Soviet and Communist studies

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Soviet and Communist studies is the field of historical studies of the Soviet Union and other Communist states as well as of Communist parties such as the Communist Party USA that existed or still exist in some form in many countries, inside or outside the former Soviet Bloc.[1] Aspects of its historiography have attracted controversy between historians on topics including totalitarianism and Cold War espionage.[2][3]

Soviet and Eastern European studies was also a form of area studies that included the study of various aspects of Soviet society including agriculture, trade relations in the Warsaw Pact, nationality policy, Kremlinology, human rights, empire, and collectivization. The wider field included independent study in universities and academia, as well as some support from military and intelligence.[1] Major contemporary journals included Communisme, Europe-Asia Studies, and The Russian Review, among others. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the field focused on historical studies and began to include comparisons to the post-Soviet years as well as new data from the Soviet archives.

Historiography[edit]

The academic field after World War II and during the Cold War was dominated by the "totalitarian model" of the Soviet Union,[4] stressing the absolute nature of Joseph Stalin's power. The "totalitarian model" was first outlined in the 1950s by political scientist Carl Joachim Friedrich, who posited that the Soviet Union and other Communist states were totalitarian systems, with the personality cult and almost unlimited powers of the "great leader" such as Stalin.[5] The "revisionist school" beginning in the 1960s focused on relatively autonomous institutions which might influence policy at the higher level.[6] Matt Lenoe describes the "revisionist school" as representing those who "insisted that the old image of the Soviet Union as a totalitarian state bent on world domination was oversimplified or just plain wrong. They tended to be interested in social history and to argue that the Communist Party leadership had had to adjust to social forces."[7] These "revisionist school" historians such as J. Arch Getty and Lynne Viola challenged the "totalitarian model", which was considered to be outdated,[8] and were active in the former Communist states' archives, especially the State Archive of the Russian Federation related to the Soviet Union.[6][9]

Some critics of the "totalitarian model", such as Robert C. Tucker, formulated an alternative that also focused on the personality cult of Stalin. Tucker, influenced by George F. Kennan's writings on how the Soviet Union had reverted into a tsarist autocracy, emphasized that the Soviet Union was not guided by socialism or ideology but more by ruling class.[1] This perspective emerged significantly from ideas of neo-Freudian psychoanalysis, evaluating Stalin as a deeply paranoid tyrant and in the process creating a more tsarist-type government.[10] Moshe Lewin cautioned historians not to "over-Stalinize" the whole of Soviet history, while he also stated that the Soviet Union developed a "propensity for authoritarianism" after Marxian principles had failed to be established.[11] Lewin argued that the Soviet Union recapitulated a "bureaucratic absolutism" almost Prussian in nature, where the "monarch was dependent on his bureaucracy".[12]

Cold War and espionage[edit]

Post-Soviet access to archives, including Eastern Bloc archives and the Venona project's decrypts, bolstered traditionalists' view on Cold War intelligence that the CPUSA was subsidized by the Soviet Union, and particularly before the 1950s aiding it in espionage, as well as the knowledge that extensive operations were conducted by atomic spies for the Soviet Union.[13][14][15] Daniel Patrick Moynihan, a United States Senator for the Democratic Party who led the Moynihan Commission on Government Secrecy, played a major role in publicizing the Venona evidence.[13][14] Archives have shed new light on inter-Communist rivalries during the Cold War, such as the Soviet–Chinese spy wars during the Sino–Soviet split.[16]

Communism[edit]

According to John Earl Haynes and Harvey Klehr, the historiography is characterized by a split between traditionalists and revisionists. "Traditionalists" characterize themselves as objective reporters of what they see as a "totalitarian nature" of communism and Communist states. They are criticized by their opponents as being anti-communist in their eagerness on continuing to focus on the issues of the Cold War. Alternative characterizations for traditionalists include "anti-Communist", "conservative", "Draperite" (after Theodore Draper), "orthodox", and "right-wing";[2] Haynes and Klehr argue that "revisionists" categorize all "traditionalists" as conservative to undermine liberal forms of this study, despite the liberal or even left background of many of the founding members of this view on communism, such as Draper and the Cold War liberals.[17]

Norman Markowitz, a prominent "revisionist", referred to traditionalists as "reactionaries", "right-wing romantics", and "triumphalist" who belong to the "HUAC school of CPUSA scholarship."[18] Haynes and Klehr criticize some "revisionists" for characterizing "traditionalists" as "lowercase" ideological anticommunists (communism in general) rather than anti-Communists (the historically established Communist parties). In their view, "revisionists" such as Joel Kovel imply that "traditionalists" in Communist studies are foremost opposing the establishment of an "ideal" Marxist society, when in practice, traditionalists have criticized the form of "real socialism" that existed in the Soviet system at the time, a form also criticized by many revisionists. Kovel wrote that the "Soviet system while nominally communist was, given its hierarchy, exploitation and lack of democracy, neither communist nor even authentically socialist."[19] "Revisionists", characterized by Haynes and Klehr as historical revisionists, are more numerous and dominate academic institutions and learned journals.[20] A suggested alternative formulation is "new historians of American communism", but that has not caught on because these historians would describe themselves as unbiased and scholarly and contrast their work to the work of anti-communist "traditionalists", whom they would term biased and unscholarly.[17]

Controversies and debates[edit]

Totalitarianism, revisionism, and the Holodomor[edit]

J. Arch Getty's Origins of Great Purges, a book published in 1985 in which Getty posits that the Soviet political system was not completely controlled from the center and that Stalin only responded to political events as they arose,[6] was a challenge to works by Robert Conquest and part of the debates between the "totalitarian model" and "revisionist school" of the Soviet Union. In an appendix to the book, Getty also questioned the previously published findings that Stalin organized himself the murder of Sergey Kirov to justify his campaign of Great Purge.[7] The "totalitarian model" historians objected to the "revisionist school" of historians such as Getty as apologetics for Stalin and accused them of downplaying the terror. Lenoe responds that "Getty has not denied Stalin's ultimate responsibility for the Terror, nor is he an admirer of Stalin."[7][21] As the leader of the second generation of the "revisionist school", or "revisionist historians", Sheila Fitzpatrick was the first to call the group of historians working on Soviet history in the 1980s "a new cohort of [revisionist school] historians."[22] Most young "revisionist school" historians did not want to separate the social history of the Soviet Union from the evolution of the political system. Fitzpatrick explained in the 1980s, when the "totalitarian model" was still widely used, "it was very useful to show that the model had an inherent bias and it did not explain everything about Soviet society. Now, whereas a new generation of academics considers sometimes as self evident that the totalitarian model was completely erroneous and harmful, it is perhaps more useful to show than there were certain things about the Soviet company that it explained very well."[23]

