|Part of the Anglo-Spanish War (1585–1604) and the Eighty Years' War|
The Spanish Armada and English ships in August 1588, by unknown painter (English School, 16th century)
| Kingdom of England
|Iberian Union (Habsburg Spain)|
|Commanders and leaders|
| Lord Howard of Effingham
Justinus van Nassau
|Duke of Medina Sidonia|
163 armed merchant vessels
(30 over 200 tons)
|22 galleons of Portugal and Castile,
108 armed merchant vessels (including 4 war galleasses of Naples)
|Casualties and losses|
|Battle of Gravelines:
8 fireships burnt
|Battle of Gravelines:
Over 600 dead
5 ships sunk or captured
~35 ships lost (10 scuttled)
The Spanish Armada (Spanish: Grande y Felicísima Armada , literally "Great and Most Fortunate Navy") was a Spanish fleet of 130 ships that sailed from A Coruña in August 1588, under the command of the Duke of Medina Sidonia with the purpose of escorting an army from Flanders to invade England. The strategic aim was to overthrow Queen Elizabeth I of England and the Tudor establishment of Protestantism in England, with the expectation that this would put a stop to English interference in the Spanish Netherlands and to the harm caused to Spanish interests by English and Dutch privateering.
The Armada chose not to attack the English fleet at Plymouth, then failed to establish a temporary anchorage in the Solent, after one Spanish ship had been captured by Francis Drake in the English Channel, and finally dropped anchor off Calais. While awaiting communications from the Duke of Parma's army the Armada was scattered by an English fireship attack. In the ensuing Battle of Gravelines the Spanish fleet was damaged and forced to abandon its rendezvous with Parma's army, who were blockaded in harbour by Dutch flyboats. The Armada managed to regroup and, driven by southwest winds, withdrew north, with the English fleet harrying it up the east coast of England. The commander ordered a return to Spain, but the Armada was disrupted during severe storms in the North Atlantic and a large number of the vessels were wrecked on the coasts of Scotland and Ireland. Of the initial 130 ships over a third failed to return. As Martin and Parker explain, "Philip II attempted to invade England, but his plans miscarried, partly because of his own mismanagement, and partly because the defensive efforts of the English and their Dutch allies prevailed."
The expedition was the largest engagement of the undeclared Anglo-Spanish War (1585–1604). The following year, England organised a similar large-scale campaign against Spain, the Drake-Norris Expedition, also known as the "Counter-Armada of 1589", which was also unsuccessful.
- 1 Etymology
- 2 History
- 3 Technological revolution
- 4 Legacy
- 5 Historiography
- 6 Panorama
- 7 In popular culture
- 8 See also
- 9 References
- 10 External links
The word armada is from the Spanish armada, cognate with English army. Originally from the Latin armāta , the past participle of armāre to arm, used in Romance languages as a noun, for armed force, army, navy, fleet. 
Philip II of Spain had been co-monarch of England until the death of his wife, Mary I, in 1558. A devout Roman Catholic, he deemed his Protestant sister-in-law and successor, Elizabeth I, a heretic and illegitimate ruler of England. He is alleged to have supported previous plots to have her overthrown in favour of her Catholic cousin and heir presumptive, Mary, Queen of Scots; however these were thwarted when Elizabeth had the Queen of Scots imprisoned and finally executed in 1587. In addition, Elizabeth, who sought to advance the cause of Protestantism where possible, had supported the Dutch revolt against Spain.
In retaliation, Philip planned an expedition to invade England and overthrow the Protestant regime of Elizabeth, thereby ending the English material support for the United Provinces - the part of the Low Countries that had successfully seceded from Spanish rule – and cutting off English attacks on Spanish trade and settlements in the New World. The King was supported by Pope Sixtus V, who treated the invasion as a crusade, with the promise of a subsidy should the Armada make land.
A raid on Cadiz, led by Francis Drake in April 1587, had captured or destroyed some thirty ships and great quantities of supplies, setting preparations back by a year. Philip initially favoured a triple attack, starting with a diversionary raid on Scotland, while the main Armada would capture the Isle of Wight, or Southampton, to establish a safe anchorage in the Solent. The Duke of Parma would then follow with a large army from the Low Countries crossing the English Channel. Parma was uneasy about mounting such an invasion without any possibility of surprise. He was also alarmed by the costs that would be incurred, and advised Philip to postpone or abandon it. The Armada's appointed commander was the highly experienced Álvaro de Bazán, Marquis of Santa Cruz, but he died in February 1588, and the Duke of Medina Sidonia, a high-born courtier, took his place. While a competent soldier and distinguished administrator, Medina Sidonia had no naval experience. He wrote to Philip expressing grave doubts about the planned campaign but this was prevented from reaching the King by courtiers on the grounds that God would ensure the Armada's success.
Planned invasion of England
Prior to the undertaking, Pope Sixtus V allowed Philip II of Spain to collect crusade taxes and granted his men indulgences. The blessing of the Armada's banner on 25 April 1588, was similar to the ceremony used prior to the Battle of Lepanto in 1571. On 28 May 1588, the Armada set sail from Lisbon and headed for the English Channel. The fleet was composed of 130 ships, 8,000 sailors and 18,000 soldiers, and bore 1,500 brass guns and 1,000 iron guns. The full body of the fleet took two days to leave port. It included twenty eight purpose-built warships, of which twenty were galleons, four galleys and four (Neapolitan) galleasses. The remainder of the heavy vessels were mostly armed carracks and hulks together with thirty-four light ships.
