State of Katanga
|State of Katanga|
|État du Katanga
Inchi ya Katanga
"Force, espoir et Paix dans la Prosperite" (French)
"Power, Hope and Peace in Prosperity"
1961 territorial control in Congo. Katanga shown in green.
Swahili · Tshiluba
|Religion||Christianity, Baluba religion, Bantu religion|
|Historical era||Congo Crisis|
|-||Congolese independence||30 June 1960|
|-||Secession||11 July 1960|
|-||Kasai secessiona||8 August 1960|
|-||Defeated||15 January 1963|
|a.||Until 30 December 1961.|
Katanga was a breakaway state that proclaimed its independence from the Republic of Congo-Léopoldville on 11 July 1960 under Moise Tshombe, leader of the local CONAKAT (French: Confédération des associations tribales du Katanga) party. The new Katangese government did not enjoy full support throughout the province, especially in the northern Baluba areas. The state is now Katanga Province, part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
The declaration of independence was made with the support of Belgian business interests and over 6,000 Belgian troops. Tshombe was known to be close to the Belgian industrial companies which mined the rich resources of copper, gold and uranium. Katanga was one of the richest and most developed areas of the Congo. Without Katanga, Congo would lose a large part of its mineral assets and consequently government income. The view of the Congolese central government and a large section of international opinion was that this was an attempt to create a Belgian-controlled puppet-state run for the benefit of the mining interests. Not even Belgium officially recognised the new state despite providing it with military assistance. A military force designated the Katanga Gendarmerie, raised by the Tshombe government, was initially organised and trained by regular Belgian officers and subsequently by European mercenaries from various nations.
- 1 Congo Crisis
- 2 American involvement
- 3 See also
- 4 References
- 5 Bibliography
- 6 Further reading
- 7 External links
Origins of the Katanga State
Shortly after the chaotic dissolution of the Belgian Congo, President Moise Tshombe proclaimed Katanga, one of the territory's wealthiest provinces which had accounted for nearly fifty per cent of Congolese revenues, an independent and autonomous nation. According to Tshombe and his officials at the time, this action was taken to secede from chaos and because the current regime under Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba was following a Communist line. The Katangese government went on to appeal for Belgian military aid to support their unilateral declaration of independence. Tshombe was also seeking support and recognition from the United States for his cause, as he felt that they shared a common concern for possible exploitation of the Congo Crisis by the Soviet Union.
A common myth in 1961 among the United Nations in general was that Katanga was an expression of indigenous nationalist sentiment. However, this was true only in part. The political leaders of the northern districts in the province were actively opposed to independence, and the Katangese population never directly consulted on the matter. In reality, secession proved to be a strategy designed to preserve the comparative wealth of Katanga and stability of the region in general. Maintaining support of the European-descended white settler elite was also a priority of President Tshombe, as they possessed much-needed professional skills and an exodus of such people in the face of anarchy or Communist rule would likely prove fatal to their homeland's industry.
Within a week of Katanga's unilateral declaration of independence, Prime Minister Lumumba sent a telegram to the Secretary-General of the UN, insisting that something be done about "Belgium's military aggression" in his country and their overt backing of Katangese secession. Lumumba solicited "urgent military assistance" due to the central government in Leopoldville's inability to maintain order in the massive country. He went on to blame post-independence Belgian intrigues for the present crisis. Inside the United Nations itself, feelings towards Katanga were generally mixed. Britain and France remained neutral, the latter quietly hostile towards the very idea of peacekeeping in Congo. The British initially provided general assistance to the UN troops who were eventually dispatched, but refused to cooperate with subsequent efforts to deal with Tshombe's rebellious regime. Portugal and the Union of South Africa were openly hostile towards the operation from its very conception, and maintained consistent opposition against any interference with the Katanga state.
Gerald-Libois writes: '..during the entire month of August, a ..race against the clock took place with the objective of building a more or less efficient Katangese gendarmery before the eventual withdrawal of the Belgian troops. The commander of the new gendarmery, Major Crèvecoeur, called for former officers of the Force Publique who had left the Congo after the July troubles or were in Katanga.' The numbers of the new force were originally fixed at 1,500 volunteers from sixteen to twenty-one years of age recruited from 'safe' ethnic groups, and almost all the aircraft of the Force Publique had been transferred to Kamina, then requisitioned by Katanga.
