mi), Rwanda's population density is among the highest in Africa. Rwanda's population had increased from 1.6 million people in 1934 to 7.1 million in 1989, leading to competition for land. Historians such as Gérard Prunier believe that the 1994 genocide can be partly attributed to population density.
Rwandan Civil War
In the 1980s, a group of 500 Rwandan refugees in Uganda, led by Fred Rwigyema, fought with the rebel National Resistance Army (NRA) in the Ugandan Bush War, which saw Yoweri Museveni overthrow Milton Obote. These soldiers remained in the Ugandan army following Museveni's inauguration as Ugandan president, but simultaneously began planning an invasion of Rwanda through a covert network within the army's ranks. In October 1990, Rwigyema led a force of over 4,000 rebels from Uganda, advancing 60 km (37 mi) into Rwanda under the banner of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). Rwigyema was killed on the third day of the attack, and France and Zaire deployed forces in support of the Rwandan army, allowing them to repel the invasion. Rwigyema's deputy, Paul Kagame took command of the RPF forces, organising a tactical retreat through Uganda to the Virunga Mountains, a rugged area of northern Rwanda. From there, he rearmed and reorganised the army, and carried out fundraising and recruitment from the Tutsi diaspora.
Kagame restarted the war in January 1991, with a surprise attack on the northern town of Ruhengeri. The RPF captured the town, benefiting from the element of surprise, and held it for one day before retreating to the forests. For the next year, the RPF waged a hit-and-run style guerrilla war, capturing some border areas but not making significant gains against the Rwandan army. In June 1992, following the formation of a multiparty coalition government in Kigali, the RPF announced a ceasefire and began negotiations with the Rwandan government in Arusha, Tanzania. In early 1993, several extremist Hutu groups formed and began campaigns of large scale violence against the Tutsi. The RPF responded by suspending peace talks and launching a major attack, gaining a large swathe of land across the north of the country. Peace negotiations eventually resumed in Arusha; the resulting set of agreements, known as the Arusha Accords, were signed in August 1993 and gave the RPF positions in a Broad-Based Transitional Government (BBTG) and in the national army. The United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), a peacekeeping force, arrived in the country and the RPF were given a base in the national parliament building in Kigali, for use during the setting up of the BBTG.
Hutu Power movement
In the early years of Habyarimana's regime, there was greater economic prosperity and reduced violence against Tutsi. Many hardline anti-Tutsi figures remained, however, including the family of the first lady Agathe Habyarimana, who were known as the akazu or clan de Madame, and the president relied on them to maintain his regime. When the RPF invaded in 1990, Habyarimana and the hardliners exploited the fear of the population to advance an anti-Tutsi agenda which became known as Hutu Power. A group of military officers and government members founded a magazine called Kangura, which became popular throughout the country. This published anti-Tutsi propaganda, including the Hutu Ten Commandments, an explicit set of racist guidelines, including labelling Hutu who married Tutsi as "traitors". In 1992, the hardliners created the Coalition for the Defence of the Republic (CDR) party, which was linked to the ruling party but more right wing, and promoted an agenda critical of the president's alleged "softness" with the RPF.
Following the 1992 ceasefire agreement, a number of the extremists in the Rwandan government and army began actively plotting against the president, worried about the possibility of Tutsi being included in government. Habyarimana attempted to remove the hardliners from senior army positions, but was only partially successful; akazu affiliates Augustin Ndindiliyimana and Theoneste Bagosora remained in powerful posts, providing the hardline family with a link to power. Throughout 1992, the hardliners carried out campaigns of localised killings of Tutsi, culminating in January 1993, in which extremists and local Hutu murdered around 300 people. When the RPF resumed hostilities in February 1993, it cited these killings as the primary motive, but its effect was to increase support for the extremists amongst the Hutu population.
From mid-1993, the Hutu Power movement represented a third major force in Rwandan politics, in addition to Habyarimana's government and the traditional moderate opposition. Apart from the CDR, there was no party that was exclusively part of the Power movement. Instead, almost every party was split into "moderate" and "Power" wings, with members of both camps claiming to represent the legitimate leadership of that party. Even the ruling party contained a Power wing, consisting of those who opposed Habyarimana's intention to sign a peace deal. Several radical youth militia groups emerged, attached to the Power wings of the parties; these included the Interahamwe, which was attached to the ruling party, and the CDR's Impuzamugambi. The youth militia began actively carrying out massacres across the country. The army trained the militias, sometimes in conjunction with the French, who were unaware of their true purpose.
Preparation for genocide
Historians do not agree on the precise date on which the idea of a "final solution" to kill every Tutsi in Rwanda was first mooted. Gerard Prunier dates it to 1992, when Habyarimana began negotiating with the RPF, while journalist Linda Melvern dates it to 1990, following the initial RPF invasion. The army began arming civilians with weapons such as machetes from 1990, and training the Hutu youth in combat, officially as a programme of "civil defence" to the RPF threat, but these weapons were later used in carrying out the genocide. Rwanda also purchased large numbers of grenades and munitions from late 1990; in one deal, future UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, in his role as Egyptian foreign minister, facilitated a large sale of arms from Egypt. The Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR) expanded rapidly at this time, growing from less than 10,000 troops to almost 30,000 in one year. The new recruits were often poorly disciplined; a divide grew between the elite Presidential Guard and Gendarmerie units, who were well trained and battle ready, and the ordinary rank and file.
In March 1993, the Hutu Power began compiling lists of "traitors" whom they planned to kill, and it is possible that Habyarimana's name was on these lists; the CDR were publicly accusing the president of treason. The Power groups also believed that the national radio station, Radio Rwanda, had become too liberal and supportive of the opposition; they founded a new radio station, Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (RTLMC), which broadcast racist propaganda, obscene jokes and music, becoming very popular throughout the country. One study finds that approximately 10% of the overall violence during the Rwandan genocide can be attributed to this new radio station. During 1993, the hardliners imported machetes on a scale far larger than that required for agriculture, as well as other tools which could be used as weapons, such as razor blades, saws and scissors. These tools were distributed around the country, ostensibly as part of the civil defence network.
