South Canyon Fire

South Canyon Fire
The fatal spot fire approaching the ridgeline.
Date(s)	July 2, 1994 (1994-07-02) — July 11, 1994 (1994-07-11)
Statistics
Burned area	2,115 acres (9 km2)
Impacts
Deaths	14
Ignition
Cause	Lightning
Map
The location of the South Canyon Fire.

The South Canyon Fire was a 1994 wildfire that took the lives of 14 wildland firefighters on Storm King Mountain, near Glenwood Springs, Colorado, on July 6, 1994. It is often also referred to as the Storm King fire. The fire was started by a dry lightning storm, sending several wildland firefighting crews to engage the fire. On July 6th, a cold front reached the area, increasing wind speed and creating a surge in fire activity. A major spot fire developed and entrapped 9 hotshots, 3 smokejumpers, and 2 helitack crewmembers, leading to their deaths.

Background

During June of 1994, Colorado experienced record highs and weather patterns of intense thunderstorms, leading to several wildfires across the state. Red flag warnings were issued for western Colorado based on forecasts for dry thunderstorms with strong and gusty winds. Western Colorado was in extreme drought, as shown on the July 9 Palmer Drought Index map.

The Bureau of Land Management's Grand Junction District had experienced several fires, which were twice the annual average. Type 1 and 2 Incident Management Teams had responded to five times the number of fires that they would respond to in a normal year. The district issued a directive ordering all fires to be attacked and suppressed as soon as possible.

The Grand Junction District, which included the BLM regional dispatch center, was in very high to extreme fire danger, with 90 percent of its firefighting resources committed to fires. Lightning storms during the previous 2 days had resulted in more than 40 new fires, and the district had developed a priority list for initial attack. Highest priority was given to fires threatening residences, structures, and utilities, and to fires with the highest potential for spread.

Fire origin

On July 2nd, 1994, lightning sparked a fire near the base of Storm King Mountain, 7 miles (11 km) west of Glenwood Springs, Colorado. Initially small and well away from private property, the fire was assigned low priority and allowed to smolder for the first two days.

A top-down view of the South Canyon Fire.

Nearby residents of Canyon Creek Estates grew increasingly concerned by the persistent blaze, prompting local authorities to take action. At 11:00 a.m. Mountain Standard Time (GMT-7) on July 3rd, local authorities reported the fire to the BLM dispatch center, which contacted the Western Slope Fire Coordination Center and requested eight smokejumpers and a lead plane to respond to Storm King Mountain and other possible fires in the area.

By July 4th, the fire had burned only 3 acres (1.2 ha). It burned in a low intensity state, consuming grass, twigs, and leaves downslope of the initial lightning strike. At 3:40 p.m., the Sopris Ranger District dispatched one Forest Service engine crew to the fire, which reported that the fire posed no threat to structures in town. Another engine, this one BLM, was sent to the fire. At 6:30 p.m., the incident commander, BLM, and USFS firefighters sized up the fire and decided to begin suppression operations on the next day, July 5th. Their decision was due to the darkness and steep terrain they saw.

Incident

Smokejumpers and part of the Prineville Hotshot Crew on the West Flank Fireline, surrounded by thick Gamble Oak on the slope of Storm King Mountain. Photo by Tony Petrilli, U.S. Forest Service.

July 5th

On July 5th, firefighters began their approach from the west at the east end of Canyon Creek Estates, making a difficult march up the rugged terrain. Upon arrival at the top of the ridge, the combined BLM and Forest Service crews began clearing a landing zone known as Helispot 1. This helispot could serve as a safety zone. Firefighters began constructing firelines to contain the blaze.

The fight was joined that evening by smokejumpers (from Missoula, MT) who began aiding in the construction of the firelines, working well into the night of July 5 but quitting at approximately 12:30 a.m. (July 6th) due to danger from rolling rocks. By the end of July 5th, the fire had burned approximately 50 acres, while leaving small unburnt islands in the valley. Early in the morning of July 6th, the BLM and Forest Service crew completed work on a second landing/safety zone, Helispot 2. Another smokejumper crew, this time from McCall, ID, arrived to the incident. In addition, Helicopter 93R (Romeo) was ordered in addition to the Western Slope Helitack Crew.