In the Spanish Netherlands, 30,000 soldiers awaited the arrival of the Armada, the plan being to use the cover of the warships to convey the army on barges to a place near London. All told, 55,000 men were to have been mustered, a huge army for that time. On the day the Armada set sail, Elizabeth's ambassador in the Netherlands, Valentine Dale, met Parma's representatives in peace negotiations. The English made a vain effort to intercept the Armada in the Bay of Biscay.
On 16 July negotiations were abandoned, and the English fleet stood prepared, if ill-supplied, at Plymouth, awaiting news of Spanish movements. The English fleet outnumbered the Spanish, 200 ships to 130, while the Spanish fleet outgunned the English—its available firepower was 50% more than that of the English. The English fleet consisted of the 34 ships of the Royal Fleet (21 of which were galleons of 200 to 400 tons) and 163 other ships (30 of which were of 200 to 400 tons and carried up to 42 guns each), 12 of these were privateers owned by Lord Howard of Effingham, Sir John Hawkins and Sir Francis Drake.
The Armada was delayed by bad weather, forcing the four galleys and one of the galleons to leave the fleet, and was not sighted in England until 19 July, when it appeared off The Lizard in Cornwall. The news was conveyed to London by a system of beacons that had been constructed all the way along the south coast. On that evening, the English fleet was trapped in Plymouth Harbour by the incoming tide. The Spanish convened a council of war, where it was proposed to ride into the harbour on the tide and incapacitate the defending ships at anchor and from there to attack England; but Medina Sidonia declined to act because this had been explicitly forbidden by Philip, and decided to sail on to the east and towards the Isle of Wight. As the tide turned, 55 English ships set out to confront them from Plymouth under the command of Lord Howard of Effingham, with Sir Francis Drake as Vice Admiral. Howard ceded some control to Drake, given his experience in battle. The rear admiral was Sir John Hawkins.
First actions (1588)
On 20 July the English fleet was off Eddystone Rocks, with the Armada upwind to the west. That night, in order to execute their attack, the English tacked upwind of the Armada, thus gaining the weather gage, a significant advantage.
At daybreak on 21 July the English fleet engaged the Armada off Plymouth near the Eddystone rocks. The Armada was in a crescent-shaped defensive formation, convex towards the east. The galleons and great ships were concentrated in the centre and at the tips of the crescent's horns, giving cover to the transports and supply ships in between.
Given the Spanish advantage in close-quarter fighting, the English ships used their superior speed and manoeuvrability to keep beyond grappling range and bombarded the Spanish ships from a distance with cannon fire.
However the distance was too great for this to be effective, and at the end of the first day's fighting neither fleet had lost a ship in action, although the Spanish carrack Rosario and galleon San Salvador were abandoned after they collided. When night fell, Francis Drake turned his ship back to loot the Spanish ships, capturing supplies of much-needed gunpowder, and gold. However, Drake had been guiding the English fleet by means of a lantern. Because he snuffed out the lantern and slipped away for the abandoned Spanish ships, the rest of his fleet became scattered and was in complete disarray by dawn. It took an entire day for the English fleet to regroup and the Armada gained a day's grace. The English ships then used their superior speed and manoeuvrability to catch up with the Spanish fleet after a day of sailing.
On 23 July the English fleet and the Armada engaged once more, off Portland. This time a change of wind gave the Spanish the weather-gage, and they sought to close with the English, but were foiled by the smaller ships' greater manoeuvrability. At one point Howard formed his ships into a line of battle, to attack at close range bringing all his guns to bear, but this was not followed through and little was achieved.
If the Armada could create a temporary base in the protected waters of the Solent (a strait separating the Isle of Wight from the English mainland), they could wait there for word from Parma's army. However, in a full-scale attack, the English fleet broke into four groups – Martin Frobisher of Aid now also being given command over a squadron – with Drake coming in with a large force from the south. At the critical moment Medina Sidonia sent reinforcements south and ordered the Armada back to open sea to avoid The Owers shoals. There were no other secure harbours further east along England's south coast, so the Armada was compelled to make for Calais, without being able to wait for word of Parma's army.
On 27 July the Armada anchored off Calais in a tightly-packed defensive crescent formation, not far from Dunkirk, where Parma's army, reduced by disease to 16,000, was expected to be waiting, ready to join the fleet in barges sent from ports along the Flemish coast. Communication had proven to be far more difficult than anticipated, and it only now became known that this army had yet to be equipped with sufficient transport or assembled in the port, a process which would take at least six days, while Medina Sidonia waited at anchor; and that Dunkirk was blockaded by a Dutch fleet of thirty flyboats under Lieutenant-Admiral Justin of Nassau. Parma wanted the Armada to send its light pataches to drive away the Dutch, but Medina Sidonia could not do this because he feared that he might need these ships for his own protection. There was no deep-water port where the fleet might shelter – always acknowledged as a major difficulty for the expedition – and the Spanish found themselves vulnerable as night drew on.
