Spanish coup of July 1936
The Spanish coup of July 1936 (Spanish: Golpe de Estado de España de julio de 1936) fractured the Spanish Republican Armed Forces and marked the beginning of the Spanish Civil War. Following a period of troubles in the Second Spanish Republic, a group of officers attempted to overthrow the left-wing Popular Front government, elected five months previously, in a military coup. Planning started in early 1936, and the coup was launched on 17 and 18 July. The coup failed to take complete control of the country and civil war ensued.
The rising was intended to be swift, but the government retained control of most of the country including Málaga, Jaén and Almería. Cadiz was taken for the rebels and General Queipo de Llano managed to secure Seville. In Madrid, the rebels were hemmed into the Montaña barracks, which fell with much bloodshed. On 19 July the cabinet headed by the newly appointed prime minister José Giral ordered the distribution of weapons to the unions, helping to defeat the rebels in Madrid, Barcelona, and Valencia, which led to anarchists taking control of large parts of Aragon and Catalonia. Rebel General Goded surrendered in Barcelona and was later condemned to death. The rebels had secured the support of around half of Spain's Peninsular army, which totaled, allowing for large numbers on extended leave, about 66,000 men, as well as the 30,000-strong Army of Africa. The Army of Africa was Spain's most professional and effective military force. The government retained less than half the supply of rifles, heavy and light machine guns and artillery pieces. Both sides had few tanks and outdated aircraft, and naval capacity was fairly even. Officers' defections weakened Republican units of all types.
- 1 Background
- 2 Preparations
- 3 Murder of Calvo Sotelo
- 4 Beginning of the coup
- 5 Coup in military districts
- 6 Outcome
- 7 References
Following the elections of November 1933, Spain entered a period called the "black two years" (Spanish: bienio negro). Both Carlists and Alfonsist monarchists continued to prepare, receiving the backing of Italian Prime Minister Benito Mussolini. José-María Gil-Robles, leader of the right-wing Spanish Confederation of Autonomous Rights (CEDA), struggled to control the party's youth wing, which copied the youth movements of Germany and Italy. Monarchists, however, turned their attention to the Fascist Falange Española, under the leadership of José Antonio Primo de Rivera. Open violence occurred in the streets of Spanish cities. Gil-Robles' CEDA continued to mimic the German Nazi Party, staging a rally in March 1934. Gil-Robles used an anti-strike law to successfully provoke and break up unions one at a time. Efforts to remove local councils from socialist control prompted a general strike, which was brutally put down, with the arrest of four deputies and other significant breaches of articles 55 and 56 of the constitution.
On 26 September, the CEDA announced it would no longer support the centrist Radical Republican Party's minority government; it was replaced by an RRP cabinet that included three members of the CEDA. A UGT general strike in early October 1934 was quickly put down throughout most of Spain. General Francisco Franco was put in informal command of the military effort against the Asturian miners' revolt of 1934, during which striking laborers had occupied several towns and the provincial capital. Around 30,000 workers had been called to arms in ten days. Franco's men, some brought in from Spain's Army of Africa, acted horrifically, killing men, women and children, and carrying out summary executions when the main cities of Asturias had been retaken. About 1,000 workers were killed, and about 250 government soldiers. This marked the effective end of the republic. Months of retaliation and repression by both sides followed; torture was used on political prisoners. Bombings, shootings, political and religious killings were usual on the streets. Political parties created their own armed militias. Gil-Robles once again prompted a cabinet collapse, and five members of Lerroux's new government were conceded to CEDA. The military was purged of Republicanist members and reformed; those loyal to Gil-Robles were promoted – Franco was made Chief of Staff.
Elections in 1936 were narrowly won by a grouping of left-wing parties , united as the Popular Front, who defeated the Nationalist block with less than one percent of the votes.  The right began to conspire as to how to best overthrow the republic, rather than taking control of it. The government was weak, and Azaña led a minority government. Pacification and reconciliation would have been a huge task. Acts of violence and reprisals spiralled. In April, parliament replaced Zamora with Azaña as president. However, Azaña was increasingly isolated from everyday politics; his replacement, Casares Quiroga, was weak. This was a watershed event which inspired conservatives to give up on parliamentary politics. CEDA turned its campaign chest over to army plotter Emilio Mola. Monarchist José Calvo Sotelo replaced CEDA's Gil-Robles as the right's leading spokesman in Parliament. Prieto did his best to avoid revolution, promoting a series of public works and civil order reforms, including parts of the military and civil guard. Communists quickly took over the ranks of socialist organisations, scaring the middle classes. Several generals decided that the government had to be replaced if the dissolution of Spain was to be prevented. They held professional politicians in contempt.
