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SCADA (supervisory control and data acquisition) is a system operating with coded signals over communication channels so as to provide control of remote equipment (using typically one communication channel per remote station). The control system may be combined with a data acquisition system by adding the use of coded signals over communication channels to acquire information about the status of the remote equipment for display or for recording functions. It is a type of industrial control system (ICS). Industrial control systems are computer-based systems that monitor and control industrial processes that exist in the physical world. SCADA systems historically distinguish themselves from other ICS systems by being large-scale processes that can include multiple sites, and large distances. These processes include industrial, infrastructure, and facility-based processes, as described below:
- Industrial processes include those of manufacturing, production, power generation, fabrication, and refining, and may run in continuous, batch, repetitive, or discrete modes.
- Infrastructure processes may be public or private, and include water treatment and distribution, wastewater collection and treatment, oil and gas pipelines, electrical power transmission and distribution, wind farms, civil defense siren systems, and large communication systems.
- Facility processes occur both in public facilities and private ones, including buildings, airports, ships, and space stations. They monitor and control heating, ventilation, and air conditioning systems (HVAC), access, and energy consumption.
- 1 Common system components
- 2 Systems concepts
- 3 Human–machine interface
- 4 Hardware solutions
- 5 SCADA architectures
- 6 Security issues
- 7 SCADA In the workplace
- 8 See also
- 9 References
- 10 External links
Common system components
A SCADA system usually consists of the following subsystems:
- Remote terminal units (RTUs) connect to sensors in the process and convert sensor signals to digital data. They have telemetry hardware capable of sending digital data to the supervisory system, as well as receiving digital commands from the supervisory system. RTUs often have embedded control capabilities such as ladder logic in order to accomplish boolean logic operations.
- Programmable logic controller (PLCs) connect to sensors in the process and convert sensor signals to digital data. PLCs have more sophisticated embedded control capabilities (typically one or more IEC 61131-3 programming languages) than RTUs. PLCs do not have telemetry hardware, although this functionality is typically installed alongside them. PLCs are sometimes used in place of RTUs as field devices because they are more economical, versatile, flexible, and configurable.
- A telemetry system is typically used to connect PLCs and RTUs with control centers, data warehouses, and the enterprise. Examples of wired telemetry media used in SCADA systems include leased telephone lines and WAN circuits. Examples of wireless telemetry media used in SCADA systems include satellite (VSAT), licensed and unlicensed radio, cellular and microwave.
- A data acquisition server is a software service which uses industrial protocols to connect software services, via telemetry, with field devices such as RTUs and PLCs. It allows clients to access data from these field devices using standard protocols.
- A human–machine interface or HMI is the apparatus or device which presents processed data to a human operator, and through this, the human operator monitors and interacts with the process. The HMI is a client that requests data from a data acquisition server.
- A Historian is a software service which accumulates time-stamped data, boolean events, and boolean alarms in a database which can be queried or used to populate graphic trends in the HMI. The historian is a client that requests data from a data acquisition server.
- A supervisory (computer) system, gathering (acquiring) data on the process and sending commands (control) to the SCADA system.
- Communication infrastructure connecting the supervisory system to the remote terminal units.
- Various process and analytical instrumentation.
The term SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition) usually refers to centralized systems which monitor and control entire sites, or complexes of systems spread out over large areas (anything from an industrial plant to a nation). Most control actions are performed automatically by RTUs or by PLCs. Host control functions are usually restricted to basic overriding or supervisory level intervention. For example, a PLC may control the flow of cooling water through part of an industrial process, but the SCADA system may allow operators to change the set points for the flow, and enable alarm conditions, such as loss of flow and high temperature, to be displayed and recorded. The feedback control loop passes through the RTU or PLC, while the SCADA system monitors the overall performance of the loop.
Data acquisition begins at the RTU or PLC level and includes meter readings and equipment status reports that are communicated to SCADA as required. Data is then compiled and formatted in such a way that a control room operator using the HMI can make supervisory decisions to adjust or override normal RTU (PLC) controls. Data may also be fed to a Historian, often built on a commodity Database Management System, to allow trending and other analytical auditing.
