Talk:Asiana Airlines Flight 214/Archive 2

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Archive 1 Archive 2 Archive 3 Archive 4 Archive 5

AsianaAirlinesFlight214.jpg

image:AsianaAirlinesFlight214.jpg has been nominated for deletion -- 76.65.128.222 (talk) 06:24, 9 July 2013 (UTC)

Nothing that can't or shouldn't be homemade in an even more legible SVG, minus all the copyvio cruft (terrain images). --Mareklug talk 10:01, 9 July 2013 (UTC)

A UA885 cockpit account (the plane that was waiting for take-off near the crash site)

Not admissible as it stands as reliable source, but may become usable, after it is republished, re-quoted by a reliable source. :) At any rate, very interesting details. --Mareklug talk 10:31, 9 July 2013 (UTC)

Injury pattern

--Another Believer (Talk) 14:46, 9 July 2013 (UTC)

Boeing 777's design & flight attendants applauded as heroes

The Wall Street Journal, USA Today, The New York Times, etc. have reported, citing aviation experts, that Boeing 777's design and flight attendants' "heroic" actions were the reason behind the crash's "so low" casualty figures. This is no longer speculation, and addition to the article is needed. -- Frenchpride08 (talk) 20:25, 9 July 2013 (UTC)

Er it is speculation and opinion and not needed in the article. It can be added if it is in the NTSB final report. MilborneOne (talk) 20:26, 9 July 2013 (UTC)
The NTSB final report probably won't be released until 2015 or late-2014 by the earliest. If not, at least their heroic actions are worth mentioning. -- Frenchpride08 (talk) 20:32, 9 July 2013 (UTC)
This is not a tabloid. And neither is it a PR piece for Boeing. We do not know what factors led to the accident, and we do not know the extent to which any particular characteristics of the 777s design had any significance regarding survivability. As for 'heroic' actions by flight attendants, the article already makes clear that they did the job they were employed to do, and apparently did it well. Leave the hyperbole out, and let actions speak for themselves. AndyTheGrump (talk) 20:35, 9 July 2013 (UTC)
Fair enough. -- Frenchpride08 (talk) 20:40, 9 July 2013 (UTC)

Referencing format

Can we get a consensus on just what referencing format we are using for this article, there are so many bare urls that it's not funny.Graham1973 (talk) 21:26, 9 July 2013 (UTC)

I don't see any bare URL's. Just give it a couple of weeks for things to quiet down and then we can clean it up. — Lfdder (talk) 21:34, 9 July 2013 (UTC)

Behind the aft pressure bulkhead

The following statement is misleading, inaccurate and has no valid citation to support it.

"...and the tail section behind the aft pressure bulkhead became separated from the aircraft.[19]"

The cited article does not say that the part of the tail that came off, was "aft of the pressure bulkhead." Thus, the statement amounts to OR and speculation. It shouldn't be there without being supported by the requirements of the RS rule.

-- The aft pressure bulkhead is in the form of a large salad bowl, turned on edge. It is NOT just a flat plate-like structure.

-- From one of the photos, it is clear that the part of the fuselage that broke away at first impact, was all the way up to the leading edge of that pressure bulkhead (top of the salad bowl), which means that much of that broken tail section was FORWARD of the rear portion of that (salad bowl shape) part of the aft pressure bulkhead.

-- The vertical stabilizer was also a part of that tail section that broke free of the fuselage, at initial impact. The leading edge of that stabilizer, where it attaches to the fuselage, was well-FORWARD of the ENTIRE aft pressure bulkhead.

-- The aft portion of that aft pressure bulkhead is missing in the photo, and two surviving flight attendants were tossed out of that gaping hole that remained.

Thus, the statement should read "...and the tail section became separated from the aircraft.[19]" -- and nothing more.

Please do not revert the adjustment of that sentence again, without a valid RS citation, and further discussion on this talk page. EditorASC (talk) 00:51, 10 July 2013 (UTC)

'spinning in the air'

In the Crash section we currently have the statement "the remainder of the fuselage and wings, after spinning in the air, stopped to the left of the runway". The choice of words leaves multiple interpretations open as to which axis the aircraft spun about and whether it retained contact with the ground, together with the possibility of confusion with an aerodynamic spin. Based on http://edition.cnn.com/video/data/2.0/video/us/2013/07/07/vo-plane-sf-plane-crash-on-cam.courtesy-fred-hayes.html I would suggest changing the wording to something like "the aircraft slid off the runway to the left as it pivoted about the left wingtip and nose" possibly elaborating it with "the fuselage and right wing lifting into the air" which should give a much clearer word picture of what happened. 92.235.125.151 (talk) 12:16, 8 July 2013 (UTC)

I initially inserted that passage with "cartwheeled", which I still think that, word for word, is the more precise and descriptive term. It is also the term used by some expert commentators on Aviation Herald and a witness in a CBS news story. But this was promptly changed by Tariq as unidiomatic and a hyperbole. --Mareklug talk 22:54, 8 July 2013 (UTC)
I would call it a "ground loop". Ahh, ground loop (aviation) htom (talk) 01:57, 9 July 2013 (UTC)
I woudn't: "In aviation, a ground loop is a rapid rotation of a fixed-wing aircraft in the horizontal plane while on the ground." --Mareklug talk 02:31, 9 July 2013 (UTC)
"...Aerodynamic forces may cause the advancing wing to rise, which may then cause the other wingtip to touch the ground. In severe cases (particularly if the ground surface is soft), the inside wing can dig in, causing the aircraft to swing violently or even cartwheel.[1]..."htom (talk) 03:56, 9 July 2013 (UTC)
A ground loop sounds like exactly what happened. It spun around on the ground. Near the end (judging by that one video), while going somewhat backwards, it looks like the tail lifted up some and slammed back down, but I don't think that's a cartwheel. When I saw the video the first time, I thought the plane had flipped (which would also not be a cartwheel), but that was incorrect -- the plane just went up in the air some, remaining basically horizontal, then came back down. From the aviation chatter I've been reading, a cartwheel is essentially rotation in the vertical plane, i.e. when tips of wings, nose, and tail can all hit the ground in succession, that sort of thing. Even the Sioux City flight apparently did not cartwheel,[1] despite the term being widely (but erroneously) used to describe that landing, and the pilot of that flight seems pretty adamant on that point. Going airborne a bit and coming back down is not nearly the same thing, from the sounds of it. Carl Lindberg (talk) 05:10, 9 July 2013 (UTC)
I still maintain that rotaing at above 45 degree angle about wing and nose is "cartwheeled", for all intents and purposes, if one needed a word, instead of a paragraph. Look, I just went through 32 pages of airlinepilotforums.com, and must have seen "cartwheel" as verb over 10 times, used by what looked to be actual pilots. Ironically enough, the first time it was to laugh at an eyewitness account that used that word, but then they saw the CNN footage and one actually *apologized* for doubting the cartwheel. So, technically inaccurate as it may be, it is in the living language ...of pilots, no less. --Mareklug talk 09:52, 9 July 2013 (UTC)
Once every three pages? How often was the term ground loop used? htom (talk) 12:48, 9 July 2013 (UTC)
On average, yes, but in a concentrated few, as that is where the CNN video was being discussed, around late 20s. And I don't recall ground loop being used even once. --Mareklug talk 19:21, 9 July 2013 (UTC)
Listening to NPR this afternoon, someone from the NTSB said that the aircraft struck the seawall and "entered a flat spin", if I heard correctly. Doubtless the reports will say. htom (talk) 01:59, 10 July 2013 (UTC)

Oxygen

During the crash, oxygen masks deployed (and presumably dispensed O2) - at sea level. Has there been any discussion as to whether this contributed to the fireball? Kortoso (talk) 21:37, 8 July 2013 (UTC)

