|The Right Honourable
The Earl of Avon
KG, MC, PC
|Prime Minister of the United Kingdom|
6 April 1955 – 10 January 1957
|Preceded by||Sir Winston Churchill|
|Succeeded by||Harold Macmillan|
|Deputy Prime Minister of the United Kingdom|
26 October 1951 – 6 April 1955
|Prime Minister||Sir Winston Churchill|
|Preceded by||Herbert Morrison|
|Succeeded by||Rab Butler[a]|
|Leader of the Conservative Party|
6 April 1955 – 10 January 1957
|Preceded by||Sir Winston Churchill|
|Succeeded by||Harold Macmillan|
|Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs|
28 October 1951 – 7 April 1955
|Prime Minister||Sir Winston Churchill|
|Preceded by||Herbert Morrison|
|Succeeded by||Harold Macmillan|
22 December 1940 – 26 July 1945
|Prime Minister||Winston Churchill|
|Preceded by||The Viscount Halifax|
|Succeeded by||Ernest Bevin|
22 December 1935 – 20 February 1938
|Preceded by||Sir Samuel Hoare, Bt|
|Succeeded by||The Viscount Halifax|
|Leader of the House of Commons|
22 February 1942 – 26 July 1945
|Prime Minister||Winston Churchill|
|Preceded by||Sir Stafford Cripps|
|Succeeded by||Herbert Morrison|
|Secretary of State for War|
11 May 1940 – 22 December 1940
|Prime Minister||Winston Churchill|
|Preceded by||Oliver Stanley|
|Succeeded by||David Margesson|
|Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs|
3 September 1939 – 14 May 1940
|Preceded by||Sir Thomas Inskip|
|Succeeded by||The Viscount Caldecote|
|Lord Privy Seal|
June 1934 – 7 June 1935
|Prime Minister||Ramsay MacDonald|
|Preceded by||Stanley Baldwin|
|Succeeded by||The Marquess of Londonderry|
|Member of Parliament
for Warwick and Leamington
6 December 1923 – 10 January 1957
|Preceded by||Ernest Pollock|
|Succeeded by||John Hobson|
|Born||Robert Anthony Eden
12 June 1897
County Durham, England
|Died||14 January 1977
Alvediston, Salisbury, Wiltshire, England
|Resting place||Churchyard of St Mary's, Alvediston|
|Alma mater||Christ Church, Oxford|
|Profession||Member of Parliament|
|Years of service||1914–1918, 1939|
|Unit||King's Royal Rifle Corps|
|Battles/wars||World War I|
|a. ^ Office vacant from 6 April 1955 to 13 July 1962.|
Robert Anthony Eden, 1st Earl of Avon, KG, MC, PC (12 June 1897 – 14 January 1977) was a British Conservative politician who served three periods as Foreign Secretary and then a relatively brief term as Prime Minister of the United Kingdom from 1955 to 1957.
Achieving rapid promotion as a young Member of Parliament, he was Foreign Secretary at the early age of thirty-eight, before resigning in protest at Neville Chamberlain's appeasement of Mussolini's Italy. He again held that position during the last five years of the Second World War, and a third time in the early 1950s. Having been Churchill's undisputed deputy for fifteen years, he succeeded him as Prime Minister in 1955, and a month later won a general election.
By this time Eden was suffering from recurrent fevers and using mood-altering prescription drugs following a series of botched operations. His worldwide reputation as an opponent of appeasement, a "Man of Peace", and a skilled diplomat was overshadowed in 1956 when the United States refused to support the Anglo-French military response to the Suez Crisis, which critics across party lines regarded as an historic setback for British foreign policy, signalling the end of British predominance in the Middle East. Most historians argue that he made a series of blunders, especially not realising the depth of the United States' opposition to military action. After the Suez Crisis he resigned as Prime Minister on grounds of ill health, and because he was widely suspected of having misled the House of Commons over the degree of “collusion” between Britain and Israel. He played little part in public life thereafter.
He is generally ranked among the least successful British Prime Ministers of the 20th century, although two broadly sympathetic biographies (in 1986 and 2003) have gone some way to redressing the balance of opinion. D.R. Thorpe says the Suez Crisis "was a truly tragic end to his premiership, and one that came to assume a disproportionate importance in any assessment of his career."
- 1 Early life
- 2 School, war and Oxford
- 3 Early political career, 1922–31
- 4 Foreign Affairs Minister, 1931–5
- 5 Foreign Secretary and resignation (1935–38)
- 6 World War II
- 7 Post-war, 1945–55
- 8 Prime Minister (1955–57)
- 9 Retirement
- 10 Personal Life
- 11 Illness and death
- 12 Character, speaking style and assessments
- 13 Eden in popular culture
- 14 Cabinet (1955–57)
- 15 Ancestry
- 16 Memoirs
- 17 Notes
- 18 Further reading
- 19 External links
Eden was born at Windlestone Hall, County Durham, England, into a very conservative landed gentry family. He was a younger son of Sir William Eden, baronet, a former army officer and local magistrate from an old titled family, and an eccentric and often foul-tempered man. His mother, Sybil Frances Grey, was a member of the famous Grey family of Northumberland (see below). She had wanted to marry Francis Knollys, later an important Royal adviser. Although she was a popular figure locally, she had a strained relationship with her children, and her profligacy ruined the family fortunes. Eden’s older brother Tim had to sell Windlestone in 1936. Rab Butler would later quip that Eden—a handsome but ill-tempered man—was "half mad baronet, half beautiful woman".
Eden's great-grandfather was William Iremonger who commanded the 2nd Regiment of Foot during the Peninsular War, fighting under Wellington (as he became) at Vimiero. He was also descended from Governor Sir Robert Eden, 1st Baronet, of Maryland, the Calvert Family of Maryland, the Schaffalitzky de Muckadell family of Denmark, and Bie family of Norway. Eden was once amused to learn that one of his ancestors had, like Churchill’s ancestor the Duke of Marlborough, been the lover of Barbara Castlemaine.
There was speculation for many years that Eden's natural father was the politician and man of letters George Wyndham, but this is considered impossible as Wyndham was in South Africa at the time of Eden's conception. His mother was rumoured to have had an affair with Wyndham. Eden had an elder brother called John, who was killed in action in 1914 and a younger brother, Nicholas, who was killed when the battlecruiser HMS Indefatigable blew up and sank at the Battle of Jutland in 1916.
School, war and Oxford
Eden was educated at two independent schools: at Sandroyd School in Cobham from 1907 to 1910, where he swam poorly but excelled in languages, followed by Eton College, where he won a Divinity prize and excelled at cricket, rugby and rowing, winning House colours in the last. Although Eden later claimed to have had no interest in politics until the early 1920s, his teenage letters and diaries show him to have been obsessed with the subject. He was a strong, partisan Conservative, rejoicing in the defeat of Charles Masterman at a by-election (May 1913) and once astonishing his mother on a train journey by telling her the MP and the size of his majority for each constituency through which they passed. By 1914 he was a member of the Eton Society (“Pop”).
During World War I, Eden served with the 21st (Yeoman Rifles) Battalion of the King's Royal Rifle Corps, and reached the rank of captain. One summer night in 1916, near Ploegsteert, Eden had to lead a small raid into an enemy trench to kill or capture enemy soldiers, so as to identify the enemy units opposite. He and his men were pinned down in No Man’s Land under enemy fire, his sergeant seriously wounded in the leg. Eden sent one man back to British lines to fetch another man and a stretcher, then he and three others carried the wounded sergeant back with, as he later put it in his memoirs, a “chilly feeling down our spines”, unsure whether the Germans had not seen them in the dark or were chivalrously declining to fire. He omitted to mention that he had been awarded the Military Cross for the incident, something of which he had made little mention in his political career.
Although Lloyd George was one of the few politicians of whom Eden reported front-line soldiers speaking highly, he wrote to his sister (23 December 1917) in disgust at his “wait and see twaddle” in declining to extend conscription to Ireland. In spring 1918 he became brigade major of the 198th Infantry Brigade. At the age of twenty-one he was the youngest brigade-major in the British Army. At a conference in the early 1930s, he and Adolf Hitler observed that they had probably fought on opposite sides of the trenches in the Ypres sector. He considered standing for Parliament at the end of the war, but the general election was called too early for this to be possible. 
