|Born||Steven J. Brams
November 28, 1940
Concord, New Hampshire
New York University
|Alma mater||Massachusetts Institute of Technology
|Known for||Independent discoverer of approval voting
Solved the problem of envy-free cake-cutting
Has applied game theory to a wide range of strategic situations
Steven J. Brams (born November 28, 1940, in Concord, New Hampshire) is an American game theorist and political scientist at the New York University Department of Politics. Brams is best known for using the techniques of game theory, public choice theory, and social choice theory to analyze voting systems and fair division. He is one of the independent discoverers of approval voting, as well as an extension of approval voting to multiple-winner elections known as Satisfaction approval voting.
Brams was a co-discoverer, with Alan Taylor, of the first envy-free cake-cutting solution for n people. Previous to the Brams-Taylor procedure, the cake-cutting problem had been one of the most important open problems in contemporary mathematics. He is co-inventor with Taylor of the fair-division procedure, Adjusted Winner, which was patented by New York University in 1999 (# 5,983,205). Adjusted Winner has been licensed to a Boston law firm, which formed a company, Fair Outcomes, Inc., that markets several fair-division algorithms.
Brams worked briefly in U.S. federal government positions and for the Institute for Defense Analyses before taking an Assistant Professor position at Syracuse University in 1967. He moved to New York University in 1969, where he is Professor in the Department of Politics. He has been a visiting professor at the University of Rochester, the University of Michigan, the University of California, Irvine, the University of Pennsylvania, and Yale University.
In 1990-1991 he was president of the Peace Science Society (International); in 2004-2006, he was president of the Public Choice Society.  He is a Guggenheim Fellow (1986–87), an American Association for the Advancement of Science Fellow (1992), and was a Russell Sage Foundation Visiting Scholar (1998–99).
- Game Theory and Politics. New York: Free Press, 1975. Rev. ed., 2004 (Dover).
- Paradoxes in Politics: An Introduction to the Nonobvious in Political Science. New York: Free Press, 1976.
- The Presidential Election Game. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1978. Rev. ed., 2008 (A K Peters).
- Co-edited with A. Schotter and G. Schwödiauer, Applied Game Theory: Proceedings of a Conference, Vienna, 1978. Würzburg, Germany: Physica-Verlag, 1979.
- Biblical Games: Game Theory and the Hebrew Bible. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1980. Rev. ed., 2003 (MIT Press). Japanese translation, 2006.
- Co-edited with William F. Lucas and Philip D. Straffin, Jr., Modules in Applied Mathematics: Political and Related Models, vol. 2. New York: Springer-Verlag, 1983.
- Co-authored with Peter C. Fishburn, Approval Voting. Cambridge, MA: Birkhäuser Boston, 1983. Rev. ed., 2007 (Springer).
- Superior Beings: If They Exist, How Would We Know? Game-Theoretic Implications of Omniscience, Omnipotence, Immortality, and Incomprehensibility. New York: Springer-Verlag, 1983. Rev. ed., 2007 (Springer).
- Superpower Games: Applying Game Theory to Superpower Conflict. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1985.
- Rational Politics: Decisions, Games, and Strategy. Washington, DC: CQ Press, 1985. Reprinted by Academic Press, 1989.
- Co-authored with D. Marc Kilgour, Game Theory and National Security. New York: Basil Blackwell, 1988. Spanish translation, 1989.
- Negotiation Games: Applying Game Theory to Bargaining and Arbitration. New York: Routledge, 1990. Rev. ed., 2003.
- Theory of Moves. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1994.
- Co-authored with Alan D. Taylor, Fair Division: From Cake-Cutting to Dispute Resolution. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
- Co-authored with Alan D. Taylor, The Win-Win Solution: Guaranteeing Fair Shares to Everybody. New York: W. W. Norton, 1999. Japanese, Portuguese, and Spanish translations, 2000; Chinese, Korean, and Russian translations, 2002.
- Mathematics and Democracy: Designing Better Voting and Fair-Division Procedures. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008.
- Co-edited with William V. Gehrlein and Fred S. Roberts. The Mathematics of Preference, Choice, and Order: Essays in Honor of Peter C. Fishburn. Berlin: Springer, 2009.
- Game Theory and the Humanities: Bridging Two Worlds. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2011.
- Brams, Steven & Fishburn, Peter (1978). "Approval Voting". American Political Science Review. 72 (3): 831–847. doi:10.2307/1955105. JSTOR 1955105.
- Steven J. Brams, D. Marc Kilgour (2014): "Satisfaction approval voting." Voting Power and Procedures, pp 323-346 
- Steven J. Brams; Alan D. Taylor (January 1995). "An Envy-Free Cake Division Protocol". The American Mathematical Monthly. Mathematical Association of America. 102 (1): 9–18. doi:10.2307/2974850. JSTOR 2974850.
- Will Hively (March 1995). "Dividing the spoils - Steven Brams, Alan Taylor devise procedure to divide anything equitably". Discover Magazine. http://discovermagazine.com/1995/mar/dividingthespoil479/
- Adjusted Winner http://www.nyu.edu/projects/adjustedwinner
- Adjusted Winner US patent http://www.google.com/patents/about/5983205_Computer_based_method_for_the_fa.html?id=C8QWAAAAEBAJ
- Fair Outcomes, Inc. http://www.FairOutcomes.com
- Biblical Games: Game Theory and the Hebrew Bible. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1980. Rev. ed., 2003 (MIT Press). Japanese translation, 2006
- Game Theory and the Humanities: Bridging Two Worlds. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2011
- Superpower Games: Applying Game Theory to Superpower Conflict. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1985
- Co-authored with D. Marc Kilgour, Game Theory and National Security. New York: Basil Blackwell, 1988. Spanish translation, 1989
- Peace Science Society (International) http://pss.la.psu.edu
- Public Choice Society: Past Presidents http://www.publicchoicesociety.org/webpages.asp?wpid=2#presidents
- Public Choice Society http://www.publicchoicesociety.org
- Steven J. Brams (2008). Mathematics and Democracy: Designing Better Voting and Fair-Division Procedures. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. ISBN 9780691133218.