The republican government had been attempting to remove suspect generals from their posts, and so Franco was relieved as chief of staff and transferred to command of the Canary islands. Goded was replaced as Inspector General and made general of the Balearic islands; Emilio Mola was moved from head of the Army of Africa to be military commander of Pamplona in Navarre. However, this allowed Mola to direct the mainland uprising, although the relationship between him and Carlist leaders was problematic. General José Sanjurjo became the figurehead of the operation, and helped to come to an agreement with the Carlists. Mola was chief planner and second in command. José Antonio Primo de Rivera was put in prison in mid-March in order to restrict the Falange. However, government actions were not as thorough as they might have been: warnings by the Director of Security and other figures were not acted upon.
On 12 June, Prime Minister Casares Quiroga met General Juan Yagüe, who was rightly accused of masterminding the growing conspiracy in North Africa, but Yagüe managed to convince Casares of his loyalty to the republic. Mola held a meeting between garrison commanders in the north of Spain on 15 June, and local authorities, on hearing of the meeting, surrounded it with Civil Guards. However, Casares ordered their removal, saying he trusted Mola. Mola began serious planning in the spring, but General Francisco Franco hesitated until early July, inspiring other plotters to refer to him as "Miss Canary Islands 1936". Franco was a key player because of his prestige as a former director of the military academy and as the man who suppressed the Socialist uprising of 1934. He was well respected in the Spanish Moroccan Army, Spain's strongest military force. He wrote a cryptic letter to Casares on 23 June, suggesting that the military was disloyal, but could be restrained if he were put in charge. Casares did nothing, failing to arrest or buy off Franco, even if placing him in overall command was impossible. Franco was to be assigned control of Morocco in the new regime, and largely sidelined. On July 5, an aircraft was chartered to take Franco from the Canary Islands to Morocco. It arrived on July 14.
Murder of Calvo Sotelo
On 12 July 1936, in Madrid, a member of the Falange named Jorge Bardina murdered Lieutenant José Castillo of the Assault Guards police force. Castillo was a member of the Socialist party. The next day, members of the Assault Guards arrested José Calvo Sotelo, a leading Spanish monarchist and a prominent parliamentary conservative; the original target was Gil Robles but he could not be found. Calvo Sotelo had protested against agricultural reforms, expropriations, and restrictions on the authority of the Catholic Church, which he considered Bolshevist and anarchist. He instead advocated the creation of a corporative state. Calvo Sotelo was shot by the Guards without trial.
The killing of Sotelo, a prominent member of Parliament, with involvement of the police, aroused suspicions and strong reactions among the government's opponents on the right.[nb 1] Massive reprisals followed. Although the conservative Nationalist generals were already in advanced stages of a planned uprising, the event provided a catalyst and convenient public justification for their coup, and in particular that Spain would have to be saved from anarchy by military rather than democratic means. The Socialists and Communists (led by Prieto) demanded that arms be distributed to the people before the military took over. The Prime Minister was hesitant.
Franco's plane landed in Gran Canaria on July 14, but, based in Tenerife, he would have been unable to make the plane without the death of General Amado Balmes, military commander in Gran Canaria, who was killed in a shooting accident on July 16. Whether his death was an accident, suicide, or murder is unknown.
Beginning of the coup
The uprising's timing was fixed at 17 July, at 5:00 p.m.; this was agreed to by the leader of the Carlists, Manuel Fal Condé. However, the timing was changed: the men in Spanish Morocco were to rise up at 5:00 a.m. and those in Spain itself starting exactly a day later, so control of Spanish Morocco could be achieved and forces sent to Iberia from Morocco to coincide with the risings there. The rising was intended to be a swift coup d'état, but the government retained control of most of the country.