After the war he studied at Christ Church, Oxford, starting in October 1919, where he graduated with a Double First in Oriental Languages. He was fluent in French and Persian, and also spoke German and Arabic. He took no part in student politics, and his main leisure interest at the time was art; he was already collecting paintings. Eden’s German was not quite fluent and he needed a translator present when he met Hitler in February 1933. In the spring of 1921 he was briefly recalled to military service to command local defence forces at Spennymoor as serious industrial unrest seemed possible.
Early political career, 1922–31
Captain Eden, as he was still known, was selected to contest Spennymore, as a Conservative. At first he had hoped to win (with some Liberal support as the Conservatives were still supporting Lloyd George's coalition government) but by the time of the November 1922 general election it was clear that the surge in the Labour vote made this unlikely. He read the writings of Lord Curzon and was hoping to emulate him by entering politics with a view to specialising in foreign affairs.
He was elected Member of Parliament for Warwick and Leamington in the December 1923 general election, at the age of twenty-six. His maiden speech (19 February 1924) was a controversial attack on Labour and was heckled, and thereafter he was careful to speak only after deep preparation.
Early in 1925 Eden, disappointed not to have been offered a position on the Conservatives' return to power the previous autumn, went on a tour of the Middle East, meeting Emir Feisal of Iraq and inspecting the oil refinery at Abadan, which he likened to Swansea. He was appointed Parliamentary Private Secretary to Godfrey Locker-Lampson, Under-Secretary at the Home Office (17 February 1925) (serving under Home Secretary William Joynson Hicks) and then remained with Locker-Lampson when the latter was appointed Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office in December 1925. Eden distinguished himself with a speech on the Middle East (21 December 1925) and in July 1926 he became PPS to the Foreign Secretary Sir Austen Chamberlain. In November 1928, with Austen Chamberlain away on a voyage to recover his health, Eden had to speak for the government in a debate on a recent Anglo-French naval agreement, replying to Ramsay MacDonald (then Leader of the Opposition).  According to Austen Chamberlain, he would have been promoted to his first ministerial job, Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, if the Conservatives had won the 1929 election.
Eden’s father had died on 20 February 1915. As a younger son, he had inherited capital of £7,675 and in 1922 he had a private income of £706 after tax (approximately £375,000 and £35,000 at 2014 prices). Besides supplementing his parliamentary income (around £300 a year at that time) by writing and journalism (in 1926 he published a book about his travels, “Places in the Sun”, highly critical of the detrimental effect of socialism on Australia, and to which Baldwin wrote a foreword), in opposition between 1929 and 1931 he worked as a City broker for Harry Lucas (a firm eventually absorbed into S. G. Warburg & Co.). 
Foreign Affairs Minister, 1931–5
In August 1931 Eden held his first ministerial office as Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs in Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald's National Government. Initially the office of Foreign Secretary was held by Lord Reading (in the House of Lords), although Sir John Simon held the job from November 1931.
Like many of his generation who had served in World War I, Eden was strongly anti-war, and strove to work through the League of Nations to preserve European peace. The government proposed measures, superseding the postwar Versailles Treaty, that would allow Germany to rearm (albeit replacing her small professional army with a short-service militia) and reduce French armaments. Winston Churchill criticised the policy sharply in the House of Commons on 23 March 1933, opposing "undue" French disarmament as this might require Britain to take action to enforce peace under the 1925 Locarno Treaty. Eden, replying for the government, dismissed Churchill's speech as exaggerated and unconstructive, commenting that land disarmament had yet to make the same progress as naval disarmament at the Washington and London treaties, and arguing that French disarmament was needed in order to "secure for Europe that period of appeasement which is needed". Eden's speech was met with approval by the House of Commons. Neville Chamberlain commented shortly afterwards: “That young man is coming along rapidly; not only can he make a good speech but he has a good head and what advice he gives is listened to by the Cabinet”  Eden later wrote that in the early 1930s the word “appeasement” was still used in its correct sense (from the Oxford English Dictionary) of seeking to settle strife. Only later in the decade did it come to acquire a pejorative meaning of caving in to bullying demands.
In December 1933 he was appointed Lord Privy Seal, a position that was combined with the newly created office of Minister for the League of Nations. He entered Cabinet for the first time in June 1935 when Stanley Baldwin formed his third administration. Eden later came to recognise that peace could not be maintained by appeasement of Nazi Germany and fascist Italy. He privately opposed the policy of the Foreign Secretary, Sir Samuel Hoare, of trying to appease Italy during its invasion of Abyssinia (Ethiopia) in 1935. When Hoare resigned after the failure of the Hoare-Laval Pact, Eden succeeded him as Foreign Secretary. When Eden had his first audience with King George V, the King is said to have remarked, "No more coals to Newcastle, no more Hoares to Paris."
At this stage in his career Eden was considered as something of a leader of fashion. He regularly wore a Homburg hat (similar to a trilby but more rigid), which became known in Britain as an "Anthony Eden".
Foreign Secretary and resignation (1935–38)
Eden became Foreign Secretary at a time when Britain was having to adjust its foreign policy to face the rise of the fascist powers. He supported the policy of non-interference in the Spanish Civil War through conferences like the Nyon Conference, and supported prime minister Neville Chamberlain in his efforts to preserve peace through reasonable concessions to Germany. The Italian-Ethiopian War was brewing, and Eden tried in vain to persuade Mussolini to submit the dispute to the League of Nations. The Italian dictator scoffed at Eden publicly as "the best dressed fool in Europe." Eden did not protest when Britain and France failed to oppose Hitler's reoccupation of the Rhineland in 1936. When the French requested a meeting with a view to some kind of military action in response to Hitler's occupation, Eden in a statement firmly ruled out any military assistance to France.
His resignation in February 1938 was largely attributed to growing dissatisfaction with Chamberlain's policy of appeasement. That is, however, disputed by new research; it was not the question if there should be negotiations with Italy, but only when they should start and how far they should be carried. Similarly, he at no point registered his dissatisfaction with the appeasement policy directed towards Nazi Germany in his period as Foreign Secretary. He became a Conservative dissenter leading a group conservative whip David Margesson called the "Glamour Boys," and a leading anti-appeaser like Winston Churchill, who led a similar group called "The Old Guard."
Although Churchill claimed to have lost sleep the night of Eden's resignation (later recounted in his wartime memoirs The Gathering Storm, 1948), they were not allies and did not see eye-to-eye until Churchill became Prime Minister. There was much speculation that Eden would become a rallying point for all the disparate opponents of Neville Chamberlain, but his position declined heavily amongst politicians as he maintained a low profile, avoiding confrontation, though he opposed the Munich Agreement and abstained in the vote on it in the House of Commons. However, he remained popular in the country at large, and in later years was often wrongly supposed to have resigned as Foreign Secretary in protest at the Munich Agreement.
In a 1967 interview Eden explained his decision to resign: "It was not over protocol, Chamberlain's communicating with Mussolini without telling me. I never cared a goddamn, a tuppence about protocol. The reason for my resignation was that we had an agreement with Mussolini about the Mediterranean and Spain, which he was violating by sending troops to Spain, and Chamberlain wanted to have another agreement. I thought Mussolini should honour the first one before we negotiated for the second. I was trying to fight a delaying action for Britain, and I could not go along with Chamberlain's policy."
World War II
During the last months of peace in 1939, Eden joined the Territorial Army with the rank of major, in the London Rangers motorized battalion of the King's Royal Rifle Corps and was at annual camp with them in Beaulieu, Hampshire when he heard news of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact.
On the outbreak of war (3 September 1939) Eden, unlike most Territorials, did not mobilise for active service. Instead he returned to Chamberlain's government as Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, but was not in the War Cabinet. As a result, he was not a candidate for the Premiership when Chamberlain resigned in May 1940 after the Narvik Debate and Churchill became Prime Minister. Churchill appointed Eden Secretary of State for War.
At the end of 1940 Eden returned to the Foreign Office, and in this role became a member of the executive committee of the Political Warfare Executive in 1941. Although he was one of Churchill's closest confidants, his role in wartime was restricted because Churchill conducted the most important negotiations, with Franklin D. Roosevelt and Joseph Stalin, himself, but Eden served loyally as Churchill's lieutenant. In December 1941, he travelled by ship to Russia where he met with the Soviet leader Joseph Stalin  and surveyed the battlefields upon which the Russians had successfully defended Moscow from the German Army attack in Operation Barbarossa.