The Dutch flyboats mainly operated in the shallow waters off Zeeland and Flanders that larger warships with a deeper draught, like the Spanish and English galleons, could not safely enter. The Dutch therefore enjoyed unchallenged naval superiority in these waters, even though their navy was inferior in naval armament. An essential element of the plan of invasion, as it was eventually implemented, was the transportation of a large part of Parma's Army of Flanders as the main invasion force in unarmed barges across the English Channel. These barges would be protected by the large ships of the Armada. However, to get to the Armada, they would have to cross the zone dominated by the Dutch navy, where the Armada could not go. This problem seems to have been overlooked by the Spanish planners, but it was insurmountable. Because of this obstacle, England never was in any real danger, at least from the Duke of Parma and the Army of Flanders. Because of the eventual English victory at sea, the Army of Flanders escaped the drowning death Justinus and his men had in mind for them, ready to fight another day.
At midnight on 28 July, the English set alight eight fireships, sacrificing regular warships by filling them with pitch, brimstone, some gunpowder and tar, and cast them downwind among the closely anchored vessels of the Armada. The Spanish feared that these uncommonly large fireships were "hellburners", specialised fireships filled with large gunpowder charges, which had been used to deadly effect at the Siege of Antwerp. Two were intercepted and towed away, but the remainder bore down on the fleet. Medina Sidonia's flagship and the principal warships held their positions, but the rest of the fleet cut their anchor cables and scattered in confusion. No Spanish ships were burnt, but the crescent formation had been broken, and the fleet now found itself too far to leeward of Calais in the rising southwesterly wind to recover its position. The English closed in for battle.
Battle of Gravelines
The small port of Gravelines was then part of Flanders in the Spanish Netherlands, close to the border with France and the closest Spanish territory to England. Medina Sidonia tried to re-form his fleet there and was reluctant to sail further east knowing the danger from the shoals off Flanders, from which his Dutch enemies had removed the sea marks.
The English had learned more of the Armada's strengths and weaknesses during the skirmishes in the English Channel and had concluded it was necessary to close within 100 yards to penetrate the oak hulls of the Spanish ships. They had spent most of their gunpowder in the first engagements and had, after the Isle of Wight, been forced to conserve their heavy shot and powder for a final attack near Gravelines. During all the engagements, the Spanish heavy guns could not easily be run in for reloading because of their close spacing and the quantities of supplies stowed between decks, as Francis Drake had discovered on capturing the damaged Rosario in the Channel. Instead the gunners fired once and then jumped to the rigging to attend to their main task as marines ready to board enemy ships, as had been the practice in naval warfare at the time. In fact, evidence from Armada wrecks in Ireland shows that much of the fleet's ammunition was never spent. Their determination to fight by boarding, rather than cannon fire at a distance, proved a weakness for the Spanish; it had been effective on occasions such as the battles of Lepanto and Ponta Delgada (1582), but the English were aware of this strength and sought to avoid it by keeping their distance.
With its superior manoeuvrability, the English fleet provoked Spanish fire while staying out of range. The English then closed, firing repeated and damaging broadsides into the enemy ships. This also enabled them to maintain a position to windward so that the heeling Armada hulls were exposed to damage below the water line. Many of the gunners were killed or wounded, and the task of manning the cannon often fell to the regular foot soldiers on board, who did not know how to operate the guns. The ships were close enough for sailors on the upper decks of the English and Spanish ships to exchange musket fire. After eight hours, the English ships began to run out of ammunition, and some gunners began loading objects such as chains into cannons. Around 4:00 pm, the English fired their last shots and were forced to pull back.
Five Spanish ships were lost. The galleass San Lorenzo, flagship of Don Hugo de Moncada, ran aground at Calais and was taken by Howard after murderous fighting between the crew, the galley slaves, the English, and the French, who ultimately took possession of the wreck. The galleons San Mateo and San Felipe drifted away in a sinking condition, ran aground on the island of Walcheren the next day, and were taken by the Dutch. One carrack ran aground near Blankenberge; another foundered. Many other Spanish ships were severely damaged, especially the Spanish and Portuguese Atlantic-class galleons which had to bear the brunt of the fighting during the early hours of the battle in desperate individual actions against groups of English ships. The Spanish plan to join with Parma's army had been defeated and the English had gained some breathing space, but the Armada's presence in northern waters still posed a great threat to England.
On the day after the battle of Gravelines, the wind had backed southerly, enabling Medina Sidonia to move his fleet northward away from the French coast. Although their shot lockers were almost empty, the English pursued in an attempt to prevent the enemy from returning to escort Parma. On 2 August Old Style (12 August New Style) Howard called a halt to the pursuit in the latitude of the Firth of Forth off Scotland. By that point, the Spanish were suffering from thirst and exhaustion, and the only option left to Medina Sidonia was to chart a course home to Spain, by a very hazardous route.
The threat of invasion from the Netherlands had not yet been discounted by the English, and Robert Dudley, Earl of Leicester maintained a force of 4,000 soldiers at West Tilbury, Essex, to defend the Thames Estuary against any incursion up-river towards London.