In October 1993, the President of Burundi, Melchior Ndadaye, who had been elected in June as the country's first ever Hutu president, was assassinated by extremist Tutsi army officers. The assassination caused shockwaves, reinforcing the notion among Hutus that the Tutsi were their enemy and could not be trusted. The CDR and the Power wings of the other parties realised they could use this situation to their advantage. The idea of a "final solution," which had first been suggested in 1992 but had remained a fringe viewpoint, was now top of their agenda, and they began actively planning it. They were confident of persuading the Hutu population to carry out killings, given the public anger at Ndadaye's murder, as well as RTLM propaganda and the traditional obedience of Rwandans to authority. The Power leaders began arming the interahamwe and other militia groups with AK-47s and other weapons; previously, they had possessed only machetes and traditional hand weapons.
On January 11, 1994, General Romeo Dallaire, commander of UNAMIR, sent his "Genocide Fax" to UN Headquarters. The fax stated that Dallaire was in contact with a high level informant who told him of plans to distribute weapons to Hutu militias to kill Belgian members of UNAMIR in order to guarantee Belgian withdrawal. The informant, a local politician, had been ordered to register all Tutsis in Kigali with an example that they could kill up to 1,000 Tutsis in 20 minutes, leading to the extermination of the Tutsis. Dallaire requested permission for the protection of the informant and his family. Kofi Annan repeatedly forbade the operation until guidance was received from headquarters. He did so even as the genocide had started, despite having the authority for approval. His reason for not doing so was Article 2(4) of the Charter, although the intervention would have been by the UN itself, not a member state. The UNAMIR force was established by Resolution 872 on October 5, 1993 with the consent of both parties to the civil war. Thomas Pogge argues that UNAMIR could not have been charged with intervening because both sides requested and consented to it and it was authorized by the UN Security Council.
Assassination of Habyarimana
On April 6, 1994, the airplane carrying Rwandan President Juvénal Habyarimana and Cyprien Ntaryamira, the Hutu president of Burundi, was shot down as it prepared to land in Kigali, killing everyone on board. Responsibility for the attack was disputed, with both the RPF and Hutu extremists being blamed. A later investigation by the Rwandan government blamed Hutu extremists in the Rwandan army. In January 2012, a French investigation confirmed that the missile fire which brought down the plane "could not have come from a military base occupied by Kagame's [Tutsi] supporters." Despite disagreements about the perpetrators, many observers believe the attack and deaths of the two Hutu presidents served as the catalyst for the genocide.
Following Habyarimana's death, on the evening of 6 April, a crisis committee was formed; it consisted of Major General Augustin Ndindiliyimana, Colonel Theoneste Bagosora, and a number of other senior army staff officers. The committee was headed by Bagosora, despite the presence of the more senior Ndindiliyimana. Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana was legally next in the line of political succession, but the committee refused to recognise her authority. Dallaire met with the committee that night and insisted that Uwilingiyimana be placed in charge, but Bagosora refused, saying Uwilingiyimana did not "enjoy the confidence of the Rwandan people" and was "incapable of governing the nation." The committee also justified its existence as being essential to avoid uncertainty following the president's death. Bagosora sought to convince UNAMIR and the RPF that the committee was acting to contain the Presidential Guard, which he described as "out of control", and that it would abide by the Arusha agreement.
Killing of moderate leaders
UNAMIR sent an escort of ten Belgian soldiers to Prime Minister Uwilingiyimana, with the intention of transporting her to the Radio Rwanda offices to address the nation. This plan was cancelled because the Presidential Guard took over the radio station shortly afterwards and would not permit Uwilingiyimana to speak on air. Later in the morning, a number of soldiers and a crowd of civilians overwhelmed the Belgians guarding Uwilingiyimana, forcing them to surrender their weapons. Uwilingiyimana and her husband were killed, although their children survived by hiding behind furniture and were rescued by Senegalese UNAMIR officer Mbaye Diagne. The ten Belgians were taken to the Camp Kigali military base, where they were tortured and killed. Major Bernard Ntuyahaga, the commanding officer of the Presidential Guard unit which carried out the murders, was sentenced to 20 years imprisonment by a court in Belgium in 2007.
In addition to assassinating Uwilingiyimana, the extremists spent the night of 6–7 April moving around the houses of Kigali with lists of prominent moderate politicians and journalists, on a mission to kill them. Fatalities that evening included President of the Constitutional Court Joseph Kavaruganda, Minister of Agriculture Frederic Nzamurambaho, Parti Liberal leader Landwald Ndasingwa and his Canadian wife, and chief Arusha negotiator Boniface Ngulinzira. A few moderates survived, including prime minister-delegate Faustin Twagiramungu, but the plot was largely successful. According to Dallaire, "by noon on April 7 the moderate political leadership of Rwanda was dead or in hiding, the potential for a future moderate government utterly lost." The only exception to this was the new army chief of staff, Marcel Gatsinzi; Bagosora's preferred candidate Augustin Bizimungu was rejected by the crisis committee, forcing Bagosora to agree to Gatsinzi's appointment. Gatsinzi attempted to keep the army out of the genocide, and to negotiate a ceasefire with the RPF, but he had only limited control over his troops and was replaced by the hardline Bizimungu after just ten days.