Rebel control in Spanish Morocco was all but certain. The 30,000 strong Army of Africa comprised the professional elite of the Spanish Army. Many of the soldiers acted as mercenaries and the vast majority of officers backed the rebel cause. The regulares (troops recruited from the local populace) were predominantly Muslim and were told that the Republic wished to abolish Allah. The plan was discovered in Morocco during 17 July, which prompted it to be enacted immediately. By the scheduled time, Spanish Morocco had already been secured as legionnaires moved into working-class areas and shot unionists. The army commander in eastern Morocco, General Manuel Romerales, and other senior officers loyal to the Republic were executed. Little resistance was encountered; in total, 189 people were shot by the rebels. Goded and Franco immediately took control of the islands to which they were assigned. Warned that a coup was imminent, leftists barricaded the roads on 17 July, but Franco avoided capture by taking a tugboat to the airport.
On 18 July, Casares Quiroga refused an offer of help from the CNT and UGT, proclaiming that nowhere outside Spanish Morocco had joined the rebels and that the populace should trust legal methods to deal with the uprising. Handing out weapons would be illegal. The CNT and UGT proclaimed a general strike, in effect mobilising. They opened weapons caches, some buried since the 1934 risings. The paramilitary forces, better trained than the army, often waited to see the outcome of militia action before either joining or suppressing the rebellion. Quick action by either the rebels or anarchist militias was often enough to decide the fate of a town.
Coup in military districts
In mid-1936 the peninsular Spain was divided into 8 military districts, each home to one division. Most senior staff forming the local command layer were not involved in the conspiracy. Out of 8 districts commanders (and commanders of respective divisions at the same time) there was only one engaged in the plot; he was also the only one who actually adhered to the coup. Out of 8 district chiefs of staff there were 3 officers involved in the conspiracy, though further 3 joined the unfolding rebellion. The conspiracy relied mostly on mid-range staff and line officers; they were expected to take control of the garrisons and either overpower their seniors or persuade them to join. In some districts - like Zaragoza or Seville - the conspiracy network was well developed and Mola was confident of success there; in some districts - like Valencia or La Coruña - the network was sketchy and the plotters took into account a would-be failure.
Madrid (1. Division)
The district commander general Virgilio Cabanellas Ferrer was loyal to the government. The divisional chieff of staff, coronel Luis Pérez-Peñamaría, was aware and supportive of the plot, though he did not act as its co-ordinator. The plot was managed by other Madrid-based generals, especially Rafael Villegas – in the plan featuring as head of the rebellious Madrid troops – and Joaquín Fanjul. Miaja was probably sounded on his access but he either declined or remained ambiguous. On July 18. Villegas quoted a number of difficulties and remained passive; it was Fanjul who moved to the Montaña barracks and assumed the leading role. Cabanellas remained loyal and Pérez-Peñamaria pretended to be so. Once the troops of Fanjul had been defeated the 1. Division was officially dissolved. Cabanellas and Pérez-Peñamaria were detained; Pérez-Peñamaria was trialed for negligence, later trialed also by the Nationalists. Villegas was also arrested, soon to be executed by the Republican militia.
|control of provincial capitals as of July:|
|Palma de Mallorca||R||N||N||N|
|S. Cruz de Tenerife||N||N||N||N|
Seville (2. Division)
The district commander general José Fernández Villa-Abrille and his chief of staff coronel Juan Cantero Ortega were loyal to the government. The conspiracy network was headed by the staff officer comandante José Cuesta Monereo, who built a firm and efficient structure; some describe it as a “parallel staff”. Few days before the coup Villa-Abrille was invited to join; he declined, but nothing is known of him taking action against the plotters. According to the plan of Mola, it was general Queipo de Llano who was to assume command of the rebel Seville troops; indeed on July 18 Cuesta organised Queipo de Llano’s takeover of the garrison. Villa-Abrile was incapacitated and detained, later trialed by the Nationalists and sentenced to prison. At the time of the coup Cantero was on leave in Algeciras, where he assumed a wait-and-see stand. He returned to Seville early August; the victorious Nationalists released him from all functions. 