On 8 August (18 August New Style) Queen Elizabeth went to Tilbury to encourage her forces, and the next day gave to them what is probably her most famous speech:
My loving people, we have been persuaded by some that are careful of our safety, to take heed how we commit ourselves to armed multitudes for fear of treachery; but, I do assure you, I do not desire to live to distrust my faithful and loving people. Let tyrants fear, I have always so behaved myself, that under God I have placed my chiefest strength and safeguard in the loyal hearts and goodwill of my subjects; and, therefore, I am come amongst you as you see at this time, not for my recreation and disport, but being resolved, in the midst and heat of battle, to live or die amongst you all – to lay down for my God, and for my kingdoms, and for my people, my honour and my blood even in the dust. I know I have the body of a weak and feeble woman; but I have the heart and stomach of a king – and of a King of England too, and think foul scorn that Parma or Spain, or any prince of Europe, should dare to invade the borders of my realm; to which, rather than any dishonour should grow by me, I myself will take up arms – I myself will be your general, judge, and rewarder of every one of your virtues in the field. I know already, for your forwardness, you have deserved rewards and crowns, and, we do assure you, on the word of a prince, they shall be duly paid you. In the mean time, my lieutenant general shall be in my stead, than whom never prince commanded a more noble or worthy subject; not doubting but by your obedience to my general, by your concord in the camp, and your valour in the field, we shall shortly have a famous victory over those enemies of my God, of my kingdom, and of my people.
Return to Spain
In September 1588 the Armada sailed around Scotland and Ireland into the North Atlantic. The ships were beginning to show wear from the long voyage, and some were kept together by having their hulls bundled up with cables. Supplies of food and water ran short. The intention would have been to keep well to the west of the coast of Scotland and Ireland, in the relative safety of the open sea. However, there being at that time no way of accurately measuring longitude, the Spanish were not aware that the Gulf Stream was carrying them north and east as they tried to move west, and they eventually turned south much further to the east than planned, a devastating navigational error. Off the coasts of Scotland and Ireland the fleet ran into a series of powerful westerly winds, which drove many of the damaged ships further towards the lee shore. Because so many anchors had been abandoned during the escape from the English fireships off Calais, many of the ships were incapable of securing shelter as they reached the coast of Ireland and were driven onto the rocks. Local men looted the ships. The late 16th century, and especially 1588, was marked by unusually strong North Atlantic storms, perhaps associated with a high accumulation of polar ice off the coast of Greenland, a characteristic phenomenon of the "Little Ice Age." As a result, more ships and sailors were lost to cold and stormy weather than in direct combat.
Following the gales it is reckoned that 5,000 men died, by drowning, starvation and slaughter at the hands of English forces after they were driven ashore in Ireland. Reports of the passage around Ireland abound with strange accounts of hardship and survival.
In the end, 67 ships and fewer than 10,000 men survived. Many of the men were near death from disease, as the conditions were very cramped and most of the ships ran out of food and water. Many more died in Spain, or on hospital ships in Spanish harbours, from diseases contracted during the voyage. It was reported that, when Philip II learned of the result of the expedition, he declared, "I sent the Armada against men, not God's winds and waves".
The English fleet was still cautious of the remaining Armada after the Battle of Gravelines, requiring it to remain on duty even as some of its sailors died. The following year Elizabeth I launched the Counter Armada, under Sir Francis Drake, but it was unsuccessful in its goals, resulting in Philip II retaining naval superiority.
It is true that the Spanish failed to gain control of the Channel from the English, nor stop their intervention in the region of Flanders or their privateer transatlantic raids; however, for the sixteen years that the war continued, the English ultimately failed in their systematic pretensions against the various fleets of the Indies, despite the great number of military personnel mobilized every year. The English were also unsuccessful in plots to achieve the uprising of the kingdom of Portugal and its division from the Spanish crown. Spanish naval power not only continued its hegemony in the key trade routes but also in the creation of the Armada de Barlovento. An important fortification effort ensued in different fortifications at both sides of the Atlantic, notably in Cartagena or Portobelo. Despite the efforts by the English and Dutch, Spain remained the predominant power in Europe for several decades, thanks to sufficient financing and organization as well as superior technology to enhance its naval strength.
The outcome seemed to vindicate the English strategy and resulted in a revolution in naval battle tactics with the promotion of gunnery, which until then had played a supporting role to the tasks of ramming and boarding. Most[who?][dubious ] military historians hold that the battle of Gravelines reflected a lasting shift in the balance of naval power in favour of the English, in part because of the gap in naval technology and armament it confirmed between the two nations, which continued into the next century. In the words of Geoffrey Parker, by 1588 'the capital ships of the Elizabethan navy constituted the most powerful battlefleet afloat anywhere in the world.' The English navy yards were leaders in technical innovation, and the captains devised new tactics. Parker argues that the full-rigged ship was one of the greatest technological advances of the century and permanently transformed naval warfare.
In 1573 English shipwrights introduced designs, first demonstrated in Dreadnought, that allowed the ships to sail faster and manoeuvre better and permitted heavier guns. Whereas before warships had tried to grapple with each other so that soldiers could board the enemy ship, now they more often stood off and fired broadsides that could sink the enemy vessel. Superior English ships and seamanship had foiled the invasion. The English also took advantage of Spain's over-complex strategy that required coordination between the invasion fleet and the Spanish army on shore. But the poor design of the Spanish cannon meant they were much slower in reloading in a close-range battle, allowing the English to take control. Spain still had numerically larger fleets, but England was catching up.