The genocide itself, the large scale killing of Tutsi on the grounds of ethnicity, began within a few hours of Habyarimana's death. Military leaders in Gisenyi province, the heartland of the akazu, were initially the most organised, convening a large gathering of interahamwe and civilian Hutu; the commanders announced the president's death, blaming the RPF, and then ordered the crowd to "begin your work" and to "spare no one", including babies. The killing spread to Ruhengeri, Kibuye, Kigali, Kibungo, Gikongoro and Cyangugu provinces on 7 April; in each case, local officials, responding to orders from Kigali, spread rumours that the RPF had killed the president, followed by a command to kill Tutsi. The Hutu population, which had been prepared and armed during the preceding months, and maintained the Rwandan tradition of obedience to authority, carried out the orders without question. There were few killings in the provinces of Gitarama and Butare during the early phase, as the governors of those areas were moderates opposed to the violence; the genocide began in Gitarama on 9 April, and in Butare on 19 April, following the arrest and murder of Tutsi governor Jean Baptiste Habyarimana. The genocide did not affect areas already under RPF control, including parts of Byumba province and eastern Ruhengeri.
During the remainder of April and early May, the Presidential Guard, gendarmerie and the youth militia, aided by local populations, continued killing at a very high rate. Gerard Prunier estimates that during the first six weeks, up to 800,000 Rwandans may have been murdered, representing a rate five times higher than during the Holocaust of Nazi Germany. The goal was to kill every Tutsi living in Rwanda and, with the exception of the advancing RPF army, there was no opposition force to prevent or slow the killings: the domestic opposition had already been eliminated, while UNAMIR were expressly forbidden to use force except in self-defence. In rural areas, where Tutsi and Hutu lived side by side and families knew each other, it was easy for Hutu to identify and target their Tutsi neighbours. In urban areas, where residents were more anonymous, identification was facilitated using road blocks manned by military and interahamwe; each person passing the road block was required to show the national identity card, which included ethnicity, and any with Tutsi cards were slaughtered immediately. Many Hutu were also killed for a variety of reasons, including alleged sympathy for the moderate opposition parties, being a journalist or simply having a "Tutsi appearance."
The RPF was making slow but steady gains in the north and east of the country, ending the killings in each area occupied. The genocide was effectively ended during April in areas of Ruhengeri, Byumba, Kibungo and Kigali provinces. The killings ceased during April in the akazu heartlands of western Ruhengeri and Gisenyi, as almost every Tutsi had been eliminated. Large numbers of Hutu in the RPF conquered areas fled, fearing retribution for the genocide; 500,000 Kibungo residents walked over the bridge at Rusumo Falls, into Tanzania, in a few days at the end of April, and were accommodated in United Nations camps effectively controlled by ousted leaders of the Hutu regime, with the former governor of Kibungo province in overall control.
In the remaining provinces, killings continued throughout May and June, although they became increasingly low-key and sporadic; most Tutsi were already eliminated, and the interim government wished to rein in the growing anarchy and engage the population in fighting the RPF. On 23 June, around 2,500 soldiers entered southwestern Rwanda as part of the French-led United Nations Operation Turquoise. This was intended as a humanitarian mission, but the soldiers were not able to save significant numbers of lives. The genocidal authorities were overtly welcoming of the French, displaying the French flag on their own vehicles, but slaughtering Tutsi who came out of hiding seeking protection. In July, the RPF completed their conquest of the country, with the exception of the zone occupied by Operation Turquoise. The RPF took Kigali on 4 July, and Gisenyi and the rest of the northwest on 18 July. The genocide was over, but as had occurred in Kibungo, the Hutu population fled en masse across the border, this time into Zaire, with Bagosora and the other leaders accompanying them.
Planning and organization
The crisis committee, headed by Theoneste Bagosora, took power in the country following Habyarimana's death, and was the principal authority coordinating the genocide. Bagosora immediately began issuing orders to kill Tutsi, addressing groups of interahamwe in person in Kigali, and making telephone calls to leaders in the provinces. Other leading organisers on a national level were defence minister Augustin Bizimana, commander of the paratroopers Aloys Ntabakuze; and the head of the Presidential Guard, Protais Mpiranya. Businessman Felicien Kabuga funded the RTLM and the Interahamwe, while Pascal Musabe and Joseph Nzirorera were responsible for coordinating the Interahamwe and Impuzamugambi militia activities nationally.
In Kigali, the genocide was led by the Presidential Guard, the elite unit of the army. They were assisted by the Interahamwe and Impuzamugambi, who set up road blocks throughout the capital; each person passing the road block was required to show the national identity card, which included ethnicity, and any with Tutsi cards were slaughtered immediately. The militias also initiated searches of houses in the city, slaughtering Tutsi and looting their property. Kigali governor Tharcisse Renzaho played a leading role, touring the road blocks to ensure their effectiveness and using his position at the top of the Kigali provincial government to disseminate orders and dismiss officials who were not sufficiently active in the killings.
In rural areas, the local government hierarchy was also in most cases the chain of command for the execution of the genocide. The governor of each province, acting on orders from Kigali, disseminated instructions to the district leaders (bourgmestres), who in turn issued directions to the leaders of the sectors, cells and villages within their districts. The majority of the actual killings in the countryside were carried out by ordinary civilians, under orders from the leaders. Tutsi and Hutu lived side by side in their villages, and families all knew each other, making it easy for Hutu to identify and target their Tutsi neighbours. Gerard Prunier ascribes this mass complicity of the population to a combination of the "democratic majority" ideology, in which Hutu had been taught to regard Tutsi as dangerous enemies, the culture of unbending obedience to authority, and the duress factor – villagers who refused to carry out orders to kill were often branded as Tutsi sympathisers and killed themselves.
The crisis committee appointed an interim government on 8 April; using the terms of the 1991 constitution instead of the Arusha Accords, the committee designated Theodore Sindikubwabo as interim president of Rwanda, while Jean Kambanda was the new prime minister. All political parties were represented in the government, but most members were from the "Hutu Power" wings of their respective parties. The interim government was sworn in on 9 April, but immediately relocated from Kigali to Gitarama to avoid fighting between the RPF and the Rwandan army in the capital. The crisis committee was officially dissolved, but Bagosora and the senior officers remained the de facto rulers of the country. The government played its part in mobilising the population, giving the regime an air of legitimacy, but was effectively a puppet regime with no ability to halt the army or the Interahamwe's activities. When Romeo Dallaire visited the government's headquarters a week after its formation, he found most officials at leisure, describing their activities as "sorting out the seating plan for a meeting that was not about to convene any time soon."