Deployment of United Nations troops
On 14 July 1960, in response to requests by Prime Minister Lumumba, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 143. This called upon Belgium to remove its military personnel from the Congo, especially in the case of Katanga, and for the UN to provide 'military assistance' to the Congolese forces to allow them 'to meet fully their tasks'. Lumumba demanded that Belgium remove its troops immediately, threatening to seek help from the Soviet Union if they did not leave within two days. The UN reacted quickly and established United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC). The first UN troops arrived the next day but there was instant disagreement between Lumumba and the UN over the new force's mandate. Because the Congolese army had been in disarray, Lumumba wanted to use the UN peacekeepers to subdue Katanga by force. Referring to the resolution, Lumumba wrote to UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld, ‘From these texts it is clear that, contrary to your personal interpretation, the UN force may be used to subdue the rebel government of Katanga.’ ONUC refused. To Hammarskjöld, the secession of Katanga was an internal Congolese matter and the UN was forbidden to intervene by Article 2 of the United Nations Charter.
Disagreements over what the UN force could and could not do continued throughout its deployment, despite the passage of two further Security Council resolutions. Passed on 22 July, Security Council Resolution 145 affirmed that Congo should be a unitary state and strengthened the call for Belgium to withdraw its forces. On 9 August, Security Council Resolution 146 mentioned Katanga for the first time, and explicitly allowed UN forces to enter Katanga whilst forbidding their use to 'intervene in or influence the outcome of any internal conflict.'
A subject of much controversy was Belgium's involvement with Katanga. Brussels had neither inspired nor engineered Moise Tshombe's scheme of Katangese secession, but provided technical, financial, and military aid in order to keep Katanga stable in terms of public order and domestic security. The Belgians went on to advise the ONUC force against unnecessary interventions against the state, as it would only "risk increasing the confusion." At the same time, Pierre Wigny, the Foreign Minister, informed the United States, France, and Britain that his government was opposed to Tshombe's intrigues and was concerned that long-term separation would compromise Congo's economic vitality. Despite the fact that most of Belgium's military personnel were withdrawn from Katanga in September 1960, over two hundred stayed on, making horizontal career shifts into roles as paid mercenaries serving with the nation's Gendarmes. As late as 1963, several of these soldiers of fortune were still at large, having shed their military uniforms for civilian dress. Other notable Belgian nationals who stayed on included political advisers and some diplomatic ministers. Upon the arrival of United Nations forces in the Congo, they were opposed to allowing ONUC freedom of movement in Katanga and insisted upon obstructing the peacekeeping effort. This view was generally strengthened with President Tshombe himself as time advanced, especially with increasingly vocal demands from Léopoldville that the UN use their military advantage to forcibly remove his regime from power. The Security Council, however, only reaffirmed that the ONUC would not be party to any internal disputes but would enter Katanga to assist with keeping the peace. The first such personnel, largely Swedish forces, entered Élisabethville, the Katangese capital city, on August 12, 1960.
All of this only frustrated the Congolese government, which, on August 27, launched a poorly organized, ill-fated, incursion into Katanga with ANC soldiers trucked into the province on a motley assortment of Soviet military vehicles. It was unclear what the subsequent rampage attempted to accomplish, but the attackers, who were busily raping and murdering their way through the countryside, were quickly driven off by the European-officered Katangese Army. This incident would only lead to the further deterioration of relations between the two governments; sporadic clashes would continue for the next two years.
Only shortly afterwards, Patrice Lumumba was replaced in a coup d'état by Joseph Mobutu. On 17 January 1961 Mobutu sent Lumumba to Élisabethville where he was tortured and executed shortly after arrival.
The United Nations Security Council met in the wake of Lumumba's death in a highly emotional atmosphere charged with anti-colonial feeling and rhetoric. On 21 February 1961 the Council adopted resolution 161, which authorised 'all appropriate measures' to 'prevent the occurrence of civil war in the Congo, including '... the use of force, if necessary, in the last resort'. This resolution demanded the expulsion from the Congo of all Belgian troops and foreign mercenaries, but did not explicitly mandate the UN to conduct offensive operations. However, it was ultimately interpreted by the local UN forces to justify military operations in ending the secession of Katanga. Despite the resolution, during the next six months the UN undertook no major military operations, concentrating instead on facilitating several rounds of political negotiations. However, many sources on location claimed that UN personnel initiated and maintained a high degree of violence and were both overtly and indirectly responsible for hundreds if not even thousands of civilian deaths.