Do you have a source? Some of the masks may just have fallen out due to the force of the crash. It seems unlikely that this was a major issue.115.189.224.101 (talk) 21:44, 8 July 2013 (UTC)
It is a major issue, insofar as masks falling out triggers the oxygen generators to produce oxygen, if that is what the plane was ordered with. The alternative is oxygen bottles. The choice is that of the ordering customer. In any event, bottles or activated generators account for the pattern of burned out aluminum skin on top of the aircraft, as these things reside close to the ceiling and provided ready oxygen to burn the aluminum skin. --Mareklug talk 22:50, 8 July 2013 (UTC)
What do the reliable secondary sources say? There is no point in guessing here. VQuakr (talk) 22:53, 8 July 2013 (UTC)
Nothing, that I could find... Apteva (talk) 23:10, 8 July 2013 (UTC)
http://science.howstuffworks.com/transport/flight/modern/question258.htm and http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chemical_oxygen_generator should get you started. --Mareklug talk 00:00, 9 July 2013 (UTC)
Indications are that the cabin only caught fire after the plane crashed and everyone evacuated, so it doesn't seem overly relevant. Also, oxygen is only released once passengers pull down on the masks. Anyway, we don't have a good source that says the masks were deployed; and it seems unlikely that they would deploy. 115.188.246.74 (talk) 02:23, 9 July 2013 (UTC)
The Aviation Herald source prominently displays an actual photo of the interior, with the masks deployed. And you don't think a sizable fraction of the passangers did tug on their masks? People everywhere are puzzling why the top of the aircraft is burned out. We owe them at least a sentence of explanation. --Mareklug talk 02:34, 9 July 2013 (UTC)
Looking at Air France Flight 358, having the top of the fuselage burned out doesn't seem all that unusual. Little is mentioned there about oxygen being an important contributor to anything. Chris857 (talk) 02:47, 9 July 2013 (UTC)
If there is a good source saying the oxygen masks deployed, then that is worth including (simply because it is unusual). I think we will have to wait for the official report to understand exactly what happened regarding the fire. I am also curious as to why the cabin burned out. 115.188.246.74 (talk) 03:05, 9 July 2013 (UTC)
Please try to confine discussions to matters of direct relevance to article content - which means material from reliable sources. If you want to speculate, this isn't the place to do it. AndyTheGrump (talk) 03:10, 9 July 2013 (UTC)
@Chris857 It's amazing that you did not notice this in the Irregularities section write-up:Passenger oxygen tanks supposedly exploded in the heat of the fire. (Emergency passenger oxygen is provided via a chemical oxygen generator but the aircraft would have been carrying therapeutic oxygen for passengers requiring a constant supply throughout the flight and first aid situations.) --Mareklug talk 05:04, 9 July 2013 (UTC)
  • Here is a reliable source, if Aviation Herald's inclusion of the interior photograph is not reliable source enough: Oxygen masks hang from the ceiling in the cabin of Asiana Airlines Flight 214. (Photo: Getty Images) http://www.usatoday.com/story/travel/news/2013/07/08/asiana-airlines-san-francisco-crash/2497769/ --Mareklug talk 06:23, 9 July 2013 (UTC)
  • The photograph included at Aviation Herald source is credited: "Scenes inside the wreckage (Photo: NTSB)", so we could have it on Commons, if I understand correctly the implications of the PD license for US government works. --Mareklug talk 06:41, 9 July 2013 (UTC)
That photo shows masks hanging. It does not state that masks "deployed", let alone that they delivered oxygen, let alone that they contributed to a fireball. Speculation here is meaningless; see WP:SYN. VQuakr (talk) 07:17, 9 July 2013 (UTC)
Whatever, man. Except that the "fireball" had nothing to do with it; it was most likely the empty/vapour central tank going off (it was a very short lived fireball). Also, per FAA PDF about oxygen systems (I am too lazy to link it here), what you see is labeled by FAA as "deployed". Lastly, no need to spew Wikpolicyilinks. It's almost uncivil, at this point, considering the participating audience. The oxygen stuff contributed to the roof fire, ignited by the hot detached engine. I am not hell-bent on having any of this in the article, not now, not two months from now. But when the final report comes out, you will owe me a beer. :) --Mareklug talk 09:42, 9 July 2013 (UTC)
I don't see why linking to relevant policies is uncivil when it's clear some people here do not understand them, like our policy on OR which seems to be what's going on in this discussion. The fact that the OR may end up being correct is neither here nor there, I've tagged or removed OR from articles even though I suspect it to be correct when it's clear it's OR and the sort of thing which definitely should be sourced. Remember the purpose of this talk page is to discuss improvements to the article not stuff which may be added eventually if the investigation proves our personal theories are correct but are basically just personal theories at the moment. Nil Einne (talk) 19:36, 9 July 2013 (UTC)
A policy link, one that you still need to review per your Also, per FAA PDF about oxygen systems... statement. What the final report states is irrelevant; we do not predict the conclusions here. VQuakr (talk) 19:38, 9 July 2013 (UTC)

OK, for the record, the short version: Masks are "deployed" when they come down from the overhead. The oxygen generators are not activated until the user pulls on the mask, specifically because the latch on the panel holding the masks is deliberately small, to speed deployment. It's not at all uncommon for a hard landing to cause some of the panels to pop open and deploy their masks; I've personally experienced one where we landed hard enough that I suddenly had a mask in my face, but there was no actual damage to the airplane (a 727-200). So it's safe to say that the fire wasn't fueled by the oxygen generators. And in any event, until a reliable source states that the oxygen generators contributed to the fire, any such claim constitutes original research and is not permitted. Can we drop this now? rdfox 76 (talk) 02:28, 10 July 2013 (UTC)

First or ninth?

Does anyone else see a problem here? "Pilot was at his first landing with a B777 and it was his ninth training flight in that model aircraft." Did they go back into the cabin for landing eight times, or parachute out instead of landing? Do we know which pilot was at the controls? Normally it would be the more experienced of the two. Apteva (talk) 21:45, 8 July 2013 (UTC)

The First Officer was the PF. News reporting he had 43 hours on type. I find it hard to believe it was his first RL landing in a 777, normally pilots undergo a checkride first. Feedthepope (talk) 22:20, 8 July 2013 (UTC)
What's a PF? What's an RL? (One of the unfortunate things about articles on events like this is that they attract an awful lot of industry insiders and aficionados who insist on using industry jargon and seem to find it impossible to write in the much clearer language that Wikipedia articles must contain.) HiLo48 (talk) 22:29, 8 July 2013 (UTC)
Pilot flying. Real life. — Lfdder (talk) 22:34, 8 July 2013 (UTC)
The Pilot in Command is confusing because this was a training flight, and the student was as is normal sitting in the left, captain's seat, and was operating the controls until perhaps the last seconds. The instructor, in the right seat, is ultimately responsible for everything that the student does, regardless of what they do. Presumably commands to "add power", and "go around" would not come from the student, but from the instructor. Did pulling up on the stick cause the tail to strike the breakwater? We will not know until the NTSB report, probably early next year. All we do know is that it was not a particularly good landing... The information I have is it is their second landing in a 777, but am having trouble finding a reference. Apteva (talk) 23:22, 8 July 2013 (UTC)
I would also add that NTSB's official statement on July 8, 2013, is that they have not fully determined who was the pilot-in-command and who was the flying pilot yet. In addition, there were three captains on board, one FO. One of the captains was flying as a check pilot.Mahka42 (talk) 02:21, 9 July 2013 (UTC)

If the First Officer was the student pilot and was the PF (pilot flying the plane), then the Check pilot (a Captain instructor) would be sitting in the left seat, and the FO in the right seat. If the student pilot being checked, was a Captain, then he would be in the left seat and the Check instructor Captain would be in the right seat.

A pilot can make his very first landing in the aircraft, with the plane full of passengers, if he has passed all the required training in the simulator that meets all the certification standards. When I made my first landing in the B-727, AND the B-777, AND the B-747-400, I had never actually flown those planes before. Those planes were full of passengers on my first flight in each of them, takeoff and landing. That was legal because I obtained my Captain's ratings in those planes with the required simulator course training, passing all the required maneuvers for each rating.

It appears to me that this accident was caused by the same factor as the Turkish Airline crash of a B-737-800 at Amsterdam (Feb, 2009), just short of the runway: Namely, that the pilots failed to pay attention to their flight instruments, at a critical time during the approach.

The NTSB has already stated the plane was flying at a mere 103 Kts, moments before the crash, when it should have been flying at no less than 137 kts. That wide discrepancy in airspeed could only have happened if no one was paying attention to their basic flight instruments, which is what caused the Turkish Airline crash.

The pilot flying the approach, whether AP is engaged or not, is supposed to keep his hand on the thrust levers and the other hand on the control yoke. He is supposed to be constantly making the necessary adjustments on both of those controls, to ensure the correct speed is maintained and the correct angle of descent is adhered to. To do that, he has to CONSTANTLY be watching his basic flight instruments, while also glancing outside at the approach runway.

The other pilot (in this case the check captain in the left seat) has the duty of calling out any significant deviations from the target approach speed (Vref) or proper glide slope, or normal rate of descent. If the student pilot is allowing the plane to get below the target Vref speed, then the check captain is supposed to advance the thrust levers and announce he needs more thrust. The PNF (pilot not flying) also has the duty to call out "1,000 above," and any deviation from target airspeed, more than 5 kts. Again, at 500 ft. he is supposed to call out "500 above," and any significant deviation from target Vref speed. And again, at 100 ft. he again is supposed to call out "100 above," and any significant deviation from target Vref. The NTSB has indicated those calls were not made, which means they were not watching their basic flight instruments during the final approach, as they were required to do.

The deterioration from 137 kts to 103 kts would take enough time to indicate that four pilots in that cockpit were not paying attention to the basic flight instruments. That is the only reasonable explanation. They simply were not doing their jobs as they had been trained to do them. EditorASC (talk) 06:36, 9 July 2013 (UTC)

I'm running into some discrepancy whether this was the pilot's 9th or 10th flight leg in the 777. Most of the news reports and Asiana's conference stated it was his 9th, the NTSB conference on July 9 said that the pilot relayed that it was his 10th. I'm leaving it untouched for now, but did add in that he was about halfway through Asiana's training requirement.Mahka42 (talk) 15:58, 10 July 2013 (UTC)

Impact vs Aftermath

In the last few hours, the Aftermath section was merged with the Impact section. While I agree with the premise of doing this, I feel the resulting section should be named "Aftermath" or something else instead of "Impact" to keep confusion to a minimum. (The article is about a plane crash, after all, which carries a different semantic for the word "impact".) — 67.180.24.57 (talk) 07:49, 9 July 2013 (UTC)

Indeed. When I saw the Impact section title, my first reaction was, is this about hitting the seawall? --Mareklug talk 08:19, 9 July 2013 (UTC)
agree, and changed IdreamofJeanie (talk) 08:22, 9 July 2013 (UTC)

The Aftermath section includes the statement "The crash damaged Asiana's reputation[26][78][79] and that of South Korea's aviation industry". As the South Korean aviation sector includes not just airlines, but aircraft manufacturers, with both civil and military product lines, while Boeing are a non-Korean manufacturer, I believe the reference to the South Korean aviation industry should be removed.92.235.125.151 (talk) 23:18, 10 July 2013 (UTC)