Means of killing
On April 9, UN observers witnessed the massacre of children at a Polish church in Gikondo. The same day, 1,000 heavily armed and trained European troops arrived to escort European civilian personnel out of the country. The troops did not stay to assist UNAMIR. Media coverage picked up on the 9th, as the Washington Post reported the execution of Rwandan employees of relief agencies in front of their expatriate colleagues.
Butare Province was an exception to the local violence. Jean-Baptiste Habyarimana was the only Tutsi prefect, and the province was the only one dominated by an opposition party. Opposing the genocide, Habyarimana was able to keep relative calm in the province, until he was deposed by the extremist Sylvain Ndikumana. Finding the population of Butare resistant to murdering their fellow citizens, the government flew in militia from Kigali by helicopter, and they readily killed the Tutsi.
Most of the victims were killed in their own villages or in towns, often by their neighbors and fellow villagers. The militia typically murdered victims with machetes, although some army units used rifles. The Hutu gangs searched out victims hiding in churches and school buildings, and massacred them. Local officials and government-sponsored radio incited ordinary citizens to kill their neighbors, and those who refused to kill were often murdered on the spot. "Either you took part in the massacres or you were massacred yourself."
One such massacre occurred at Nyarubuye. On April 12, more than 1,500 Tutsis sought refuge in a Catholic church in Nyange, then in Kivumu commune. Local Interahamwe, acting in concert with the authorities, used bulldozers to knock down the church building. The militia used machetes and rifles to kill every person who tried to escape. Local priest Athanase Seromba was later found guilty and sentenced to life in prison by the ICTR for his role in the demolition of his church; he was convicted of the crime of genocide and crimes against humanity. In another case, thousands sought refuge in the Official Technical School (École Technique Officielle) in Kigali where Belgian UNAMIR soldiers were stationed. On April 11, the Belgian soldiers withdrew, and Rwandan armed forces and militia killed all the Tutsi.
Several individuals attempted to halt the Rwandan genocide, or to shelter vulnerable Tutsi. Among them were Romeo Dallaire (Canadian Lieutenant-General of UNAMIR), Henry Kwami Anyidoho (Ghanaian Deputy Commander of UNAMIR), Pierantonio Costa (Italian diplomat who rescued many lives), Antonia Locatelli (Italian volunteer who tried to save 300 or 400 Tutsis by calling officials in the international community and was later murdered by the Interahamwe), Jacqueline Mukansonera (Hutu woman who saved a Tutsi during the genocide), Paul Rusesabagina (the Academy Award nominated film Hotel Rwanda is based on his story), Carl Wilkens (the only American who chose to remain in Rwanda during the genocide), André Sibomana (Hutu priest and journalist who saved many lives) and Captain Mbaye Diagne (Senegalese army officer of UNAMIR who saved many lives before he was killed).
Rape was used as a tool by the Interahamwe, the chief perpetrators, to separate the consciously heterogeneous population and to drastically exhaust the opposing group. The use of propaganda played an important role in both the genocide and the gender specific violence. The Hutu propaganda depicted Tutsi women as "a sexually seductive ‘fifth column’ in league with the Hutus’ enemies". The exceptional brutality of the sexual violence, as well as the complicity of Hutu women in the attacks, suggests that the use of propaganda had been effective in the exploitation of gendered needs which had mobilized both females and males to participate. Soldiers of the Army for the Liberation of Rwanda and the Rwandan Defence Forces, including the Presidential Guard, and civilians also committed rape against mostly Tutsi women. Although Tutsi women were the main targets, moderate Hutu women were also raped.
Along with the Hutu moderates, Hutu women who were married to or who hid Tutsis were also targeted. In his 1996 report on Rwanda, the UN Special Rapporteur Rene Degni-Segui stated, "Rape was the rule and its absence the exception." He also noted, "Rape was systematic and was used as a weapon." With this thought and using methods of force and threat, the genocidaires forced others to stand by during rapes. A testimonial by a woman of the name Maria Louise Niyobuhungiro recalled seeing local peoples, other generals and Hutu men watching her get raped about 5 times a day. Even when she was kept under watch of a woman, she would give no sympathy or help and furthermore, forced her to farm land in between rapes.
Many of the survivors became infected with HIV from the HIV-infected men recruited by the genocidaires. During the conflict, Hutu extremists released hundreds of patients suffering from AIDS from hospitals, and formed them into "rape squads." The intent was to infect and cause a "slow, inexorable death". Tutsi women were also targeted with the intent of destroying their reproductive capabilities. Sexual mutilation sometimes occurred after the rape and included mutilation of the vagina with machetes, knives, sharpened sticks, boiling water, and acid. Men were seldom the victims of war rape, but sexual violence against men included mutilation of the genitals, then displayed as trophies in public.
Given the chaotic situation, there is no consensus on the number of people killed during the genocide. Unlike the genocides carried out by Nazi Germany and the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, authorities made no attempts to record deaths. The succeeding RPF government has stated that 1,071,000 were killed, 10% of whom were Hutu. The journalist Philip Gourevitch agrees with an estimate of one million, while the UN estimates the death toll as 800,000. Alex de Waal and Rakiya Omar of African Rights estimate the number as "around 750,000," while Alison Des Forges of Human Rights Watch stated that it was "at least 500,000." James Smith of Aegis Trust notes, "What's important to remember is that there was a genocide. There was an attempt to eliminate Tutsis – men, women, and children – and to erase any memory of their existence."
Out of a population of 7.3 million people–84% of whom were Hutu, 15% Tutsi and 1% Twa–the official figures published by the Rwandan government estimated the number of victims of the genocide to be 1,174,000 in 100 days (10,000 murdered every day, 400 every hour, 7 every minute). It is estimated that about 300,000 Tutsi survived the genocide. Thousands of widows, many of whom were subjected to rape, are now HIV-positive. There were about 400,000 orphans and nearly 85,000 of them were forced to become heads of families.