Nevertheless, he was in charge of handling much of the relations between Britain and Free French leader de Gaulle during the last years of the war. Eden was often critical of the emphasis Churchill put on the Special Relationship with the United States, and was often disappointed by American treatment of their British allies.
In 1942 Eden was given the additional role of Leader of the House of Commons. He was considered for various other major jobs during and after the war, including Commander-in-Chief Middle East in 1942 (this would have been a very unusual appointment as Eden was a civilian; General Harold Alexander was in fact appointed), Viceroy of India in 1943 (General Archibald Wavell was appointed to this job), or Secretary-General of the newly formed United Nations Organisation in 1945. In 1943 with the revelation of the Katyn Massacre Eden refused to help the Polish Government in Exile.
In early 1943 Eden blocked a request from the Bulgarian authorities to aid with deporting part of the Jewish population from newly acquired Bulgarian territories to British-controlled Palestine. After his refusal, those people were transported to concentration camps in Poland.
In 1944 Eden went to Moscow to negotiate with the Soviet Union at the Tolstoy Conference. Eden also opposed the Morgenthau Plan to deindustrialise Germany. After the Stalag Luft III murders he vowed in the House of Commons to bring the perpetrators of the crime to "exemplary justice", leading to a successful manhunt after the war by the Royal Air Force Special Investigation Branch.
Eden's eldest son, Pilot Officer Simon Gascoigne Eden, went missing in action, later declared deceased, while serving as a navigator with the RAF in Burma, in June 1945. There was a close bond between Anthony and Simon, and Simon's death was a great personal shock to his father, who nevertheless accepted it. Lady Eden reportedly reacted to her son's loss differently, and this led to a breakdown in the marriage. De Gaulle wrote him a personal letter of condolence in French.
In 1945 he was mentioned by Halvdan Koht among seven candidates who were qualified for the Nobel Prize in Peace. However, he did not explicitly nominate any of them. The person actually nominated was Cordell Hull.
In opposition (1945–51)
After the Labour Party won the 1945 election, Eden went into opposition as Deputy Leader of the Conservative Party. Many felt that Churchill should have retired and allowed Eden to become party leader, but Churchill refused to consider this. As early as the spring of 1946, Eden openly asked Churchill to retire in his favour. He was in any case depressed during this period by the break-up of his first marriage and the death of his eldest son. Churchill was in many ways only "part-time Leader of the Opposition", given his many journeys abroad and his literary work, and left the day-to-day-work largely to Eden. Eden was largely regarded as lacking sense of party politics and contact with the common man. In these opposition years, however, he developed some knowledge about domestic affairs and created the idea of a "property-owning-democracy", which Margaret Thatcher's government attempted to achieve decades later. His domestic agenda is overall considered centre-left.
Return to government, 1951–55
In 1951 the Conservatives returned to office and Eden became Foreign Secretary for a third time, as well as Deputy Prime Minister. Churchill was largely a figurehead in this government, and Eden had effective control of British foreign policy for the first time, as the Empire declined and the Cold War grew more intense.
Eden’s biographer Richard Lamb said that Eden bullied Churchill into going back on commitments to European unity made in opposition. The truth appears to be more complex. Britain was still a world power, or at least trying to be, in 1945–55, with the concept of sovereignty not as discredited as on the continent. The USA encouraged moves towards European federalism as she wanted to withdraw US troops and get the Germans rearmed under supervision. Eden was less Atlanticist than Churchill, and had little time for European federalism. He wanted firm alliances with France and other Western European powers to contain Germany. Half of British trade at that time was with the sterling area, and only a quarter with Western Europe. In February 1952 even Macmillan (who was later to spread much mythology on this topic) acknowledged that Britain’s relationship with the USA and the Commonwealth would prevent her from joining a federal Europe at that time. Eden was also irritated by Churchill's hankering for a summit meeting with the USSR, during the period in 1953 after Stalin's death and whilst Eden was seriously ill from a botched bile duct operation.
Despite the ending of the British Raj in India, British interest in the Middle East remained strong: Britain had treaty relations with Jordan and Iraq, with the protecting power for Kuwait and the Trucial States, the colonial power in Aden, and the occupying power in the Suez Canal. Many right-wing Conservative MPs, organised in the so-called Suez Group, sought to retain this imperial role, though economic pressures made maintenance of it increasingly difficult. Britain did seek to maintain its huge military base in the Suez Canal zone and, in the face of Egyptian resentment, further develop its alliance with Iraq, and the hope was that the Americans would assist Britain, possibly through finance. While the Americans did co-operate with the British in overthrowing the Mosaddegh government in Iran, after it had nationalised British oil interests, the Americans developed their own relations in the region, taking a positive view of the Egyptian Free Officers and developing friendly relations with Saudi Arabia. Britain was eventually forced to withdraw from the canal zone and the Baghdad Pact security treaty was not supported by the United States, leaving Eden vulnerable to the charge of having failed to maintain British prestige.
Eden had grave misgivings about American foreign policy under Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and President Dwight D. Eisenhower. Eisenhower was concerned, as early as March 1953, at the escalating costs of defence and the increase of state power which this would bring. Eden was irked by Dulles's policy of "brinkmanship", or display of muscle, in relations with the Communist world. The success of the 1954 Geneva Conference on Indo-China ranks as the outstanding achievement of his third term in the Foreign Office, although he was critical of the United States decision not to sign the accord. During the summer and fall of 1954, the Anglo-Egyptian agreement to withdraw all British forces from Egypt was also negotiated and ratified.
There were concerns that if the EDC was not ratified as they wanted, the US Republican Administration might withdraw into defending only the Western Hemisphere (although recent documentary evidence confirms that the US intended to withdraw troops from Europe anyway if the EDC was ratified). After the French Assembly rejected the EDC in September 1954, Eden tried to come up with a viable alternative. Between 11 and 17 September he visited every major West European capital, to negotiate West Germany becoming a sovereign state and entering the Brussels pact prior to entering NATO. Paul-Henri Spaak said he “saved the Atlantic alliance”.
In 1954 he was made a Knight of the Garter and became Sir Anthony Eden.
Prime Minister (1955–57)
In April 1955 Churchill finally retired, and Eden succeeded him as Prime Minister. He was a very popular figure as a result of his long wartime service and his famous good looks and charm. His famous words "Peace comes first, always" added to his already substantial popularity.
On taking office, he immediately called a general election for 26 May 1955, at which he increased the Conservative majority from seventeen to sixty, a majority that broke a ninety-year record for any UK government. The 1955 general election was the last in which the Conservatives won the majority share of the votes in Scotland. However, Eden had never held a domestic portfolio and had little experience in economic matters. He left these areas to his lieutenants such as Rab Butler, and concentrated largely on foreign policy, forming a close relationship with US President Dwight Eisenhower. Eden's attempts to maintain overall control of the Foreign Office drew widespread criticism.
Eden has the distinction of being the British prime minister to oversee the lowest unemployment figures of the post-World War II era, with unemployment standing at just over 215,000—barely one percent of the workforce—in July 1955.
The alliance with the US proved not universal, however, when in July 1956 Gamal Abdel Nasser, President of Egypt, unexpectedly nationalised (seized) the Suez Canal, following the withdrawal of Anglo-American funding for the Aswan Dam. Eden believed the nationalisation was in violation of the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement that Nasser had signed with the British and French governments on 19 October 1954. This view was shared by Labour leader Hugh Gaitskell and Liberal leader Jo Grimond. In 1956 the Suez Canal was of vital importance since over two-thirds of the oil supplies of Western Europe (60 million tons annually) passed through it, with 15,000 ships a year, one third of them British; three-quarters of all Canal shipping belonged to NATO countries. Britain's total oil reserves at the time of the nationalisation were only enough for six weeks. The Soviet Union was certain to veto any sanctions against Nasser at the United Nations. Britain and a conference of other nations met in London following the nationalisation in an attempt to resolve the crisis through diplomatic means. However, a series of eighteen proposals, including an offer of Egyptian representation on the board of the Suez Canal Company and a share of profits, were rejected by Nasser. Eden feared that Nasser intended to form an Arab Alliance that would threaten to cut off oil supplies to Europe and, in conjunction with France, decided he should be removed from power.
Eden, drawing on his experience in the 1930s, saw Nasser as another Mussolini, considering the two men aggressive nationalist socialists determined to invade other countries. Others believed that Nasser was acting from legitimate patriotic concerns and the nationalisation was determined by the Foreign Office to be deliberately provocative but not illegal. The Attorney General, Sir Reginald Manningham-Buller, was not asked for his opinion officially but made his view that the government's contemplated armed strike against Egypt would be unlawful known through the Lord Chancellor.