Hannah Arendt, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Conquest, and Carl Joachim Friedrich were prominent advocates of applying the totalitarian concept to comparison of Nazism and Stalinism. It was considered to be outdated by the 1980s and for the post-Stalinist era,[8] and is seen as a useful word, but the old 1950s theory about it is defunct among scholars.[24] Fitzpatrick and Michael Geyer criticize the concept and highlight the differences between Nazism and Stalinism.[25] Henry Rousso defends the work of Friedrich et al. while noting the concept is both useful and descriptive rather than analytical, with the conclusion the regimes described as totalitarian do not have a common origin and did not arise in similar ways. Philippe Burrin and Nicholas Werth take a middle position between one making Stalin seem all-powerful and the other making him seem like a weak dictator.[26] Ian Kershaw and Moshe Lewin take a longer historical perspective and regard Nazism and Stalinism not so much as examples of a new type of society like Arendt, Brzezinski and Friedrich did, but more as historical "anomalie" or unusual deviations from the typical path of development that most industrial societies are expected to follow.[27] According to Nicholas Doumanis, the totalitarian perspective of equating Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union under Stalin is not conceivable and is a misunderstanding of the two distinct natures of the regimes, which is why they were enemies. Stalin's main goal was to create a socialist state, under the banner of socialism in one country, that was autarkic, industrialized, and multiethnic. Genocide was not in Stalin's plans, rather nationalism and nation-building were, and it was not inherent in the building of a non-capitalist, non-expansionary state.[28]

During the debates in the 1980s, the use of émigré sources and the insistence on Stalin's engineering of Kirov's murder became embedded in the two sides' position. In a review of Conquest's work on the Soviet famine of 1932–1933, especially The Harvest of Sorrow,[29] Getty writes that Stalin and the Soviet Politburo played a major role,[30] but "there is plenty of blame to go around. It must be shared by the tens of thousands of activists and officials who carried out the policy and by the peasants who chose to slaughter animals, burn fields, and boycott cultivation in protest."[31] In an analysis of scholarship surrounding the Ukrainian famine of the 1930s, Jeff Coplon says that allegations by "mainstream academics", including Conquest, of genocide against the Soviet Union were historically dubious and politically motivated as part of a campaign by the Ukrainian nationalist community.[31] In a letter to the editors, Conquest dismissed the article as "error and absurdity."[32] Michael Ellman states that in the end it all depends on the definition of genocide[33] and that if Stalin was guilty of genocide in the Holodomor, then "[m]any other events of the 1917–53 era (e.g. the deportation of whole nationalities, and the 'national operations' of 1937–38) would also qualify as genocide, as would the acts of [many Western countries]",[34] such as the Atlantic slave trade, the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and the sanctions against Iraq in the 1990s, among many others. Historian Hiroaki Kuromiya finds it persuasive.[33]

As summarized by David R. Marples, Conquest's thesis that the famine constituted genocide and was deliberately inflicted is controversial and remains part of the ongoing debates on the Holodomor genocide question.[35] Vladimir N. Brovkin describes it as a challenge to the "revisionist school" of historians, while Alexander Nove states "Conquest seems prone to accept the Ukrainian nationalist myth."[35] Hiroaki writes that "those who examine the famine from a general Soviet perspective downplay any specific Ukrainian factor, while specialists on Ukraine generally support the concept of a genocidal famine."[35] The most notable work in the field that maintains the famine was not genocide is by R. W. Davies and Stephen G. Wheatcroft, both of whom cite a letter from Conquest stating "he does not believe that Stalin deliberately inflicted the 1933 famine."[35]

Sarah Davies and James Harris write that with the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the release of the Soviet archives, some of the heat has gone out of the debate.[36] A 1993 study of archival data by Getty et al. showed that a total of 1,053,829 people died in the Gulag from 1934 to 1953.[37] Getty and Wheatcroft write that the opening of the Soviet archives has vindicated the lower estimates put forth by the "revisionist school" scholars.[38][39] Steven Rosefielde writes that the number has to be augmented by 19.4 percent in light of more complete archival evidence to 1,258,537, with the best estimate of Gulag deaths being 1.6 million from 1929 to 1953 when excess mortality is taken into account.[40]

Victims of Stalinism[edit]

According to J. Arch Getty, over half of the 100 million deaths which are commonly attributed to Communism were due to famines. Getty writes that the "overwhelming weight of opinion among scholars working in the new archives is that the terrible famine of the 1930s was the result of Stalinist bungling and rigidity rather than some genocidal plan."[41] As the majority of excess deaths under Joseph Stalin were not direct killings, the exact number of victims of Stalinism is difficult to calculate due to lack of consensus among scholars on which deaths can be attributed to the regime.[42]

Stephen G. Wheatcroft posits that "[t]he Stalinist regime was consequently responsible for about a million purposive killings, and through its criminal neglect and irresponsibility it was probably responsible for the premature deaths of about another two million more victims amongst the repressed population, i.e. in the camps, colonies, prisons, exile, in transit and in the POW camps for Germans. These are clearly much lower figures than those for whom Hitler's regime was responsible." Wheatcroft states that Stalin's "purposive killings" fit more closely into the category of "execution" than "murder", given he thought the accused were indeed guilty of crimes against the state and insisted on documentation. Hitler simply wanted to kill Jews and communists because of who they were, insisted on no documentation and was indifferent at even a pretence of legality for these actions.[43]

Michael Ellman says that "the very category 'victims of Stalinism' is a matter of political judgement." Ellman says that mass deaths from famines are not a "uniquely Stalinist evil", and compares the behavior of the Stalinist regime vis-à-vis the Holodomor to that of the British Empire (towards Ireland and India) and the G8 in contemporary times. According to Ellman, the latter "are guilty of mass manslaughter or mass deaths from criminal negligence because of their not taking obvious measures to reduce mass deaths" and a possible defense of Stalin and his associates is that "their behaviour was no worse than that of many rulers in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries."[42]

Ellman, Getty, and Wheatcroft in particular, among others, criticized Robert Conquest (Wheatcroft said that Conquest's victim totals for Stalinist repressions are still too high, even in his reassessments)[44] and other historians for relying on hearsay and rumour as evidence, and cautioned that historians should instead utilize archive material.[39] During the debates, Ellman distinguished between historians who baseed their research on archive materials, and those like Conquest whose estimates were based on witnesses evidence and other data that is unreliable.[42] Wheatcroft stated that historians relied on Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn to support their estimates of deaths under Stalin in the tens of millions but research in the state archives vindicated the lower estimates, while adding that the popular press has continued to include serious errors that should not be cited, or relied on, in academia.[39]