SCADA systems typically implement a distributed database, commonly referred to as a tag database, which contains data elements called tags or points. A point represents a single input or output value monitored or controlled by the system. Points can be either "hard" or "soft". A hard point represents an actual input or output within the system, while a soft point results from logic and math operations applied to other points. (Most implementations conceptually remove the distinction by making every property a "soft" point expression, which may, in the simplest case, equal a single hard point.) Points are normally stored as value-timestamp pairs: a value, and the timestamp when it was recorded or calculated. A series of value-timestamp pairs gives the history of that point. It is also common to store additional metadata with tags, such as the path to a field device or PLC register, design time comments, and alarm information.
SCADA systems are significantly important systems used in national infrastructures such as electric grids, water supplies and pipelines. However, SCADA systems may have security vulnerabilities, so the systems should be evaluated to identify risks and solutions implemented to mitigate those risks.
A human–machine interface (HMI) is the input-output device through which the human operator controls the process, and which presents process data to a human operator.
HMI(Human Machine interface) is usually linked to the SCADA system's databases and software programs, to provide trending, diagnostic data, and management information such as scheduled maintenance procedures, logistic information, detailed schematics for a particular sensor or machine, and expert-system troubleshooting guides.
The HMI system usually presents the information to the operating personnel graphically, in the form of a mimic diagram. This means that the operator can see a schematic representation of the plant being controlled. For example, a picture of a pump connected to a pipe can show the operator that the pump is running and how much fluid it is pumping through the pipe at the moment. The operator can then switch the pump off. The HMI software will show the flow rate of the fluid in the pipe decrease in real time. Mimic diagrams may consist of line graphics and schematic symbols to represent process elements, or may consist of digital photographs of the process equipment overlain with animated symbols.
The HMI package for the SCADA system typically includes a drawing program that the operators or system maintenance personnel use to change the way these points are represented in the interface. These representations can be as simple as an on-screen traffic light, which represents the state of an actual traffic light in the field, or as complex as a multi-projector display representing the position of all of the elevators in a skyscraper or all of the trains on a railway.
An important part of most SCADA implementations is alarm handling. The system monitors whether certain alarm conditions are satisfied, to determine when an alarm event has occurred. Once an alarm event has been detected, one or more actions are taken (such as the activation of one or more alarm indicators, and perhaps the generation of email or text messages so that management or remote SCADA operators are informed). In many cases, a SCADA operator may have to acknowledge the alarm event; this may deactivate some alarm indicators, whereas other indicators remain active until the alarm conditions are cleared. Alarm conditions can be explicit—for example, an alarm point is a digital status point that has either the value NORMAL or ALARM that is calculated by a formula based on the values in other analogue and digital points—or implicit: the SCADA system might automatically monitor whether the value in an analogue point lies outside high and low- limit values associated with that point. Examples of alarm indicators include a siren, a pop-up box on a screen, or a coloured or flashing area on a screen (that might act in a similar way to the "fuel tank empty" light in a car); in each case, the role of the alarm indicator is to draw the operator's attention to the part of the system 'in alarm' so that appropriate action can be taken. In designing SCADA systems, care must be taken when a cascade of alarm events occurs in a short time, otherwise the underlying cause (which might not be the earliest event detected) may get lost in the noise. Unfortunately, when used as a noun, the word 'alarm' is used rather loosely in the industry; thus, depending on context it might mean an alarm point, an alarm indicator, or an alarm event.
SCADA solutions often have Distributed Control System (DCS) components. Use of "smart" RTUs or PLCs, which are capable of autonomously executing simple logic processes without involving the master computer, is increasing. A standardized control programming language, IEC 61131-3 (a suite of 5 programming languages including Function Block, Ladder, Structured Text, Sequence Function Charts and Instruction List), is frequently used to create programs which run on these RTUs and PLCs. Unlike a procedural language such as the C programming language or FORTRAN, IEC 61131-3 has minimal training requirements by virtue of resembling historic physical control arrays. This allows SCADA system engineers to perform both the design and implementation of a program to be executed on an RTU or PLC. A Programmable Automation Controller (PAC) is a compact controller that combines the features and capabilities of a PC-based control system with that of a typical PLC. PACs are deployed in SCADA systems to provide RTU and PLC functions. In many electrical substation SCADA applications, "distributed RTUs" use information processors or station computers to communicate with digital protective relays, PACs, and other devices for I/O, and communicate with the SCADA master in lieu of a traditional RTU.