Rwandan Patriotic Front military campaign and victory
On 7 April, as the genocide started, RPF commander Paul Kagame warned the crisis committee and UNAMIR that he would resume the civil war if the killing did not stop. The next day, Rwandan government forces attacked the national parliament building from several directions, but RPF troops stationed there successfully fought back. The RPF then began an attack from the north on three fronts, seeking to link up quickly with the isolated troops in Kigali. Kagame refused to talk to the interim government, believing that it was just a cover for Bagosora's rule and not committed to ending the genocide. Over the next few days, the RPF advanced steadily south, capturing Gabiro and large areas of the countryside to the north and east of Kigali. They avoided attacking Kigali or Byumba, but conducted manoeuvres designed to encircle the cities and cut off supply routes. The RPF also allowed Tutsi refugees from Uganda to settle behind the front line in the RPF controlled areas.
Throughout April, there were numerous attempts by UNAMIR to establish a ceasefire, but Kagame insisted each time that the RPF would not stop fighting unless the killings stopped. In late April, the RPF secured the whole of the Tanzanian border area and began to move west from Kibungo, to the south of Kigali. They encountered little resistance, except around Kigali and Ruhengeri. By 16 May, they had cut the road between Kigali and Gitarama, the temporary home of the interim government, and by 13 June, had taken Gitarama itself, following an unsuccessful attempt by the Rwandan government forces to reopen the road; the interim government was forced to relocate to Gisenyi in the far north west. As well as fighting the war, Kagame was recruiting heavily to expand the army. The new recruits included Tutsi survivors of the genocide and refugees from Burundi, but were less well trained and disciplined than the earlier recruits.
Having completed the encirclement of Kigali, the RPF spent the latter half of June fighting for the city itself. The government forces had superior manpower and weapons, but the RPF steadily gained territory as well as conducting raids to rescue civilians from behind enemy lines. According to Dallaire, this success was due to Kagame's being a "master of psychological warfare"; he exploited the fact that the government forces were concentrating on the genocide rather than the fight for Kigali, and capitalised on the government's loss of morale as it lost territory. The RPF finally defeated the Rwandan government forces in Kigali on 4 July, and on 18 July took Gisenyi and the rest of the northwest, forcing the interim government into Zaire and ending the genocide. At the end of July 1994, Kagame's forces held the whole of Rwanda except for the zone in the south west which had been occupied by a French-led United Nations force as part of Opération Turquoise.
The United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) had been in Rwanda since October 1993, with a mandate to oversee the implementation of the Arusha Accords. UNAMIR commander Roméo Dallaire learned of the Hutu Power movement during the mission's deployment, as well as plans for the mass extermination of Tutsi, Dallaire learned of secret weapons caches, but his request to raid them was turned down by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). UNAMIR's effectiveness in peacekeeping was also hampered by President Habyarimana and Hutu hardliners, and by April 1994, the Security Council threatened to terminate UNAMIR's mandate if it did not make progress.
Following the death of Habyarimana, and the start of the genocide, Dallaire liaised repeatedly with both the Crisis Committee and the RPF, attempting to re-establish peace and prevent the resumption of the civil war. Neither side was interested in a ceasefire, the government because it was controlled by the genocidaires, and the RPF because it considered it necessary to fight to stop the killings. UNAMIR's Chapter VI mandate rendered it powerless to intervene militarily, and most of its Rwandan staff were killed in the early days of the genocide, severely limiting its ability to operate.
UNAMIR was therefore largely reduced to a bystander role, and Dallaire later labelled it a "failure." Its most significant contribution was to provide refuge for thousands of Tutsi and moderate Hutu at its headquarters in Amahoro Stadium, as well as other secure UN sites, and to assist with the evacuation of foreign nationals. On 12 April, the Belgian government, which was one of the largest troop contributors to UNAMIR, and had lost ten soldiers protecting Prime Minister Uwilingiliyimana, announced that it was withdrawing, reducing the force's effectiveness even further. In mid-May, the UN finally conceded that "acts of genocide may have been committed," and agreed to reinforcement, which would be known as UNAMIR 2. The new soldiers did not start arriving until June, and following the end of the genocide in July, the role of UNAMIR 2 was largely confined to maintaining security and stability, until its termination in 1996.
France and Opération Turquoise
During President Habyarimana's years in power, France maintained very close relations with him, as part of its Françafrique policy, and assisted Rwanda militarily against the RPF during the Civil War; France considered the RPF, along with Uganda, as part of an "plot" to increase Anglophone influence at the expense of French influence. During the first few days of the genocide, France launched Amaryllis, a military operation assisted by the Belgian army and UNAMIR, to evacuate expatriates from Rwanda. The French and Belgians refused to allow any Tutsi to accompany them, and those who boarded the evacuation trucks were forced off at Rwandan government checkpoints, where they were killed. The French also separated several expatriates and children from their Tutsi spouses, rescuing the foreigners but leaving the Rwandans to likely death. The French did, however, rescue several high profile members of Habyarimana's government, as well as his wife, Agathe.
In late June 1994, France launched Opération Turquoise, a UN-mandated mission to create safe humanitarian areas for displaced persons, refugees, and civilians in danger; from bases in the Zairian cities of Goma and Bukavu, the French entered southwestern Rwanda and established the zone Turquoise, within the Cyangugu–Kibuye–Gikongoro triangle, an area occupying approximately a fifth of Rwanda. Radio France International estimates that Turquoise saved around 15,000 lives, but with the genocide coming to an end and the RPF's ascendancy, many Rwandans interpreted Turquoise as a mission to protect Hutu from the RPF, including some who had participated in the genocide. The French remained hostile to the RPF, and their presence temporarily stalled the RPF's advance.