Anthony Nutting recalled that Eden told him, "What's all this nonsense about isolating Nasser or 'neutralising' him as you call it? I want him destroyed, can't you understand? I want him murdered, and if you and the Foreign Office don't agree, then you'd better come to the cabinet and explain why." When Nutting pointed out that they had no alternative government to replace Nasser, Eden apparently replied, "I don't give a damn if there's anarchy and chaos in Egypt." At a private meeting at Downing Street on 16 October 1956 Eden showed several ministers a plan, submitted two days earlier by the French. Israel would invade Egypt, Britain and France would give an ultimatum telling both sides to stop and, when one refused, send in forces to enforce the ultimatum, separate the two sides – and occupy the Canal and get rid of Nasser. When Nutting suggested the Americans should be consulted Eden replied, "I will not bring the Americans into this ... Dulles has done enough damage as it is. This has nothing to do with the Americans. We and the French must decide what to do and we alone." Eden openly admitted his view of the crisis was shaped by his experiences in the two world wars, writing, "We are all marked to some extent by the stamp of our generation, mine is that of the assassination in Sarajevo and all that flowed from it. It is impossible to read the record now and not feel that we had a responsibility for always being a lap behind ... Always a lap behind, a fatal lap."
There was no question of an immediate military response to the crisis – Cyprus had no deep-water harbours, which meant that Malta, several days' sailing from Egypt, would have to be the main concentration point for an invasion fleet if the Libyan government would not permit a land invasion from its territory. Eden initially considered using British forces in Libya to regain the Canal, but then decided this risked inflaming Arab opinion. Unlike the French prime minister Guy Mollet, who saw regaining the Canal as the primary objective, Eden believed the real need was to remove Nasser from office. He hoped that if the Egyptian army was swiftly and humiliatingly defeated by the Anglo-French forces the Egyptian people would rise up against Nasser. Eden told Field Marshal Sir Bernard Montgomery that the overall aim of the mission was simply, "To knock Nasser off his perch." In the absence of a popular uprising Eden and Mollet would say that Egyptian forces were incapable of defending their country and therefore Anglo-French forces would have to return to guard the Suez Canal.
Eden believed that if Nasser were seen to get away with seizing the Canal then Egypt and other Arab countries might move closer to the Soviet Union. At that time, the Middle East accounted for 80–90 percent of Western Europe's oil supply. If Nasser were seen to get away with it, then other Middle East countries might be encouraged to nationalise their oil. The invasion, he contended at the time, and again in a 1967 interview, was aimed at maintaining the sanctity of international agreements and at preventing future unilateral denunciation of treaties. Eden was energetic during the crisis in using the media, including the BBC, to incite public opinion to support his views of the need to overthrow Nasser. In September 1956 a plan was drawn up to reduce the flow of water in the Nile by using dams in an attempt to damage Nasser's position. However, the plan was abandoned because it would take months to implement, and due to fears that it could affect other countries such as Uganda and Kenya.
On 25 September 1956, the Chancellor of the Exchequer Harold Macmillan met informally with President Eisenhower at the White House; he misread Eisenhower's determination to avoid war and told Eden that the Americans would not in any way oppose the attempt to topple Nasser. Though Eden had known Eisenhower for years and had many direct contacts during the crisis, he also misread the situation. The Americans saw themselves as the champion of decolonization and refused to support any move that could be seen as imperialism or colonialism. Eisenhower felt the crisis had to be handled peacefully; he told Eden that American public opinion would not support a military solution. Eden and other leading British officials incorrectly believed Nasser's support for Palestinian terrorists against Israel, as well as his attempts to destabilise pro-western regimes in Iraq and other Arab states, would deter the US from intervening with the operation. Eisenhower specifically warned that the Americans, and the world, "would be outraged" unless all peaceful routes had been exhausted, and even then "the eventual price might become far too heavy". At the root of the problem was the fact that Eden felt that Britain was still an independent world power. His lack of sympathy for British integration into Europe, manifested in his scepticism about the fledgling European Economic Community (EEC), was another aspect of his belief in Britain's independent role in world affairs.
Israel invaded the Sinai peninsula at the end of October 1956. Britain and France moved in ostensibly to separate the two sides and bring peace, but in fact to regain control of the canal and overthrow Nasser. The United States immediately and strongly opposed the invasion. The United Nations denounced the invasion, the Soviets were bellicose, and only New Zealand, Australia, West Germany and South Africa spoke out for Britain's position.
The Suez Canal was of lesser economic importance to the USA, which acquired 15 percent of its oil through that route. Eisenhower wanted to broker international peace in "fragile" regions. He did not see Nasser as a serious threat to the West, but he was concerned that the Soviets, who were well known to want a permanent warm water base for their Black Sea fleet in the Mediterranean, might side with Egypt. Eisenhower feared a pro-Soviet backlash amongst the Arab nations if, as seemed likely, Egypt suffered an humiliating defeat at the hands of the British, French and Israelis.
Eden, who faced domestic pressure from his party to take action, as well as stopping the decline of British influence in the Middle East, had ignored Britain's financial dependence on the US in the wake of World War II, and had assumed the US would automatically endorse whatever action taken by its closest ally. At the 'Law not War' rally in Trafalgar Square on 4 November 1956, Eden was ridiculed by Aneurin Bevan: 'Sir Anthony Eden has been pretending that he is now invading Egypt to strengthen the United Nations. Every burglar of course could say the same thing; he could argue that he was entering the house to train the police. So, if Sir Anthony Eden is sincere in what he is saying, and he may be, then he is too stupid to be a prime minister'. Public opinion was mixed; some historians think that the majority of public opinion in the UK was on Eden's side. Eden was forced to bow to American diplomatic and financial pressure, and protests at home, by calling a ceasefire when Anglo-French forces had captured only 23 miles of the Canal. With the US threatening to withdraw financial support from sterling, the Cabinet divided and the Chancellor of the Exchequer Harold Macmillan threatening to resign unless an immediate ceasefire was called, Eden was under immense pressure. He considered defying the calls until the commander on the ground told him it could take up to six days for the Anglo-French troops to secure the entire Canal zone. Therefore, a ceasefire was called at quarter past midnight on 7 November.
In his 1987 book "Spycatcher" Peter Wright said that, following the imposed ending to the military operation, Eden reactivated the assassination option for a second time. By this time virtually all MI6 agents in Egypt had been rounded up by Nasser, and a new operation, using renegade Egyptian officers, was drawn up. It failed principally because the cache of weapons which had been hidden on the outskirts of Cairo was found to be defective.
Suez damaged Eden's reputation for statesmanship, in many eyes, and led to a breakdown in his health. He went on vacation to Jamaica in November 1956, at a time when he was still determined to soldier on as Prime Minister. His health, however, did not improve, and during his absence from London his Chancellor Harold Macmillan and Rab Butler worked to manoeuvre him out of office. On the morning of the ceasefire Eisenhower agreed to meet with Eden to publicly resolve their differences, but this offer was later withdrawn after Secretary of State Dulles advised that it could inflame the Middle Eastern situation further.
The Observer newspaper accused Eden of lying to Parliament over the Suez Crisis, while MPs from all parties criticised his calling a ceasefire before the Canal was taken. Churchill, while publicly supportive of Eden's actions, privately criticised his successor for not seeing the military operation through to its conclusion. Eden easily survived a vote of confidence in the House of Commons on 8 November.
While Eden was on holiday in Jamaica, other members of the government discussed on 20 November how to counter charges that the UK and France had worked in collusion with Israel to seize the Canal, but decided there was very little evidence in the public domain.
On his return from Jamaica on 14 December, Eden still hoped to continue as Prime Minister. He had lost his traditional base of support on the Tory left and amongst moderate opinion nationally, but appears to have hoped to rebuild a new base of support amongst the Tory Right. However, his political position had eroded during his absence. He wished to make a statement attacking Nasser as a puppet of the Soviets, attacking the United Nations and speaking of the “lessons of the 1930s”, but was prevented from doing so by Macmillan, Butler and Lord Salisbury.