In comparing the deaths caused by both Stalin and Hitler's policies, historians posit that archival evidence released after the collapse of the Soviet Union confirms that Stalin did not kill more people than Hitler. Timothy D. Snyder said that the Nazi regime killed about 11 million non-combatants (which rises to above 12 million if "foreseeable deaths from deportation, hunger, and sentences in concentration camps are included"), with analogous figures for Stalin's regime being roughly 6 and 9 million.[45][nb 1]

Memory politics[edit]

The double genocide theory is a theory popular in Eastern Europe which originated in the Baltic states during the 1990s, positing an equivalence between the Nazi Holocaust and a Soviet genocide committed against the local population. It represents a "revisionist" view that according to Michael Shafir is at worse Holocaust obfuscation.[46] Dovid Katz considers it "Holocaust revisionism", whose debate is prompted by a "movement in Europe that believes the crimes—morally, ethically—of Nazism and Communism are absolutely equal, and that those of us who don't think they're absolutely equal, are perhaps soft on Communism."[47] Although a "revisionist" view, it is built on the "totalitarian model" and is a popular and accepted view in Eastern Europe that is legitimized by political declarations such as the Black Ribbon Day and the Prague Declaration.[48] According to Laure Neumayer, much of the content of the Prague Declaration reproduced demands formulated by the conservative European People's Party in 2004 and draws heavily on the "totalitarian model" theory.[49]

Jacques Sémelin writes that Stéphane Courtois and Jean-Louis Margolin "view class genocide as the equivalent to racial genocide." Alongside Michael Mann, they contributed to "the debates on comparisons between Nazism and communism", with Sémelin describing this as a theory.[50] Michael David-Fox describes Courtois and Martin Malia as "revisionists" for positing Communism being worse than Nazism, which goes back to the conservative "revisionist" Ernst Nolte and the Historikerstreit. David-Fox criticizes the figures as well as the idea to combine loosely connected events under a single category of Communist death toll, blaming these authors for their manipulation and deliberate inflation which are presented to advocate the idea that Communism was a greater evil than Nazism. In particular, David-Fox criticizes the idea to connect the deaths with some "generic Communism" concept, defined down to the common denominator of party movements founded by intellectuals.[51] In their critique of "revisionists" positing Communism as the greater evil, Jens Mecklenburg and Wolfgang Wippermann posit that a connection between the events in Pol Pot's Cambodia and under the Stalin era are far from evident and that Pol Pot's study of Marxism in Paris is insufficient for connecting radical Soviet industrialism and the Khmer Rouge's murderous anti-urbanism under the same category.[52]

The Black Book of Communism[edit]

Another controversy came with the publication of The Black Book of Communism by Stéphane Courtois, described as one of the most influential and controversial books written about the history of communism in the 20th century,[53] in particular the history of the Soviet Union and other Communist states and state socialist regimes.[54] While it was praised by several publications, its reception among the academic field was more mixed and negative. The introduction, the main issue of controversy, was especially criticized for comparing Communism to Nazism and accused of manipulations and inflating numbers, including challenges from the main contributors to the book.[55] Laure Neumayer says that The Black Book of Communism contributed greatly to "legitimising the equivalence of Nazi and Communist crimes" by "making criminality the very essence of communism."[49]

According to Jon Wiener, the book was "especially controversial in France because it was published during the 1997 trial of Nazi collaborator Maurice Papon for crimes against humanity for his role in the deportation of Jews from Bourdeaux to Hitler's death camps. Papon's lawyers introduced the book as evidence for the defense."[56] The book has been especially influential in Eastern Europe, where it was uncritically embraced by prominent politicians and intellectuals, many of whom popularized it using terminology and concepts popular with the radical right.[57] According to Stanley Hoffmann, "[t]his gigantic volume, the sum of works of 11 historians, social scientists, and journalists, is less important for the content, but for the social storm it has provoked in France. ... What Werth and some of his colleagues object to is 'the manipulation of the figures of the numbers of people killed' (Courtois talks of almost 100 million, including 65 million in China); 'the use of shock formulas, the juxtaposition of histories aimed at asserting the comparability and, next, the identities of fascism, and Nazism, and communism.' Indeed, Courtois would have been far more effective if he had shown more restraint."[58]

Communist holocaust[edit]

Communist holocaust is a proposed concept, overlapping with the double genocide theory, that killings under Communist states were a red holocaust. Both terms have been used, in reference to the killings, by some authors and the Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation as well as being referenced in the Friendship Act (HR3000) of 1993 by the United States Congress.[59] Steven Rosefielde wrote Red Holocaust in reference to all "peacetime state killings" under Communist states.[60]

Michael Shafir says that the use of the term supports the "competitive martyrdom component of Double Genocide", a theory whose worst version is Holocaust obfuscation.[46] George Voicu states that Leon Volovici has "rightfully condemned the abusive use of this concept as an attempt to 'usurp' and undermine a symbol specific to the history of European Jews."[61] Clemens Heni describes "red Holocaust" and the concept of a Communist holocaust, among others, as Holocaust trivialization and "softcore" Holocaust denial not easily identified and that it is often "tolerated, or even encouraged and reproduced in the mainstream, not only in Germany. ... Scholars have only recently begun to unravel this disturbing phenomenon."[62]

Victims of Communism[edit]

"Victims of Communism" is a concept proposed by some scholars and historians such as Courtois[63] and George Watson.[64] The theory posits that famine and mass killing under Communist states can be attributed to a single cause and that Communism, as "the deadliest ideology in history", or in the words of Jonathan Rauch as "the deadliest fantasy in human history", represents the greatest threat to humanity.[59]

Kristen Ghodsee, a professor of Russian and East European Studies, has challenged the attempt by historians such as Stéphane Courtois to make estimates of victims, who are typically referred to as "victims of Communism", based on mass mortality from famines, purges, and wars.[41] According to Klas-Göran Karlsson and Michael Schoenhals, discussion of the number of victims has been "extremely extensive and ideologically biased."[65] Any attempt to estimate a total number of killings under Communist regimes depends greatly on definitions.[66] The criticism of some of the estimates are mostly focused on three aspects, namely that the estimates were based on sparse and incomplete data when significant errors are inevitable; that the figures were skewed to higher possible values; and that those dying at war and victims of civil wars, Holodomor, and other famines under Communist regimes should not be counted.[67][68][63][69][70][71]