Testomony / Passenger and crew accounts

New edits to the Testimony section (now renamed Passenger and crew accounts) appear to make it read like a list. I am unsure of the reason for the recent edits, but I feel they should be reverted. Thoughts?67.180.24.57 (talk) 02:52, 10 July 2013 (UTC)

EDIT: In second reading, it actually seems to sound okay. But maybe the section should be renamed Survivor and Witness Accounts to accommodate all parties who may have experienced the crash? — 67.180.24.57 (talk) 02:57, 10 July 2013 (UTC)

Or perhaps "Eyewitness". This will become necessary if and when the UA885 cockpit narrative becomes a reliable source, i.e. quoted in one. --Mareklug talk 03:53, 10 July 2013 (UTC)
And it has, and has been incorporated. --Mareklug talk 05:29, 10 July 2013 (UTC)
It seems that someone has reverted the title back to "witness" without providing a reason. Changing it back to "Survivor and eyewitness accounts" — 67.180.24.57 (talk) 05:40, 10 July 2013 (UTC)
  • This header was originally changed because testimony means a "formal written or spoken statement," whereas this section contains basic personal accounts. Witness is an appropriate descriptor for Wikipedia and encompasses everyone who experienced any part of the incident first-hand, including all passengers and crew. Taroaldo 06:30, 10 July 2013 (UTC)

Gotta get some more of this aviation jargon outa here

In the Crash section we have "The weather at the time of the accident was Visual Meteorological Conditions (VMC)."

OK, VMC is linked, but it's a certainty that 99% of our readers won't know what is it and will have to follow the link to find out. Let's just describe the relevant aspects of the weather there, in the article, as normal humans would expect.

And in the Passengers and crew section, most of our readers won't have a clue what a check pilot is. Can someone turn than into normal English please? HiLo48 (talk) 07:41, 10 July 2013 (UTC)

Hopefully addressed this. — Lfdder (talk) 11:16, 10 July 2013 (UTC)
Yes. Looking better. HiLo48 (talk) 11:34, 10 July 2013 (UTC)

Block quotation in Investigation section

It appears that someone has added a large block quotation from an article into the Investigation section. Perhaps this information should be summarized and incorporated into the section instead of quoted? — 67.180.24.57 (talk) 07:55, 10 July 2013 (UTC)

Yes, I was thinking along similar lines myself. Good suggestion. HiLo48 (talk) 08:00, 10 July 2013 (UTC)
The edit description by the user who added the quote says, "This autothrottle business and the pilot's claim is best given IN CONTEXT by this quote which mentions what the pilots said, what the NTSB chair said, and what an expert said. It also explains it all. So I replaced/quoted all of it." While this is a fair argument, I don't feel such large quotes to explain the content belong in an encyclopedic article. A good summary should do just fine. — 67.180.24.57 (talk) 08:06, 10 July 2013 (UTC)
Except that the first cut at this summary is beyond terrible. It implies that the autothrottle may have worked or not in this event, whereas the quote plainly says that it could not, while clearly saying why this is so. Which is why I introduced the quote verbatim in the first place, as it is the only source I found so far that does better than half-assed job of relating yesterday's autothrottle findings. I knew this would get botched on Wikipedia. :/ But feel free to make it good. :) --Mareklug talk 08:16, 10 July 2013 (UTC)

Descent profile of aircraft

Knocked together something on Excel, parsing the json data on FlightAware. http://imageshack.us/a/img42/7163/cx0.gif

The altitude and speed are indexed separately. For instance:

view-source:http://flightaware.com/live/flight/AAR214/history/20130706/0730Z/RKSI/KSFO

Constructed by going into source, matching points. For example:

altitude_json = ...[1373120739000,2400],[1373120754000,2200],[1373120768000,1900] speed_json = ...[1373120739000,187],[1373120754000,187],[1373120768000,186]

The first number in the brackets is used to match altitude and speed together. Verified this on the Flightaware page.

Altitude is X-axis, Speed is Y-axis. Data for July 5, 6, 7, 8. Didn't see anything here on it yet; but I imagine someone parsed it out days ago.

Winsettz (talk) 21:21, 8 July 2013 (UTC)

The first number is the time, in milliseconds, using 1970 as the epoch. Apteva (talk) 08:16, 11 July 2013 (UTC)

Shanghai PVG origin?

Where is the source of the information regarding Shanghai PVG as the origin of OZ214 coming from? Resources like Star Alliance Timetable report OZ214 as originating from ICN. There are flights OZ362/364/366/368 departing from PVG to ICN.  « Saper // @talk »  09:36, 7 July 2013 (UTC)

Indeed. Maybe the aircraft operated a Shanghai-Seoul flight prior to departing to San Francisco, but if so, the flight number changed (and this means that it's not the same flight). Though, according to flightstats.com no PVG-ICN flights are operated by an 777.--FoxyOrange (talk) 09:40, 7 July 2013 (UTC)
CNN says "flight originated from Shanghai". There is also a mention of "reconciliation of two intake points at the airport.". Actual equipment might have changed, what wonders me if that was a stopover at ICN is whether transit passengers were actually all deboarded from the plane (I think it should be a case because of security requirements at U.S. airports - my speculation, not a fact).  « Saper // @talk »  09:53, 7 July 2013 (UTC)
My bad, two reconciliation points was my addition. That was actually in reference to unaccounted for persons - emergency personnel brought victims to two different points at the airport, so the lists weren't the same as they checked people in.Mahka42 (talk) 07:08, 11 July 2013 (UTC)
Not assuming anything about whether or not it is the same flight and whether the plane was deboarded, I think the Shanghai origin might be appropriate to mention, in relation to the substantial amount of Chinese passengers on a South Korean plane. I assume there are other ways to get from Shanghai to San Francisco -- Katana (talk) 16:28, 8 July 2013 (UTC)
If there's a source that says so, it could be noted that many of the passengers on this flight came from Shanghai via Seoul. But the idea that this flight originated/originates in Shanghai is demonstrably false, according to the airline's schedule and the various websites that mirror it. I have no idea where this rumor, proliferated in so many news sources, about the flight originating in Shanghai came from; it's just so easy to verify. -- tariqabjotu 16:32, 8 July 2013 (UTC)
According to Chinese media, most Chinese passengers on board took Asiana Airlines Flight 362 (Airbus A330) from Shanghai Pudong International Airport to Seoul's Incheon International Airport, then changed to this Asiana Airlines Flight 214 for SFO.--Tomchen1989 (talk) 04:43, 11 July 2013 (UTC)
Quick check through FlightAware's track log of the tail number also shows that the craft didn't even come from Shanghai immediately prior - it had done a turn from Incheon to Kansai, and before that a turn from ICN to Los Angeles. Just glad this whole thing is over with here at least. Don't know when the news will stop reporting it.Mahka42 (talk) 07:08, 11 July 2013 (UTC)

Lack of ILS not a factor?

The "Crash" section currently states "The instrument landing system vertical guidance on runway 28L had been out of service since June 1, but was not a factor." It gives a citation that justifies the first part of the sentence, but not the second part. Has the NTSB ruled out the lack of ILS being a factor? If so, there should be a citation. If not, the claim should be removed or clarified. The pilots should have been able to land safely without ILS, but ILS would have provided warnings that may have led to the crew applying thrust earlier and avoiding the crash. It's just speculation until the NTSB report comes out. 115.189.224.101 (talk) 21:39, 8 July 2013 (UTC)

ILS provides no speed information, nor does PAPI, only location. There is a question as to whether the PAPI lights were operating, but I would guess it is clear that they were. Apteva (talk) 21:45, 8 July 2013 (UTC)
The source cited does not say that the ILS being out of service was not a factor in the incident. If a source cannot be found that states this, the statement should be removed. AndyTheGrump (talk) 21:50, 8 July 2013 (UTC)
Were the PAPI lights operating? The article says they were.115.188.246.74 (talk) 22:14, 8 July 2013 (UTC)
The NOTAMs indicate that the article is correct; PAPI was only out of service after the accident. The notice says "!SFO 07/046 SFO RWY 28L PAPI OTS WEF 1307062219"115.188.246.74 (talk) 22:24, 8 July 2013 (UTC)
I went ahead and removed the but. If someone has a source, they can add it again.115.188.246.74 (talk) 22:14, 8 July 2013 (UTC)
I added the lack of ILS, I did not state that it was not a factor. It is clearly a factor, I don't know why someone felt the need to add that. Furthermore, someone removed references to port and starboard in the article as apparently "they are not used in aviation"...yes they are! Feedthepope (talk) 22:17, 8 July 2013 (UTC)
Thanks for clarifying. 115.188.246.74 (talk) 22:24, 8 July 2013 (UTC)

I would agree with 115.189.224.101 that an inoperative ILS could hardly have contributed to the accident. Although the pilot was relatively inexperienced on the 777, he has close to 10,000 flying hours according to one of the reports i have read. I just refuse to believe that a pilot with that level of flying experience cant land on a runway in clear, broad daylight without automated assistance. The crash in my opinion is similar to the crash of Turkish Airlines flight 1951 where although the aircraft was a B 737 - 800, none of the 3 pilots who were in the cockpit noticed the drop in airspeed until it was too late for recovery. Wonder if we should add the Turkish Airlines crash in the list of similar accidents?? Superfast1111 (talk) 05:43, 9 July 2013 (UTC)

Apparently there is a long-standing concern at NTSB, FAA, and professional international regulatory bodies, that long-haul pilots, particularly of certain carriers, are forgetting how to fly and land manually, with there being over-reliance on automated ILS Cat IIIc landings on major airport/major airport flights. I am sure we can dig up some reliable sources on this, but perhaps that begs the question of waiting for the issuance of the final report. --Mareklug talk 06:31, 9 July 2013 (UTC)

Mareklug, i watched an interesting documentary downloaded from youtube titles Air Crash Investigation - Pilot error where this issue is debated in more detail. I believe that the crash of Air France flight 447 also raised concerns about the ability of commercial pilots manual flying skills especially when the automated systems shut down. I have also watched the investigation from Turkish Airlines flight 1951 where Gordon Bethune (a former VP at Boeing) states that the pilots main job is to fly the airplane & they must never forget it never mind what a computer says.