On his return to the House of Commons (17 December), he slipped into the Chamber largely unacknowledged by his own party. One Conservative MP rose to wave his Order Paper, only to have to sit down in embarrassment whilst Labour MPs laughed. On 18 December he addressed the 1922 committee (Conservative backbenchers), declaring “as long as I live, I shall never apologise for what we did”, but was unable to answer a question about the validity of the Tripartite Declaration of 1950 (which he had in fact reaffirmed in April 1955, two days before becoming Prime Minister). In his final statement to the House of Commons as Prime Minister (20 December 1956) he performed well in a difficult debate, but told MPs that "there was not foreknowledge that Israel would attack Egypt". Rothwell writes that the knowledge of his having misled the House of Commons on this way must have hung over him thereafter, as was the concern that the US Administration might demand that Britain pay reparations to Egypt. Papers released in January 1987 showed the entire Cabinet had been informed of the plan on 23 October 1956.
Eden suffered another fever at Chequers over Christmas, but was still talking of going on an official trip to the USSR in April 1957, wanting a full inquiry into the Crabb affair and badgering Lord Hailsham (First Lord of the Admiralty) about the £6m being spent on oil storage at Malta.
Eden resigned on 9 January 1957, after his doctors warned him his life was at stake if he continued in office. Charmley writes "Ill-health ... provide(d) a dignified reason for an action (i.e.. resignation) which would, in any event, have been necessary." Rothwell writes that “mystery persists” over exactly how Eden was persuaded to resign, although the limited evidence suggests that Butler, who was expected to succeed him as Prime Minister, was at the centre of the intrigue. Rothwell writes that Eden’s fevers were “nasty but brief and not life-threatening” and that there may have been “manipulation of medical evidence” to make Eden’s health seem “even worse” than it was. Macmillan wrote in his diary that “nature had provided a real health reason” when a “diplomatic illness” might otherwise have had to be invented. David Carlton (1981) even suggested that the Palace might have been involved, a suggestion discussed by Rothwell. As early as spring 1954 Eden had been indifferent to cultivating good relations with the new Queen. Eden in known to have favoured a Japanese or Scandinavian style monarchy (i.e. with no involvement in politics whatsoever) and in January 1956 he had insisted that Khrushchev and Bulganin spend only the minimum amount of time in talks with the Queen. Evidence also exists that the Palace were concerned at not being kept fully informed during the Suez Crisis. In the 1960s Clarissa Eden was observed to speak of the Queen “in an extremely hostile and belittling way”, and in an interview in 1976 Eden commented that he “would not claim she was pro-Suez”.
Eden was not asked his advice about his successor. Although the media expected Butler would get the nod, a survey of the Cabinet taken for the Queen showed Macmillan was the nearly unanimous choice, and he became Prime Minister on 10 January 1957. Shortly afterwards Eden and his wife left England for a holiday in New Zealand.
Suez in retrospect
Thorpe has summarised Eden's central role in the Suez Crisis of 1956:
Eden's policy had four main aims: first, to secure the Suez Canal; second and consequentially, to ensure continuity of oil supplies; third, to remove Nasser; and fourth, to keep the Russians out of the Middle East. The immediate consequence of the crisis was that the Suez Canal was blocked, oil supplies were interrupted, Nasser's position as the leader of Arab nationalism was strengthened, and the way was left open for Russian intrusion into the Middle East. It was a truly tragic end to his premiership, and one that came to assume a disproportionate importance in any assessment of his career.
Michael Foot pushed for a special inquiry along the lines of the Parliamentary Inquiry into the Attack on the Dardanelles in the First World War, although Harold Wilson (Labour Prime Minister 1964–70) regarded the matter as a can of worms best left unopened. This talk ceased after the defeat of the Arab armies by Israel in the Six Day War of 1967, after which Eden received a lot of fanmail telling him that he had been right, and his reputation, not least in Israel and the United States, soared. In 1986 Eden's official biographer Robert Rhodes James re-evaluated sympathetically Eden's stance over Suez and in 1990, following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, James asked: "Who can now claim that Eden was wrong?". Such arguments turn mostly on whether, as a matter of policy, the Suez operation was fundamentally flawed or whether, as such "revisionists" thought, the lack of American support conveyed the impression that the West was divided and weak. Anthony Nutting, who resigned as a Foreign Office Minister over Suez, expressed the former view in 1967, the year of the Arab-Israeli Six-Day War, when he wrote that "we had sown the wind of bitterness and we were to reap the whirlwind of revenge and rebellion". Conversely, Jonathan Pearson argues in Sir Anthony Eden and the Suez Crisis: Reluctant Gamble (2002) that Eden was more reluctant and less bellicose than most historians have judged. D. R. Thorpe, another of Eden's biographers, suggests that had the Suez venture succeeded, "there would almost certainly have been no Middle East war in 1967, and probably no Yom Kippur War in 1973 also".
Guy Millard, one of Eden's Private Secretaries, who thirty years later, in a radio interview, spoke publicly for the first time on the crisis, made an insider's judgement about Eden: "It was his mistake of course and a tragic and disastrous mistake for him. I think he overestimated the importance of Nasser, Egypt, the Canal, even of the Middle East itself." While British actions in 1956 are routinely described as "imperialistic", the motivation was in fact economic. Eden was a liberal supporter of nationalist ambitions, such as over Sudanese independence. His 1954 Suez Canal Base Agreement (withdrawing British troops from Suez in return for certain guarantees) was sold to the Conservative Party against Churchill's wishes.
Rothwell believes that Eden should have cancelled the Suez Invasion plans in mid-October, when the Anglo-French negotiations at the United Nations were making some headway, and that in 1956 the Arab countries threw away a chance to make peace with Israel on her existing borders.
Britain–France rejected plan for union
British Government cabinet papers from September 1956, during Eden's term as Prime Minister, have shown that French Prime Minister Guy Mollet approached the British Government suggesting the idea of an economic and political union between France and Great Britain. This was a similar offer, in reverse, to that made by Churchill (drawing on a plan devised by Leo Amery) in June 1940.
The offer by Guy Mollet was referred to by Sir John Colville, Churchill's former private secretary, in his collected diaries, The Fringes of Power (1985), his having gleaned the information in 1957 from Air Chief Marshal Sir William Dickson during an air flight (and, according to Colville, after several whiskies and soda). Mollet's request for Union with Britain was rejected by Eden, but the additional possibility of France joining the Commonwealth of Nations was considered, although similarly rejected. Colville noted, in respect of Suez, that Eden and his Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd "felt still more beholden to the French on account of this offer".
Eden resigned from the House of Commons in March 1957. He retained much of his personal popularity in Britain and soon regretted his retirement, and contemplated standing again. Several Conservative MPs were reportedly willing to give up their seats for him, although the party hierarchy were less keen. He finally gave up such hopes in late 1960 after an exhausting speaking tour of Yorkshire. Macmillan initially offered to recommend him for a viscountcy, which Eden assumed to be a calculated insult, and he was granted an earldom (which was then the traditional rank for a former Prime Minister) after reminding Macmillan that he had already been offered one by the Queen herself. He entered the House of Lords as Earl of Avon in 1961.
In retirement Eden lived in 'Rose Bower' by the banks of the River Ebble in Broad Chalke, Wiltshire. Starting in 1961 he bred a herd of sixty Herefordshire cattle (one of whom was called “Churchill”) until a further decline in his health forced him to sell them in 1975.
In July 1962 Eden made front page news by commenting that “Mr Selwyn Lloyd has been horribly treated” when the latter was dismissed as Chancellor in the reshuffle known as the “Night of the Long Knives”. In August 1962, at a dinner party, he had a “slanging match” with Nigel Birch, who as Secretary of State for Air had not wholeheartedly supported the Suez Invasion. In 1963 Eden initially favoured Hailsham for the Conservative leadership but then supported Home as a compromise candidate.
From 1945 to 1973, Eden was Chancellor of the University of Birmingham, England. In a television interview in 1966 he called on the United States to halt its bombing of North Vietnam to concentrate on developing a peace plan "that might conceivably be acceptable to Hanoi." The bombing of North Vietnam, he argued, would never settle the conflict in South Vietnam. "On the contrary," he declared, "bombing creates a sort of David and Goliath complex in any country that has to suffer—as we had to, and as I suspect the Germans had to, in the last war." Eden sat for extensive interviews for the famed multi-part Thames Television production, The World at War, which was first broadcast in 1973. He also featured frequently in Marcel Ophüls' 1969 documentary Le chagrin et la pitié, discussing the occupation of France in a wider geopolitical context. He spoke impeccable, if accented, French.