While it has its origins in Western European scholarship, the theory has become accepted scholarship in Eastern Europe and among anti-communists in general, although its estimates of over 100 million is considered to be in the high range by most genocide experts.[citation needed] According to an article by Davide Mastracci, the theory is also criticized by certain scholars who see it as an oversimplification, politically motivated as well as for equating the events with the Holocaust.[72] Various museums and monuments have been constructed in remembrance of the "victims of Communism", with support of the European Union and various governments in Canada, Eastern Europe and the United States.[41][73][74][75] The proponents posit a link between communism, sometimes socialism, with genocide, mass killing, and totalitarianism,[76] with authors such as Watson advocating a common history stretching from Karl Marx to Adolf Hitler.[64] Some right-wing authors allege that Marx was responsible for Nazism and the Holocaust.[77] Authors such as Courtois propose a theory of equivalence between class and racial genocide.[50]

Kristen Ghodsee posits that these efforts seek to institutionalize the "Victims of Communism" narrative as a double genocide theory, or the moral equivalence between the Nazi Holocaust (race murder) and those killed by Communist states (class murder). These efforts have intensified in the wake of the global financial crisis with the hope to discredit and marginalize all political ideologies that could "threaten the primacy of private property and free markets."[41] Laure Neumayer says works such as The Black Book of Communism played a major role in the criminalization of Communism in the European political space in the post Cold War-era. According to Neumayer, "by making criminality the very essence of communism, by explicitly equating the 'race genocide' of Nazism with the 'class genocide' of Communism in connection with the Ukrainian Great Famine of 1932–1933, the Black Book of Communism contributed to legitimising the equivalence of Nazi and Communist crimes. Neumayer claims the book figures prominently in the 'spaces of the anti-communist cause' comparably structured in the former satellite countries, which are a major source of the discourse criminalising the Socialist period."[49]

Journals in the field[edit]

While this area is now seldom offered as a field of study in itself, in which one might become a specialist, there are related fields emerging, as may be judged by the titles of academic journals, some of which have changed to reflect the passage of time since 1989 and the effect of the end of Soviet rule. These include Communisme, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Demokratizatsiya, Eastern European Politics (previously Journal of Communist Studies), Europe-Asia Studies (successor of Soviet Studies), Journal of Cold War Studies, Journal of Contemporary History, Kritika, Post-Soviet Affairs, Problems of Communism (renamed Problems of Post-Communism), The Russian Review, The Slavonic and East European Review (succeeded by Studies in East European Thought), and Studies in Soviet Thought (succeeded by Studies in East European Thought). The historiography of strictly Communist studies is also changing, with some different models of its aims as well as the major shift caused by access to archives.[9] The access to archives, including post-Soviet archives and the Venona project, also bolstered traditionalist views on Soviet espionage in the United States.[13][14][15]

Printed journals include Jahrbuch für Historische Kommunismusforschung (Yearbook for Historical Communist Studies) and Slavic Review. Other serial publications include the Yearbook on International Communist Affairs (1966–1991) published by the Hoover Institution Press and Stanford University[78][79][80] as well as the World Strength of the Communist Party Organizations, an annual report published by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the United States Department of State beginning in 1948.[81][82]

See also[edit]

Notes[edit]

  1. ^ Snyder says that "[e]ven historians of the Holocaust generally take for granted that Stalin killed more people than Hitler, thus placing themselves under greater pressure to stress the special character of the Holocaust, since this is what made the Nazi regime worse than the Stalinist one." Snyder states that "[t]he total figure of civilians deliberately killed under Stalinism, around six million, is of course horribly high. But it is far lower than the estimates of twenty million or more made before we had access to Soviet sources." Although "the issue of quality is more complex than was once thought", as "[m]ass murder in the Soviet Union sometimes involved motivations, especially national and ethnic ones, that can be disconcertingly close to Nazi motivations", Snyder writes that "[t]he total number of noncombatants killed by the Germans" (about 11 million) "is roughly what we had thought. The total number of civilians killed by the Soviets, however, is considerably less than we had believed. We know now that the Germans killed more people than the Soviets did."[45]

References[edit]