Since about 1998, virtually all major PLC manufacturers have offered integrated HMI/SCADA systems, many of them using open and non-proprietary communications protocols. Numerous specialized third-party HMI/SCADA packages, offering built-in compatibility with most major PLCs, have also entered the market, allowing mechanical engineers, electrical engineers and technicians to configure HMIs themselves, without the need for a custom-made program written by a software programmer. The Remote Terminal Unit (RTU) connects to physical equipment. Typically, an RTU converts the electrical signals from the equipment to digital values such as the open/closed status from a switch or a valve, or measurements such as pressure, flow, voltage or current. By converting and sending these electrical signals out to equipment the RTU can control equipment, such as opening or closing a switch or a valve, or setting the speed of a pump.
The term supervisory station refers to the servers and software responsible for communicating with the field equipment (RTUs, PLCs, SENSORS etc.), and then to the HMI software running on workstations in the control room, or elsewhere. In smaller SCADA systems, the master station may be composed of a single PC. In larger SCADA systems, the master station may include multiple servers, distributed software applications, and disaster recovery sites. To increase the integrity of the system the multiple servers will often be configured in a dual-redundant or hot-standby formation providing continuous control and monitoring in the event of a server malfunction or breakdown.
For some installations, the costs that would result from the control system failing are extremely high. Hardware for some SCADA systems is ruggedized to withstand temperature, vibration, and voltage extremes. In the most critical installations, reliability is enhanced by having redundant hardware and communications channels, up to the point of having multiple fully equipped control centres. A failing part can be quickly identified and its functionality automatically taken over by backup hardware. A failed part can often be replaced without interrupting the process. The reliability of such systems can be calculated statistically and is stated as the mean time to failure, which is a variant of Mean Time Between Failures (MTBF). The calculated mean time to failure of such high reliability systems can be on the order of centuries
Communication infrastructure and methods
SCADA systems have traditionally used combinations of radio and direct wired connections, although SONET/SDH is also frequently used for large systems such as railways and power stations. The remote management or monitoring function of a SCADA system is often referred to as telemetry. Some users want SCADA data to travel over their pre-established corporate networks or to share the network with other applications. The legacy of the early low-bandwidth protocols remains, though.
SCADA protocols are designed to be very compact. Many are designed to send information only when the master station polls the RTU. Typical legacy SCADA protocols include Modbus RTU, RP-570, Profibus and Conitel. These communication protocols are all SCADA-vendor specific but are widely adopted and used. Standard protocols are IEC 60870-5-101 or 104, IEC 61850 and DNP3. These communication protocols are standardized and recognized by all major SCADA vendors. Many of these protocols now contain extensions to operate over TCP/IP. Although the use of conventional networking specifications, such as TCP/IP, blurs the line between traditional and industrial networking, they each fulfill fundamentally differing requirements.
With increasing security demands (such as North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) and Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) in the US), there is increasing use of satellite-based communication. This has the key advantages that the infrastructure can be self-contained (not using circuits from the public telephone system), can have built-in encryption, and can be engineered to the availability and reliability required by the SCADA system operator. Earlier experiences using consumer-grade VSAT were poor. Modern carrier-class systems provide the quality of service required for SCADA.
RTUs and other automatic controller devices were developed before the advent of industry wide standards for interoperability. The result is that developers and their management created a multitude of control protocols. Among the larger vendors, there was also the incentive to create their own protocol to "lock in" their customer base. A list of automation protocols is compiled here.
Recently, OLE for process control (OPC) has become a widely accepted solution for intercommunicating different hardware and software, allowing communication even between devices originally not intended to be part of an industrial network.