Eden's public appearances were, however, rather rare, unlike, say, James Callaghan who often appeared on television and in the press to discuss current affairs. He was even accidentally omitted from a list of Conservative Prime Ministers by Margaret Thatcher when she became Conservative Leader in 1975, although she later went out of her way to establish relations with Eden and, later, his widow. In retirement he was highly critical of regimes such as Sukarno's Indonesia which confiscated assets belonging to their former colonial rulers, and appears to have reverted somewhat to the right-wing views which he had espoused in the 1920s.
In retirement Eden corresponded with Selwyn Lloyd, coordinating the release of information and with which writers they would agree to speak and when. Rumours that Britain had colluded with France and Israel appeared, albeit in garbled form, as early as 1957. By the 1970s they had agreed that Lloyd would only tell his version of the story after Eden’s death (in the event, Lloyd would outlive Eden by a year, struggling with terminal illness to complete his own memoirs).
In retirement Eden was particularly bitter that Eisenhower had initially indicated British and French troops should be allowed to remain around Port Said, only for the US ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr to press for an immediate withdrawal at the UN, thereby rendering the operation a complete failure. Eden felt the Eisenhower administration's unexpected opposition was hypocritical in light of the 1953 Iranian coup d'état and the 1954 Guatemalan coup d'état.
Eden published three volumes of political memoirs, in which he denied that there had been any collusion with France and Israel. Like Churchill, Eden relied heavily on the ghost-writing of young researchers, whose drafts he would sometimes toss angrily into the flowerbeds outside his study. One of them was the young David Dilks.
In his view, American Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, whom he particularly disliked, was responsible for the ill fate of the Suez adventure. In an October press conference, barely three weeks before the fighting began, Dulles had coupled the Suez Canal issue with colonialism, and his statement infuriated Eden and much of the UK as well. "The dispute over Nasser's seizure of the canal," wrote Eden, "had, of course, nothing to do with colonialism, but was concerned with international rights." He added that "if the United States had to defend her treaty rights in the Panama Canal, she would not regard such action as colonialism." His lack of candour further diminished his standing and a principal concern in his later years was trying to rebuild his reputation that was severely damaged by Suez, sometimes taking legal action to protect his viewpoint.
Eden faulted the United States for forcing him to withdraw, but he took credit for United Nations action in patrolling the Israeli-Egyptian borders. Eden said of the invasion, "Peace at any price has never averted war. We must not repeat the mistakes of the pre-war years, by behaving as though the enemies of peace and order are armed with only good intentions." Recalling the incident in a 1967 interview, he declared, "I am still unrepentant about Suez. People never look at what would have happened if we had done nothing. There is a parallel with the 1930s. If you allow people to break agreements with impunity, the appetite grows to feed on such things. I don't see what other we ought to have done. One cannot dodge. It is hard to act rather than dodge." In his 1967 interview (which he stipulated would not be used until after his death), Eden acknowledged secret dealings with the French and "intimations" of the Israeli attack. He insisted, however, that "the joint enterprise and the preparations for it were justified in the light of the wrongs it [the Anglo-French invasion] was designed to prevent." "I have no apologies to offer," Eden declared.
At the time of his retirement he had been short of money, although Eden was paid a £100,000 advance for his memoirs by The Times, with any profit over this amount to be split between himself and the newspaper. By 1970 they had brought him £185,000 (around £3,000,000 at 2014 prices), leaving him a wealthy man for the first time in his life. Towards the end of his life he published a highly acclaimed personal memoir of his early life, Another World (1976).
In 1923, shortly before his election to Parliament, he married Beatrice Beckett. They had three sons, one of whom died in infancy, but the marriage was not a success, with both parties apparently conducting affairs. By the mid-1930s his diaries seldom mention Beatrice. The marriage finally broke up under the strain of a son missing in action during the latter half of World War II.
In 1950 Eden and Beatrice were finally divorced, and in 1952 he married Churchill's niece Clarissa Spencer-Churchill (b. 1920), a nominal Roman Catholic, who was fiercely criticised by Catholic writer Evelyn Waugh for marrying a divorced man. This second marriage was much more successful than his first had been.
Problems with health
Eden had an ulcer, exacerbated by overwork, as early as the 1920s. 
Eden's life was changed forever by a medical mishap: during an operation on 12 April 1953 to remove gallstones his bile duct was damaged, leaving him susceptible to recurrent infections, biliary obstruction and liver failure. He suffered from cholangitis, an abdominal infection which became so agonising that he was admitted to hospital in 1956 with a temperature reaching 106 °F (41 °C). He required major surgery on three occasions to alleviate the problem. Eden would almost certainly have become Prime Minister when Churchill suffered a severe stroke on 23 June 1953, had he not been recovering from corrective surgery in the United States on the same day.
He was also prescribed Benzedrine, the wonder drug of the 1950s. Regarded then as a harmless stimulant, it belongs to the family of drugs called amphetamines, and at that time they were prescribed and used in a very casual way. Among the side effects of Benzedrine are insomnia, restlessness and mood swings, all of which Eden suffered during the Suez Crisis; indeed, earlier in his premiership he complained of being kept awake at night by the sound of motor scooters. Eden's drug use is now commonly agreed to have been a part of the reason for his bad judgment while Prime Minister. Eden was secretly hospitalised with a high fever, possibly as a result of his heavy medication, on 5–8 October 1956. He underwent further surgery at a New York hospital in April 1957.
In November 2006 private papers uncovered in the Eden family archives disclosed that he had been prescribed a powerful combination of amphetamines and barbiturates called drinamyl. Better known in post-war Britain as "purple hearts", they can impair judgement, cause paranoia and even make the person taking them lose contact with reality. Drinamyl was banned in 1978.
Illness and death
On a trip to the United States in 1976–77 to spend Christmas and New Year with Averell and Pamela Harriman, his health rapidly deteriorated. At his family's request, Prime Minister James Callaghan arranged for an RAF plane that was already in America to divert to Miami to fly him home. Eden died from liver cancer in Salisbury on 14 January 1977, at the age of 79. Born in the year of Queen Victoria's Diamond Jubilee, he thus died in the year of Queen Elizabeth II's Silver Jubilee. He was survived by Clarissa.
Anthony Eden was buried in St Mary's churchyard at Alvediston, just three miles upstream from 'Rose Bower' at the source of the River Ebble. Eden's papers are housed at the University of Birmingham Special Collections.
At his death, Eden was the last surviving member of Churchill's War Cabinet. Eden's surviving son, Nicholas Eden (1930–1985), known as Viscount Eden until 1977, was also a politician and a minister in the Thatcher government until his premature death from AIDS at the age of 54.
Character, speaking style and assessments
Anthony Eden always made a particularly cultured appearance, well-mannered and good-looking. This gave him huge popular support throughout his political life, but some contemporaries felt that he was merely a superficial person lacking any deeper convictions. That view was enforced by his very pragmatic approach to politics. Sir Oswald Mosley, for example, said that he never understood why Eden was so strongly pushed by the Tory party, while he felt that Eden's abilities were very much inferior to those of Harold Macmillan and Oliver Stanley. In 1947 Dick Crossman called him “that peculiarly British type, the idealist without conviction”. 
US Secretary of State Dean Acheson regarded him as a quite old-fashioned amateur in politics typical of the British Establishment. However, Soviet Leader Khrushchev commented that until his Suez adventure Eden had been "in the top world class".
Eden was heavily influenced by Stanley Baldwin when he first entered Parliament. After earlier combative beginnings he cultivated a low-key speaking style which relied heavily on rational argument and consensus-building rather than rhetoric and party point-scoring, and which was often highly effective in the House of Commons. However, he was not always an effective public speaker, and his parliamentary performances sometimes disappointed many of his followers, e.g. after his resignation from Chamberlain's government. Churchill once even commented on an Eden speech that the latter had used every cliché except "God is love". This was deliberate: he often struck out striking phrases from speech drafts and replaced them with clichés. 
His inability to express himself clearly is often attributed to shyness and lack of self-confidence. Eden is known to have been much more direct in meeting with his secretaries and advisors than in Cabinet meetings and public speeches, sometimes tending to become enraged and behaving "like a child", only to regain his temper within a few minutes. Many of those who worked for him remarked that he was “two men”, one charming, erudite and hard-working, the other petty and prone to temper tantrums in which he would insult his subordinates. As Prime Minister Eden was notorious for telephoning ministers and newspaper editors from 6am onwards. Rothwell writes that even before Suez, the telephone had become “a drug” and that “During the Suez Crisis Eden’s telephone mania exceeded all bounds”.