As the pilots have survived this crash,they should be able to tell the investigators a great deal about what happened. I just hope it isn't Turkish Airlines all over again. Superfast1111 (talk) 07:08, 9 July 2013 (UTC) Superfast1111 (talk) 07:08, 9 July 2013 (UTC)

Please do not speculate here plenty of blogs around for that, just a minor note sources say the glideslope was off not the whole ILS the localiser would have been on. MilborneOne (talk) 19:41, 9 July 2013 (UTC)
"Gordon Bethune (a former VP at Boeing) states that the pilots main job is to fly the airplane & they must never forget it never mind what a computer says."
Three points in relation to this:
1) "Aviate (ie 'fly the airplane'), Navigate, Communicate" is a standard expression of the proper priorities for a pilot, sometimes referred to as 'the Golden Rule', there's nothing special about Gordon Bethune, or anyone else, repeating it.
2) "fly the airplane" also involves being properly cognizant of the current autopilot, flight management system and engine settings (i.e. 'the computer' - actually many computers working in parallel and cross-checking each other, 9 in the 777 'fly-by-wire' system alone). The nature of the modern cockpit means that how an aircraft responds to a pilot's control input is a function of not just the control input itself, but of a range of other cockpit settings and what the avionics software and hardware are designed to do in that situation in response to that control input.
3) The press statements from the NTSB appear to be focusing a significant amount of media attention onto the actions of the Pilot Flying. We need to bear in mind in trying to report the facts rather than the media interpretation that both the previous points apply, as do the actual actions taken by 'the computer' in response. The issue is not simply 'he let the plane get too slow', but 'the aircraft modes were X, the pilot commanded Y, the computers did Z' 92.235.125.151 (talk) 01:21, 11 July 2013 (UTC)

dedicated 'Speculation' section

Similar wp articles regularly provide a section on speculation immediately after the incident, even after preliminaries/final reports have been released. See for example British_Airways_Flight_38#Speculation. So, I'd rather see relevant (and informed!) speculations in a dedicated section than sprinkled all over the place with users adding stuff where it doesn't belong. For reference, see [2]. Please comment/discuss, thanks! --Parallelized (talk) 11:24, 9 July 2013 (UTC)

That's all very nice, if it weren't for two details: You happened to remove as speculation the very reintroduction of fundamentally important disclosure that is part of the press briefing by the NTSB chief, linked for your convenience in its entirety as an YouTube upload. Why don't your spend the 30 minutes to listen to it. By restoring this information, I simply disagreed with the previous editor whose judgment was to omit it as potentially confusing. Now that is speculation to me (about it being confusing). Second, several talk page sections above people are openly wishing away any speculation. Andy even characterized including any speculation as being against Wikipedia policy. :) So... once again we have it both ways on Wikipedia. --Mareklug talk 11:44, 9 July 2013 (UTC)
Sorry, just see the edit history: I accidently reverted the wrong edit (your's), which has already been reverted (rightly)- so I'm not the one to delete that part originally. And in fact, when you look at the edit history, you'll see that I added exactly the same statement about idle throttles yesterday, but it was also reverted.--Parallelized (talk) 12:29, 9 July 2013 (UTC)
No indication of mechanical malfunction so far and NTSB have already said lots. We don't need to document TV 'expert' opinion on the way the crew reacted. — Lfdder (talk) 12:52, 9 July 2013 (UTC)
I see no reasons to include speculation at all. This is an encyclopaedia. Such material can be found elsewhere for those interested, and is of little long-term significance. The media may feel obliged to publish such material, but we are under no obligation to do likewise, and have different objectives. As for NTSB briefings, they aren't speculation, and of course should be included. AndyTheGrump (talk) 13:03, 9 July 2013 (UTC)
This is like the 10th time that the quoted NTSB statement regarding "idle throttles" has been deleted/reverted. So you guys need to make up your mind at some point or these ridiculous edit wars will continue for good. As for "speculation", there's a difference between a layman/non-pilot and rated 777 LR pilots analyzing known facts, such as the ADS-B profile. It's kinda weird for wikipedia to only encourage "trustworthy sources" being used, while those "trustworthy sources" have no issue with quoting sources that are not considered trustworthy by wp in the first place. Lots of media coverage we're seeing currently is obviously based on sources that wp would not allow. --Parallelized (talk) 16:22, 9 July 2013 (UTC)
The disagreement wasn't over whether the NTSB is trustworthy; it is. If there's some bit of speculation that you think would be worth adding to the article, then show it to us here first and let's discuss it. There's not much point to keep arguing about this otherwise. — Lfdder (talk) 16:38, 9 July 2013 (UTC)
NTSB's first statement on July 7 mentioned idle throttles. Their second statement on July 8 clearly says that the throttles were advanced and engines were powering up. Therefore "idle throttles" and specifically "all the while" is factually incorrect, and not speculation. This is an active investigation, the findings can and will change with each update, and may change again when the final report is released. Am I the only one sitting and watching/listening to NTSB's briefing instead of relying on the news media to pick and choose which specifics they want to report on?Mahka42 (talk) 18:25, 9 July 2013 (UTC)
You are the only one who is removing consistently the "throttles were set to idle" part of the briefing. You seem convinced that allowing the airspeed to decay to near stall is somehow usual. Clearly the throttles were advanced IN THE END, but they were advanced TOO LATE. And yes, they were set to idle ALL THE WHILE. Meaning, from the time they were set to idle, they were not moved to non-idle until literally seconds before inpact when the aircraft was already below glide path and arriving too slow, too low. So, I still challenge you for making that passage completely beg the question and obfuscate the factual report of the NTSB chair as well as the primary cause (so far) of the crash. --Mareklug talk 19:11, 9 July 2013 (UTC)
I think this issue has been resolved with today's NTSB briefing, where the pilots are stating that they had set auto-throttle. Now, whether or not auto-throttle was properly engaged or properly working will likely be a focus on the investgation (as mentioned in the auto-throttle portion below), but I think we can agree now that "set" is the incorrect term here. The FDR may end up showing that engines were at idle power, but the setting may have been different.Mahka42 (talk) 06:07, 10 July 2013 (UTC)
You think? Information from the flight data recorder showed that the pilots first increased engine power from flight idle at 125 ft. altitude, reaching 50% thrust 3 sec. before impact. http://www.aviationweek.com/Article.aspx?id=/article-xml/awx_07_09_2013_p0-595503.xml "Asiana 214 Pilot Hints At Autothrottle Confusion" By John Croft, john.croft@aviationweek.com, Source: AWIN First. Sounds like THROTTLES WERE SET TO IDLE ALL THE WHILE to me, regardless of what the pilots thought they did with/to the autothrottle controls. Also, the crew did not manually advance the throttles (and the autothrottle sure did not do it for them), until a few seconds before impact, when it was too late. Why can't our article say that, if the NTSB chair had said it: "throttles were at idle"? I remind you that you censored her say because you think this information is potentially confusing, per your edit summary. --Mareklug talk 09:22, 11 July 2013 (UTC)
I don't know what preceded, but what Mareklug is saying is correct; the throttles were set to idle no matter the A/T setting. — Lfdder (talk) 10:20, 11 July 2013 (UTC)

Precision Approach

I do suspect that "precision approach not available" is misleading as a PAPI "precision approach path indicators" was operational at the time of the crash.

- a precision approach path indicator (PAPI), a visual-based glideslope, were operational at the time of the accident, Hersman says.

- refer to NOTAM for SFO from: DUAT Weather Archive prior to the incident available for at least 10 days

The ILS was US at the time. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 41.132.229.101 (talkcontribs) 19:07, 10 July 2013 (UTC)

Not misleading but somewhat confusing. A PAPI-assisted visual approach is not a precision approach. - Lfdder (talk) 19:38, 10 July 2013 (UTC)
And the ILS was not U/S, the localiser was working and the glideslope was turned off so it could be moved. MilborneOne (talk) 19:49, 10 July 2013 (UTC)
You can only say that ILS G/S was inoperative (which was known due to NOTAMs), but there are other ways of conducting a precision approach, including RNAV/GPS or INS for example. The vertical profile (glidepath) can be monitored regardless of an ILS - even a plain VOR/VOR or VOR/DME approach would allow you to check your profile.--Parallelized (talk) 10:31, 11 July 2013 (UTC)
VOR/DME/NDB/LOC approaches are non-precision approaches. The only precision approach a 777 can perform is an ILS approach. You need to have vertical guidance for an approach to qualify as 'precision'. With x/DME, you simply check you're on the right altitude at y distance against the chart. Same with RNAV. — Lfdder (talk) 10:56, 11 July 2013 (UTC)
Please read my statement again to ensure that you actually understand what I wrote. Please try not to make authoritative statements without first checking your facts. It's a waste of time. Thank you. --Parallelized (talk) 18:40, 11 July 2013 (UTC)
Did I misunderstand something you said? Then just tell me. Did I say something wrong? Then just tell me. Works better than being a prick about it. — Lfdder (talk) 18:44, 11 July 2013 (UTC)