From late 1960 onwards, Katanga was characterised by a series of clashes between pro-Tshombe loyalists and Baluba tribesmen, whose political leaders were nominally allied to Leopoldville and opposed Katangese secession. Smaller battles were fought against ANC units attacking from other provinces, as well. Sparsely deployed and on many occasions even outgunned by both sides, UN forces had an almost hopeless task of attempting to prevent outright civil war. Anticipating the need for continued ONUC presence in the state, the Security Council authorized an increased presence in Élisabethville. By mid-1961, however, presidential security forces had killed almost 7,000 Balubas. Factional strife also began to engulf the struggling regime. Increased numbers of peacekeepers only enraged the Baluba people, who viewed the United Nations as an unwanted intruder and began attacking both Katangese and UN soldiers with little discrimination.
In February 1961, attempting to bolster his position in Katanga, Moise Tshombe began importing more and more foreign mercenaries from neighboring states to assist his Gendarmes. The "Mercenary Problem", as the international community termed it, was a major concern of the ONUC. The Katangese Army was already staffed by Belgian officers, and white volunteers of Belgian extraction constituted about one hundred and seventeen men under Tshombe's direction. Although from January to February 1961, gestures were made to remove these 'illegal combatants' from the Congo, their places were quickly taken by a sizable force of close to five hundred British, Rhodesian, French, and South African irregulars. Many of them were given command assignments in the Gendarmes, while others formed a pro-Tshombe unit known as the "International Company", composed chiefly of white South African fighters.
Especially notable among the French mercenaries were professional career soldiers who had fought in the Algerian War. Several in particular were the heads of a paracommando training program in Katanga. On March 30, one of the first public reports mentioning large contingents of foreign soldiers claimed that the mercenaries in Katanga included "Belgians, Italians, and 100 South Africans". Serious fighting soon broke out as President Tshombe began to incite both Katangese civilians and white mercenaries to attack UN forces after the ONUC dispatched elements of the nearly 5,000 man-strong 99th Indian Infantry Brigade into the capital. On April 5, 1961, the Secretary-General criticised Belgian mercenaries for their service in Katanga and condemned Tshombe for turning the Katangese public against the United Nations Force. Hostilities broke out again just three days later, when Belgian and South African Gendarmes assaulted Kabalo, a Baluba town in northern Katanga, and engaged the Ethiopian peacekeepers stationed there. In the battle that followed, at least thirty mercenaries were disarmed and captured. It was not until April 30 that the State of Katanga agreed to cease hostilities against the ONUC.
In June, President Tshombe was arrested after attending the Coquilhatville Conference of Congo Leaders, the day he was about to board a plane back to his country. He was held under house arrest and charged with inciting revolt against the Congolese government, the illegal seizure of arms and aircraft, and printing counterfeit money by issuing a Katangese currency. Tshombe subsequently signed a pledge to reunite Katanga with the rest of the nation, and was released accordingly. However, by August it was clear he had no intention of implementing this agreement. Tshombe openly declared in a speech that month that he would defend Katanga's rights as a sovereign state and would do everything to maintain this status quo even in the face of all opposition.
In August and September, the UN conducted two operations to arrest and repatriate mercenary soldiers and the Belgian political advisers from Katanga by military force, deeming that such foreigners were the backbone behind the regime. The first operation was carried out by Indian UNF troops, who began rounding up mercenaries at 5am, culminating in the bloodless capture of nearly 400 men. Not a single shot had been fired. Although Belgium's consul in Katanga was ordered to deport the remaining Belgian nationals, including political advisers, he countered that he could only exercise legal authority over those who were official staff affiliated with his nation's government or military.