  1. ^ a b c Dresen, F. Joseph. "Looking Back at the Origins of Soviet Studies". Wilson Center. Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Retrieved 8 December 2021.
  2. ^ a b Haynes, John Earl; Klehr, Harvey (2003). "Revising History". In Denial: Historians, Communism and Espionage. San Francisco: Encounter. pp. 11–57. ISBN 1-893554-72-4.
  3. ^ Davies, Sarah; Harris, James (2005). "Joseph Stalin: Power and Ideas". Stalin: A New History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 1–17. ISBN 978-1-139-44663-1.
  4. ^ Davies, Sarah; Harris, James (2005). "Joseph Stalin: Power and Ideas". Stalin: A New History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 3. ISBN 978-1-139-44663-1. Academic Sovietology, a child of the early Cold War, was dominated by the 'totalitarian model' of Soviet politics. Until the 1960s it was almost impossible to advance any other interpretation, in the USA at least.
  5. ^ Davies, Sarah; Harris, James (2005). "Joseph Stalin: Power and Ideas". Stalin: A New History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 3–4. ISBN 978-1-139-44663-1. In 1953, Carl Friedrich characterised totalitarian systems in terms of five points: an official ideology, control of weapons and of media, use of terror, and a single mass party, 'usually under a single leader.' There was of course an assumption that the leader was critical to the workings of totalitarianism: at the apex of a monolithic, centralised, and hierarchical system, it was he who issued the orders which were fulfilled unquestioningly by his subordinates.
  6. ^ a b c Davies, Sarah; Harris, James (2005). "Joseph Stalin: Power and Ideas". Stalin: A New History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 4–5. ISBN 978-1-139-44663-1. Tucker's work stressed the absolute nature of Stalin's power, an assumption which was increasingly challenged by later revisionist historians. In his Origins of the Great Purges, Arch Getty argued that the Soviet political system was chaotic, that institutions often escaped the control of the centre, and that Stalin's leadership consisted to a considerable extent in responding, on an ad hoc basis, to political crises as they arose. Getty's work was influenced by political science of the 1960s onwards, which, in a critique of the totalitarian model, began to consider the possibility that relatively autonomous bureaucratic institutions might have had some influence on policy-making at the highest level.
  7. ^ a b c Lenoe, Matt (June 2002). "Did Stalin Kill Kirov and Does It Matter?". The Journal of Modern History. 74 (2): 352–380. doi:10.1086/343411. ISSN 0022-2801. S2CID 142829949.
  8. ^ a b Zimmerman, William (September 1980). "Review: How the Soviet Union is Governed". Slavic Review. 39 (3): 482–486. doi:10.2307/2497167. JSTOR 2497167. In the intervening quarter-century, the Soviet Union has changed substantially. Our knowledge of the Soviet Union has changed as well. We all know that the traditional paradigm no longer satisfies, despite several efforts, primarily in the early 1960s (the directed society, totalitarianism without terror, the mobilization system) to articulate an acceptable variant. We have come to realize that models which were, in effect, offshoots of totalitarian models do not provide good approximations of post-Stalinist reality.
  9. ^ a b Sheila, Fitzpatrick (November 2007). "Revisionism in Soviet History". History and Theory. 46 (4): 77–91. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2303.2007.00429.x. ISSN 1468-2303. ... the Western scholars who in the 1990s and 2000s were most active in scouring the new archives for data on Soviet repression were revisionists (always 'archive rats') such as Arch Getty and Lynne Viola.
  10. ^ Martin, Douglas (1 August 2010). "Robert C. Tucker, a Scholar of Marx, Stalin and Soviet Affairs, Dies at 92". The New York Times. ISSN 0362-4331. Retrieved 8 December 2021.
  11. ^ Cohen, Stephen F.; English, Robert; Kraus, Michael; Lih, Lars T.; Sharlet, Robert (Spring 2011). "Moshe Lewin". Slavic Review. Cambridge University Press. 70 (1): 242. doi:10.5612/slavicreview.70.1.0242. ISSN 0037-6779.
  12. ^ Lewin, Moshe (2005). Elliot, Gregory (ed.). The Soviet Century. London: Verso Books. p. 383. ISBN 9781844670161.
  13. ^ a b c Moynihan, Daniel Patrick (1998). Secrecy: The American Experience. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press. pp. 15–16. ISBN 978-0-300-08079-7. Retrieved 8 December 2021 – via Internet Archive.
  14. ^ a b c Haynes, John Earl (February 2000). "Exchange with Arthur Herman and Venona book talk". John Earl Haynes. Retrieved 8 December 2021.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: url-status (link)
  15. ^ a b Storrs, Landon R. Y. (2 July 2015). "McCarthyism and the Second Red Scare". Oxford Research Encyclopedia of American History. Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acrefore/9780199329175.013.6. ISBN 978-0-199-32917-5. The tenor of debate shifted again when the end of the Cold War made available new evidence from Soviet archives and U.S. intelligence sources such as the VENONA decrypts. That evidence indicated that scholars had underestimated the success of Soviet espionage in the United States as well as the extent of Soviet control over the American Communist Party.
  16. ^ "The Soviet-Chinese Spy Wars in the 1970s: What KGB Counterintelligence Knew, Part II". Wilson Center. Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Retrieved 8 December 2021.
  17. ^ a b Haynes, John Earl; Klehr, Harvey (2003). "Revising History". In Denial: Historians, Communism and Espionage. San Francisco: Encounter. pp. 43–44. ISBN 1-893554-72-4.
  18. ^ Haynes, John Earl; Klehr, Harvey (2003). "Revising History". In Denial: Historians, Communism and Espionage. San Francisco: Encounter. p. 43. ISBN 1-893554-72-4.
  19. ^ Haynes, John Earl; Klehr, Harvey (2003). "Revising History". In Denial: Historians, Communism and Espionage. San Francisco: Encounter. pp. 50–51. ISBN 1-893554-72-4.
  20. ^ Haynes, John Earl; Klehr, Harvey (2005). In Denial: Historians, Communism and Espionage. San Francisco: Encounter. p. 87. ISBN 1-59403-088-X.
  21. ^ Haynes, John Earl; Klehr, Harvey (2003). In Denial: Historians, Communism, & Espionage. Encounter Books. pp. 15–17. ISBN 978-1-893554-72-6.
  22. ^ Fitzpatrick, Sheila (October 1986). "New Perspectives on Stalinism". The Russian Review. Wiley. 45 (4): 409–413. doi:10.2307/130466. JSTOR 130466.
  23. ^ Fitzpatrick, Sheila (October 1986). "New Perspectives on Stalinism". The Russian Review. Wiley. 45 (4): 357–373. doi:10.2307/130471. JSTOR 130471.
  24. ^ Connelly, John (September 2010). "Totalitarianism: Defunct Theory, Useful Word". Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History. 11 (4): 819–835. doi:10.1353/kri.2010.0001. S2CID 143510612. The word is as functional now as it was 50 years ago. It means the kind of regime that existed in Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union, the Soviet satellites, Communist China, and maybe Fascist Italy, where the word originated. ... Who are we to tell Václav Havel or Adam Michnik that they were fooling themselves when they perceived their rulers as totalitarian? Or for that matter any of the millions of former subjects of Soviet-type rule who use the local equivalents of the Czech totalita to describe the systems they lived under before 1989? It is a useful word and everyone knows what it means as a general referent. Problems arise when people confuse the useful descriptive term with the old 'theory' from the 1950s.
  25. ^ Fitzpatrick, Sheila; Geyer, Michael, eds. (2009). Beyond Totalitarianism: Stalinism and Nazism Compared. Cambridge University Press. pp. 3–4, 8–12, 17–19. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511802652. ISBN 978-0-521-72397-8.
  26. ^ Goslan, Richard Joseph; Rousso, Henry, eds. (2004). Stalinism and Nazism: History and Memory Compared. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. ISBN 978-0-803-29000-6.
  27. ^ Kershaw, Ian; Lewin, Moshe, eds. (1997). Stalinism and Nazism: Dictatorships in Comparison. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-56521-9.
  28. ^ Doumanis, Nicholas, ed. (2016). The Oxford Handbook of European History, 1914–1945 (E-book ed.). Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. p. 378. ISBN 9780191017759.
  29. ^ Getty, J. Arch (22 January 1987). "Starving the Ukraine". The London Review of Books. 9 (2): 7–8. Retrieved 20 December 2020. Conquest's hypothesis, sources and evidence are not new. Indeed, he himself first put forward his view two years ago in a work sponsored by the American Enterprise Institute. The intentional famine story, however, has been an article of faith for Ukrainian émigrés in the West since the Cold War. ... Conquest's book will thus give a certain academic credibility to a theory which has not been generally accepted by non-partisan scholars outside the circles of exiled nationalities. In today's conservative political climate, with its 'evil empire' discourse, I am sure that the book will be very popular.