In England, the boost to national pride lasted for years, and Elizabeth's legend persisted and grew long after her death. The repulsing of the Spanish naval force may have given heart to the Protestant cause across Europe and the belief that God was behind the Protestant cause. This was shown by the striking of commemorative medals that bore variations on the inscription, "1588. Flavit Jehovah et Dissipati Sunt" - with "Jehovah" in Hebrew letters ("God blew, and they are scattered"), or He blew with His winds, and they were scattered. There were also more lighthearted medals struck, such as the one with the play on the words of Julius Caesar: Venit, Vidit, Fugit (he came, he saw, he fled). The victory was acclaimed by the English as their greatest since Agincourt.
The English attempted to press home their advantage the following year, when the Drake-Norris Expedition of 1589, with a comparable fleet of English privateers, sailed to establish a base in the Azores, attack Spain, and raise a revolt in Portugal. This expedition, led by Sir Francis Drake and John Norreys raided Corunna but withdrew from Lisbon after failing to co-ordinate its strategy effectively with the Portuguese.
Two more armadas were sent by Spain, in 1596 and 1597, but both were scattered by storms.
The Spanish Navy underwent a major organisational reform that helped it to maintain control over its trans-Atlantic routes. High-seas buccaneering and the supply of troops to Philip II's enemies in the Netherlands and France continued, but brought few tangible rewards for England.
The memory of the victory over the Armada was evoked during both the Napoleonic Wars and the Second World War, when Britain again faced a concrete danger of invasion.
Knerr (1989) has reviewed the main trends in historiography over five centuries. For 150 years writers relied heavily on Petruccio Ubaldini's A Discourse Concernye the Spanish Fleete Invadinye Englande (1590), which argued that God decisively favoured the Protestant cause. William Camden (1551-1623) pointed in addition to elements of English nationalism and the private enterprise of the sea dogs. He also emphasized that the Duke of Medina Sidonia was an incompetent seaman. David Hume (1711–76) praised the leadership of Queen Elizabeth. However the Whig historians, led by James A. Froude (1818–94), rejected Hume's interpretation and argued that Elizabeth was vacillating and almost lost the conflict by her unwillingness to spend enough to maintain the fleet. Scientific modern historiography came of age with the publication of two volumes of primary documents by John K. Laughton in 1894. This enabled the leading naval scholar of the day Julian Corbett (1854–1922) to reject the Whig views and turn attention to the professionalization of the Royal Navy as a critical factor. Twentieth-century historians have focused on technical issues, such as the relative power of English and Spanish guns and the degree of credit due Francis Drake and Charles Howard.
In popular culture
The preparations of the Armada and the Battle of Gravelines form the backdrop of two graphic novels in Bob de Moors "Cori le Moussaillon" (Les Espions de la Reine and Le Dragon des Mers'). In them, Cori the cabin boy works as a spy in the Armada for the English.
The Battle of Gravelines and the subsequent chase around the northern coast of Scotland form the climax of Charles Kingsley's 1855 novel Westward Ho!, which in 1925 became the first novel to be adapted into a radio drama by BBC.
In golf, Seve Ballesteros and José María Olazábal, who had a Ryder Cup record of 11–2–2 as a team—the best record for a pairing in the history of the competition—came to be called the "Spanish Armada".
Australian band "Paper Boat Armada" take their name from the stories of "The invincible Spanish Armada".
In the twentieth season of The Simpsons, an episode depicts the reason for the Armada's attack as Queen Elizabeth's rebuff of the King of Spain. Homer Simpson (as Walter Raleigh) accidentally sets the only English ship on fire; then collides with the Armada, setting all their ships on fire, creating victory for England.
The Final Jeopardy! response on 20 May 2009 on Jeopardy! was "The Spanish Armada". The clue was "It was the 'they' in the medal issued by Elizabeth I reading, 'God breathed and they were scattered.'"
Winston Graham wrote a history of "The Spanish Armadas" and a historical novel, The Grove of Eagles, based on it - the plural "Armadas" referring to a lesser-known second attempt by Philip II of Spain to conquer England during 1598, which Graham argued was better planned and organized than the famous one of 1588 but was foiled by a fierce storm scattering the Spanish ships and sinking many of them.
Several alternate history writers have published variant descriptions of how history might have proceeded had the Spanish Armada won, including John Brunner (Times Without Number, 1962), Keith Roberts (Pavane, 1969) and Harry Turtledove (Ruled Britannia 2002).
- Mattingly p. 401 the defeat of the Spanish armada really was decisive
- Parker & Martin p. 5 an unmitigated disaster
- Vego p 148 the decisive defeat of the Spanish armada.
- Lucy Hughes-Hallett notes that the action off Gravelines "was the fight which would enter English history books as “the defeat of the Spanish Armada,” but to those who took part in it the engagement appeared inconclusive. By the end of it the Armada was battered but still battleworthy, while the English were almost entirely out of ammunition". Hughes-Hallett, Lucy: Heroes: A History of Hero Worship. Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group, 2010. ISBN 9780307485908, p. 327.