First generation: "Monolithic"
Early SCADA system computing was done by large minicomputers. Common network services did not exist at the time SCADA was developed. Thus SCADA systems were independent systems with no connectivity to other systems. The communication protocols used were strictly proprietary at that time. The first-generation SCADA system redundancy was achieved using a back-up mainframe system connected to all the Remote Terminal Unit sites and was used in the event of failure of the primary mainframe system. Some first generation SCADA systems were developed as "turn key" operations that ran on minicomputers such as the PDP-11 series made by the Digital Equipment Corporation
Second generation: "Distributed"
SCADA information and command processing was distributed across multiple stations which were connected through a LAN. Information was shared in near real time. Each station was responsible for a particular task thus making the size and cost of each station less than the one used in First Generation. The network protocols used were still not standardized. Since the protocols were proprietary, very few people beyond the developers knew enough to determine how secure a SCADA installation was. Security of the SCADA installation was usually overlooked.*
Third generation: "Networked"
Similar to a distributed architecture, any complex SCADA can be reduced to simplest components and connected through communication protocols. In the case of a networked design, the system may be spread across more than one LAN network called a process control network (PCN) and separated geographically. Several distributed architecture SCADAs running in parallel, with a single supervisor and historian, could be considered a network architecture. This allows for a more cost effective solution in very large scale systems.
Fourth generation: "Internet of Things"
With the commercial availability of cloud computing, SCADA systems have increasingly adopted Internet of Things technology to significantly reduce infrastructure costs and increase ease of maintenance and integration. As a result SCADA systems can now report state in near real-time and use the horizontal scale available in cloud environments to implement more complex control algorithms than are practically feasible to implement on traditional programmable logic controllers. Further, the use of open network protocols such as TLS inherent in the Internet of Things technology, provides a more readily comprehensible and manageable security boundary than the heterogeneous mix of proprietary network protocols typical of many decentralized SCADA implementations. One such example of this technology is an innovative approach to rainwater harvesting through the implementation of real time controls (RTC).
This decentralization of data also requires a different approach to SCADA than traditional PLC based programs. When a SCADA system is used locally, the preferred methodology involves binding the graphics on the user interface to the data stored in specific PLC memory addresses. However, when the data comes from a disparate mix of sensors, controllers and databases (which may be local or at varied connected locations), the typical 1 to 1 mapping becomes problematic. A solution to this is Data Modeling, a concept derived from object oriented programming.
In a Data Model, a virtual representation of each device is constructed in the SCADA software. These virtual representations (“Models”) can contain not just the address mapping of the device represented, but also any other pertinent information (web based info, database entries, media files, etc.) that may be used by other facets of the SCADA/IoT implementation. An example of data modeling in this context can be found in the Virtualization of Things (VoT) Platform developed by B-Scada. As the increased complexity of the Internet of Things renders traditional SCADA increasingly “house-bound,” and as communication protocols evolve to favor platform-independent, service-oriented architecture (such as OPC UA), it is likely that more SCADA software developers will implement some form of data modeling.
SCADA systems that tie together decentralized facilities such as power, oil, and gas pipelines and water distribution and wastewater collection systems were designed to be open, robust, and easily operated and repaired, but not necessarily secure. The move from proprietary technologies to more standardized and open solutions together with the increased number of connections between SCADA systems, office networks, and the Internet has made them more vulnerable to types of network attacks that are relatively common in computer security. For example, United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT) released a vulnerability advisory that allowed unauthenticated users to download sensitive configuration information including password hashes on an Inductive Automation Ignition system utilizing a standard attack type leveraging access to the Tomcat Embedded Web server. Security researcher Jerry Brown submitted a similar advisory regarding a buffer overflow vulnerability in a Wonderware InBatchClient ActiveX control. Both vendors made updates available prior to public vulnerability release. Mitigation recommendations were standard patching practices and requiring VPN access for secure connectivity. Consequently, the security of some SCADA-based systems has come into question as they are seen as potentially vulnerable to cyber attacks.
In particular, security researchers are concerned about:
- the lack of concern about security and authentication in the design, deployment and operation of some existing SCADA networks
- the belief that SCADA systems have the benefit of security through obscurity through the use of specialized protocols and proprietary interfaces
- the belief that SCADA networks are secure because they are physically secured
- the belief that SCADA networks are secure because they are disconnected from the Internet.
SCADA systems are used to control and monitor physical processes, examples of which are transmission of electricity, transportation of gas and oil in pipelines, water distribution, traffic lights, and other systems used as the basis of modern society. The security of these SCADA systems is important because compromise or destruction of these systems would impact multiple areas of society far removed from the original compromise. For example, a blackout caused by a compromised electrical SCADA system would cause financial losses to all the customers that received electricity from that source. How security will affect legacy SCADA and new deployments remains to be seen.