  30. ^ Getty, J. Arch (22 January 1987). "Starving the Ukraine". The London Review of Books. 9 (2). Retrieved 20 December 2020. Stalin gave his backing to radicals in the Party who saw the mixed economy of the Twenties as an unwarranted concession to capitalism. These leftists, for whom Stalin was spokesman and leader, argued that the free market in grain confronted the state with an unpredictable, inefficient and expensive food supply. ... These radical activists, who became the shock troops of the voluntarist 'Stalin Revolution' which swept the Soviet Union in the Thirties, were concentrated in working-class and youth groups. ... The collectivisation of agriculture from 1929 to about 1934 proceeded in several fitful campaigns characterised by confusion, lurches to left and right, and the substitution of enthusiasm, exhortation and violence for careful planning. Hard-line officials and volunteers forced reluctant peasants into improvised collective farms. Peasants resisted by slaughtering animals and refusing to plant, harvest or market grain. Neither side would give way. By 1934 the Stalinists had won, at least insofar as the collective farm system was permanently established, but they had paid a painful price: catastrophic livestock losses, social dislocation and, in some places, famine. Millions of people died from starvation, deportation and violence.
  31. ^ a b Coplon, Jeff (12 January 1988). "In Search of a Soviet Holocaust". Village Voice. Retrieved 30 November 2020 – via Montclair State University. 'There is no evidence it was intentionally directed against Ukrainians,' said Alexander Dallin of Stanford, the father of modern Sovietology. 'That would be totally out of keeping with what we know -- it makes no sense.' 'This is crap, rubbish,' said Moshe Lewin of the University of Pennsylvania, whose Russian Peasants and Soviet Power broke new ground in social history. 'I am an anti-Stalinist, but I don't see how this [genocide] campaign adds to our knowledge. It's adding horrors, adding horrors, until it becomes a pathology.' 'I absolutely reject it,' said Lynne Viola of SUNY-Binghamton, the first US historian to examine Moscow's Central State Archive on collectivization. 'Why in god's name would this paranoid government consciously produce a famine when they were terrified of war [with Germany]?' 'He's terrible at doing research,' said veteran Sovietologist Roberta Manning of Boston College. 'He misuses sources, he twists everything.'
  32. ^ Conquest, Robert (21 February 1988). "Letters to the Editors". The Ukrainian Weekly. Retrieved 14 September 2021.
  33. ^ a b Hiroaki, Kuromiya (June 2008). "The Soviet Famine of 1932–1933 Reconsidered". Europe-Asia Studies. 60 (4): 663–675. doi:10.1080/09668130801999912. JSTOR 20451530.
  34. ^ Ellman, Michael (June 2007). "Stalin and the Soviet Famine of 1932–33 Revisited" (PDF). Europe-Asia Studies. 59 (4). doi:10.1080/09668130701291899. JSTOR 20451381.
  35. ^ a b c d Marples, David R. (May 2009). "Ethnic Issues in the Famine of 1932–1933 in Ukraine". Europe-Asia Studies. 61 (3): 505–518. doi:10.1080/09668130902753325.
  36. ^ Sarah Davies; James Harris (8 September 2005). "Joseph Stalin: Power and Ideas". Stalin: A New History. Cambridge University Press. pp. 3–5. ISBN 978-1-139-44663-1.
  37. ^ Getty, J. Arch; Rittersporn, Gábor; Zemskov, Viktor (1993). "Victims of the Soviet Penal System in the Pre-War Years: A First Approach on the Basis of Archival Evidence" (PDF). American Historical Review. 98 (4): 1017–1049. doi:10.2307/2166597. JSTOR 2166597. Retrieved 30 November 2020.
  38. ^ Getty, J. Arch; Rittersporn, Gábor; Zemskov, Viktor (1993). "Victims of the Soviet penal system in the pre-war years: a first approach on the basis of archival evidence" (PDF). American Historical Review. 98 (4): 1017–1049. doi:10.2307/2166597. JSTOR 2166597. The long-awaited archival evidence on repression in the period of the Great Purges shows that levels of arrests, political prisoners, executions, and general camp populations tend to confirm the orders of magnitude indicated by those labeled as 'revisionists' and mocked by those proposing high estimates.
  39. ^ a b c Wheatcroft, Stephen G. (1999). "Victims of Stalinism and the Soviet Secret Police: The Comparability and Reliability of the Archival Data. Not the Last Word" (PDF). Europe-Asia Studies. 51 (2): 340–342. doi:10.1080/09668139999056. For decades, many historians counted Stalin' s victims in 'tens of millions', which was a figure supported by Solzhenitsyn. Since the collapse of the USSR, the lower estimates of the scale of the camps have been vindicated. The arguments about excess mortality are far more complex than normally believed. R. Conquest, The Great Terror: A Re-assessment (London, 1992) does not really get to grips with the new data and continues to present an exaggerated picture of the repression. The view of the 'revisionists' has been largely substantiated (J. Arch Getty & R. T. Manning (eds), Stalinist Terror: New Perspectives (Cambridge, 1993)). The popular press, even TLS and The Independent, have contained erroneous journalistic articles that should not be cited in respectable academic articles.
  40. ^ Rosefielde, Steven (2010). Red Holocaust. London: Routledge. pp. 67, 77. ISBN 978-0-415-77757-5.
  41. ^ a b c d Ghodsee, Kristen (Fall 2014). "A Tale of 'Two Totalitarianisms': The Crisis of Capitalism and the Historical Memory of Communism" (PDF). History of the Present: A Journal of Critical History. 4 (2): 115–142. doi:10.5406/historypresent.4.2.0115. JSTOR 10.5406/historypresent.4.2.0115.
  42. ^ a b c Ellman, Michael (November 2002). "Soviet Repression Statistics: Some Comments". Europe-Asia Studies. Taylor & Francis. 54 (7): 1152–1172. doi:10.1080/0966813022000017177. JSTOR 826310.
  43. ^ Wheatcroft, Stephen G. (1996). "The Scale and Nature of German and Soviet Repression and Mass Killings, 1930–45" (PDF). Europe-Asia Studies. 48 (8): 1319–1353. doi:10.1080/09668139608412415. JSTOR 152781.
  44. ^ Wheatcroft, Stephen G. (September 2000). "The Scale and Nature of Stalinist Repression and its Demographic Significance: On Comments by Keep and Conquest" (PDF). Europe-Asia Studies. 52 (6): 1143–1159. doi:10.1080/09668130050143860. JSTOR 153593. PMID 19326595. Retrieved 1 September 2021.
  45. ^ a b Snyder, Timothy (10 March 2011). "Hitler vs. Stalin: Who Killed More?" The New York Review of Books. Retrieved 12 September 2020.
  46. ^ a b Shafir, Michael (Summer 2016). "Ideology, Memory and Religion in Post-Communist East Central Europe: A Comparative Study Focused on Post-Holocaust". Journal for the Study of Religions and Ideologies. 15 (44): 52–110.
  47. ^ Liedy, Amy Shannon; Ruble, Blair (7 March 2011). "Holocaust Revisionism, Ultranationalism, and the Nazi/Soviet 'Double Genocide' Debate in Eastern Europe". Wilson Center. Retrieved 14 November 2020.
  48. ^ Dujisin, Zoltan (July 2020). "A History of Post-Communist Remembrance: From Memory Politics to the Emergence of a Field of Anticommunism". Theory and Society. doi:10.1007/s11186-020-09401-5.
  49. ^ a b c Neumayer, Laure (2018). The Criminalisation of Communism in the European Political Space after the Cold War. London: Routledge. ISBN 9781351141741.
  50. ^ a b Jaffrelot, Christophe; Sémelin, Jacques, eds. (2009) Purify and Destroy: The Political Uses of Massacre and Genocide. Translated by Schoch, Cynthia. CERI Series in Comparative Politics and International Studies. New York: Columbia University Press. p. 37. ISBN 978-0-231-14283-0. "Mann thus establishes a sort of parallel between racial enemies and class enemies, thereby contributing to the debates on comparisons between Nazism and communism. This theory has also been developed by some French historians such as Stéphane Courtois and Jean-Louis Margolin in The Black Book of Communism: they view class genocide as the equivalent to racial genocide. Mann however refuses to use the term 'genocide' to describe the crimes committed under communism. He prefers the terms 'fratricide' and 'classicide', a word he coined to refer to intentional mass killings of entire social classes."
  51. ^ David-Fox, Michael (Winter 2004). "On the Primacy of Ideology: Soviet Revisionists and Holocaust Deniers (In Response to Martin Malia)". Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History. 5 (1): 81–105. doi:10.1353/kri.2004.0007.
  52. ^ Mecklenburg, Jens; Wippermann, Wolfgang, eds. (1998). 'Roter Holocaust'? Kritik des Schwarzbuchs des Kommunismus [A 'Red Holocaust'? A Critique of the Black Book of Communism]. Hamburg: Konkret Verlag Literatur (in German). ISBN 3-89458-169-7.
  53. ^ Aronson, Ronald (2003). "Communism's Posthumous Trial". History and Theory. 42 (2): 222–245. doi:10.1111/1468-2303.00240.
  54. ^ Suny, Ronald Grigor (2007). "Russian Terror/ism and Revisionist Historiography". Australian Journal of Politics & History. 53 (1): 5–19. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8497.2007.00439.x. The Black Book may be the single most influential text on the Soviet Union and other state socialist regimes and movements published since The Gulag Archipelago.
  55. ^ Chemin, Ariane (30 October 1997). "Les divisions d'une équipe d'historiens du communisme" [Divisions among the team of historians of Communism]. Le Monde (in French). ISSN 1950-6244. Retrieved 3 August 2016.