Altogether, about 300 of those captured were expelled from Congo, although several of the mercenaries later returned. White Katangese especially resented this action by the UN. Tshombe was taken by surprise, and tensions escalated rapidly. On September 11, the UNF further demanded that all foreigners serving as police officers in Katanga be expelled, but the president did not comply. Any chances of negotiation for the peaceful removal of remaining foreign players was quickly crushed by the revelation that some UN personnel had been planning to aid in a conspiracy to remove Tshombe from power, seize the radio station in Élisabethville, and apprehend his Gendarmes. The Katangese quickly unearthed the plot, and when Tshombe confronted the UN with his charges it was revealed, much to the latter's embarrassment, that these allegations were based on fairly solid evidence. If such an incident had been allowed to take place, it would clearly have been considered a violation of the ONUC's vows to remain neutral in internal issues besides taking proper action to prevent a major conflict. The following day, hostilities reopened after some Irish soldiers protecting civilians in Jadotville were surrounded by a superior force of Gendarmes, including many Europeans. Despite suffering several attacks launched by Katanga's mercenary-piloted Air Force in support of the Gendarme unit, the troopers refused to surrender and were resupplied with fresh water by a UN helicopter.
No longer able to take the increasing violence in Katanga, the ONUC commanders finally agreed to a new plan which would remove the Katangese government from power. It called for UNF troops to apprehend mercenaries, seize post offices and radio stations in Élisabethville, and send a representative from the central Congolese government to take command. This attempt was not at all bloodless. It was in fact resisted by the Gendarmes and their mercenary allies. The initial UN initiative to take over the post offices was efficiently repulsed. Later that day, Katangese soldiers launched a coordinated attack on ONUC forces. An eight-day battle was waged in the city, resulting in the deaths of 11 UN personnel. One company of Irish troops, at Jadotville, were captured. Tshombe's army enjoyed unchallenged air power, and the tiny Katangese Air Force carried out successful strafing and bombing runs on UN positions entrenched in Jadotville, Élisabethville, and Kamina.
The dismal failure of the UNF could also be attributed to inferior equipment. While the Gendarmes were armed with automatic rifles, heavy machine guns, mortars, and Greyhound armored cars, the vast majority of UN troopers used antiquated rifles and civilian vehicles plated with only makeshift protection. During the fighting, the Katangese authorities offered a conditional ceasefire, which was immediately rejected by the ONUC. Eventually, it became clear that any objective to depose Moise Tshombe had failed. The British, Belgian, and French governments became especially critical of 'peacekeeping operations' in Congo which would involve such interference in domestic affairs. They called for an immediate ceasefire. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, protested that more force should have been used to subdue Katanga and initiate an immediate reunification with the Mobutu government.
Under UN pressure (military attacks), Tshombe later agreed to a three-stage plan from the acting Secretary General, U Thant, that would have reunited Katanga with Congo. However, this remained an agreement on paper only. The Katangese government insisted that, should the plan in full be honored by Leopoldville, Tshombe be entitled to aid in drafting a new Congolese constitution and elect his own representatives to Parliament. However, both sides began to express reservations about the terms less than a week later. The president wished that his agreement should be ratified by his national assembly before it could be considered binding; this misunderstanding quickly led to a collapse in relations with Congolese leader Cyrille Adola's regime. The frustrated United Nations went on to adopt a new plan, one that called for the adoption of a federal constitution in Congo within thirty days, an end to the illegal Katangese rebellion, the unification of currency, and the sharing of mining revenues on a fifty-fifty split between Katanga and the central government. U Thant, who was the chief architect of this proposal, also demanded that Tshombe unconditionally release all of his political prisoners. Belgium and the United States, hoping that the latter would have a positive role in reforming a unified Congo, endorsed the plan. While Cyrille Adola immediately accepted this compromise, Moise Tshombe stipulated conditions. A series of discussions hosted by the UN followed, although it failed to yield tangible results. Thant, who had become increasingly incensed by what he regarded as the Katangese state stalling for time, imposed economic sanctions. This, however, only succeeded in destroying the last hopes the Secretary-General had for a peaceful integration. On December 19, an exasperated Tshombe withdrew from ongoing negotiations in protest.
As 1962 drew to a close, the United Nations gradually increased its operational strength in Katanga, with Thant considering ever more seriously the option of forcibly ending Tshombe's secession. As UNF forces continued to be harassed by Gendarmerie, the political stalemate rapidly escalated into outright military tension. When the Katangese populace celebrated the anniversary of their independence, for example, UN officials blocked the roads into Élisabethville, fearful of the 2,000-strong "honour guard" that was scheduled to march in upcoming parades. Several thousand civilian residents promptly demonstrated against this unilateral action. Two months later, the local authorities impounded several railroad cars bearing equipment and supplies for use in ONUC operations and a number of Gurkha peacekeepers were wounded by unmarked land mines on the Katangese border.