Morning of July 6th

The day after, July 6th, strong winds began to blow in the West Drainage area. A crew of hotshots from Prineville, OR, were ordered to the South Canyon Fire. They joined 16 smokejumpers, 2 helitack crewmembers, and 11 BLM/USFS engine crewmembers. Gusts grew in speed, and a helicopter tasked with observation was limited to four hours due to the dangerous conditions. The jumper-in-charge, Don Mackey, of the smokejumpers and another jumper expressed safety concerns due to the downhill line construction and worsening weather.

Meanwhile, at 3:20 p.m., a cold front which had been forecasted hit the fire area. Firefighters were not formally briefed on this weather event, with a couple of Prineville crewmembers aware of the upcoming winds. The cold front brought 45 mph winds directly over the fire area. Dispatchers neglected to inform lead smokejumper Mackey.

Blowup

A map of the progression of the fire through the blowup on July 6th.

At 3:45 p.m., the fire made several rapid movements with 100-foot flame lengths. It reversed directions several times and began to reach the canopy of trees. At this point, water drops were deemed ineffective, and several firefighters working on the main fireline noticed the activity and began to pull back.

At 4:00 p.m., the fire blew up and raced towards the fleeing firefighters. As it went up the slope, even stronger winds of 40 knots pushed it further. Beginning at 4:14 and 4:18 p.m., the fire was observed to spot back to the east side of the drainage below the crew that was walking out the fireline to the ridge. The spot fire reached the ridgeline in 2 minutes. During the run the fire's rate of speed accelerated from 3 to 11 mph.

Smokejumpers with Petrilli

Don Mackey, the jumper-in-charge, left to locate a line scout, Dale Longanecker, who had been monitoring the fire. He was last seen alive by a group led by smokejumper Anthony Petrilli, who was headed toward the burnt-out area by Helispot 1. At 4:19 p.m., 8 smokejumpers, including Petrilli, deployed their fire shelters just below Helispot 1. All 8 smokejumpers survived.

An image taken by one of the surviving hotshot crewmembers of the spot fire.

Main Prineville hotshot group

Meanwhile, 11 members of Prineville IHC, including the superintendent, had been on the main ridge and were ordered to the safety zone Helispot 1. However, fire had enveloped the safety zone and forced them to move toward the Helispot 2 safety zone. These hotshots made it down the ridge and onto the interstate, surviving the fire.

Western flank group

On the western flank, the 9 remaining members of the Prineville Hotshot Crew joined up with jumper-in-charge Mackey. At this point, firefighters were unaware of the wall of flame growing behind them. A spot fire grew to 150 ft tall and 1/4 of a mile wide, and began rolling down the slope to the hotshots and smokejumpers. As the spot fire spread, the crew's squad leaders ordered the firefighters to drop their equipment and run. Conflicting orders came through, with the squad leader at the front of the line ordering the crew to deploy fire shelters. In the end, all the firefighters abandoned their gear and ran for the ridge top, an incredibly steep climb through thick pinyon-juniper.

Smokejumper Eric Hipke showing the trail where he was forced to run for his life.

South Canyon Fire Day Shift Fire Map for July 10, 1994. This map shows the approximate final fire perimeter and fire size of 2,115 acres.

Two smokejumpers, Erickson and Haugh, ran for the ridge top first. A third jumper, Eric Hipke, joined them at the top. Hipke was seriously burned, but all three survived, escaping down the drainage to the interstate. The fire overtook the firefighters who had delayed their run, killing all of them just short of the ridge top. This group contained the other half of the Prineville Hotshot Crew and three smokejumpers.

Helitack crewmembers

The remaining helitack crewmembers were directing fire suppression efforts when they were yelled at by other firefighters to escape through the East Drainage. However, they did not feel that it was a good escape route and chose to run along the ridge to find a better route. The fire funneled through the saddle at the jumpers' landing site and cut off an eastern escape route. At 4:22 p.m., they were stopped on the ridge by a steep, rocky chute 50 feet deep and perished when they couldn't cross.