Eden was notoriously “unclubbable” and offended Churchill by declining to join The Other Club. He also declined honorary membership of the Athenaeum.  However, he maintained friendly relations with Opposition MPs: George Thomas received a kind two-page letter from Eden on learning that his stepfather had died.  He was a Trustee of the National Gallery (in succession to MacDonald) between 1935 and 1949. He also had a deep knowledge of Persian poetry, and of Shakespeare, and would bond with anybody who could display similar knowledge. 
Rothwell writes that although he was capable of acting with ruthlessness, e.g. over the repatriation of the Cossacks in 1945, his main concern was to avoid being seen as “an appeaser” (e.g. over the Soviet reluctance to accept a democratic Poland in October 1944) and that like many people he persuaded himself that his past actions were more consistent than they had in fact been. Recent biographies put more emphasis on Eden's achievements in foreign policy, and perceive him to have held deep convictions regarding world peace and security as well as a strong social conscience. Rhodes James applies to Eden Churchill’s famous verdict on Lord Curzon (in Great Contemporaries): “The morning had been golden; the noontime was bronze; and the evening lead. But all was solid, and each was polished until it shone after its fashion”. 
Eden in popular culture
As Secretary of State for War in 1940, Eden authorised the setting-up of the Local Defence Volunteers (soon renamed the Home Guard). In the film of the TV sitcom Dad's Army, the (fictional) Walmington-on-Sea platoon is formed in response to Eden's radio broadcast. The debonair Sergeant Wilson takes enormous pride in being often said to resemble Eden.
Eden appears as a character in the 2008 play Never So Good—portrayed as a hysterical, pill-addicted wreck, spying on members of his own Cabinet by ordering government chauffeurs to report on their comings and goings. He is shown being overwhelmed by the chaos of the Suez Crisis and eventually forced out of office by his Conservative Party colleagues, at the urging of the American government. He also appeared in the 2013 stage play The Audience by Peter Morgan (in the premiere of which he was played by Michael Elwyn). In the 2015 West End version featuring Kristin Scott Thomas as the Queen in the revival of the Audience, Eden is portrayed by Scottish actor David Robb. His scene in the play is a prediction of Eden's audience with the Queen the day before the invasion of Anglo-French forces in Egypt. The conversation that takes place, features Eden attempting to feed selected information to the Queen rather than the whole facts about the Suez crisis and the Queen's reaction to the proposed invasion. In the 2015 rewrite of the Audience the Queen also makes reference to Tony Blair, seen in a flashback, and his proposal of sending troops to Iraq, likening it to the conversation she'd had with Eden 50 years previously about Suez.
The first season of the UK TV series The Hour revolves around the Suez Crisis and the effect of journalism and censorship on public perception of Eden and his government as a metaphor for modern Western military involvement in the Middle East.
In one episode of The Honeymooners Ed Norton mentions that Anthony Eden would not have been able to join the Raccoon Lodge due to the Lodge's membership requirements.
- Prime Minister: Sir Anthony Eden
- Lord Chancellor: Lord Kilmuir
- Lord President of the Council and Leader of the House of Lords: Lord Salisbury
- Lord Privy Seal and Leader of the House of Commons: Harry Crookshank
- Chancellor of the Exchequer: R.A. Butler
- Foreign Secretary: Harold Macmillan
- Home Secretary: Gwilym Lloyd George
- Secretary of State for the Colonies: Alan Lennox-Boyd
- Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations: Lord Home
- President of the Board of Trade: Peter Thorneycroft
- Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster: Lord Woolton:
- Minister of Education: Sir David Eccles:
- Secretary of State for Scotland: James Stuart
- Minister of Agriculture: Derick Heathcoat Amory
- Minister of Labour and National Service: Sir Walter Turner Monckton
- Minister of Defence: Selwyn Lloyd
- Minister of Housing and Local Government: Duncan Sandys
- Minister of Pensions and National Insurance: Osbert Peake
- December 1955: Rab Butler succeeds Harry Crookshank as Lord Privy Seal and Leader of the House of Commons. Harold Macmillan succeeds Butler as Chancellor of the Exchequer. Selwyn Lloyd succeeds Macmillan as Foreign Secretary. Sir Walter Monckton succeeds Lloyd as Minister of Defence. Iain Macleod succeeds Monckton as Minister of Labour and National Service. Lord Selkirk succeeds Lord Woolton as Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster. The Minister of Public Works, Patrick Buchan-Hepburn, enters the Cabinet. The Minister of Pensions and National Insurance leaves the Cabinet upon Peake's retirement.
- October 1956: Sir Walter Monckton becomes Paymaster-General. Antony Henry Head succeeds Monckton as Minister of Defence.
Eden's initial cabinet is remarkable for the fact that 10 out of the original 18 members were Old Etonians: Eden, Salisbury, Crookshank, Macmillan, Home, Stuart, Thorneycroft, Heathcoat Amory, Sandys and Peake were all educated at Eton.
|Ancestors of Anthony Eden|
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- The Eden Memoirs: the Reckoning. London. Casell, 1965. Covers 1938–1945.
- The Eden Memoirs: Full Circle. London. Casell, 1960. Covers postwar career.
- As Territorial, pre-outbreak of World War II.
- David Dutton: Anthony Eden. A Life and Reputation (London, Arnold, 1997).
- Tony Shaw, Eden, Suez & the Mass Media: Propaganda & Persuasion during the Suez Crisis (1996)
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- D. R. Thorpe, 'Eden, (Robert) Anthony, first earl of Avon (1897–1977)', Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004; online edn, May 2011
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- This was the speech in which Churchill declared “Thank God for the French Army”, and in which he stated that Ramsay MacDonald had “more than any other man, the gift of compressing the largest number of words into the smallest amount of thought”. Although Churchill compared Eden’s planned trip to see Mussolini to the Holy Roman Emperor's’s trip to Canossa, they had a friendly drink afterwards. [Rhodes James 1986, pp. 126–7]
- Hansard. 23 March 1933.
- Rhodes James 1986, pp. 126–7
- Manchester, William (1988). The last lion, Winston Spencer Churchill vol. 2. Alone: 1932–1940. Boston, MA: Little, Brown. pp. 100–101. ISBN 0-316-545120. William Manchester claims that the speech brought him a standing ovation in the House
- Thorpe 1997, p29
- Thorpe 2003, p55
- W.N. Medlicott et al., Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919–39, XVI(H.M.S.O.), pp. 60–66
- "Oxford DNB theme: Glamour boys". Oxforddnb.com. Retrieved 15 June 2010.
- "Career Built on Style and Dash Ended with Invasion of Egypt". The New York Times.
- Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Volume 17, page 669.
- Blake, Robert (1993). "How Churchill Became Prime MInister". In Blake, Robert B.; Louis, William Roger. Churchill. Oxford: Clarendon Press. p. 261. ISBN 0-19-820626-7.
- Andrews, Allen (1976). Exemplary Justice. London: Harrap. ISBN 978-0-245-52775-3.
- A History of Israel: From the Rise of Zionism to Our Time by Howard M. Sachar, Alfred A. Knopf, N.Y., 2007
- "Casualty Details". CWGC. 23 June 1945. Retrieved 15 June 2010.
- "Record from The Nomination Database for the Nobel Prize in Peace, 1901–1956". Nobel Foundation. Retrieved 14 May 2010.[dead link]
- Williams, Charles Harold Macmillan (2009) p. 183
- "Foreign News: Sir Anthony Eden: The Man Who Waited". Time. 11 April 1955. Retrieved 25 April 2010.
- Charmley 1995, pp. 30, 246–9
- Charmley 1995, p299
- Turner, Suez 1956: The Inside Story of the First Oil War, Hodder & Stoughton, ISBN 978-0340837696, 2007
- Charmley 1995, p274-5
- Gilbert, Martin. Winston S. Churchill: Never Despair: 1945–1965. (c) 1988: p298-300
- "Whatever happened to full employment?". BBC News. 13 October 2011.
- James Eayrs, The Commonwealth and Suez: A Documentary Survey (Oxford University Press, 1964)
- "Anthony Eden and the Suez Crisis". History Today. Retrieved 21 July 2012.
- Ian J. Bickerton and Carla L. Klausner, A Concise History of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, p.126-127
- Dyer, Clare (9 March 2004). "Clare Dyer: Legality of the war in Iraq". The Guardian (London).