- "The 1588 campaign was a major English propaganda victory, but in strategic terms it was essentially indecisive". Holmes, Richard; Marix Evans, Martin: Battlefield: Decisive Conflicts in History. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. ISBN 9780191501173, p. 108.
- According to José Alcalá-Zamora Queipo de Llano, "the confused and partial news of the indecisive naval actions fought between both naval formations in the English Channel were transformed into adulatory, courtier and political victorious reports". Alcalá-Zamora, José N.: La empresa de Inglaterra: (la "Armada invencible": fabulación y realidad). Madrid: Real Academia de la Historia, 2004. ISBN 9788495983374, p. 20.
- Parker & Martin p. 245
- Alcalá-Zamora p 56
- Richard Holmes 2001, Battlefield: Decisive Conflicts in History, p. 858: "The 1588 campaign was a major English propaganda victory
- Mattingly 362
- Colin Martin, Geoffrey Parker, The Spanish Armada, Penguin Books, 1999, ISBN 1-901341-14-3, p. 40.
- Colin Martin, Geoffrey Parker,The Spanish Armada, Penguin Books, 1999, ISBN 1-901341-14-3, pp.10, 13, 19, 26.
- Lewis, Michael.The Spanish Armada, New York: T.Y. Crowell Co., 1968, p. 184.
- John Knox Laughton,State Papers Relating to the Defeat of the Spanish Armada, Anno 1588, printed for the Navy Records Society, MDCCCXCV, Vol. II, pp. 8–9, Wynter to Walsyngham: indicates that the ships used as fire-ships were drawn from those at hand in the fleet and not hulks from Dover.
- Lewis, p. 182.
- Aubrey N. Newman, David T. Johnson, P.M. Jones (1985) The Eighteenth Century Annual Bulletin of Historical Literature 69 (1), 108 doi:10.1111/j.1467-8314.1985.tb00698.
- Casado Soto, José L.: Atlantic shipping in sixteenth-century Spain and the 1588 Armada, in Rodríguez-Salgado, M. J. and Simon Adams (eds.): England, Spain and the Gran Armada, 1585-1604. Edinburgh: John Donald, 1991. ISBN 9780859763004, p. 122.
- Garrett Mattingly rejects old estimations, makes a recount and concludes: "So, lost, at most, 31 ships (not 41), 10 pinnaces at most (not 20), 2 galleasses (not 3), 1 galley. Total, not more than 44 (not 65), probably five or six and perhaps a doze less." Mattingly, Garrett: The Armada. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1987. ISBN 9780395083666, p. 426.
- Lewis p. 208
- Lewis p. 208-9
- Hanson pg 563
- "The Safeguard of the Sea, A Naval History of Britain, 660-1649", N A M Rodgers, Penguin, 2004, p 263-269
- John A. Wagner (2010). Voices of Shakespeare's England: Contemporary Accounts of Elizabethan Daily Life: Contemporary Accounts of Elizabethan Daily Life. ABC-CLIO. p. 91.
- Colin Martin; Geoffrey Parker (1999). The Spanish Armada (revised ed.). Manchester University Press. p. 5.
- [Oxford English Dictionary]], armada.
- Hart, Francis Rußel, Admirals of the Caribbean, Hougton Mifflin Co., 1922, pp. 28–32, describes a large privateer fleet of 25 ships commanded by Drake in 1585 that raided about the Spanish Caribbean colonies.
- "The Spanish Armada". Catholic Encyclopedia. New York: Robert Appleton Company. 1913. "…the widespread suffering and irritation caused by the religious wars Elizabeth fomented, and the indignation caused by her religious persecution, and the execution of Mary Stuart, caused Catholics everywhere to sympathise with Spain and to regard the Armada as a crusade against the most dangerous enemy of the faith," and, "Pope Sixtus V agreed to renew the excommunication of the Queen, and to grant a large subsidy to the Armada, but given the time needed for preparation and actual sailing of the fleet, would give nothing until the expedition should actually land in England. In this way he eventually was saved the million crowns, and did not take any proceedings against the heretic queen."
- Wagner, John (1999). Historical Dictionary of the Elizabethan World; Britain, Ireland, Europe, and America. Oxford and New York: Routledge. p. 45. ISBN 1-57958-269-9. Retrieved 16 October 2013.
- Coote, Stephen (2003). Drake, The Life and Legend of an Elizabethan Hero. London: Simon & Schuster UK Ltd. pp. 248–52. ISBN 0-7432-2007-2. Retrieved 16 October 2013.
- Colin Martin, Geoffrey Parker,The Spanish Armada, Penguin Books, 1999, ISBN 1-901341-14-3, p. 94, gives 30,500 and raised to 30,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry on p.96. Also, the hoax paper The English Mercurie published by Authoritie, Whitehall 23 July 1588, Imprinted at London by Chriss Barker, Her Highnesse's Printer, 1588, otherwise states fairly accurately, p. 3, "…all the Spanish troops in the Netherlands, and consists of thirty thousand Foot and eighteen hundred Horse."
- The Spanish Armada : Sir Francis Drake
- Colin Martin, Geoffrey Parker,The Spanish Armada, Penguin Books, 1999, ISBN 1-901341-14-3, p. 185.
- Colin Martin, Geoffrey Parker,The Spanish Armada, Penguin Books, 1999, ISBN 1-901341-14-3, p.153.