A subsequent report compiled by New York indicated that the Katangese regime was purchasing new military aircraft and increasing the size of its army, reporting that they now had at their disposal "40,000 troops and Gendarmerie, at least 400 mercenaries and at least 20 planes." These figures were exaggerated. The Secretary-General's office responded by increasing trade sanctions, but several member states, the United Kingdom in particular, continued to oppose the use of embargoes to force a political solution.
On December 20, the American State Department announced it would be sending a US military mission to Katanga, a move that was severely criticised by white and black Katangese alike. At least a hundred local students, many of them European, subsequently protested at the United States consulate. The Congolese government and the Eastern Bloc also voiced their dissent. But it soon became apparent that Katanga's bid for international recognition was doomed; skyrocketing pressure for direct action, growing American interests, the militant mood of the UNF commanders, and Belgium's pledge to cease supporting a rebel government all suggested that soon the United Nations would take more forceful measures against Moise Tshombe in the near future.
On December 24, 1962, United Nations forces and Katangese Gendarmes clashed near a UNF observation post near Élisabethville. A helicopter was subsequently shot down, and President Tshombe expressed regrets over what initially appeared to be a misunderstanding, promising to call off his forces. But by December 27, the firing on both sides had not ceased; UN officers notified the National Assembly that they would take all necessary action in self-defense unless a ceasefire was observed immediately. The following day, peacekeepers marched on Élisabethville to neutralize the Gendarmes.
Within three days, Élisabethville was under UN control. A number of Gendarmes were either captured or forced to withdraw further south. The foreign mercenaries scattered. Fighter aircraft conducted over seventy sorties against the Katangese Air Force; all but two jets were destroyed on the ground. Tshombe himself escaped his capital, but threatened to launch a counteroffensive unless the UNF restrained itself and called off their attack. A truce was observed until January 1, but, in a controversial act of defiance, UN personnel explicitly ignored their orders from New York and assaulted Jadotville. Katangese forces demolished the bridges over the Lufira River to prevent them from proceeding, but the latter was able to cross using debris, despite light resistance and sporadic sniper fire. It was later suggested that this was due to the slow state of communications then plaguing ONUC in Katanga and the Congo at large. The subsequent capture of Jadotville prevented Tshombe's loyalists from making a stand there, as had originally been feared.
After the fall of Jadotville, some atrocities were committed by UN forces. Two Belgian women in a car were killed at a road checkpoint after being fired upon by its Indian guards. There were other civilian casualties, including two more unidentified Europeans, who died as a result of actions taken by the UNF. Following these incidents, U Thant suspended further military operations while Belgian and British officials opened up discussions with Tshombe himself and attempted to talk him into capitulating. It became clear that he was running desperately short of time. On January 11, peacekeepers entered Sakania, near the Rhodesian border. The Katangese Gendarmes had already been routed and failed to pose a serious threat. Remaining mercenaries, mostly Frenchmen and South Africans, were unable to provide any effective leadership. They ignored instructions to follow a "scorched earth" policy and fled the country by way of Angola. On January 21, Moise Tshombe conceded defeat and agreed to allow UN officials into Kolwezi, his last surviving stronghold. Land mines and demolitions were to be removed, and all armed loyalists directed to surrender their weapons. Tshombe reportedly claimed in a final address to his supporters: "For the last two and a half years you have twice fought heroically against the enemy. Now their superiority has become overwhelming."
The Congolese government took immediate steps to reintegrate Katanga with the rest of the nation. Gendarmes were absorbed into the national military, and Joseph Ileo, former Prime Minister, was appointed Resident Minister of the new province. The United Nations provided assistance in reuniting divided economic and administrative divisions. On January 29, the Secretary-General's office stated that most UN action in the former state would be limited to economics and that a substantially reduced force would be maintained to keep order. Denmark, Ghana, and the Philippines each pledged to dispatch more personnel. U Thant also called for a slow reduction of military presence, in case a second secession was attempted by fanatics or diehards. Although he defended the use of force taken by ONUC in ousting Tshombe, he also commented regarding the final campaign, "For a peace force, even a little fighting is too much, and only a few casualties are too many."
The main "legacy" of Katanga State was 3 coins bearing its name: circulating 1 and 5 Francs made of Bronze and a commemorative 5 francs made of Gold, all dated 1961, the gold 5 Francs was minted by 20000 pieces.
