Sino-Soviet conflict (1929)

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For the 1969 border conflict, see Sino-Soviet border conflict.
Sino-Soviet conflict (1929)
KVZHD 1929 01.jpg
Soviet soldiers with captured Kuomintang banners.
Date July 22 – September 9, 1929
Location Inner Manchuria
Result

Soviet victory

  • Provisions of 1924 agreement were upheld.
Belligerents

Taiwan Republic of China

 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Commanders and leaders
Taiwan Zhang Xueliang Soviet Union Vasily Blyukher
Strength
100,000 40,000
Casualties and losses
7 ships lost
2,000 killed
1,000 wounded
more than 8,550 prisoners[citation needed]
187 killed
665 wounded[1]

The Sino-Soviet conflict of 1929 (Chinese: 中东路事件, Russian: Конфликт на Китайско-Восточной железной дороге) was a minor armed conflict between the Soviet Union and Chinese warlord Zhang Xueliang of the Republic of China over the Chinese Eastern Railway (also known as CER).

When the Chinese seized the Chinese Eastern Railway in 1929, swift Soviet military intervention quickly put an end to the crisis and forced the Chinese to accept restoration of joint Soviet-Chinese administration of the railway.[2]

Origin[edit]

In order to understand why the Chinese forced a hostile takeover, one must look at the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1924. On July 25, 1919, the Soviet government’s Assistant Commissar of Foreign Affairs, Lev Karakhan, had issued a manifesto to the Chinese government promising, among other things, to return the CER to Chinese control free of charge.[3] On August 26, 1919, the Karakhan Manifesto was published by the Soviet press, but the document did not contain anything about returning the CER to China without compensation--the Soviets had laid the foundation to double-cross the Chinese. They would later use the August 26th version of the Manifesto to argue with the Chinese government that they did not have to pay compensation for the CER.[4]

Along with the original Karakhan telegram, the Chinese had the Vilenski pamphlet as evidence.[5] The Vilenski pamphlet also shows the Chinese that the Soviets were willing to return the CER to the Chinese without compensation. The July 25th Karakhan telegram shows the Soviet Union's original intention, which was to return the CER back to Chinese control without compensation. The July 25th telegram was used to satisfy the diplomatic requirements for the Chinese government, while the August 26thk one was published to uphold propaganda requirements inside the Soviet Union.[6]

The first major step in uncovering the hostile takeover of the CER by the Chinese in 1929 starts with the understanding of the Secret Protocol of March 14, 1924, and the Secret Agreement of September 20, 1924. The March 14, 1924, Secret Protocol stated that all former conventions, treaties, protocols, contracts and any other document between the Soviet and China would be annulled until a conference could convene.[7] This made all treaties, border relations and commercial relations dependent on the upcoming conference. This, in turn, gave the Soviets time to turn to Zhang Xueliang in Manchuria, the strongest warlord there at the time. He had control of the Mukden government (today the city is known as Shenyang). The Soviets were the first to propose joint management of the CER with the Chinese, but Zhang stood in the way of this joint management. The Soviets decided to make a deal with Zhang.[8]

On May 31, 1924, Lev Karakhan and Dr. V.K. Ellington Koo, the Minister of Foreign Affairs for the Republic of China, signed the Sino-Soviet treaty. It included multiple articles, which played right into the Soviets' hand because in Article V it said “the employment of persons in the various departments of the railway shall be in accordance with the principle of equal representation between the nationals of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and those of the Republic of China.”[9] The Soviets added, “In carrying out the principle of equal representation the normal course of life and activities of the Railway shall in no case be interrupted or injured, that is to say the employment of both nationalities shall be in accordance with experience, personal qualifications and fitness of applicants.”[10]

While negotiations had been concluded with the Chinese, the Soviets turned to make a deal with Zhang Xueliang. They promised him full control of choosing which Chinese officials would be on the board in the joint Chinese-Soviet management of the CER. This would give him half control of CER. On September 20, 1924, he signed the Secret Agreement, not knowing the Chinese government had signed the Secret Protocol earlier in the year. Since the CER was originally controlled by the Soviets, the majority of the positions would be under Soviet control. Then the Soviets claimed they should keep majority control because any other solution would interrupt or injure the railway.[11]

The Soviets were also the puppet master of the President for the CER. The Soviet government was able to regain majority control of the CER by playing the secret protocols off each other and outmaneuvering the Chinese. The Soviets allowed the Chinese to think they were adding workers loyal to their government. However, in reality, the Soviets were creating more jobs on the railway and hiring Soviet workers. In the end, the Soviets controlled 67% of all positions on the CER.[12]

The Chinese entertained joint management until mid-1929. The change from Soviet control to Chinese control started when the Chinese authorities made a radical move to try to remove Soviet management. Chinese authorities stormed the Soviet Consulate in Harbin. They arrested the General Manager of the CER, his assistant and other Soviet citizens and removed them from power in the CER. The Soviets retaliated by arresting Chinese citizens inside the USSR. On July 13, 1929, the Soviets sent their formal demands to the Chinese concerning what was happening on the CER. On July 19 they discontinued their diplomatic relations with the Chinese. They suspended railway communication and demanded that all Chinese diplomats leave Soviet territory.[13] By July 20 the Soviets were transferring their funds to New York. While in the cities of Suifenhe and Lahususa, the Soviets were terrorizing the Chinese civilians by having their warships' guns pointed at the city and having their planes make fly-bys.[14] On August 6 the Soviet Union created the Special Red Banner Far Eastern Army. By doing so they were willing to do whatever it took to return the CER back to their control.