Valencia (3. Division)
Neither the district commander general Fernando Martínez Monje nor his chief of staff Adolfo Machinandiarena Berga were involved in the plot. The local conspiracy junta missed officers on key positions; the most important of them was comandante Bartolomé Barba Hernández, though he excelled in ensuring civilian rather than military support. General Manuel González Carrasco, initially marked to lead the rebels, was re-assigned by Mola to lead the Barcelona rising and re-assigned back to Valencia shortly before the coup. On July 18. a few conspirators tried to persuade Martínez to join the insurgency, but the commander remained ambiguous; this was the position adopted also by Machinandiarena; engulfed by doubts, González Carrasco remained rather passive. Many conspiring officers were ready to join the coup given orders are issued by divisional command; for some 2 weeks the Valencia garrison did not take firm position. Eventually Barba and González Carrasco fled to the Nationalist zone. Martínez was re-assigned to non-combat positions, while Machinandiarena was detained and trialed, later also by the Nationalists. 
Barcelona (4. Division)
The district commander general Francisco Llano de la Encomienda was entirely loyal to the Republic. His chief of staff, Manuel Moxó Marcaida, was at least aware of the plot, though it is likely that he supported it. The key man of Mola in Barcelona was comandante Francisco Mut Ramón, high member of the divisional staff, supported by some local commanders. The initial plan of Mola envisioned that command of the rebellious Barcelona troops would be assumed by general Manuel González Carrasco, but shortly before the coup he was re-assigned to Valencia and replaced by Manuel Goded. The latter arrived in Barcelona when the rebellion was already under way; Moxó immediately accepted his command. Llano de la Encomienda was actively working to suppress the coup within the local military structures until he was detained by units loyal to Goded, though his captivity lasted only few hours. Once the military were overwhelmed by the crowd Goded and Moxó were arrested and trialed, the first executed by firing squad and the later murdered by the militia. Mut escaped and made it to the Nationalist zone.
Zaragoza (5. Division)
Both the district commander general Miguel Cabanellas Ferrer and his chief of staff Federico Montaner Canet were active conspirators. The conspiracy network was firm and Mola was confident that the Zaragoza troops would adhere to the coup. This is indeed what happened. Though the conspiracy network was not extensive, the fact that both key military men were involved in the plot led to almost all troops in the district obeying the orders from the rebellious command; few loyalist officers were easily overwhelmed by the rebels. Despite his age, it was Cabanellas who led the action, and Montaner supported him as the chief of staff. As planned, Cabanellas remained in command of the Zaragoza military district also after the successful coup.
Burgos (6. Division)
The district commanded general Domingo Batet Mestres did not take part in the conspiracy; its key man was the interim chief of staff, teniente coronel José Aizpuru Martín-Pinillos. In early July 1936 he ceded the function to coronel Fernando Moreno Calderón, a man not involved in the plot, yet Aizpuru went on as the key plotter. His network was so extensive that Mola was confident the 6. Division would be firmly with the rebels. On July 19 they took over key posts of command. Batet firmly refused to join and was detained, later to be trialed and executed. Moreno joined in the last minute, facing resolute action of junior officers. As planned by Mola, command of the Burgos military district after the successful coup was assumed by general Fidel Dávila Arrondo. 
Valladolid (7. Division)
The district commander general Nicolás Molero Lobo was not involved in the plot. The key person among the conspirators was the divisional chief of staff, comandante Anselmo López-Maristany; however, in June he was posted to Madrid and he kept co-ordinating the plot in Valladolid from the capital. His successor as chief of staff, coronel Juan Quero Orozco, was not involved in the plot and apparently he was not aware of it unfolding. On the evening of July 18. it was a group of senior officers from Madrid, including general Saliquet, coronel Uzquiano, López-Maristany and comandante Martín-Montalvo who led takeover of the military structures, which involved shootout with ayudantes of general Molero, who was eventually detained; later he was trialed by the Nationalists and sentenced to prison. Quero remained passive and eventually joined the rebels. In line with initial planning, command of the Valladolid district was assumed by Andrés Saliquet.
La Coruña (8. Division)
The district commander general Enrique Salcedo Molinuevo was not aware of the conspiracy. The chief of staff, teniente coronel Luis Tovar Figueras, maintaned sporadic and loose contacts with UME, but he neither took part in the conspiracy nor took any action against it. The key man of the plotters was comandante Fermín Gutiérrez Soto, high member of the divisional staff. On July 18. and 19. the conspiracy network remained fairly disorganized, with no resolute action taken. Suspicious of his staff, in the early hours of July 20. Salcedo ordered detention of both Tovar and Gutiérrez. It was the rapid counter-action of Gutiérrez and coronel Martin Alonso which produced detention of Salcedo, who was later trialed and executed; Tovar adhered to the coup. Given the sketchy insurgency scheme in La Coruña, the plan of Mola did not envision any specific individual as local commander following the coup; this role was temporarily assumed by coronel Enrique Cánovas Lacruz, who before eventually accepting rebel command a few times had refused to take it.
