Talk:11th Armored Cavalry Regiment

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I was with the Black Horse since 1986 in germany. I was under Major Nishakawa and Col. John Abrams. Yes, it's tough doing every thing, training and fighting over oceans back and forth. All I will say is either we do it or the US is in trouble-in the past all Empires destroyed theirselves. Roman, England, USSR, France look in your selves ,dig deep, saddle up. We have to be the greatest unit of all time. Sorry 82nd 1st calvary, but since we started we have always lead, so soilders of the Black Horse forget politics go into battle because after all ALLONS WE LEAD THE WAY.

              Black Horse.
              Brothers Always.
              CW3 James Kendle Jr. ALLONS

Headline text[edit]

As a member of the 11th Armored Calvary Regiment, I post this open criticism in hopes that leaders and members alike would push for change. It is easy to identify the problems within the unit, but requires some bold actions to change things for the better.

Root Causes

The obvious cause is the Iraq War bearing stress on the entire Army. The second and probably the main cause is the dual mission requirements. The 11th ACR DOES NOT need to train to deploy every other month while attempting to train deploying units at the National Training Center. The unit performs marginally at both, but can't perform either mission decently. Some, if not most leaders in the 11th ACR believe that the regiment tries to accomplish too much because its leader needs a good OER. Although it’s only an opinion, it may not be far from the truth. The result is that many leaders in the chain of command resent the commanders' attitude because they believe it's the reason for their long hours and lack of efficient operations. The primary mission of the 11th ACR is to train deploying units so that they have the best chances of performing the Army's mission. The OPFOR unit needs to be the best unit in the Army so that it can properly teach other units on the lessons learned in war. Instead, the soldiers worry more about how to entertain themselves out in the dessert rather than acting their role as Iraqi civilians. And the leaders worry about how to joggle next month's BLUEFOR training rather than focusing on the present.

Left Unchanged

The regiment may be ordered to be deployed again someday, but the sad truth is that the regiment has neither the equipment, training, nor the motivation present to deploy as a whole unit. On paper, the 11th ACR is ready to deploy but every aspect of training and maintenance has been "pencil whipped" by its leaders. Many good officers are disgusted with the lack of commitment in the regiment and seek transfers. If the situation doesn’t change, the unit will continue in a downward spiral until it bottoms out. Disgruntled soldiers will continue to make shortcuts and leaders will exaggerate their effectiveness and performance, but the real casualties of this attitude are the soldiers and units deploying to Iraq. When they deploy, they would receive the half hearted training the National Training Center provided them, rather than maximizing their training experience.

Obvious problems within the regiment

1. LEADERSHIP FLAWS: The 11th Armored Calvary Regiment is stretched thin in terms of quality leaders. Most junior NCOs have been promoted too fast and lack the basic leadership skills and responsibility to properly lead soldiers. Many company grade and junior officers lack the motivation to make a difference within the unit, sensing that they do not have the support from higher leaders. The squadron and regimental leadership seem to understand the problems but often overlook their seriousness.

2. TOO MANY MISSIONS, TOO LITTLE TIME: It's easy to claim that the 11th Armored Calvary Regiment can perform a "dual mission" of supporting the OPFOR rotation and training to be deployed for war, but the regiment is good at neither because it doesn't have the time to become proficient at either. During OPFOR rotations, the units go through the motion of playing Iraqi towns folk and live in the dessert for 16 days. There are no incentives to take the initiative to make improvements to the training experience except to follow orders. During the BLUEFOR training, many units exaggerate their training records to satisfy the squadron or regimental intent while in reality, much of the training is sub-standard or non-existent.

3. NOT TAKING CARE OF SOLDIERS: The leaders at every level are so pressured by higher commanders that the only way to get things done is either work on the weekends or stay late at work. While it is normal for the Army to take soldier's personal time to get the mission done, leaders in the 11th ACR takes advantage of soldiers and work them frequently after normal hours of operation. No unit in the Army can function for nearly a year at 100% capacity. As time passed, many "soldier problems" such as DUI, drug use, desertion and spousal abuse occur much more frequently.

A PROPOSED SOLUTION

Focus on training the deploying units so that the regiment can maximize its effort to train the deploying units. If the 11th ACR gets deployment orders again, they the unit needs to focus its full effort to train for deployment while some other unit takes over the NTC mission.

Treat soldiers like soldiers again. Leaders can say all they want about duty, integrity, loyalty, and respect, but whenever stuff hits the fan, shortcuts are made and the fundamentals get neglected by everyone.

70.173.152.249 06:19, 29 July 2007 (UTC)Signed, Concerned Member

"Notable Commanders"

I notice that under this heading, George S. Patton, Jr. is listed. In actuality, it was his son, G.S. Patton III that was the 39th Col. of the Rgt. Might someone change that? —Preceding unsigned comment added by 24.152.176.153 (talk) 03:57, 17 June 2008 (UTC)

I corrected that; BTW, George S. Patton (1885-1945) of WWII fame was actually George S. Patton III but, as he was born after the death of his grandfather, called himself George S. Patton Jr. His son (1923-2004) who commanded the 11th ACR in Vietnam called himself George S. Patton IV and is listed as such here on Wikipedia. Lyle F. Padilla, MAJ, Armor, USAR Ret (lpadilla@voicenet.com)207.103.47.120 (talk) 18:35, 20 August 2008 (UTC)

WikiProject Military history/Assessment/Tag & Assess 2008[edit]

Article reassessed and graded as start class. Referencing and appropriate inline citation guidelines not met. This article could easily be a B or even GA with references --dashiellx (talk) 17:34, 25 April 2008 (UTC)

desert storm[edit]

you list desert storm at the top of the page ...but in the history of diployments you do not mention the elements of 3/11 acr killertroop scout platoons that served in desert storm or the other two squadrons that deployed scouts as well. mark nattress — Preceding unsigned comment added by Killertroop31 (talkcontribs) 05:39, 31 March 2011 (UTC)

Dead link[edit]

During several automated bot runs the following external link was found to be unavailable. Please check if the link is in fact down and fix or remove it in that case!

--JeffGBot (talk) 03:01, 1 June 2011 (UTC)