  56. ^ Wiener, Jon (2012). How We Forgot the Cold War. University of California Press. pp. 37–38. ISBN 9780520954250.
  57. ^ Friling, Tuvia; Ioanid, Radu; Ionescu, Mihail E.; Benjamin, Lya (2004). Distortion, negationism and minimization of the Holocaust in postwar Romania (PDF). International Commission on the Holocaust in Romania. pp. 47, 59.
  58. ^ Hoffman, Stanley (Spring 1998). "Le Livre noir du communisme: Crimes, terreur, répression (The Black Book of Communism: Crimes, Terror, and Repression) by Stéphane Courtois". Foreign Policy (110, Special Edition: Frontiers of Knowledge): 166–169. JSTOR 1149284.
  59. ^ a b Rauch, Jonathan (December 2003). "The Forgotten Millions". The Atlantic. Retrieved 20 December 2020.
  60. ^ Rosefielde, Steven (2010). Red Holocaust. London: Routledge. p. 3. ISBN 978-0-415-77757-5.
  61. ^ Voicu, George (2018). "Postcommunist Romania's Leading Public Intellectuals and the Holocaust". In Florian, Alexandru (ed.). Holocaust Public Memory in Postcommunist Romania, Studies in Antisemitism. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. pp. 41–71. ISBN 978-0-253-03274-4. Quote at p. 46.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: postscript (link)
  62. ^ Heni, Clemens (Fall 2008). "Secondary Anti-Semitism: From Hard-Core to Soft-Core Denial of the Shoah". Jewish Political Studies Review. Jerusalem. 20 (3/4): 73–92. JSTOR 25834800.
  63. ^ a b Paczkowski, Andrzej (Spring 2001). "The Strom Over the Black Book". The Wilson Quarterly. 25 (2): 28–34. JSTOR 40260182. "Some critics complained that Courtois was 'hunting' for the highest possible number of victims, which led him, as J. Arch Getty wrote in the Atlantic Monthly, to include 'every possible death just to run up the score.' To an extent, the charge is valid. Courtois and other contributors to the volume equate the people shot, hanged, or killed in prisons or the camps with those who were victims of calculated political famines (in the Chinese and Soviet cases), or who otherwise starved for lack of food or died for lack of drugs."
  64. ^ a b Grant, Robert (November 1999). "Review: The Lost Literature of Socialism". The Review of English Studies. 50 (200): 557–559. doi:10.1093/res/50.200.557.
  65. ^ Karlsson, Klas-Göran; Schoenhals, Michael (2008). Crimes Against Humanity under Communist Regimes. Forum for Living History. p. 9. ISBN 9789197748728.
  66. ^ Dallin, Alexander (Winter 2000). "The Black Book of Communism: Crimes, Terror, Repression. By Stéphane Courtois, Nicolas Werth, Jean-Louis Panné, Andrzej Paczkowski, Karel Bartošek, and Jean-Louis Margolin. Trans. Jonathan Murphy and Mark Kramer. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999. xx, 858 pp. Notes. Index. Photographs. Maps. $37.50, hard bound". Slavic Review. Cambridge University Press. 59 (4): 882–883. doi:10.2307/2697429. JSTOR 2697429.
  67. ^ Harff, Barbara (1996). "Death by Government by R. J. Rummel". The Journal of Interdisciplinary History. 27 (1): 117–119. doi:10.2307/206491. JSTOR 206491.
  68. ^ Hiroaki, Kuromiya (January 2001). "Review Article: Communism and Terror. Reviewed Work(s): The Black Book of Communism: Crimes, Terror, and Repression by Stephane Courtois; Reflections on a Ravaged Century by Robert Conquest". Journal of Contemporary History. 36 (1): 191–201. JSTOR 261138.
  69. ^ Weiner, Amir (Winter 2002). "The Black Book of Communism: Crimes, Terror, Repression by Stéphane Courtois, Nicolas Werth, Jean-Louis Panné, Andrzej Paczkowski, Karel Bartošek, Jean-Louis Margolin, Jonathan Murphy, Mark Kramer". Journal of Interdisciplinary History. 32 (3): 450–452. JSTOR 3656222.
  70. ^ Dulić, Tomislav (2004). "Tito's Slaughterhouse: A Critical Analysis of Rummel's Work on Democide". Journal of Peace Research. 41 (1): 85–102. doi:10.1177/0022343304040051. JSTOR 4149657. S2CID 145120734.
  71. ^ Harff, Barbara (2017), "The Comparative Analysis of Mass Atrocities and Genocide". In Gleditsch, N. P., ed. R.J. Rummel: An Assessment of His Many Contributions. 37. SpringerBriefs on Pioneers in Science and Practice. pp. 111–129. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-54463-2_12. ISBN 9783319544632.
  72. ^ Mastracci, Davide (21 July 2020). "The 'Memorial to the Victims of Communism' Should Be Bulldozed". Read Passage. Retrieved 20 December 2020. "This ideological process has consequences. As Katz notes, 'One major symptom of the revisionism underway in Eastern Europe is the rehabilitation of Nazi collaborators as 'national heroes' on the grounds that they were anti-Soviet.' This is also happening in Canada. ... They get that figure from The Black Book of Communism, a 1997 text that tallies up all of the ideology's supposed victims. The TL's website cites the book on numerous occasions, regardless of the fact that it has been widely debunked and was led by an editor who some of the book's contributors said was obsessed with reaching the 100 million deaths mark."
  73. ^ Neumayer, Laure (November 2017). "Advocating for the Cause of the 'Victims of Communism' in the European Political Space: Memory Entrepreneurs in Interstitial Fields". Nationalities Papers. Cambridge University Press. 45 (6): 992–1012. doi:10.1080/00905992.2017.1364230.
  74. ^ Neumayer, Laure (2018). "Introduction". The Criminalisation of Communism in the European Political Space after the Cold War. London: Routledge. ISBN 9781351141741.
  75. ^ Neumayer, Laure (November 2020). "Bridges Across the Atlantic? Intertwined Anti-Communist Mobilisations in Europe and the United States after the Cold War". Revue d'études comparatives Est-Ouest. Cairn (2–3): 151–181. doi:10.3917/receo1.512.0151.
  76. ^ Mrozick, Agnieszka (2019). "Anti-Communism: It's High Time to Diagnose and Counteract". In Kuligowski, Piotr; Moll, Łukasz; Szadkowski, Krystian. "Anti-Communisms: Discourses of Exclusion". Praktyka teoretyczna. Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań. 1 (31): 178–184. Retrieved 26 December 2020 – via Central and Eastern European Online Library. "First is the prevalence of a totalitarian paradigm, in which Nazism and Communism are equated as the most atrocious ideas and systems in human history (because communism, defined by Marx as a classless society with common means of production, has never been realised anywhere in the world, in further parts I will be putting this concept into inverted commas as an example of discursive practice). Significantly, while in the Western debate the more precise term 'Stalinism' is used – in 2008, on the 70th anniversary of the Ribbentrop–Molotov Pact, the European Parliament established 23 August as the European Day of Remembrance for Victims of Stalinism and Nazism – hardly anyone in Poland is paying attention to niceties: 'communism', or simply the left, is perceived as totalitarian here. A homogenizing sequence of associations (the left is communism, communism is totalitarianism, ergo the left is totalitarian) and the ahistorical character of the concepts used (no matter if we talk about the USSR in the 1930s under Stalin, Maoist China from the period of the Cultural Revolution, or Poland under Gierek, 'communism' is murderous all the same) not only serves the denigration of the Polish People's Republic, expelling this period from Polish history, but also – or perhaps primarily – the deprecation of Marxism, leftist programs, and any hopes and beliefs in Marxism and leftist activity as a remedy for capitalist exploitation, social inequality, fascist violence on a racist and anti-Semitic basis, as well as homophobic and misogynist violence. The totalitarian paradigm not only equates fascism and socialism (in Poland and the countries of the former Eastern bloc stubbornly called 'communism' and pressed into the sphere of influence of the Soviet Union, which should additionally emphasize its foreignness), but in fact recognizes the latter as worse, more sinister (the Black Book of Communism (1997) is of help here as it estimates the number of victims of 'communism' at around 100 million; however, it is critically commented on by researchers on the subject, including historian Enzo Traverso in the book L'histoire comme champ de bataille (2011)). Thus, anti-communism not only delegitimises the left, including communists, and depreciates the contribution of the left to the breakdown of fascism in 1945, but also contributes to the rehabilitation of the latter, as we can see in recent cases in Europe and other places." Quote at pp. 178–179.
  77. ^ Moll, Łukasz (2019). "Erasure of the Common: From Polish Anti-Communism to Universal Anti-Capitalism". In Kuligowski, Piotr; Moll, Łukasz; Szadkowski, Krystian. "Anti-Communisms: Discourses of Exclusion". Praktyka teoretyczna. Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań. 1 (31): 118–145. Retrieved 26 December 2020 – via Central and Eastern European Online Library. "As we have learned lately from public television, when the two hundredth anniversary of Karl Marx's birthday was celebrated abroad, according to right-wing journalists Marx was responsible even for Nazism and the Holocaust (Leszczyński 2018). As former Foreign Minister in Law and Justice's government Witold Waszczykowski elaborated in an interview with German daily newspaper Bild:

    We just want to heal our country of certain diseases. The previous government applied a left-wing concept. As if the world, according to the Marxist model, must move in only one direction, towards a mixture of cultures and a world of cyclists and vegetarians, which stands only for renewable energy and combating all forms of religion. This has nothing in common with traditional Polish values (Cienski 2017).

    It is hard to find a better manifestation of right-wing all-encompassing anti-communism, which mixes together nearly all possible progressive discourses." Quote at pp. 126–127.

  78. ^ Gyorgy, Andrew (1978). "1975 Yearbook on International Communist Affairs. Edited by Staar Richard F.. (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1975. Pp. 678. $25.00.)". American Political Science Review. 72 (2): 819. doi:10.2307/1954276. JSTOR 1954276. Retrieved 13 May 2017.
  79. ^ Szawlowski, Richard (October 1979). "Reviewed Work: Yearbook on International Communist Affairs 1978 by Richard F. Starr". Soviet Studies. Taylor & Francis. 31 (4): 617–619. JSTOR 150933.
  80. ^ Goshko, John M. (3 December 1991). "As Soviet Union dissolves, 'kremlinologists' shift gears". The Washington Post. Archived from the original on 31 January 2018. Retrieved 31 January 2018.
  81. ^ Morris, Bernard S. (December 1970). "Yearbook on International Communist Affairs, 1968. by Richard V. Allen". Slavic Review. Association for Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies; Cambridge University Press. 29 (4): 704–705. doi:10.2307/2493285. JSTOR 2493285.
  82. ^ McLane, Charles B. (Autumn 1972). "1970 Yearbook on International Communist Affairs and 1971 Yearbook on International Communist Affairs by Richard F. Staar". Canadian Slavonic Papers. Taylor & Francis. 14 (3): 548–551. JSTOR 40866482.

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