Despite the ruthlessness and determination of the supporters of the coup, the rebels failed to take any major cities with the critical exception of Seville which provided a landing point for Franco’s African troops. The primarily conservative and Catholic areas of Old Castile and León fell quickly, and in Pamplona they celebrated the uprising as if it were a festival. The government retained control of Málaga, Jaén and Almería. Cadiz was taken for the rebels with the help of the first troops from the Army of Africa. In Madrid they were hemmed into the Montaña barracks. The barracks fell the next day, with much bloodshed. Republican leader Santiago Casares Quiroga was replaced by José Giral who ordered the distribution of weapons among the civilian population. This facilitated the defeat of the army insurrection in the main industrial centres, including Madrid, Barcelona, Valencia and other main cities in the Mediterranean area, but it allowed the anarchists to arm themselves and take control of Barcelona and large swathes of Aragon and Catalonia. In Barcelona, the official government lost control of security, essential services and welfare. However, the anarchists held back from demanding too much political power, which could have had even more serious consequences. General Goded surrendered in Barcelona and was later condemned to death, despite broadcasting a message explaining his captivity over the radio at the request of the authorities.
Meanwhile, the Army of Africa crossed the Gibraltar Strait, using Junkers Ju 52 transport planes provided by Nazi Germany, without any loyalist Air Force interference owing to the confusion and lack of decision of the Spanish Republican side. The massive airlift of troops from Spanish Morocco was the world's first long-range combat airlift and it allowed Franco's troops to join General Queipo de Llano's forces in Seville. Their quick movement allowed them to meet General Mola's Northern Army and secure most of northern and northwestern Spain, as well as central and western Andalusia. The Republican Government ended up with controlling almost all of the Eastern Spanish coast and central area around Madrid, as well as Asturias, Cantabria and part of the Basque Country in the north. Mola was keen to create a sense of fear within Nationalist-controlled areas. There was a massive purge of freemasons, and a wide part of the left, including some moderate socialists.
The result of the coup was a polarization of Spain. Following General Mola's orders of instilling fear in potential pro-republican ranks by means of systematic executions in captured cities, a spontaneous revenge in the form of random murders of perceived fascists, conservatives and coup-sympathizers by exalted mobs flared up in loyalist areas.
The Nationalist area of control contained roughly 11 million of Spain's population of 25 million. The rebels also had secured the support of around half of Spain's territorial army, some 60,000 men. In Republican units, however, as much as 90% of officers either rebelled, defected or merely disappeared and their loyalty to the republic was put in doubt, therefore some would later turn up in Nationalist ranks. This considerably reduced the units' effectiveness as a new command structure had to be fashioned. No such problem occurred in Nationalist units. The Army of Africa, however, was entirely under Nationalist control, and numbered 30,000 men considered Spain's top fighting force. The rebels were also joined by 30,000 members of Spain's militarized police forces, the Assault Guards, the Civil Guards, and the Carabineers. 50,000 members of the latter stayed loyal to the government. Of 500,000 rifles, around 200,000 were retained by the government. 65,000 were issued to the Madrid populace in the days following the uprising – of these, only 7,000 were usable. 70,000 or so were lost following early Nationalist advances in the war. Republicans controlled about a third of both heavy and light machine guns; of 1,007 artillery pieces, 387 were in Republican hands. The Spanish Army had, before the coup, just 18 tanks of a sufficiently modern design, and the Republicans retained 10. In terms of numbers, the Nationalists had seized control of 17 warships, leaving the Republicans with 27. However, the two most modern (both cruisers of the Canarias class) were in Nationalist hands; although not ready for service when the war broke out, when launched they compensated for the lack in numbers. The Spanish Republican Navy suffered from the same problems as the army: many officers had defected or had been killed after trying to do so. Due to the concerns of a Republican officer that such a coup was imminent, two-thirds of air capability were retained by the government – however, the whole of the air service was very outdated and vulnerable both during flight and to mechanical problems.