A number of inquiries have been held into French involvement in Rwanda, including the 1998 French Parliamentary Commission on Rwanda, which accused France of errors of judgement, including "military cooperation against a background of ethnic tensions, massacres and violence," but did not accuse France of direct responsibility for the genocide itself. A 2008 report by the Rwandan government sponsored Mucyo Commission accused the French government of knowing of preparations for the genocide and helping to train Hutu militia members.
Intelligence reports indicate that United States president Bill Clinton and his cabinet were aware before the height of the massacre that a "final solution to eliminate all Tutsis" was planned. However, fear of a repeat of the events in Somalia shaped US policy at the time, with many commentators identifying the graphic consequences of the Battle of Mogadishu as the key reason behind the US's failure to intervene in later conflicts such as the Rwandan Genocide. After the battle, the bodies of several US casualties of the conflict were dragged through the streets of Mogadishu by crowds of local civilians and members of Aidid's Somali National Alliance. According to the US's former deputy special envoy to Somalia, Walter Clarke: "The ghosts of Somalia continue to haunt US policy. Our lack of response in Rwanda was a fear of getting involved in something like a Somalia all over again." President Clinton has referred to the failure of the U.S. government to intervene in the genocide as one of his main foreign policy failings, saying "I don't think we could have ended the violence, but I think we could have cut it down. And I regret it." Eighty percent of the discussion in Washington concerned the evacuation of American citizens.
Israel has been accused of selling arms (guns, bullets and grenades) to the Rwandan government during the genocide. In 2016, the Israeli Supreme Court decided that records documenting Israel’s arms sales to Rwanda during the 1994 genocide would remain sealed and concealed from the public.
The Roman Catholic Church affirms that genocide took place but states that those who took part did so without the permission of the Church. Though religious factors were not prominent, in its 1999 report Human Rights Watch faulted a number of religious authorities in Rwanda, including Roman Catholics, Anglicans and Protestants, for failing to condemn the genocide – though that accusation was belied over time. Some in its religious hierarchy have been tried and convicted for their participation by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. Bishop Misago was accused of corruption and complicity in the genocide, but was cleared of all charges in 2000. Many other Catholic and other clergy, however, gave their lives to protect Tutsis from slaughter. Some clergy participated in the massacres. In 2006, Father Athanase Seromba was sentenced to 15 years imprisonment by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda for his role in the massacre of 2,000 Tutsis. The court heard that Seromba lured the Tutsis to the church, where they believed they would find refuge. When they arrived, he ordered bulldozers to crush the refugees within and Hutu militias to kill any survivors.
Refugee crisis, insurgency, and Congo wars
Following the RPF victory, approximately two million Hutu fled to refugee camps in neighbouring countries, particularly Zaire, fearing RPF reprisals for the Rwandan Genocide. The camps were crowded and squalid, and thousands of refugees died in disease epidemics, including cholera and dysentery. The camps were set up by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), but were effectively controlled by the army and government of the former Hutu regime, including many leaders of the genocide, who began rearming in a bid to return to power in Rwanda.
By late 1996, Hutu militants from the camps were launching regular cross-border incursions, and the RPF-led Rwandan government launched a counteroffensive. Rwanda provided troops and military training to the Banyamulenge, a Tutsi group in the Zairian South Kivu province, helping them to defeat Zairian security forces. Rwandan forces, the Banyamulenge, and other Zairian Tutsi, then attacked the refugee camps, targeting the Hutu militia. These attacks caused hundreds of thousands of refugees to flee; many returned to Rwanda despite the presence of the RPF, while others ventured further west into Zaire. The defeated forces of the former regime continued a cross-border insurgency campaign, supported initially by the predominantly Hutu population of Rwanda's north western provinces. By 1999, a programme of propaganda and Hutu integration into the national army, succeeded in bringing the Hutu to the government side and the insurgency was defeated.
In addition to dismantling the refugee camps, Kagame began planning a war to remove long-time dictator President Mobutu Sese Seko from power. Mobutu had supported the genocidaires based in the camps, and was also accused of allowing attacks on Tutsi people within Zaire. Together with Uganda, the Rwandan government supported an alliance of four rebel groups headed by Laurent-Désiré Kabila, which began waging the First Congo War. The rebels quickly took control of North and South Kivu provinces and then advanced west, gaining territory from the poorly organised and demotivated Zairian army with little fighting, and controlling the whole country by May 1997. Mobutu fled into exile, and the country was renamed Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Rwanda fell out with the new Congolese regime in 1998, and Kagame supported a fresh rebellion, leading to the Second Congo War. This war lasted until 2003 and caused millions of deaths and massive damage. A 2010 United Nations report accused the Rwandan army of committing wide scale human rights violations and crimes against humanity in the Democratic Republic of the Congo during the two Congo wars, charges denied by the Rwandan government.
The infrastructure and economy of the country had suffered greatly during the genocide. Many buildings were uninhabitable, and the former regime had carried with them all currency and moveable assets when they fled the country. Human resources were also severely depleted, with over 40% of the population having been killed or fled. Many of the remainder were traumatised: most had lost relatives, witnessed killings or participated in the genocide. The long-term effects of war rape in Rwanda for the victims include social isolation, sexually transmitted diseases, unwanted pregnancies and babies, with some women resorted to self-induced abortions. The army, led by Paul Kagame, maintained law and order while the government began the work of rebuilding the country's structures.
Non-governmental organisations began to move back into the country, but the international community did not provide significant assistance to the new regime, and most international aid was routed to the refugee camps which had formed in Zaire following the exodus of Hutu from Rwanda. Kagame strove to portray the government as inclusive and not Tutsi dominated. He directed removal of ethnicity from citizens' national identity cards, and the government began a policy of downplaying the distinctions among Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa.