The Conflict[edit]

Small skirmishes had broken out in July, but this would not be considered the first major military action. The first battle happened on August 17, 1929, when the Soviets attacked Chalainor. Chinese troops retreated to an entrenchment which was supported by machine guns. The Soviets had walked into a trap--whether by Chinese deception or by accident, nobody can say. The Soviets suffered heavy losses that day; this would be the only time the Soviet forces would incur such heavy losses.[15]

In October the Soviets forced their naval fleets up the Amur and Songhua tivers and capture the Lahasusu. This maneuver caused the Chinese to move to a different location. On their way to Fujin, Chinese troops would kill any civilian they came across and raid any stores.[16] The Soviets stated that they did not touch the civilian population, and encouraged Chinese civilians to fight alongside them against the Chinese army. They also denied killing civilians, and were said to only take military goods. All civilian personal items were left in place; this was strictly enforced.[17]

On November 17 the Soviets decided to take ten divisions and split their attack into two stages. The first stage was to go past Manzhouli and attack the region of Chalainor. After capturing the region, Soviet troops set their sights on Manzhouli.[18] When they reached Manzhouli they found that the Chinese were not prepared for battle and that Chinese forces were looting houses, stores and stealing civilian clothes and trying to escape. The Soviet strategy was a success; on November 26 the Chinese were ready to sign a treaty with the Soviets on Soviet terms. On December 13, after much debate on the Chinese side, the Chinese signed the Khabarovsk Protocol. This restored peace and the 1924 status quo ante, which was the Sino-Soviet treaty of 1924.[19]

The victory over China was an eye opener for the world--nobody expected the Soviets to win. During the conflict, the Soviets used propaganda to help spread communist ideology and confuse the Chinese Army by using radio and leaflets. They did this by deceiving the Chinese command on which town was the Soviets' next target. “Its military forces combined carefully measured use of depth and variety, coordinated in the fashion of a swift action design to achieve the precise goal of ‘an annihilating offensive under complex condition’ against enemy forces.”[20] The conflict brought a sense of military prestige back into the Asian region. The Soviet victory was also applauded by such western nations as the (US, France and Great Britain). It showed the west that the Soviets were able to use both diplomacy and military might to achieve its goal. However, while some might have applauded the Soviets for using this technique, others feared it. This was a legitimate concern. The western nations were frightened that this method could potentially mean the Soviet Union might one day be able to beat a western nation at its own game.[21]

The impact of the conflict left the Manchurian region in a power vacuum. This left the door wide open for the Japanese to take control of the region. After observing how easily Soviet forces beat the Chinese, the Japanese employed a similar technique to defeat the Chinese and occupy Manchuria before WWII.[22]

See also[edit]

Notes[edit]

  1. ^ Krivosheev, G. F. (1997). "Soviet Casualties and Combat Losses in the Twentieth Century". Page 370, Table 111.
  2. ^ Collective security
  3. ^ Elleman, Bruce (May 1994). The Soviet Union's Secret Diplomacy Concerning the Chinese Eastern Railway, 1924–1925 (2nd ed.). Association of Asian Studies. p. 460.  Check date values in: |access-date= (help);
  4. ^ Elleman; 461
  5. ^ Elleman; 461
  6. ^ Elleman; 461
  7. ^ Elleman; 468
  8. ^ Elleman; 471
  9. ^ Elleman; 476
  10. ^ Elleman; 476
  11. ^ Elleman; 476
  12. ^ Elleman; 476
  13. ^ Patrikeef, Felix (2010). Elleman, Bruce; Kotkin, Stephen, eds. Manchurian Railways and the Opening of China: An International History Railway as Political Catalyst: The Chinese Eastern Railway and the 1929 Sino-Soviet Conflict. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe.  Check date values in: |access-date= (help);
  14. ^ Patrikeef
  15. ^ Patrikeef
  16. ^ Patrikeef
  17. ^ Patrikeef
  18. ^ Patrikeef
  19. ^ Patrikeef
  20. ^ Patrikeef
  21. ^ Patrikeef
  22. ^ Patrikeef

Bibliography[edit]

  • Bruce A. Elleman. The Soviet Union's Secret Diplomacy Concerning the Chinese Eastern Railway, 1924–1925. 2nd ed. Vol. 53. May: Association of Asian Studies, 1994.
  • Felix Patrikeeff, Russian Politics in Exile: The Northeast Asian Balance of Power, 1924–1931 Basingstoke 2002, ISBN 0-333-73018-6
  • George Alexander Lensen, The Damned Inheritance. The Soviet Union and the Manchurian Crises. 1924–1935, Ann Arbor 1974
  • Felix Patrikeef Railway as Political Catalyst: The Chinese Eastern Railway and the 1929 Sino-Soviet Conflict. Edited by: Elleman, Bruce A., and Stephen Kotkin. Manchurian Railways and the Opening of China: An International History. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2010.

External links[edit]

Time Magazine