US dealings with Africa do not go very far compared with those of the ex-colonial powers. It was only in 1958 that a Bureau of African Affairs was set up with its own Assistant Secretary of State and, even so, it was relegated to marginal operations. Yet, in 1962, the United States played an unusually large role in ending the secession of Katanga. On December 11, the Defense officials of the Pentagon recommended that the UN be offered a ‘U.S. military package consisting of one Composite Air Strike Unit with necessary support elements and the requisite base security force. If this were insufficient to end the secession, more U.S. force should be committed.’ 
According to Stephen T. Weissman, America's sudden involvement in Congo was to a great extent motivated by an ‘access interest’. Like other Western countries, the United States had a vested interest in the mineral activities of the Katanga-Rhodesia Copperbelt: in 1960, the U.S. imported from Katanga alone three-quarters of its cobalt and one half of its tantalum- two minerals used in the aerospace industry. However, Larry Devlin, the CIA chief station in Congo, in his book, Chief of Station, Congo, sheds light on ‘a more sinister threat’ that attracted the attention of the U.S. government on Congo. He notes that, by mid-1960, ‘personnel from the Soviet Union … and Communist China began to flood into the country.’ Chaos in the Congo, in this reading, was to be feared above all, not so much for its economic consequences, but for the opportunity it would present to the Russians. This was highly relevant as the Republican, business-oriented “Europeanists” of the Eisenhower administration were part of a generation that had seen and internalised post-War Communist expansion, making anti-communism a norm in American governing circles. The Congo, because of its wealth, size and location, was seen as a valuable prize for communism. When Lumumba confirmed America’s worst fears by seeking Soviet assistance, the Eisenhower Administration started to look at Katanga, whose declaration of independence had professed its intention to fight Soviet penetration, as the last anti-Communist bastion in Congo. As a result the Eisenhower Government kept a benevolent attitude towards Katanga and the American consul in Elisabethville (now Lubumbashi) was instructed to tell Tshombe that the American decision not to recognise his government, ‘should not be interpreted as hostility.’
Two events marked a shift in American policy towards Congo: the assassination of Lumumba and the start of the Kennedy Administration in the United States in January 1961. Kennedy's policy was to deal with African countries as states in their own right and to create mutually-benefiting relations with those countries. The elimination of the ‘communist’ leader, Lumumba, and the formation, undertaken under America’s aegis, of a moderate government under Cyrille Adoula further erased the need for an anti-Communist Katanga. Katanga then came to be seen as the main source of division and chaos, and therefore as facilitating, if not encouraging, Communist penetration. Therefore, Kennedy backed the UN action in Katanga.
However, by the time fighting started again in early December 1961, a lively campaign had been launched in the press against the military acts and methods of the UN, causing Kennedy to adopt a more peaceful strategy of 'quiet diplomacy'  and to support cease-fire demands.
Shortly afterwards, the National Security Council decided to give the UN ‘whatever equipment was necessary to reintegrate Katanga by force.’ Following the end of the Katangese secession, on January 17, Kennedy was thus able to declare publicly that:
‘The end of the secession … is warmly welcomed by the United States and all who are concerned with the future of the Congo and the whole of Africa, This secession has been a serious source of contention and an obstacle to progress in the Congo for the past two and a half years.’
- The National Anthem of the State of Katanga: La Katangaise (The Katangese) NationalAnthems.info. Retrieved on 2014-06-26
- For more on the Gendarmerie, see Jules Gérard-Libois, 'Katanga Secession,' University of Wisconsin Press, 1966, 114-115, 155-174.
- Lumumba, Patrice, Congo, My Country, Pall Mall Press. Speeches and selected writing by Lumumba, 1962
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- Source: Krause , Picture in Wikipedia: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/3/3a/Katanga%2C_5_Francs%2C_1961.jpg/1024px-Katanga%2C_5_Francs%2C_1961.jpg
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- Young, Crawford (1965) Politics in the Congo, Princeton University Press
- Gérard-Libois, J. (1963) Sécession au Katanga, Brussels, Centre de Recherche et d'Information Socio-Politiques.
- Larmer, Miles and Kennes, Erik (2014) "Rethinking the Katangese Secession" in Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, pp. 1-21.
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