- Mcdermott. England and the Spanish Armada. p. 260
- Patrick Fraser Tytler (1833), Life of Sir Walter Raleigh, Edenburgh: Oliver & Boyd; [etc., etc.], OCLC 3656130
- Israel, J.I. and Parker, G. (1991) "Of Providence and Protestant Winds: the Spanish Armada of 1588 and the Dutch armada of 1688", in: The Anglo-Dutch moment. Essays on the Glorious Revolution and its world impact. Cambridge U.P., ISBN 0-521-39075-3; pp. 349–51
- Motley, John Lothrop (1860). "XVII.1587". History of the United Netherlands from the Death of William the Silent to the Synod of Dort. 1586-89. 4194: John Murray.
- PDF (143 KiB).
- Coote, Stephen (2003). Drake. London: Simon & Schuster UK. p. 259. ISBN 0-7432-2007-2. Retrieved 5 December 2009.
- Colin Martin, Geoffrey Parker,The Spanish Armada, Penguin Books, 1999, ISBN 1-901341-14-3, pp.189–190
- Battlefield Britain: Episode 4, the Spanish Armada
- Damrosh, David, et al. The Longman Anthology of British Literature, Volume 1B: The Early Modern Period. Third ed. New York: Pearson Longman, 2006
- Brian Fagan, The Little Ice Age: How Climate Made History 1300–1850,. New York: Basic Books, 2000
- Mattingly, Garrett (1959). The Armada. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt. p. 369. ISBN 978-0-395-08366-6. LCCN 87026210. OCLC 16806339. OL 2396450M. ID information is for the 1987 reprint. The English Lord Deputy's orders were for the English soldiers in Ireland to kill Spanish prisoners which was done on several occasions instead of asking for ransom as was common during that period.
- Winston S. Churchill, The New World, vol. 3 of A History of the English-Speaking Peoples, (1956) Dodd, Mead & Co., New York, p. 130.
- In the end as many as two-thirds of the armada's original complement of 30,000 died and for every one killed killed in battle or perishing of their wounds another six or eight died due to (non-combat losses), Hanson pg 563
- SparkNotes: Queen Elisabeth – Against the Spanish Armada
- José Luis, Casado Soto (1988). Spanish Naval Construction in the 16th Century and the Great Armada. Madrid: San Martin. p. 84. ISBN 84-7140-263-7. Es cierto que los españoles no lograron el control seguro del Canal [...] Los británicos fracasaron en sus sistemáticas pretensiones de hacerse con alguna de las flotas de Indias, a pesar de los abundantes efectivos movilizados cada año para ese fin, de los 16 años que aún duró la guerra. Tampoco tuvieron éxito ni en los ataques directos ni en las conspiraciones encaminadas a lograr el levantamiento del reino de Portugal y su desmembración de la corona de España. El poder naval español no sólo siguió siendo hegemónico en las tareas fundamentales, sino que creció considerablemente, gracias a las cuantiosas nuevas fábricas de buques de guerra y privados y a la consolidación de las estructuras de las armadas permanentes preexistentes, como las del Océano de la Guarda de la Carrera de Indias, de Barlovento o del mar del Sur. Paralelamente se llevó a cabo un importante esfuerzo de fortificación de los puertos a ambos lados del Atlántico, lo que impidió o dificultó en gran medida la repetición de los magnificados golpes de mano a poblaciones desprotegidas e indefensas como los efectuados por Drake y compañía. -->
- Aubrey N. Newman, David T. Johnson, P.M. Jones (1985) The Eighteenth Century Annual Bulletin of Historical Literature 69 (1), 93–109 doi:10.1111/j.1467-8314.1985.tb00698.
- Geoffrey Parker, 'The Dreadnought Revolution of Tudor England', Mariner's Mirror, 82 (1996): 273.
- Geoffrey Parker, "The 'Dreadnought' Revolution of Tudor England," Mariner's Mirror, Aug 1996, Vol. 82, Issue 3, pp 269-300
- Geoffrey Parker, "Why the Armada Failed," History Today, May 1988, Vol. 38 Issue 5, pp 26-33
- Richard Holmes 2001, p. 858: "The 1588 campaign was a major English propaganda victory, but in strategic terms it was essentially indecisive"
- Parker & Martin p. 244
- Tenace 2003, pp. 855-882.
- Douglas Knerr, "Through the "Golden Mist": a Brief Overview of Armada Historiography." American Neptune 1989 49(1): 5–13.
- Aled Jones (5 May 2005). Transactions of the Royal Historical Society: Sixth Series. Cambridge University Press. pp. 129–. ISBN 978-0-521-84995-1. Retrieved 8 October 2011.
- The Battle of Gravelines by Nicholas Hilliard at bbc.co.uk
- Aled Jones (5 May 2005). Transactions of the Royal Historical Society: Sixth Series. Cambridge University Press. pp. 129–. ISBN 978-0-521-84995-1. Retrieved 8 October 2011.
- Briggs, Asa. The BBC: The First Fifty Years. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1985. 63.
- Harig, Bob (11 May 2011). "Seve, Ryder Cup almost never happened". ESPN. Retrieved 11 May 2011.
