Sino-Sikh War

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Sino-Sikh war
General Zorawar Singh (1786-1841)
DateMay 1841 – August 1842
Result Stalemate
Status quo ante bellum
Flag of China (1862–1889).svg Qing dynasty Sikh Empire flag.jpg Sikh Empire
Commanders and leaders
Meng Bao
Unknown Unknown
Sino-Sikh War
Traditional Chinese森巴戰爭
Simplified Chinese森巴战争
Literal meaningDogra War

The Sino-Sikh War or the Dogra-Tibetan War[1] was fought from May 1841 to August 1842, between the forces of the Dogra nobleman Gulab Singh of Jammu, under the suzerainty of the Sikh Empire, and Tibet under the suzerainty of Qing China.[1] Gulab Singh's commander was the able general Zorawar Singh Kahluria, who, after the conquest of Ladakh, attempted to extend its boundaries in order to control the trade routes into Ladakh.[2] Zorawar Singh's campaign, suffering from the effects of inclement weather, suffered a defeat at Missar and Singh was killed.[3] The Tibetans then advanced on Ladakh. Gulab Singh sent reinforcements under the command of his nephew Jawahir Singh. A subsequent battle near Leh in 1842 led to a Tibetan defeat. The Treaty of Chushul was signed in 1842 maintaining the status quo ante bellum.[4]


Sikh Empire tri-lingual.jpg

From the early 18th century, the Manchu-led Qing dynasty had consolidated its control of Tibet after defeating the Dzungar Khanate. From then until late into the 19th century, the Qing rule of the region remained unchallenged. South of the Himalayas, Ranjit Singh established his empire in the Punjab region in 1799.

In 1808, Ranjit Singh conquered Jammu, which was under control of the Hindu Rajput Dogra dynasty from Dougar Desh in Jammu[5] and incorporated them into his empire as vassals.

Historians continue to debate the reasons for the invasion; some say control of Tibet would have given Gulab Singh a monopoly on the lucrative pashmina wool trade of Tibet, others believe that he aimed to establish a land bridge between Ladakh and Nepal to create a Sikh-Gorkha alliance against the British.[6]

Zorawar Singh knew that western Tibet (Ngari) was connected to the rest of Tibet by the Mayum La, so his plan consisted of advancing as quickly as possibly into enemy territory, capturing the pass before winter, and building up his forces for a renewed campaign in the summer.[7]

Invasion of Tibet[edit]

As Zorawar Singh had done in Ladakh, so too in the newly conquered Baltistan, Zorawar recruited the Baltis into his army, which now had men from the Jammu hills, Kishtwar, and Ladakh. This five or six thousand-strong army was divided into three columns that marched parallel into Tibet in May 1841.

A view from Lake Manasarovar

One column under the Ladakhi prince Nono Sungnam followed the course of the Indus River to its source at Lake Manasarovar. Another column of 300 men under Ghulam Khan marched along the mountains leading up to the Kailash Range south of the Indus. Zorawar himself led 3000 men along the plateau region where the vast and picturesque Pangong Tso is located. The invaders met with success in the beginning of the invasion, thanks to the quality of their weapons, but the Tibetans resisted using guerrilla tactics and their knowledge of the local terrain.[8]

Sweeping all resistance before them, the three columns passed Lake Manasarovar and converged at Gartok, defeating the small Tibetan force stationed there. The enemy commander fled to Taklakot but Zorawar stormed that fort on September 6, 1841. Envoys from Tibet now came to him as did agents of the Maharaja of Nepal, whose kingdom was only fifteen miles from Taklakot.

The Sikh army now controlled the urban centers of Daba, Tholing, Tsaparang Rudok, Gartok and Taklakot (modern Burang Town).[9] He garrisoned the towns and set up an administration to rule the occupied territories. Meanwhile, in the Punjab, the British envoys pressured the Maharaja to order his withdrawal while the Nepalis helped the Qing forces against him.[9]

The fall of Taklakot finds mention in the report of the Chinese Imperial Resident, Meng Pao, at Lhasa:

On my arrival at Taklakot a force of only about 1,000 local troops could be mustered, which was divided and stationed as guards at different posts. A guard post was quickly established at a strategic pass near Taklakot to stop the invaders, but these local troops were not brave enough to fight off the Shen-Pa (Dogras) and fled at the approach of the invaders. The distance between Central Tibet and Taklakot is several thousand li…because of the cowardice of the local troops; our forces had to withdraw to the foot of the Tsa Mountain near the Mayum Pass. Reinforcements are essential in order to withstand these violent and unruly invaders.

