Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe

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Santa Fe Independent School Dist. v. Doe
Seal of the United States Supreme Court.svg
Argued March 29, 2000
Decided June 19, 2000
Full case name Santa Fe Independent School District, Petitioner v. Jane Doe, individually and as next friend for her minor children, Jane and John Doe, et al.
Citations 530 U.S. 290 (more)
120 S. Ct. 2266; 147 L. Ed. 2d 295
Prior history 168 F.3d 806 (5th Cir. 1999), affirmed
Holding
The policy of the school district "permitting student-led, student-initiated prayer at [public high school] football games violates the Establishment Clause."
Court membership
Case opinions
Majority Stevens, joined by O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer
Dissent Rehnquist, joined by Scalia, Thomas
Laws applied
U.S. Const. amend. I

Santa Fe Independent School Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000), was a case heard before the United States Supreme Court. It ruled that a policy permitting student-led, student-initiated prayer at high school football games violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. Oral arguments were heard March 29, 2000. The court announced its decision on June 19, holding the policy unconstitutional in a 6–3 decision. School prayer is a controversial topic in American jurisprudence.

Background of the case[edit]

The Santa Fe Independent School District (SFISD), a rural school district in Texas between the cities of Houston and Galveston, promoted the dominant Baptist religion in its public schools. Members of the school board claimed that separation of church and state was a "myth." Gideons International was allowed to distribute Bibles in the public schools. A teacher handed out flyers in class for a revival meeting and then harangued a Mormon student for belonging to a cult. Prayers were offered before graduations and at home football games, led by an elected student chaplain.[1]

Two sets of students and their mothers—one Mormon, the other Catholic—filed suit against the school district. The lawsuit alleged various violations of the Establishment Clause and asked for an injunction to prevent prayers from being offered at the graduation ceremony. Judge Samuel B. Kent of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas permitted the plaintiffs to file anonymously as John and Jane Does to protect them from harassment. However, school employees asked parents to sign a petition supporting the school's religious practices; anyone who did not sign was placed under suspicion of having filed the suit.[1] Judge Kent then issued an order threatening, in all caps, "THE HARSHEST POSSIBLE CONTEMPT SANCTIONS" for anyone who attempted to discover the identities of the plaintiffs.

In his decision, Judge Kent ordered the school to eliminate all denominational activity in the classroom. Religion may only be discussed in a "non-denominational and non-judgmental" manner. He also permitted students to offer a non-denominational prayer at graduation ceremonies and football games. In allowing prayer at certain school functions, Judge Kent relied on Jones v. Clear Creek ISD, another school prayer case in a Houston area school district.

The school then adopted a policy in which the students would first vote by secret ballot whether to have a benediction at the graduation. If they voted yes, then they would elect students to deliver "nonsectarian, nonproselytizing invocations and benedictions." The students voted in favor of school prayer, and two students delivered nonsectarian benedictions at the graduation ceremony. Following the ceremony, the school removed the requirement that the prayer be nonsectarian and nonproselytizing. A similar policy was adopted for football games.

Fifth Circuit decision[edit]

Both the SFISD and the Does appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The SFISD appealed because it claimed the words "nonsectarian and nonproselytizing" should not be necessary. The Does wanted prayer at school events to be found unconstitutional altogether.

In a 2-1 decision, Jacques L. Wiener, Jr., and Carl E. Stewart agreed with the District Court that "the words 'nonsectarian, nonproselytizing' are constitutionally necessary components" of a policy governing prayer at graduations. However, the Appeals Court struck down the part of the decision that permitted prayer at football games. Graduation was a once in a lifetime event that deserved to be solemnized with prayer, while football games were "far less solemn and extraordinary." E. Grady Jolly dissented, objecting that now "the majority expressly exerts control over the content of its citizens' prayers."[2]

The Supreme Court granted certiorari, limited to the following question: "Whether petitioner's policy permitting student-led, student-initiated prayer at football games violates the Establishment Clause."

Supreme Court decision[edit]

The Court held that the policy allowing the student-led prayer at the football games was unconstitutional. The majority opinion, written by Justice Stevens, depended on Lee v. Weisman.[3] It held that these pre-game prayers delivered "on school property, at school-sponsored events, over the school's public address system, by a speaker representing the student body, under the supervision of school faculty, and pursuant to a school policy that explicitly and implicitly encourages public prayer" are not private, but public speech. "Regardless of the listener's support for, or objection to, the message, an objective Santa Fe High School student will unquestionably perceive the inevitable pregame prayer as stamped with her school's seal of approval."

A dissenting opinion was written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas. His dissent asserted that the majority opinion "bristles with hostility to all things religious in public life". His material objections were, first that the policy on which the Court has now ruled had not yet been put in to practice. "[T]he question is not whether the district's policy may be applied in violation of the Establishment Clause, but whether it inevitably will be." Second, Rehnquist also stated that the speech in question would be private, chosen and delivered by the speaker, rather than public, school-sponsored speech.

See also[edit]

References[edit]

  1. ^ a b Calloff, Pamela (November 2000). "They Haven't Got a Prayer". Texas Monthly. 
  2. ^ "168 F. 3d 806 - Doe v. Santa Fe Independent School District". 
  3. ^ 505 U.S. 577 (1992)

External links[edit]

Works related to Santa Fe Independent School Dist. v. Doe at Wikisource

  • Text of Santa Fe Independent School Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000) is available from:  Findlaw  Justia  LII