- Thomas (2001). pp. 196–198, 309: Condés was a close personal friend of Castillo. His squad had originally sought to arrest Gil Robles as a reprisal for Castillo's murder, but Robles was not at home, so they went to the house of Calvo Sotelo. Thomas concluded that the intention of Condés was to arrest Calvo Sotelo and that Cuenca acted on his own initiative, although he acknowledges other sources that dispute this finding.
- Thomas, Hugh. The Spanish Civil War. p. 219. ISBN 0-141-01161-0.
- Thomas, Hugh. The Spanish Civil War. p. 315. ISBN 0-141-01161-0.
- Preston (2006). p. 66.
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- Preston (2006). p. 70.
- Thomas (1961). p. 67.
- Preston (2006). p. 72.
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- Preston (2006). p. 75.
- Thomas (1961). p. 78.
- Preston (2006). p. 77.
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- Thomas (1961). p. 80.
- Thomas (1961). p. 81.
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- Preston (2006). p. 83.
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- Payne (1973). p. 642.
- Preston (1999). pp. 17–23.
- Thomas (1961). p. 100.
- Preston (2006). p. 90.
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- Preston (1983). pp. 4–10.
- Preston (2006). pp. 94–95.
- Preston (2006). p. 95.
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- Thomas (1987). p. 8.
- Thomas (2001). pp. 196–198, 309.
- Preston (2006). p. 100.
- Thomas (1961). p. 126.
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- Beevor (2006). p. 56.
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- Beevor (2006). pp. 58–59.
- Pérez-Peñamaria in Madrid, Moxó in Barcelona and Montaner in Burgos, Arturo García Álvarez-Coque, Los militares de Estado Mayor en la Guerra Civil española (1936-1939) [PhD thesis Universidad Complutense]. Madrid 2018, p. 98
- Moreno in Burgos, Quero in Valladolid and Tovar in La Coruña, Álvarez-Coque 2018, p. 98
- Álvarez-Coque 2018, pp. 169-186
- as of late evening of a given day; source: Eduardo Palomar Baró, El Alzamiento del 18 de julio en las capitales españolas, [in:] desdemicampanario service, available here
- day the city was finally captured by the Nationalists
- Albacete was re-taken by the Republicans on July 25, 1936
- Guadalajara was re-taken by the Republicans on July 22, 1936
- Teruel was re-taken by the Republicans on January 7, 1938
- a strong pocket of Nationalist resistance, limited to the Alcazar, kept repelling Republican advances until Toledo was captured by the Nationalist troops advancing from the South-West
- Álvarez-Coque 2018, pp. 151-154
- Álvarez-Coque 2018, pp. 186-194
- Álvarez-Coque 2018, pp. 195-198
- Álvarez-Coque 2018, pp. 154-155
- Álvarez-Coque 2018, pp. 155-159
- Álvarez-Coque 2018, pp. 159-163
- Álvarez-Coque 2018, pp. 163-169
- Beevor (2006). pp. 60–61.
- Beevor (2006). p. 62.
- Beevor (2006). pp. 58–70.
- Beevor (2006). pp. 106–107.
- Beevor (2006). p. 69.
- Per photograph caption pg.146 and also text pg.201, Air Power, Budiansky, Stephen, Penguin Group, London England 2005
- Preston (2006). p. 103.
- Preston, Paul. 2012. The Spanish Holocaust. Harper Press. London.
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- Howson, Gerald (1998). Arms for Spain. London: John Murray. ISBN 0-7195-5556-6.
- Preston, Paul (2006). The Spanish Civil War: Reaction, Revolution and Revenge (3rd ed.). London: HarperCollins. ISBN 978-0-00-723207-9.
- Preston, Paul (November 1983). "From rebel to Caudillo: Franco's path to power,". History Today. 33 (11).
- Thomas, Hugh (1961, 1987, 2001). The Spanish Civil War (1st ed.). London: Eyre and Spottiswoode. OCLC 395987. Check date values in:
- Westwell, Ian (2004). Condor Legion: The Wehrmacht's Training Ground. Spearhead. 15. Hersham, United Kingdom: Ian Allan publishing. ISBN 978-0-7110-3043-5.