Controversy at Korean TV channel over remarks about Chinese dying

I found this in the SCMP:

WhisperToMe (talk) 06:42, 11 July 2013 (UTC)

SFO statistic

I recall reading a few days ago that this was the first fatal aircraft incident at SFO since the year X, but can't recall where I saw that. Does anyone have a source, please? Andy Mabbett (Pigsonthewing); Talk to Andy; Andy's edits 10:21, 11 July 2013 (UTC)

  • You can try Aviation-Safety's list of incidents at SFO [3]. The last fatality there was when a catering truck collided with the wing of a corporate jet, killing the truck driver. Until Flight 214, the last fatal plane crash there was a Learjet that crashed in 1984, killing the three on board. Sjakkalle (Check!) 19:38, 11 July 2013 (UTC)

Other natiaonalities

 Done. Can we source the nationalities of the three people listed as "other" in the table of passengers? Andy Mabbett (Pigsonthewing); Talk to Andy; Andy's edits 10:29, 11 July 2013 (UTC)

Autothrottle

The NTSB suggests the autothrottle may be involved in the loss of speed. See http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-23249012 They also give some details of crew actions before the crash. Much of this is speculative, so I'm not sure what should be included in the article; thoughts? 115.188.246.74 (talk) 01:14, 10 July 2013 (UTC)

I think it should be included, but worded carefully to prevent presenting it as a final conclusion. It is from an official NTSB press release, after all, so I feel it does merit some kind of inclusion.
EDIT: Included into the Investigation section — 67.180.24.57 (talk) 01:56, 10 July 2013 (UTC)
This is a little bit complicated. When ILS approach is used (when both the glidescope and localizer are providing input; the glidescope was turned off via NOTAM for 1 June - 22 August 2013), the autothrottle is part of the instrument landing process and operates normally, on. In a visual flight rules landing, where things require manual inputs, the pilots have to arm and then engage the autothrotle, if they want it to be on. It is not at all clear at the moment, that the autothrotle malfunctioned in any way. It is just as likely that the pilots never engaged it. However, as you say, NTSB has yet to tell us about all that. It will be on the Flight Data Recorder and system-specific diagnostic sensor outputs. --Mareklug talk 04:01, 10 July 2013 (UTC)
Regardless if the auto-throttles are engaged or not (there is NO requirement that they be turned on during a visual approach, or even during an CAT-I instrument approach either), the PF (in this case, the student captain flying the plane from the left seat) is supposed to keep one hand on those thrust levers and the other hand on the control yoke at all times. He is also required to keep a constant watch on his basic flight instruments, so he can ensure the plane maintains the target approach speed (Vref) and the proper rate of descent, so as to touch down in the first one thousand feet area, beyond the runway displaced threshold.
At the same time, the check pilot instructor captain, occupying the right seat, is supposed to constantly check the basic flight instruments and to IMMEDIATELY call out any deviations from that target speed or proper descent profile. If the student captain doesn't IMMEDIATELY respond in the proper manner, then the check captain must take over the controls to force the plane back on profile, without further delay. In addition, the PNF is always supposed to make verbal call-outs when the plane passes thru 1,000 ft., 500 ft., and 100 ft., and any additional, pertinent information. That check captain is the actual pilot in command of the aircraft, and is the final authority for the safe operation of that aircraft.
It is painfully obvious that neither pilot was carrying out their MANDATORY duties and that is why the plane crashed. Almost an identical repeat of the pilot incompetence/negligence, that caused the Turkish Air crash of the 737-800, just short of the Amsterdam airport in February, 2009. The relief FO that was on the jump-seat should have shouted out that the AS was falling off, as soon as he saw they were not paying proper attention to their flight instruments. EditorASC (talk) 07:04, 10 July 2013 (UTC)
THis is not a forum. We base articles on published reliable sources, not on what is 'painfully obvious'. If you want to speculate, do so elsewhere. AndyTheGrump (talk) 11:40, 10 July 2013 (UTC)

If you would bother to read this entire section, along with all the NTSB Press releases, Editor AndyTheGrump (talk), you would know:

  • A specific request was made by another editor (first one that started this section), for our views on the information being supplied by the NTSB. That request was quite proper and our various responses to that request, are also appropriate.
  • There have already been too many non-fact speculation, and OR statements put into the article, WITHOUT discussing such on this page FIRST. That is why we are discussing the issues here, so we can keep those kinds of errors to a minimum.
  • It is NOT speculation, that the pilots allowed the plane's AS to bleed off, from the MINIMUM REQUIRED target Vref speed of 137 Kts, all the way down to 103 Kts, without saying or doing anything to reverse that trend, until the plane was about to stall and crash. That deterioration occurred over a time span of 26 seconds, without any response by either pilot. That is FACT, that has been released by the NTSB, the ultimate RS source.
  • Additionally, if you had taken the time to follow those NTSB briefings, you would know that it is NOT speculation that the plane was too low and below a safe glide path that would lead to a safe landing beyond the displaced threshold of 28L.
  • If you had taken the time to follow those NTSB briefings, you would know that it is NOT speculation that BOTH pilots had a duty to monitor their basic flight instruments at all times during that approach, to ensure the plane remained on the target AS and the proper descent profile. The NTSB has stated those FACTS, in those press releases, and has stated those duties of pilots, during their approaches to landings, many times before in a myriad of other final accident reports.
  • This TALK PAGE is precisely for the kind of discussion we are carrying on here, as to what should be put into the article itself, either now, or later, or not at all. I have news for you: NTSB press releases and conferences ARE RS sources, and it is appropriate for us to discuss the FACTUAL information the NTSB is providing, BEFORE we make decisions as to how and when to include such in this article.

I suggest you get off your self-righteous high horse and learn something about the history of accident investigations, by the appropriate govt authority, and then pitch in and help the rest of us who are serious about doing a good and accurate job on this Wiki article.

For the record, I haven't put anything in the article so far, about the negligence of the pilots, nor have I recommended that any other editors do so at this time. But I think it is appropriate for all the editors who are working on this article, to be aware of that situation, so they can better decide when and how to word such additions to the article, as more of that kind of information becomes available, from the NTSB, and/or other air safety organizations, that have had a long standing good reputation for accurate analysis of why human factor accidents happen. The more we know and understand now, about why this accident happened, the better we are likely to word such inclusions, when we decide the time is appropriate. EditorASC (talk) 01:07, 11 July 2013 (UTC)

For the record, we base articles on published reliable sources. And yes, I am well aware of what the NTSB has said in briefings. I am also aware that they have not yet reached any conclusions. Your assertion that "neither pilot was carrying out their MANDATORY duties and that is why the plane crashed" is therefore speculation. It is also a violation of WP:BLP policy (which apply everywhere in Wikipedia, including talk pages). If you want to speculate, do so elsewhere. AndyTheGrump (talk) 01:19, 11 July 2013 (UTC)

Your BLP red herring argument is one of the most absurd that I have ever heard on Wiki talk pages. Every bit of what I said about their having a duty to monitor the basic flight instruments at all times, during an approach to landing, and that they obviously failed to do that, is documented by RS sources, so the BLP argument is simply idiotic.

  • "There are expectations that the crew is monitoring speed on approach," Hersman said. [4]
  • "If there are four pilots there, even if you are sitting on a jump seat, that's something you watch, the airspeed and the descent profile," said John Cox, a former US Airways pilot and former Air Line Pilots Association accident investigator."[5]
  • "National Transportation Safety Board chairman Deborah Hersman said the autothrottle was set for 157 mph and the pilots assumed it was controlling the plane's airspeed. However, the autothrottle was only "armed," she said."[6]
  • "The pilot flying the plane had turned off his flight director, while the training captain had his flight director on, Hersman said. The flight director computes and displays the proper pitch and bank angles required in order for the aircraft to follow a selected path....In most airliners, an autothrottle will not turn on if one flight director is off and one on because it has to work in harmony with the flight directors — both need to be either on or off, Moss said."[7]
  • "This is one of the two hallmarks of complexity and challenge in the industry right now," Moss said. "It's automation confusion because from what Deborah Hersman said, it appears very likely the pilots were confused as to what autothrottle and pitch mode the airplane was in. It's very likely they believed the autothrottles were on when in fact they were only armed."[8]
  • NTSB Chair, Debbie Hersman, 4th Press briefing, 130710: [As to the autothrottle], "....but just understand, the pilot sets what he wants, in different modes, but then there is a responsibility to monitor that he is getting what he asked for."..."Aviation safety experts and federal investigators have questioned why the crew did not recognize the problem and take action before the plane struck the end of the runway." Hersman rejected the suggestion that any problem or misunderstanding about the auto-throttle by the crew would excuse the pilots from their duty to manually fly the airplane...."But let me be clear: the crew is required to maintain a safe aircraft, which means that they need to monitor. They have a monitoring function, all three of them in the cockpit. One of the very critical things that need to be monitored on approach to landing is speed," she said."[9] EditorASC (talk) 15:32, 12 July 2013 (UTC)

On Korean culture and Asiana 214

I found this. It is just speculation but shouldn't be included yet. But if the investigation is ongoing and it does find cultural issues, we can go back to it and use it.