- Corbett, Julian S. Drake and the Tudor Navy: With a History of the Rise of England as a Maritime Power (1898) online edition vol 1; also online edition vol 2
- Cruikshank, Dan: Invasion: Defending Britain from Attack, Boxtree Ltd, 2002 ISBN 0-7522-2029-2
- Fernández-Armesto, Felipe. The Spanish Armada: The Experience of War in 1588. (1988). 336 pp.
- Froude, James Anthony. The Spanish Story of the Armada, and Other Essays (1899), by a leading historian of the 1890s full text online
- Hanson, Neil. The Confident Hope Of A Miracle: The True History Of The Spanish Armada Random House, 2011, ISBN 9781446423226
- Kilfeather T.P: Ireland: Graveyard of the Spanish Armada, Anvil Books Ltd, 1967
- Knerr, Douglas. "Through the "Golden Mist": a Brief Overview of Armada Historiography." American Neptune 1989 49(1): 5–13. Issn: 0003-0155
- Konstam, Angus. The Spanish Armada: The Great Enterprise against England 1588 (2009)
- Lewis, Michael. The Spanish Armada, New York: T.Y. Crowell Co., 1968.
- Mcdermott, James (2005). England and the Spanish Armada: The Necessary Quarrel. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. ISBN 0-3001-0698-X.
- Martin, Colin, and Geoffrey Parker. The Spanish Armada (2nd ed. 2002), 320pp by leading scholars; uses archaeological studies of some of its wrecked ships excerpt and text search
- Martin, Colin (with appendices by Wignall, Sydney: Full Fathom Five: Wrecks of the Spanish Armada (with appendices by Sydney Wignall), Viking, 1975
- Mattingly, Garrett. The Armada (1959). the classic narrative excerpt and text search
- Parker, Geoffrey. "Why the Armada Failed." History Today 1988 38(may): 26–33. Issn: 0018-2753. Summary by leadfing historian.
- Pierson, Peter. Commander of the Armada: The Seventh Duke of Medina Sidonia. (1989). 304 pp.
- Rasor, Eugene L. The Spanish Armada of 1588: Historiography and Annotated Bibliography. (1992). 277 pp.
- Rodger, N. A. M. The Safeguard of the Sea: A Naval History of Britain 660–1649 vol 1 (1999) 691pp; excerpt and text search
- Rodriguez-Salgado, M. J. and Adams, Simon, eds. England, Spain, and the Gran Armada, 1585–1604 (1991) 308 pp.
- Tenace, Edward (2003), "A Strategy of Reaction: The Armadas of 1596 and 1597 and the Spanish Struggle for European Hegemony", English Historical Review 118 (478): 855–882, doi:10.1093/ehr/118.478.855
- Thompson, I. A. A. "The Appointment of the Duke of Medina Sidonia to the Command of the Spanish Armada", The Historical Journal, Vol. 12, No. 2. (1969), pp. 197–216. in JSTOR
- Vego, Milan N. (2013). Naval Strategy and Operations in Narrow Seas. Routledge. ISBN 9781136317941.
- Alcalá-Zamora, José N. (2004). La empresa de Inglaterra: (la "Armada invencible" : fabulación y realidad). Taravilla: Real Academia de la Historia ISBN 978-84-95983-37-4
- The Confident Hope of a Miracle. The True History of the Spanish Armada, by Neil Hanson, Knopf (2003), ISBN 1-4000-4294-1.
- Holmes, Richard. The Oxford Campanion to Military History. Oxford University Press. 2001. ISBN 978-0-19-860696-3
- From Merciless Invaders: The Defeat of the Spanish Armada, Alexander McKee, Souvenir Press, London, 1963. Second edition, Grafton Books, London, 1988.
- The Spanish Armadas, Winston Graham, Dorset Press, New York, 1972.
- Mariner's Mirror, Geoffrey Parker, 'The Dreadnought Revolution of Tudor England', 82 (1996): pp. 269–300.
- The Spanish Armada, Michael Lewis (1960). First published Batsford, 1960 – republished Pan, 1966
- Armada: A Celebration of the Four Hundredth Anniversary of the Defeat of the Spanish Armada, 1588–1988 (1988) ISBN 0-575-03729-6
- England and the Spanish Armada (1990) ISBN 0-7317-0127-5
- The Enterprise of England (1988) ISBN 0-86299-476-4
- The Return of the Armadas: the Later Years of the Elizabethan War against Spain, 1595–1603, R. B. Wernham ISBN 0-19-820443-4
- The Voyage of the Armada: The Spanish Story, David Howarth (1981) ISBN 0-00-211575-1
- T.P.Kilfeather Ireland: Graveyard of the Spanish Armada (Anvil Books, 1967)
- Winston Graham The Spanish Armadas (1972; reprint 2001) ISBN 0-14-139020-4
- Historic Bourne etc., J.J. Davies (1909)
|Wikimedia Commons has media related to Spanish Armada.|
- The Story of the Tobermory Spanish Galleon
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- English translation of Francisco de Cuellar's account of his service in the Armada and on the run in Ireland
- Elizabeth I and the Spanish Armada – a learning resource and teachers notes from the British Library
- The story of the Armada battles with pictures from the House of Lords tapestries
- BBC-ZDF etc. TV coproduction Natural History of Europe
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