There are many threat vectors to a modern SCADA system. One is the threat of unauthorized access to the control software, whether it be human access or changes induced intentionally or accidentally by virus infections and other software threats residing on the control host machine. Another is the threat of packet access to the network segments hosting SCADA devices. In many cases, the control protocol lacks any form of cryptographic security, allowing an attacker to control a SCADA device by sending commands over a network. In many cases SCADA users have assumed that having a VPN offered sufficient protection, unaware that security can be trivially bypassed with physical access to SCADA-related network jacks and switches. Industrial control vendors suggest approaching SCADA security like Information Security with a defense in depth strategy that leverages common IT practices.
The reliable function of SCADA systems in our modern infrastructure may be crucial to public health and safety. As such, attacks on these systems may directly or indirectly threaten public health and safety. Such an attack has already occurred, carried out on Maroochy Shire Council's sewage control system in Queensland, Australia. Shortly after a contractor installed a SCADA system in January 2000, system components began to function erratically. Pumps did not run when needed and alarms were not reported. More critically, sewage flooded a nearby park and contaminated an open surface-water drainage ditch and flowed 500 meters to a tidal canal. The SCADA system was directing sewage valves to open when the design protocol should have kept them closed. Initially this was believed to be a system bug. Monitoring of the system logs revealed the malfunctions were the result of cyber attacks. Investigators reported 46 separate instances of malicious outside interference before the culprit was identified. The attacks were made by a disgruntled ex-employee of the company that had installed the SCADA system. The ex-employee was hoping to be hired by the utility full-time to maintain the system.
In April 2008, the Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack issued a Critical Infrastructures Report which discussed the extreme vulnerability of SCADA systems to an electromagnetic pulse (EMP) event. After testing and analysis, the Commission concluded: "SCADA systems are vulnerable to EMP insult. The large numbers and widespread reliance on such systems by all of the Nation’s critical infrastructures represent a systemic threat to their continued operation following an EMP event. Additionally, the necessity to reboot, repair, or replace large numbers of geographically widely dispersed systems will considerably impede the Nation’s recovery from such an assault."
Many vendors of SCADA and control products have begun to address the risks posed by unauthorized access by developing lines of specialized industrial firewall and VPN solutions for TCP/IP-based SCADA networks as well as external SCADA monitoring and recording equipment. The International Society of Automation (ISA) started formalizing SCADA security requirements in 2007 with a working group, WG4. WG4 "deals specifically with unique technical requirements, measurements, and other features required to evaluate and assure security resilience and performance of industrial automation and control systems devices".
The increased interest in SCADA vulnerabilities has resulted in vulnerability researchers discovering vulnerabilities in commercial SCADA software and more general offensive SCADA techniques presented to the general security community. In electric and gas utility SCADA systems, the vulnerability of the large installed base of wired and wireless serial communications links is addressed in some cases by applying bump-in-the-wire devices that employ authentication and Advanced Encryption Standard encryption rather than replacing all existing nodes.
In June 2010, anti-virus security company VirusBlokAda reported the first detection of malware that attacks SCADA systems (Siemens' WinCC/PCS 7 systems) running on Windows operating systems. The malware is called Stuxnet and uses four zero-day attacks to install a rootkit which in turn logs into the SCADA's database and steals design and control files. The malware is also capable of changing the control system and hiding those changes. The malware was found on 14 systems, the majority of which were located in Iran.
In October 2013 National Geographic released a docudrama titled, "American Blackout" which dealt with a large-scale cyber attack on SCADA and the United States' electrical grid.
SCADA In the workplace
SCADA can be a great tool while working in an environment where operational duties need to be monitored through electronic communication instead of locally. For example, an operator can position a valve to open or close through SCADA without leaving the control station or the computer. The SCADA system also can switch a pump or motor on or off and has the capability of putting motors on a Hand operating status, Off, or Automatic. Hand refers to operating the equipment locally, while Automatic has the equipment operate according to set points the operator provides on a computer that can communicate with the equipment through SCADA.
- Stuxnet- The first known custom-made virus designed to specifically infiltrate SCADA.
- Industrial Internet
- Process control network
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