WhisperToMe (talk) 04:39, 10 July 2013 (UTC)

Agreed. It is wildly speculative and possibly offensive, and does not belong in an encyclopedia article unless it is from an official source. Right now, it's no better than the speculation the pilots weren't monitoring sensor readouts. — 67.180.24.57 (talk) 07:17, 10 July 2013 (UTC)
It is a lot more than speculation. That "cultural factor" has been researched and discussed in many "Human Factors" tomes on airline safety. KAL pilots used to get their training at Pan Am, and that is why almost all Pan Am pilots refused to deadhead on KAL, and ALPA made it clear that the full force of the union would be behind any pilot who might be charged for refusing to deadhead on KAL, if management deemed it necessary. To the best of my knowledge, no Pan Am pilot was ever disciplined for refusing to deadhead on KAL. EditorASC (talk) 08:09, 10 July 2013 (UTC)
The accident report of Korean Air Cargo Flight 8509 specifically pointed to Korean culture as being a factor in the accident. See it here. WhisperToMe (talk) 09:23, 10 July 2013 (UTC)

This NBC report is pointing to issues around crew resource management that begun to be addressed following the 1977 Tenerife airport crash in which a KLM B747 crashing into a PanAm B747 on takeoff. The KLM crew were heavily criticised in part for poor communication in that the other pilots were way too deferential towards the (senior) Captain in command. Whether or not (as NBC suggests) this will be an issue in this crash, and it arising from cultural factors, is unclear. If it is, however, it will be another in a long line of accidents in which similar CRM issues have emerged. I'm not suggesting that this speculative report be included in this article, but I won't be surprised if CRM turns out to be a significant issue identified and discussed by the NTSB, and I would put significant amounts of money on this being a topic for examination from the CVR tapes. EdChem (talk) 11:32, 10 July 2013 (UTC)

Problems with CRM/overly authoritarian cockpit hierarchies have been identified in multiple airline incident and accident reports, across multiple airlines and multiple cultural groups, including Western. In general they involve the reverse of what seems to have been the case here, with a junior Pilot Not Flying being hesitant to overrule a senior Pilot Flying. Singling out 'Korean culture' when the problem is a generic CRM issue would be inappropriate.92.235.125.151 (talk) 00:14, 11 July 2013 (UTC)

Another source:

WhisperToMe (talk) 06:36, 11 July 2013 (UTC)

"Low down on S Korean Pilots," by one of the Flight Standards experts that trained them. [10] — Preceding unsigned comment added by 71.93.90.163 (talk) 04:05, 12 July 2013 (UTC)

Account from Chicago Business Journal / PPRN forum

The Survivor and Eyewitness Account section includes a quote from Chicago Business Journal, which in turn quotes an online pilot's forum. The forum post is introduced as follows; it's not reliable and probably should be removed:

Apologies if this has been posted. I receieved this from a friend of mine who got it as part of a distribution from one of the cockpit crew of the UA 747. I don't personally know tha UA relief FO but apparently permission had been granted to distribute this email freely.

guanxi (talk) 18:28, 10 July 2013 (UTC)

I posted the link much earlier on this page to yet another forum, stipulating that as such it was not admissible as a reliable source (forum, etc.). However, as it has been quoted by now more more than one reliable source, our re-quoting those sources is completely fine. If you for some reason don't like the Chicago Business Journal's way of doing it, we can find you 5 other newspapers. --Mareklug talk 02:14, 11 July 2013 (UTC)
Do you know a RS that verified the source of the forum post? Chicago Business Journal did not, which is my concern; we have no idea who wrote the message they cited. It comes across as a chain email, the sort of rumor that appears in these situations. guanxi (talk) 03:20, 11 July 2013 (UTC)
You realize that if this were a fraudulent account, it would be quickly branded as such by the pilot community, including the 1st officer in question. Just sayin'. --Mareklug talk 03:51, 11 July 2013 (UTC)
Plenty of fraudulent information and rumor is passed around in any professional community. Even when billions are on the line, such as on Wall Street, people are taken in by rumor and fraud. guanxi (talk) 18:30, 11 July 2013 (UTC)
I don't see any sign that Noyes checked the source. He refers to the email as his source, not the author, and he doesn't know the name of the author. It's an anonymous source that he's never met -- not high journalistic standards. Technically I think that KGO, a local San Francisco ABC affiliate, is a Reliable Source. Since you seem to want to include the quote, I'll just leave it and add a couple of words to describe the source. If someone else agrees it should be removed, that would be my vote. guanxi (talk) 18:37, 11 July 2013 (UTC)
It is the best eyewitness account of the B777's last phase approach and its collision with the seawall. It comes from an expert, who is not anonymous, but identified by unique crew assignment on a particular flight, a person with the best view of those particular events, and therefore, his characterizations and descriptions are not available otherwise. It is simply irreplaceable, and other than FDR output, it is the best account of what actually happened. I should hope no one is moved to remove it. As I said before, should it prove problematic in any way, it will be identified as such by the pilot community, as well as the Flight UA885 crew member to whom it is ascribed. --Mareklug talk 00:49, 12 July 2013 (UTC)
(I'm fine with the way it is now. I'm just adding a point about whether it should be included in case it comes up later.) I agree that if it's true, it's great information and a great addition to the article. I understand you are personally confident in the "pilot community", but that's something hard to define and it is not an RS. What would be best is an RS interview with the supposed author, who shouldn't be hard to track down, but I don't suppose the various news sources do requests from Wikipedia. guanxi (talk) 17:39, 12 July 2013 (UTC)

State Department Statements

Seoul Embassy

Beijing Embassy

WhisperToMe (talk) 07:25, 12 July 2013 (UTC)

Third death

Sky News now reporting a third death. No online sources atm to verify, but suspect they will become available overnight. Mjroots (talk) 22:23, 12 July 2013 (UTC)

I just added a corresponding ref and reverted the edits done by the other two guys who'd rather revert an edit than check its veracity. --Parallelized (talk) 22:30, 12 July 2013 (UTC)

CBS Evening News just now reported the third death. ←Baseball Bugs What's up, Doc? carrots→ 22:39, 12 July 2013 (UTC)

Discussion in the aviation community

This is a placeholder to help analyze the major discussions going on in pilot forums, such as:

  • automation complacency, excessive use of automation, lack of hand-flying skills
  • potential impact of previous training/experience (influence of A320 rating/experience, autothrottle habits) and differences between the A320 and 777
  • potential b777 design issues or A320 differences [11]
    • FLCH trap (FL000), auto-throttle wake-up
    • except for the stick shaker, there's no separate aural/audio stall warning, unlike the A320
    • no standalone speed/stall warning
    • no alpha floor protection, unlike the A320
    • flaw in speed tape logic
    • flight director use during approaches vs. Airbus requiring FDs to be off to force A/T into SPD mode
    • the stick shaker/stall warning not being EGPWS/TWAS coupled, so that its warnings may be too late
  • no standalone AoA display to help SA (Sullenberger, AF 447)
  • an inexperienced/new IP being paired with an inexperienced 777 pilot
  • the IP's total 777 flight experience
  • experience being based on total flying hours, and not on number of landings, visual approaches or manually flown hours
  • relief crews on longrange flights having little chance to maintain hand-flying and visual approach proficiency
  • potential impact of FQA evaluation by the airline, airlines in general
  • little TQ/TR quality assurance, because ratings are not evaluated by third parties, or foreign countries
  • go-arounds generally being frowned upon by airlines, instead of being regularly encouraged/required by SOPs
  • the pilots not refusing the "slam-dunk" APP, the IP recognizing the unstable approach too late due to lack of monitoring by PMs
  • hand-flying/visual approach proficiency not being explicitly encouraged/required by many airlines
  • asiana SOPs regarding autothrottle use during final
  • The 28L ILS G/S being u/s, alternatives to maintain vertical SA via RNAV/GPS
  • problematic KSFO ATC practices ("slam dunks", 180kts, 5nm finals) [12]
  • potential CRM failures much earlier than 500ft AGL
  • rote learning as a factor to type rating performance
  • alleged Korean/ASIANA CRM Issues (seniority) and expat TRI/TRE feedback
  • potential language/cultural issues
  • The role of the 747 crew watching the non-stabilized approach
  • evacuation delay by FD crew
  • delay by emergency response teams

— Preceding unsigned comment added by Parallelized (talkcontribs) 18:50, 11 July 2013 (UTC)