During the genocide and in the months following the RPF victory, RPF soldiers killed many people they accused of participating in or supporting the genocide. Many of these soldiers were recent Tutsi recruits from within Rwanda, who had lost family or friends and sought revenge. The scale, scope, and source of ultimate responsibility of these killings is disputed. Human Rights Watch, as well as scholars such as Prunier, allege that the death toll might be as high as 100,000, and that Kagame and the RPF elite either tolerated or organised the killings. In an interview with journalist Stephen Kinzer, Kagame acknowledged that killings had occurred but stated that they were carried out by rogue soldiers and had been impossible to control. The RPF killings gained international attention with the 1995 Kibeho massacre, in which soldiers opened fire on a camp for internally displaced persons in Butare Province. Australian soldiers serving as part of UNAMIR estimated at least 4,000 people were killed, while the Rwandan government claimed that the death toll was 338.
Justice system after genocide
With the return of the refugees, the government began the long-awaited genocide trials, which had an uncertain start at the end of 1996 and inched forward in 1997. It was not until 1996 that courts finally began trials for genocide cases with the enactment of Organic Law N° 08/96 of 30 on August 30, 1996. This law initiated the prosecution of genocide crimes committed during the genocide and of crimes against humanity from October 199  The systematic destruction of the judicial system during the genocide and civil war was a major problem. Government institutions, including judicial courts, were destroyed, and many judges, prosecutors, and employees were murdered. Of 750 judges, 506 did not remain after the genocide—many were murdered and most of the survivors fled Rwanda. By 1997, Rwanda only had fifty lawyers in its judicial system. These barriers caused the trials to proceed very slowly: with 130,000 suspects held in Rwandan prisons after the genocide, 3,343 cases were handled between 1996 and the end of 2000. Of those defendants, twenty percent received death sentences, thirty-two percent received life in prison, and twenty percent were acquitted. It was calculated that it would take over two hundred years to conduct the trials of the suspects in prison—not including the ones who remained at large.
In response to the situation, the government of Rwanda passed Organic Law N° 40/2000 in 2001. This law established Gacaca Courts at all administrative levels of Rwanda and in Kigali. It was mainly created to lessen the burden on normal courts and provide assistance in the justice system to run trials for those already in prison. The least severe cases, according to the terms of Organic Law N° 08/96 of 30, would be handled by these Gacaca Courts. With this law, the government began implementing a participatory justice system, known as Gacaca, in order to address the enormous backlog of cases. The Gacaca court system traditionally dealt with conflicts within communities, but it was adapted to deal with genocide crimes. The following are the objectives of the Gacaca courts:
- Identifying the truth about what happened during the genocide
- Speeding up of trial genocide trials
- Fighting against the culture of impunity
- Contributing to the national unity and reconciliation process
- Demonstrating the capacity of the Rwandan people to resolve their own problems
Throughout the years, the Gacaca court system went through a series of modifications. It is estimated that the Gacaca court system has tried over one million cases to date.
Meanwhile, the UN established the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, currently based in Arusha, Tanzania. The UN Tribunal has jurisdiction over high-level members of the government and armed forces, while Rwanda is responsible for prosecuting lower-level leaders and local people.
Closing of the Gacaca courts
On June 18, 2012, the Gacaca court system was officially closed after facing criticism.
The Gacaca court system faced many controversies and challenges; they were accused of being puppets of the RPF-dominated government. The judges (known as Inyangamugayo, which means "those who detest dishonesty" in Kinyarwanda) who preside over the genocide trials were elected by the public. After election, the judges received training, but there was concern that the training was not adequate for serious legal questions or complex proceedings. Furthermore, many judges resigned after facing accusations of participating in the genocide; 27.1% of them were so accused. There was also a lack of defense counsel and protections for the accused, who were denied the right to appeal to ordinary courts. Most trials were open to the public, but there were issues with witness intimidation. The Gacaca courts did not try those responsible for massacres of Hutu civilians committed by members of the RPF, which controlled the Gacaca Court system.
Closing of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
Since the ICTR was established as an ad hoc international jurisdiction, the ICTR is scheduled to close by the end of 2014, after it completes trials by 2009 and appeals by 2010 or 2011. Initially, the U.N. Security Council established the ICTR in 1994 with an original mandate of four years without a fixed deadline and set on addressing the crimes committed during the Rwandan Genocide. As the years passed, it became apparent that the ICTR would exist long past its original mandate. However, with the announcement of its closing, there is a concern over whether the Rwandan genocide will still have an authority like that of the ICTR in prosecuting high-ranking fugitives and with access to international sources.
Kigali Genocide Memorial Center
Media and popular culture
Canadian Lieutenant-General Roméo Dallaire became the best-known eyewitness to the genocide after co-writing the 2003 book Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda, describing his experiences with depression and post-traumatic stress disorder. Another firsthand account of the Rwandan genocide is offered by Dr. James Orbinski in his book An Imperfect Offering: Humanitarian Action in the Twenty-first Century. Among survivors, Immaculée Ilibagiza documented her story in Left to Tell: Discovering God Amidst the Rwandan Holocaust. The book recounts how she survived for 91 days with seven other women during the holocaust in a damp and small bathroom, no larger than 3 feet (0.91 m) long and 4 feet (1.2 m) wide. Gil Courtemanche, a French-Canadian writer, authored Dimanche à la piscine à Kigali (A Sunday at the Pool in Kigali), which focuses on events in Kigali during the genocide.
The critically acclaimed and multiple Academy Award-nominated 2004 film Hotel Rwanda is based on the experiences of Paul Rusesabagina, a Kigali hotelier at the Hôtel des Mille Collines who sheltered over a thousand refugees during the genocide. It is listed by the American Film Institute as one of the 100 most inspirational movies of all time. This same story is related in Rusesabagina's 2006 autobiography An Ordinary Man.
in 2005, HBO produced a television movie named Sometimes in April. The story centers on two brothers: Honoré Butera, working for Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines, and Augustin Muganza, a captain in the Rwandan army (who was married to a Tutsi woman), who bear witness to the killing of close to over a million people in 100 days while becoming divided by politics and losing some of their own family.
The documentary Earth Made of Glass, an independent film, about the personal and political costs of the genocide, focusing on Rwandan President Paul Kagame and genocide survivor Jean-Pierre Sagahutu, premiered at the 2010 Tribeca Film Festival.