- Robert McNamara. Britain, Nasser and the balance of power in the Middle East, 1952–1967 (2003) p. 46
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- Tony Shaw, "Government Manipulation of the Press during the 1956 Suez Crisis," Contemporary Record, 1994, 8#2, pp 274–288
- "BBC NEWS – UK – UK considered cutting off Nile". bbc.co.uk.
- Williams, Harold Macmillan (2009) p. 250-252
- James, Anthony Eden, pp 462–5, quote p 472 dated 31 July 1956
- C. Philip Skardon, A Lesson for Our Times: How America Kept the Peace in the Hungary-Suez Crisis of 1956 (2010) pp 194–5
- Gorst, Anthony; Johnman, Lewis (1997). The Suez crisis. Routledge Sources in History. Psychology Press. p. 115. ISBN 0-415-11449-7.
- Dietl, Ralph "Suez 1956: An European Intervention?" pp. 259–273 from Journal of Contemporary History, Volume 43, Issue # 2, April 2008, p. 273
- Simon C. Smith (2008). Reassessing Suez 1956: New Perspectives on the Crisis and Its Aftermath. Ashgate. p. 109.
- "Drama sparks Suez Crisis memories". Norfolk life – Eastern Daily Press. 30 June 2011. Retrieved 21 July 2012.
- "Gamal Nasser : Biography". Spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk. Retrieved 21 July 2012.
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- Bingham, John (2 October 2008). "Sir Anthony Eden's cabinet discussed concealing Suez 'collusion', records show". The Daily Telegraph (London).
- Rothwell 1992, p244, 247
- Charmley 1995 p352-3
- Rhodes James 1986, pp. 591–2 Rhodes James was a clerk of the House of Commons in the 1950s. His account of this incident appears to be that of a personal eyewitness.
- Rothwell 1992, p244, 247
- Rothwell 1992, p244, 247
- Rothwell 1992, p244, 247
- James, Anthony Eden p 595
- Charmley 1995 p353
- Rothwell 1992, p245-6
- Rhodes James 1986 pp599-600
- Rothwell 1992, p246
- James, Anthony Eden pp 599–600
- Rhodes James 1986, p612-14
- Robert Rhodes James (1986) Anthony Eden
- Letter, Daily Telegraph, 7 August 1990.
- Anthony Nutting (1967) No End of a Lesson
- D. R. Thorpe (2003) Eden
- "What we failed to learn from Suez". Telegraph. Retrieved 21 July 2012.
- Rothwell 1992, p254-5
- When Britain and France nearly married 15 January 2007
- See David Faber (2005) Speaking for England
- See, for example, Julian Jackson (2003) The Fall of France
- "Postscript to Suez", recording conversation of 9 April 1957: John Colville (1985) The Fringes of Power, Volume Two
- Rhodes James 1986, p608-9
- Rhodes James 1986, p609-10
- The London Gazette: . 14 July 1961.
- Rhodes James 1986, p617
- Rothwell 1992, p248
- Rhodes James 1986, p611
- We would have done the same under Nazi occupation Tuesday 25 April 2006
- Rothwell 1992, p249
- Rothwell 1992, p251
- Rothwell 1992, p246-7
- Rhodes James 1986, p611
- "Suez in Retrospect: Anthony Eden's Memoirs – Chalmers Roberts". The Atlantic. 1 April 1960. Retrieved 21 July 2012.
- Rhodes James 1986, p616 It is unclear from the wording whether this includes the initial £100,000
- Compute the Relative Value of a U.K. Pound
- Rhodes James 1986, p158
- The Mail on Sunday, Anthony Eden's Cleopatra; EXCLUSIVE:The beautiful American Countess, and her passionate affair with a Prime Minister-in-waiting., 26 January 1997
- ""Not new but fresh", Time Magazine, 23 June 1947". Time.com. 23 June 1947. Retrieved 15 June 2010.
- Rhodes James 1986, p93
- Cecil Beaton, diary, quoted in Hugo Vickers (1994) Loving Garbo
- Morris, Nigel (4 November 2006). "Eden 'was on purple hearts during Suez crisis' – UK Politics – UK". The Independent. Retrieved 21 July 2012.
- Rothwell 1992, p250
- "Clarissa Eden: A witness to history". Telegraph. 21 October 2007. Retrieved 21 July 2012.
- "Anthony Eden (1897–1977) – Find A Grave Memorial". Findagrave.com. Retrieved 21 July 2012.
- "Special Collections". Special-coll.bham.ac.uk. Retrieved 15 June 2010.
- Sir Oswald Mosley. My Life London, 1968
- Rothwell 1992, p250
- Rothwell 1992, p.255
- Rhodes James 1986, p624
- Rhodes James 1986, p161
- Evelyn Shuckburgh: Descent to Suez. Diaries 1951–1956. London, 1986
- Rhodes James 1986, p623
- Rothwell 1992, p254
- Rhodes James 1986, p158
- Rhodes James 1986, p160
- Rhodes James 1986, p162
- Rothwell 1992, p251-2
- Rhodes James 1986, p625
- Rentoul, John (27 January 2013). "Yes, Prime Ministers!". The Independent. Retrieved 16 August 2013.
- Carlton, David (1981). Anthony Eden, a Biography. London: Hodder & Stoughton. ISBN 978-0-713-90829-9.
- Dutton, David. Anthony Eden: a life and reputation (1997)
- Charmley, John (1996). Churchill's Grand Alliance: The Anglo-American Special Relationship 1940–57. London: Hodder & Stoughton. ISBN 978-0-340-59760-6. OCLC 247165348.
- Hathaway, Robert M. "Suez, the perfect failure," Political Science Quarterly, Summer 1994, 109#2 pp 361–66 in JSTOR
- Henderson, John T. "Leadership Personality and War: The Cases of Richard Nixon and Anthony Eden," Political Science Dec 1976, 28#2 pp 141–164,
- James, Robert Rhodes. "Anthony Eden and the Suez Crisis," History Today, November 1986, 36#11 pp 8–15
- James, Robert Rhodes. Anthony Eden: A Biography (1986), detailed scholarly biography
- Lamb, Richard (1987). The Failure of the Eden Government. London: Sidgwick & Jackson Ltd. ISBN 978-0-283-99534-7.
- Pearson, Jonathan. Sir Anthony Eden and the Suez Crisis: Reluctant Gamble (2002) ISBN 9780333984512
- Rothwell, V. Anthony Eden: a political biography, 1931–1957 (1992)
- Ruane, Kevin. "SEATO, MEDO, and the Baghdad Pact: Anthony Eden, British Foreign Policy and the Collective Defense of Southeast Asia and the Middle East, 1952–1955," Diplomacy & Statecraft, March 2005, 16#1, pp 169–199
- Ruane, Kevin, and James Ellison. "Managing the Americans: Anthony Eden, Harold Macmillan and the Pursuit of 'Power-by-Proxy' in the 1950s," Contemporary British History, Autumn 2004, 18#3, pp 147–167
- Thorpe, D. R. "Eden, (Robert) Anthony, first earl of Avon (1897–1977)", Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (Oxford University Press, 2004) online
- Thorpe, D.R. Eden: The Life and Times of Anthony Eden, First Earl of Avon, 1897–1977. London: Chatto and Windus, 2003 ISBN 0-7126-6505-6). detailed scholarly biography
- Jay, Peter. Review of the above The Guardian 22 March 2003.
- Watry, David M. Diplomacy at the Brink: Eisenhower, Churchill, and Eden in the Cold War. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2014. ISBN 9780807157183
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- Media related to Anthony Eden at Wikimedia Commons
- Search and download private office papers of Eden from The National Archives' website
- Archival material relating to Anthony Eden listed at the UK National Archives
- Hansard 1803–2005: contributions in Parliament by Anthony Eden
- University of Birmingham Special Collections The Avon Papers including on the Suez Crisis
- Works by or about Anthony Eden at Internet Archive
- Works by Anthony Eden at LibriVox (public domain audiobooks)
- Sir Anthony Eden – obituary. (Newsreel). British Pathé. 1957. Retrieved 8 March 2010.
- Portraits of Anthony Eden, 1st Earl of Avon at the National Portrait Gallery, London
- "Prime Ministers in the Post-War world: Anthony Eden", lecture by Dr David Carlton, given at Gresham College, 10 May 2007 (available for download as video or audio files)