Just because these views are being expressed on aviation forums doesn't make them remotely authoritative. For instance, "automation complacency, excessive use of automation, lack of hand-flying skills" is commonly expressed by pilots who view the encroachment of computers into the cockpit as detrimental to airmanship, and 'fly the airplane' does indeed remain a priority, but there are a whole range of accidents in which the direct cause of the accident was failure to appropriately understand the aircraft systems, and 'fly the airplane' requires you to understand that just as much as it requires you to understand the basic forces on control surfaces. 'Airmanship' in a 777 or any other modern aircraft is a lot wider body of knowledge than in a Cessna, or even a 737 Classic. Equally [13] includes a lot of speculation - it dresses them up as 'theories', but the fact an accident-chasing lawyer might pursue them doesn't make them anything more. The only agency which can 'promote' them to legitimacy is NTSB based on the full set of facts they ascertain. Airbus and Boeing do do things differently, that doesn't make one right and the other wrong, it represents different and equally valid ways of looking at the cockpit environment and how to best protect the aircraft and passengers. WRT delayed evacuation, evacuation should be prompt, but it should also be safe, and the consequences of getting that decision wrong can be fatal, the crew needed to determine if and where there was any fire or wreckage, potentially factor in prevailing wind - a non-trivial problem after being spun around, and combine all that to decide which exits could safely be used. They evacuated on the left hand side of the aircraft, without using the right-side exits near to the separated engine, so they got that right, which is better than quicker but wrong. 92.235.125.151 (talk) 12:30, 13 July 2013 (UTC)
"WRT delayed evacuation, evacuation should be prompt, but it should also be safe, and the consequences of getting that decision wrong can be fatal, the crew needed to determine if and where there was any fire or wreckage, potentially factor in prevailing wind - a non-trivial problem after being spun around, and combine all that to decide which exits could safely be used."
DEAD WRONG! The evacuation should NEVER be delayed, when it is obvious the plane has crashed, causing significant damage to the structure. The presence of fire is to be ASSUMED! Of course, the FAs try to steer passengers away from an exit if they see fire right outside of that door, but that is to be done WHILE the evac is in process.
We were NEVER trained to wait until a thorough assessment had been taken first. The whole purpose of the FAA rule of total evac within 90 seconds, with half of the exits unusable, for aircraft certification, is to ensure that the maximum amount of lives will be saved, if a crash takes place.
How absurd that the FAA would require that capability before the plane can be certified, and then someone declares that he thinks the evac should be delayed until a thorough evaluation has been made. The argument is absurd, dead wrong and defies years of training, over and over again, that evacuations are to begin IMMEDIATELY, once the plane has come to a stop. EditorASC (talk) 19:24, 13 July 2013 (UTC)
Presumably that topic will come up in the further training that is promised for that airline. We can note that it happened but will need to wait for the final NTSB report to indicate whether it was a factor in the survivability. Please note though that slide 2R which deployed into the cabin would have deployed directly into the burning engine. I see no indication that the crew chose not to deploy 1R and 2R towards the fire (which is kind of bizarre), but the chutes themselves oddly refused to go near the fire. It will probably be a long time before we if ever know why they deployed inside the cabin. 3R and 4R chutes apparently were not deployed, but with the attitude of the aircraft the doors appear to be close to the ground and there is some indication that some passengers used one or both, but 3R is also where the language barrier occurred. Apteva (talk) 20:49, 13 July 2013 (UTC)
The safety recommendations from the AAIB report (http://www.aaib.gov.uk/cms_resources.cfm?file=/8-1988%20G-BGJL.pdf) into Airtours Flight 28M at Manchester in 1985(about the worst fire in the cabin/evacuation incident in respect of actual outcome versus theoretical survivability, almost certainly the most influential) included 1) taking the time to position the aircraft with the fire downwind if possible, 2) providing aircrew with a method to assess exterior fire and damage, 3) ops manuals to be amended to provide in any rejected takeoff or emergency landing for the pilots to review whether to stop on the runway or to clear it, 4) provision of an alarm system to prime cabin crew to either evac immediately, or to wait for the aircraft to halt. So apparently one of the most influential air crash investigation units, looking at an evacuation that went dreadfully wrong, concluded that actually thinking before initiating an evacuation was preferable to following a checklist mindlessly. 92.235.125.151 (talk) 21:19, 13 July 2013 (UTC)

Per WP:NOTFORUM, why would this be appropriate here? Dicklyon (talk) 20:01, 11 July 2013 (UTC)

A number of spot-on discussions and statements by commercial pilots have meanwhile been re-published by major media, which "promoted" them to become eligible for being mentioned here at the same time. If you are following the recent news coverage, you'll notice that 3 of the issues mentioned above were recently covered by online and print media. --Parallelized (talk) 19:08, 12 July 2013 (UTC)
180 kts, 5 nmi has been corrected. It was a flight separation requirement to fly at 180 kts until 5 nmi out. Apteva (talk) 21:51, 12 July 2013 (UTC)
Regardless of whether this speculation is reported by the media, it is still speculation. They may have pages to fill, and deadlines to meet. We don't. We can wait until the official report. AndyTheGrump (talk) 21:58, 12 July 2013 (UTC)
This is what most of you seem to be failing to understand: There's a difference between some semi-accomplished wikipedia editors/admins trying to contribute here in some shape or form, vs. some long-term ATPL holders who may even be 777 rated and regularly fly into SFO expressing organizational concerns. This isn't about speculation, it's about identifying issues that have existed before flight 214 even became relevant in the first place. Any speculation or not, other aviation accidents covered at wp also provide a dedicated section on aviation repercussions and perception. --Parallelized (talk) 22:07, 12 July 2013 (UTC)
Yup. I've seen some of the other articles - and a complete mess some of them have become, filled with WP:OR, POV-pushing, and other material that simply doesn't belong in an encyclopaedia. Just because other articles have got it wrong, we don't have to repeat it here. AndyTheGrump (talk) 22:11, 12 July 2013 (UTC)
Don't write off the wikipedia editors vs the aviation forums, I've not done a systematic trawl of aviation forums, but the talk page here is better balanced than much of what I've seen. We also need to be very careful of opinions expressed by (non-777) pilots no matter how experienced due to the difference in design philosphies between Airbus and Boeing envelope protection systems, which can reach Mac vs PC levels of dogma as to which is 'better', ditto on Airbus vs Boeing controls (see Flight Control Modes). Pilots are no more immune to Monday-morning-quarterbacking (aka speculation) than any other group, and having actually flown doesn't necessarily make their speculation right. 92.235.125.151 (talk) 11:52, 13 July 2013 (UTC)

Image caption

Does anyone really care if the oxygen masks were deployed or not? I do not see that is important. Oxygen masks are primarily there if the cabin loses pressure at high altitude, as air at 40,000 feet is not breathable. If anyone is concerned about the visually impaired, the correct method to do that is with an alt tag, not with details that do not matter to those who are looking at the image. A recent NTSB briefing stated that no passenger seats were ejected from the aircraft. Apteva (talk) 01:00, 12 July 2013 (UTC)

Apteva, I do care about whether oxygen masks were deployed. I believe that many people find this sort of information to be interesting and helpful. An alt tag is great to have, for those people who have extreme visual impairment. For those who have temporary impairment or modest impairment, the alt tag isn't necessarily as useful. For those people, a clear caption describing the image is helpful. What sorts of people might be helped most? Senior citizens who struggle with their bifocals, those with a temporary visual problem, those who view the image on a small or low resolution screen, those who are unfamiliar with the interior of a 777, those who have no idea what the dangling oxygen masks are, young people who have little experience with aircraft interiors. That is not an exhaustive list. Just because you can quickly and clearly view and understand an image does not mean that everyone can do so. The captioning Mareklug has provided is helpful for those who are not as fortunate as you. I think those people count. Ande B. (talk) 04:14, 12 July 2013 (UTC)
I read that a number of seats were ejected from the back of the palne? --Malerooster (talk) 03:24, 12 July 2013 (UTC)
Two of the stewardesses (oops, flight attendants) with their seats were ejected. No passenger seats were ejected. Apteva (talk) 12:19, 12 July 2013 (UTC)
Yes, it is important, as one passenger's tug on a deployed oxygen mask activates chemical oxygen production for the entire row of seats. This means release of oxygen for 20 minutes in 3-6 places, and production of intense albeit localized heat. This may have implications for the roof fire. A correctly phrased tag not only works for visually impaired but channels the attention of the viewer and informs the viewer of the saliency of what is being depicted. For example, you had no idea about the oxygen masks. Someone else may not realize that the seats remaining in place saved lives here, but has not necessarily been the case in earlier crashes. Seats not being ejected is not the same as seats becoming dislodged and blocking exit, as well as causing injuries/fatalities. --Mareklug talk 01:21, 12 July 2013 (UTC)
That is simply speculation. We need a reliable source that covers this to include anything like this. "The saliency"? Please, the salience is just a photo of the interior. Apteva (talk) 02:41, 12 July 2013 (UTC)
If you care about the visually impaired, why not use the alt text perameter in the image? Again, rather than parrotting what some taking head said, just find a RS for this material. --Malerooster (talk) 01:38, 12 July 2013 (UTC)
This was already provided earlier on this talk page: http://science.howstuffworks.com/transport/flight/modern/question258.htm (The reason why oxygen canisters can cause fires is because they are hot and they generate oxygen. Anything nearby that happens to ignite will burn intensely because of the rich oxygen supply.) and Chemical oxygen generator (The chemical reaction is exothermic and the exterior temperature of the canister will reach 260 °C (500 °F). It will produce oxygen for 12 to 22 minutes.[1][2] The two-mask generator is approximately 63 mm (2.5 in) in diameter and 223 mm (8.8 in) long. The three-mask generator is approximately 70 mm (2.8 in) in diameter and 250 mm (9.8 in) long., When the passengers pull down on the mask they remove the retaining pins and trigger the production of oxygen.). --Mareklug talk 02:11, 12 July 2013 (UTC)
User Apteva added the alt description, finally, Interior of the aircraft, after the crash, showing oxygen masks hanging from the ceiling, ready for use. The seat backs have video displays installed, and all seats are in position, some reclined, some upright. The overhead compartments are open.. The problem with this is that this is incorrect. All seats are not "in position" whatever that means, a number are collapesd onto each other. I know this is minor, but it still should be worded correctly, even if it is an alt description. I wouldn't add any more detail than the article does in its text, as is the intention of MOSCAPTION. --Malerooster (talk) 03:19, 12 July 2013 (UTC)
I am sure that alt will help somebody, but it does not render in any fashion whatsover using the main browsers I use for Wikipedia (Safari, Google Chrome). This was one reason why I basically don't bother with alt on Wikipedia, as I don't even have a ready way to see them. Safari and Google merely display the image URL in the status bar at the bottom. --Mareklug talk 04:09, 12 July 2013 (UTC)
The consensus here, except for one editor, is that whether the oxygen masks deployed or not isn't particularly relevant, and that the statement about the seat being unmoved could be just plain wrong, or at least we need a good source to back them up. I'm going to sleep on it, and unless the discussion turns around because other editors want the extensive caption (and can find sources to back up the statement that the seats remained in place), it should be pruned. Jehochman Talk 05:24, 12 July 2013 (UTC)
One of the briefings is worth mentioning about modern aircraft require seats to remain in place with 16g of force, helping to improve survivability. Apteva (talk) 12:17, 12 July 2013 (UTC)
I agree that is worth mentioning if we can find a comment from a reliable source stating that all or most of the seats stayed anchored. We need a source because there may be nuances. A few seats appear to have fallen out hole in the back of the aircraft, for example. Jehochman Talk 12:54, 12 July 2013 (UTC)
We have the NTSB briefing (3rd or 4th), and I believe it says what year the regulation went into effect. It does not indicate which aircraft meet it other than that this one did. Apteva (talk) 18:15, 12 July 2013 (UTC)