In 2005, Alison Des Forges wrote that eleven years after the genocide, films for popular audiences on the subject greatly increased the "widespread realization of the horror that had taken the lives of more than half a million Tutsi". In 2007, Charlie Beckett, Director of POLIS, said: "How many people saw the movie Hotel Rwanda? [It is] ironically the way that most people now relate to Rwanda."
Among songs, "Rwanda" by the punk-ska band Rancid from the album Rancid is about the Rwandan genocide. So is the punk-ska band Rx Bandits's song "In All Rwanda's Glory" on their album Progress, which they say contains "overly political lyrics". Brooke Fraser wrote the song "Albertine" on her album Albertine about an eponymous orphan from the genocide whom Fraser met one time in Rwanda in 2005.
Former journalist and current United States Ambassador to the United Nations Samantha Power is interviewed about the Rwandan genocide in Watchers of the Sky, a 2014 documentary by Edet Belzberg about genocide throughout history and its eventual inclusion in international law.
A "double genocides" theory, accusing the Tutsis of engaging in a "counter-genocide" against the Hutus, is promulgated in Black Furies, White Liars, the controversial book by French investigative journalist Pierre Péan. One 2009 study of central and southern Rwanda, based on 8 months of field research in Rwanda over a period of 2 years, found, however, that the absolute number of Tutsis killed was double that for Hutus, and that the patterns of killing for the two groups differed. Jean-Pierre Chrétien, a French historian whom Péan describes as an active member of the "pro-Tutsi lobby", criticized Péan's "amazing revisionist passion".
Another person accused of genocide revisionism is the Montreal writer Robin Philpot, whom Gerald Caplan identified in a 2007 Globe and Mail article as believing that "many people were killed in 1994 by both sides making those who carried out the genocide and their enemies morally equivalent." He further charges that Philpot argued "[t]here was no one-sided conspiracy by armed Hutu forces and militias against a million defenceless Tutsi, he says."
In 2009, Christian Davenport of the University of Michigan and Allan C. Stam, the Daniel Webster Professor of Government at Dartmouth, posed the question: "What really happened in Rwanda?" The pair do not question that an anti-Tutsi genocide took place in 1994, but their investigation led them to conclude that "conventional wisdom was only partly correct". They argue that the genocide constituted only part of the slaughter of spring and summer 1994; that the RPF was "clearly responsible" for another major portion of the killings; that the victims were "fairly evenly distributed between Tutsi and Hutu"; that the majority of the dead were actually Hutu, rather than Tutsi; and that, "among other things, it appears that there simply weren't enough Tutsi in Rwanda at the time to account for all the reported deaths." They said that the whole truth, however inconvenient it may be for the RPF-led government of Paul Kagame, must come out. Davenport and Stam have been threatened by members of the Rwandan government and individuals around the world, and—despite their repeated and explicit statements acknowledging the genocide of the Tutsis—labeled "genocide deniers".
In October 2014, a BBC documentary, Rwanda: The Untold Story, was aired featuring interviews with Davenport and Stam and that suggested Kagame's RPF was involved in shooting down Habyarimana's plane. It aroused considerable controversy, as well as earning the ire of the Rwandan government, which banned the BBC's Kinyarwanda-language radio broadcasts from the country before conducting a three-week inquiry into the documentary. In November 2014, Emmanuel Mughisa (also known as Emile Gafarita), a former Rwandan soldier who said he had evidence that Kagame had ordered Habyarimana's plane shot down, was abducted in Nairobi hours after he was called to testify at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, "join[ing] a long list of Mr Kagame's opponents who have disappeared or died."
Revisionism and the Rwandan constitution
Under the Rwandan constitution, "revisionism, negationism and trivialisation of genocide" are criminal offences. Hundreds of people have been tried and convicted for "genocide ideology", "revisionism", and other laws ostensibly related to the genocide. Of the 489 individuals convicted of "genocide revisionism and other related crimes" in 2009, five were sentenced to life imprisonment, a further five were sentenced to more than 20 years in jail, 99 were sentenced to 10–20 years in jail, 211 received a custodial sentence of 5–10 years, and the remaining 169 received jail terms of less than five years. Amnesty International has criticized the Rwandan government for using these laws to "criminalize legitimate dissent and criticism of the government." In 2010, even an American law professor and attorney, Peter Erlinder, was arrested in Kigali and charged with genocide denial while defending presidential candidate Victoire Ingabire against charges of genocide.
- See, e.g., Rwanda: How the genocide happened, BBC, April 1, 2004, which gives an estimate of 800,000, and OAU sets inquiry into Rwanda genocide[dead link], Africa Recovery, Vol. 12 1#1 (August 1998), p. 4, which estimates the number at between 500,000 and 1,000,000. Seven out of every 10 Tutsis were killed.
- UN decides it is officially ‘genocide against Tutsi’ - News
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|Wikimedia Commons has media related to Rwandan genocide.|
|Wikiversity has learning materials about Rwandan genocide|
- Genocide Archive Rwanda
- Through My Eyes Website[dead link] Imperial War Museum – Online Exhibition
- United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
- Rwanda Commemoration Project: Genocide in Our Time
- Rwandan Genocide Background from the Human Rights Watch
- Step Up! American Association for Rwandan Women
- Gacaca Film Series Official site for the documentary film series that includes "My Neighbor My Killer" (Official Selection at Cannes Film Festival), "Gacaca Living Together in Rwanda?", "In Rwanda We Say ... The family that does not speak dies" and "The Notebooks of Memory" By Emmy-winner Anne Aghion
- Rwandan Overview. Committee on Conscience: Rwandan Genocide. United States Holocaust Memorial Museum
- Voices of Rwanda: The Rwanda Testimony Film Project—A populous oral history archive dedicated to filming video testimonies of Rwandans
- Sexual Violence and Genocide Against Tutsi Women
- International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda Archives
- Gacaca Courts Archives