Zorawar and his men went on pilgrimage to Mansarovar and Mount Kailash. He had extended his communication and supply line over 450 miles of inhospitable terrain by building small forts and pickets along the way. The fort Chi-T’ang was built near Taklakot, where Mehta Basti Ram was put in command of 500 men, with 8 or 9 cannon. With the onset of winter all the passes were blocked and roads snowed in. The supplies for the Dogra army over such a long distance failed despite Zorawar’s meticulous preparations.[citation needed]

As the intense cold, coupled with the rain, snow and lightning continued for weeks upon weeks, many of the soldiers lost their fingers and toes to frostbite. Others starved to death, while some burnt the wooden stock of their muskets to warm themselves. The Tibetans and their Han Chinese allies regrouped and advanced to give battle, bypassing the Dogra fort of Chi-T’ang. Zorawar and his men met them at the Battle of Toyo on December 12, 1841. In the early exchange of fire the Rajput general was wounded in his right shoulder, but he grabbed a sword in his left hand. The Tibetan horsemen then charged the Dogra position and one of them thrust his lance in Zorawar Singh’s chest. Wounded and unable to escape he was pulled down off his horse and beheaded.[8] The battle marked the end of the invasion, with the death of their general and 300 dead and 700 soldiers captured,[8] the army of Punjab hurriedly retreated to Ladakh with the Sino-Tibetan forces on their heels until they finally halted the pursuit just a day from Leh.[10]

Qing invasion of Ladakh[edit]

The Sino-Tibetan force then mopped up the other garrisons of the Dogras and advanced on Ladakh, now determined to conquer it and add it to the Imperial Chinese dominions. However the force under Mehta Basti Ram withstood a siege for several weeks at Chi-T’ang before escaping with 240 men across the Himalayas to the British post of Almora. Within Ladakh the Sino-Tibetan army laid siege to Leh, when reinforcements under Diwan Hari Chand and Wazir Ratnu came from Jammu and repulsed them. The Tibetan fortifications at Drangtse were flooded when the Dogras dammed up the river. On open ground, the Chinese and Tibetans were chased to Chushul. The climactic Battle of Chushul (August 1842) was won by the Sikhs who executed the enemy general to avenge the death of Zorawar Singh.[11][unreliable source?][12]

The Treaty of Chushul[edit]

At this point, neither side wished to continue the conflict, as the Sikhs were embroiled in tensions with the British that would lead up to the First Anglo-Sikh War, while the Qing were in the midst of the First Opium War with the East India Company. Qing China and the Sikh Empire signed a treaty in September 1842 that stipulated no transgressions or interference in the other country's frontiers.[13]

"As on this auspicious day, the 3nd of Assuj, samvat 1899 (16th/17th September 1842) we, the officers of the Lhasa (Governrnent), Kalon of Sokan and Bakshi Shajpuh, commander of the forces, and two officers on behalf of the most resplendent Sri Khalsa ji Sahib, the asylum of the world, King Sher Singh ji, and Sri Maharaja Sahib Raja-i-Rajagan Raja Sahib Bahadur Raja Gulab Singh, i.e.. the Muktar-ud-Daula Diwan Hari Chand and the asylum of vizirs, Vizir Ratnun. in a meeting called together for the promotion of peace and unity, and by professions and vows of friendship, unity and sincerity of heart and by taking oaths like those of Kunjak Sahib, have arranged and agreed that relations of peace, friendship and unity between Sri Khalsaji and Sri Maharaja Sahib Bahadur Raja Gulab Singh ji, and the Emperor of China and the Lama Guru of Lhasa will hence forward remain firmly established forever; and we declare in the presence of the Kunjak Sahib that on no account whatsoever will there be any deviation, difference of departure (from this agreement). We shall neither at present nor in the future have anything to do or interfere at all with the boundaries of Ladakh and its surroundings as fixed from ancient times and will allow the annual export of wool, shawls and tea by way of ladakh according to the old established customs.

Should any of the Opponents of Sri Sarkar Khalsa ji and Sri Raja Sahib Bahadur at any time enter our territories, we shall not pay any heed to his words or allow him to remain in our country. We shall offer no hindrance to traders of Ladakh who visit our territories. We shall not even to the extent of a hair's breadth act in contravention of the terms that we have agreed to above regarding firm friendship, unity, the fixed boundaries of Ladakh and the keeping open of the route for wool, shawls and tea. We call Kunjak Sahib, Kairi, Lassi, Zhon Mahan, and Khushal Chon as witnesses to this treaty."[13]

See also[edit]



  1. ^ a b Fisher, Rose & Huttenback, Himalayan Battleground (1963), pp. 49–59.
  2. ^ Fisher, Rose & Huttenback, Himalayan Battleground (1963), p. 49.
  3. ^ Huttenback, Gulab Singh and the Creation of the Dogra State (1961), p. 485.
  4. ^ Huttenback, Gulab Singh and the Creation of the Dogra State (1961), p. 487.
  5. ^ Heath (2005), p. 35
  6. ^ Bakshi (2002), p. 96
  7. ^ Bakshi (2002), p. 97
  8. ^ a b c Maher & Shakabpa (2010), p. 577
  9. ^ a b McKay 2003, p. 28
  10. ^ Maher & Shakabpa (2010), p. 584
  11. ^ Sino-Dogra War,, 6 February 2012
  12. ^ Sandhya Jain (21 May 2013). "On the defensive on too many occasions". The Pioneer.
  13. ^ a b Rubin, Alfred P. (1960), "The Sino-Indian Border Disputes", International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 9 (1): 96–124, doi:10.1093/iclqaj/9.1.96, JSTOR 756256