Google appears to be clueless about the alt tag, and does not use it, although, "Inspect element" shows it along with a great deal more. Most browsers, IE and Firefox included, display the alt text in the box where the image would be if images are turned off. I am certain that Google will get oodles of complaints from anyone blind trying to use Chrome. Or they will just blindly avoid using Chrome. Apteva (talk) 12:17, 12 July 2013 (UTC)

There are plugins for Chrome that provide features for blind and low-vision users.[14] Jehochman Talk 12:54, 12 July 2013 (UTC)
I saw that, but Google only lists low-vision, color-impaired, deaf, and hearing-impaired users. There are in fact blind web users. We likely have blind editors. Apteva (talk) 18:15, 12 July 2013 (UTC)
  • Simon Hradecky just updated the Aviation Herald source we use with 12 July additions, highlighted for now in yellow. I will only quote the part pertaining to my assertion that the seats remained intact, all the passenger seats, despite claims to the contrary by people in this thread: All passenger seats were inside the aircraft cabin, only 3 flight attendant seats were ejected from the aircraft with the flight attendants seated in them. A firefighter entering the aircraft via door 2L before the fire reached the cabin reported, that when he looked right the cabin and seats looked "pristine" as if the aircraft could just turn around and depart again, very little if any damage. The escape lighting was on during the evacuation and the PA system was available. All occupants had left the aircraft prior to the fire reaching the cabin. The floor of the aircraft from cockpit to main wing spar was sound, the support structure of the fuselage floor past the main wing spar was compromised at the right hand side, the left hand side was still sound. Between doors 3 and 4 the damage gets progressively worse, there is no floor past doors 4. http://avherald.com/h?article=464ef64f&opt=4096 --Mareklug talk 13:55, 12 July 2013 (UTC)
Editors don't make assertions. There's nothing about all the seats remaining intact in the bit you've pasted; just a fireman quoted about the seats that were in his sight. — Lfdder (talk) 14:26, 12 July 2013 (UTC)
None of the passenger seats left the aircraft, which is what 2 editors in this section *asserted*, and that quoted bit does not come from the fireman, but the NTSB briefing itself. Also, no one has produced a reliable source that ANY passenger seats collapsed/moved/were dislodged. I have seen the new interior image NTSB has published, and the middle seats in view have melted, etc., from intense fire in the roofless portion of the cabin, while window seats, the only things recognizable as seats, remained intact. No seat in any photograph appears dislodged. --Mareklug talk 14:54, 12 July 2013 (UTC)
Argument from ignorance. — Lfdder (talk) 14:58, 12 July 2013 (UTC)
Look. Do you have a reliable source that even a single seat dislodged? By all means, produce it. Don't argue by snark. --Mareklug talk 15:14, 12 July 2013 (UTC)
I'm not arguing by snark. We've not got a source that says all the seats were intact. Absence of evidence is not proof of the contrary. But I see you've changed intact to dislodged now.... the rear cabin floor collapsed so, yes, they were dislodged. What we appear to know for sure is that none were ejected. — Lfdder (talk) 15:41, 12 July 2013 (UTC)
I remind you that all *I* wanted to do was to appropriately fully caption the first interior picture, namely mention the deployed oxygen masks and seats remaining fixed and not dislodged, blocking the aisles, or collapsed *in view*. This has after much grief been "sanitized" in the form of an ALT tag, which is a typical half-assed outcome by pseudo-consensus :) -- namely, instead of the information remaining readily visible to all, it can be now seen only by the lucky few, namely those browsing/editing with the religiously approved web browser, and those deprived of images altogether, perhaps blind or browsing with alt-supporting browsers such as Lynx (web browser). Mind you, if the information were crufty to begin with, it would have been stricken altogether. So it goes, to quote the wise Kurt Vonnegut. --Mareklug talk 15:46, 13 July 2013 (UTC)

Removal of uncited material

Extended content

Referring to uninformed edits reverting information that's been provided by the NTSB, such as [15].--Parallelized (talk) 21:44, 12 July 2013 (UTC)

It is perfectly appropriate for editors to remove info added without support from a cited source, whether they have seen what you've seen or not. Please keep a civil tone, and work toward making sure all the facts are supported by cited sources. Dicklyon (talk) 22:01, 12 July 2013 (UTC)
The consensus agreed on earlier was that the NTSB briefings *are* an authoritative source (and rightly so!), they do not need to be separately quoted by 3rd party media/press refs, let alone by questionable blog postings or other "online media". And yeah, I'd expect people to actually have seen all NTSB briefings, otherwise they have really NO reason whatsoever to bother reviewing stuff here - if anybody can't be bothered to watch the NTSB briefings, then please just read the transcripts. Frankly, it is beyond me how you guys are tolerating this type of workflow and behavior, even perceiving me stating that as an "attack"[16]. How can it be an ATTACK to expect people to be familiar with the topic they're contributing to ? Honestly, all this goes to show the weaknesses and shortcomings of crowd-sourced encyclopedia-writing, there's no proper hierarchy, and if there's one, it's one where seniority and stylistic aptitude count more than a factual background. Yeah, this is kinda disappointing.--Parallelized (talk) 22:12, 12 July 2013 (UTC)
The issue is with you not citing your source. Everything else is irrelevant. — Lfdder (talk) 22:19, 12 July 2013 (UTC)
The unfortunate truth is that it is through this exact behavior that wikipedia becomes less relevant and less useful than necessary, because the people in power are not the ones who are knowledgeable, but just the ones who happen to have spent more time taking up with Shit like this.--Parallelized (talk) 22:25, 12 July 2013 (UTC)
I'm sorry, but when did reading ntsb reports become WP policy. also, copyediting requires no sources, and any reliable source is OK for any article, regardless if the ntsb acknowleges it or not. we are not run by the government (thank god, enough bureaucracy as it is). please stop trying to own this article -- Aunva6talk - contribs 00:45, 13 July 2013 (UTC)
Aunva6 is right. I have made several edits to this article, and have no intention of ever reading the NTSB reports. My edits have been fixing up formatting, typing, grammatical and spelling errors, and getting rid of incomprehensible technical jargon added by the kinds of editors who are obsessed with NTSB reports. I will not stop doing this. HiLo48 (talk) 00:54, 13 July 2013 (UTC)
  • Perhaps you should read WP:CIVIL before starting any more discussion threads like this. WP:CIVIL is one of Wikipedia's core policies, and it cannot be ignored simply because you don't like someone else's edits. Taroaldo 01:14, 13 July 2013 (UTC)
  • While it is helpful to have someone "up" on what has been reported, by watching all of the six NTSB briefings, and/or read the transcripts, neither is required for making good faith edits, and if errors are introduced they will hopefully be corrected by others. Apteva (talk) 02:15, 13 July 2013 (UTC)
Obviously I wasn't referring to "good-faith edits" intended to help people or to help improve the article (we all appreciate those), I was referring to uninformed edits and reverts of edits that added to the article. There's no need to lecture me on wp, thanks for the offer tho - this is the first time that I have seen such aggressive uninformed editing in years. I was not at all trying to "own" the article, what I was trying is making sure that informed edits go through. In case you didn't notice, I previously asked for the article to be LOCKED for public editing, to lock out certain people (including myself!), to ensure that only a handful of people with a demonstrated background in aviation can review edits, while others could help with stylistic stuff and proper refs/quoting. At the end of the day, I have given up now - and I won't bother wasting any more time debating things here, as usual, interest will degrade over time and some jackass-type personalities will probably remove themselves sooner or later (probably the ones who just happen to be around accident-related articles because of recent news coverage) - at the moment, there's simply too much public interest, and what's happening isn't just a wp-specific issue, there's lots of layman's discussion taking place everywhere, without really adding to the quality of discussion. Finally, what's been happening here wouldn't be tolerated in a commercial environment with professional editors, where responsibility has to be assigned to individuals, encyclopedic or not. Again, this is nothing personal and against anybody here - I do realize that there are team dynamics at work here, and I have seen tons of editing wars going on here, not just due to my own edits - so I really don't take it personally. But I would hope for wikipedia to adopt some sort of policy, workflow and procedures for such "hot" events, to ensure a higher degree of QA - not just based on wp seniority/status, but based on people who have some related professional background. wp isn't going to fail obviously, but 5-10 years from now, the behavior tolerated here by some "wannabe-experts" will no longer be tolerated, and corresponding procedures will be put in place to differentiate between content and markup contributions. --Parallelized (talk) 10:48, 13 July 2013 (UTC)