Containment and mop-up operations

While firefighters were evacuated, the fire grew massively in size. At its largest, it stood around 2,115 acres. Fresh teams of firefighters were ordered to contain the fire immediately after the fatal blowup. The fire was declared controlled on July 11, 1994.

Casualties

The fireline and fatality site of the Prineville hotshot crew. The firefighters fell while attempting to climb the trail to the top of the ridge.

Twelve firefighters were unable to outrun the blaze and perished. Two more helitack firefighters were also killed as they tried to flee to the northwest. The fatalities were:

• Prineville Hotshots: Kathi Beck, Tamera Bickett, Scott Blecha, Levi Brinkley, Douglas Dunbar, Terri Hagen, Bonnie Holtby, Rob Johnson, Jon Kelso
• Missoula Smokejumpers: Don Mackey
• McCall Smokejumpers: Roger Roth, Jim Thrash
• Western Slope Helitack: Robert Browning, Jr., Richard Tyler

Aftermath and investigation

As soon as wildland firefighters were confirmed to have been killed, the director of the BLM and the chief of the USFS designated a 10 member interagency investigation team. The team was tasked to submit a developed and factual report within 45 days. Despite several investigations, the South Canyon Fire Investigative Report was criticized for its incomplete information and subpar data collection strategies.

The team identified several factors as the leadup to the fatalities. Several key ones include:

• No weather observations were taken onsite.
• Some firefighters knew a cold front was expected on July 6th.
• The fire area was very steep and rugged with 50 to 100 percent slopes.
• Fire weather and red flag warnings were not broadcast over fire radio frequencies, nor were they given to firefighters on the fire.
• Some firefighters were not briefed on escape routes and safety zones.
• Fuels were extremely dry and susceptible to rapid and explosive spread.
• Eight of the 10 Standard Firefighting Orders were compromised. Twelve of the 18 Watch Out Situations were not recognized, or proper action was not taken.

Lessons learned

One recommendation from the South Canyon fire review was that every firefighter should carry a radio. The incident investigators noted that fire weather forecasts must be communicated to firefighters on initial attack and extended attack incidents.

Another team was working on a review of the interagency management team. They recommended the addition of a fire behavior analyst (FBAN) and an incident meterologist (IMET) to large scale extended-attack fires. This team recommended the following to be implemented immediately:

• Spot weather forecasts should be requested for fires that have potential for extreme fire behavior or exceed initial attack or are located in areas for which red flag warnings have been issued.
• All wildland fire agencies broadcast fire weather forecasts over the radio and undertake other measures to ensure widespread dissemination of fire weather forecasts to all fire personnel.
• A national interagency strategy and implementation plan should be developed to improve technical transfer of fire danger and fire behavior technology.
• The Interagency Management Review Team needs to evaluate current training to assure emphasis is placed on the basics of fire behavior, firefighting strategies and tactics, the 10 standard Fire Orders, and the 18 Watch Out Situations.

The lessons learned post-South Canyon changed many of the strategies wildland firefighters today. Situational awareness is encouraged, while acronyms like LCES (Lookouts, Communications, Escape Routes, Safety Zones) are drilled into crewmembers' heads. In addition, publications like the IRPG (Incident Response Pocket Guide) is issued to all federal wildland firefighters and contains a trove of knowledge about fire behavior, avoiding casualties, and identifying common indicators of disaster fires.

Memorials

The beginning of the trail.

The Storm King Mountain Memorial Trail, closely following the actual path the firefighters hiked to fight the blaze, leads visitors to the site. Plaques and memorials line the trail explaining the events and paying homage to those who fell. Crosses were installed where each person fell. Memorials have also been constructed at Two Rivers Park in Glenwood Springs, at Ochoco Creek Park in Prineville, Oregon, and in McDonald Forest's Peavy Arboretum near Corvallis, Oregon.

The fire and ensuing casualties were the subject of John Maclean's book Fire on the Mountain: The True Story of the South Canyon Fire.