Talk:Battles of Khalkhin Gol

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"Russian" vs "Soviet"[edit]

I have fixed many areas where the text inappropriately referred to (then) non-existent entities such as "the Russian armed forces" and replaced this with the correct "Soviet." References to "Russia" i have left intact where appropriate - that is, when referring to the territory of the RSFSR. While I understand that this Russian/Soviet error is an easy one to make - Coox's book even makes this blinder IN THE TITLE, it is worth to GET IT RIGHT. You should no more tolerate references to the "Russian" army or "Russian commanders" or whatnot in the 1917-1991 period than you should listen to hearing a description of World War two in the pacific being about Japan vs California. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 82.26.7.28 (talk) 09:58, 29 July 2010 (UTC)

  • Maybe this info will help you out alittle bit; in the US Army during the 1960s, 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, the Soviets were also referred to as "Russians" during briefings and war maneuvers. "Soviets"/"Russians"...to the American fighting man, there was no difference. However, in the OPORD (Operation Orders-peace time war game versions) the terms; Warsaw Pact or Soviet 43rd Motorized Division (example, etc.) would be used. Seldom did one see the word "Russian" in the paper work orders, but they probably did exist there too. But in the field, days, weeks, months at a time...Russians or Soviets, same same. Bear in mind that the cold war was still on, and there were NOT that many Russian immigrants living in the US during those times. And some non-Russian American Servicemen who enjoyed utilizing the Russian language in the field (war games) tried NOT to get carried away with their interest, they tried to use some "common sense" caution...lest they be suspected of being a "commie" ("commie" was the actual words used while in the field). When the USSR collapsed in 1990, and Russian immigrants began their new lives in the US...as the years passed (about 20 years now), many of these new Americans might be questioning those "Soviet" & "Russian" terms.

The US civilians were also affected; although not related to the "Russian" question, they constantly call the M60 a Patton tank...it never was designated such a thing. But the civilians are adamant (as is Wikipedia) in calling the M60 Combat Tank a "Patton." Consequently, there should be no surprise in Russian or Soviet terms either; or far worse topics and titles.

If this is any help: US personnel are also called Americans. But this might be offensive to Canadians who are North Americans, or people from Central America, or people from South America, all of whom may or may not consider themselves to be "Americans." Which is why, by the way, the "US Immigration Service" (in the 20th century) used to ask people if they were "US citizens" and not "American citizens." In time, however, the term "Soviets" will most likely transition to the term "Russians", as future generations take over the helm down the road (years from now). —Preceding unsigned comment added by 75.104.160.54 (talk) 02:02, 7 September 2010 (UTC)

Added coordinates[edit]

I used the map linked from the article, and holding that map against Google Earth I found what seems to be the river and the approximate location of the area the battle was fought over. Ulflarsen (talk) 13:09, 18 October 2008 (UTC)

Autonomous Japanese Army?[edit]

This appears in the "Background" section of the article: "Additionally, the Kwantung Army, which had long been stationed in Manchuria far from the Japanese home islands, had become largely autonomous and did not need to seek approval from the Japanese government before acting aggressively against the Soviets.[5]" I'm sorry, but this seems extremely unlikely. The Japanese government would probably not risk a war with the Soviet Union by letting their army run around autonomously making attacks. Does the sourced article really say this? Is it a reliable source?114.161.253.11 (talk) 12:23, 5 September 2009 (UTC)

The wording is clumsy, but the sense is not that far off. It nicely illustrates the mess Japanese politics had become at the time. Kwangtung Army was nominally under the control of the Army General Staff in Tokyo, but its commanders became increasingly prone to act on their own authority. The General Staff were reluctant to rein them in, in part because of the loss of face involved in admitting Kwangtung Army had gotten out of hand in the first place, and in part because a lot of the General Staff were secretly sympathetic with the Kwangtung Army's aggressiveness against the Russians. The civilian Cabinet had very little control over the General Staff, let alone the Kwantung Army, because the General Staff reported directly to the Emperor and not the Cabinet. The Emperor's role in all this remains murky; the conventional post-World War II interpretation is that the Emperor had become little more than a figurehead, so that the General Staff could pretty much issue the orders they wished in the Emperor's name. The revisionist interpretation is that the Emperor supported the Army much more than the conventional interpretation admits. I don't claim to know which interpretation is correct; I suspect the truth lies between.
In any case, the bottom line is that Kwangtung Army showed a considerably willingness to defy Tokyo. Yaush (talk) 23:08, 29 November 2010 (UTC)

The Kwangtung army had been used several times to act 'autonomously' notably during the invasion of Manchuria and allegedly totally against the wishes of central command (see i.a. the wiki entry for Kwangtun or Kantogun army). After so many such incidents the Kwantung leadership familiar with the politisiced IJA came to believe their own myth and really believed themselves to be independent. So much so that several times during the conflict the High Command was not able to control them. TrustyJules (talk) 10:14, 1 September 2011 (UTC)

A bit of editing[edit]

This paragraph contains a few mistakes:

The Russians dispatched a new Corps commander, Comcor Georgy Zhukov, who arrived on June 5 and brought more motorized and armored forces (I Army Group) to the combat zone.[10] Together with Zhukov arrived Comcor Yakov Smushkevich with his aviation unit. On 27 June, the Japanese launched an air attack. The Japanese 2nd Air Brigade struck the Soviet air base at Tamsak-Bulak in Mongolia. The Japanese won this engagement, destroying half as many Soviet planes as they lost,

It should read "The Soviets dispatched..." and "destroying twice as many Soviet planes as they lost" OR "The Japanese lost this engagement..."

AThousandYoung (talk) 04:45, 3 January 2010 (UTC)

Initial Illustration Deletion[edit]

Hi everyone

I have removed the picture that purports to portray the battle from the top of the page, since it featured a T-34 tank. These didn't enter Red Army service until September 1940! if you're going to illustrate the battle in some way, don't use pictures that can be proven to be wrong!BlackMarlin (talk) 16:32, 9 February 2010 (UTC)

  • Hi. It is not T-34 - you were mistaken. It is BT-7. At T-34 are 5 axes, at BT-7 are 4. As you can see, here at the tank are 4 axes. May be it is necessary to return a picture back? Григорий А. Харьков (talk) 02:31, 5 March 2010 (UTC)

Weakest links[edit]

This & this, to pick just two, are coming back "not loading"... TREKphiler any time you're ready, Uhura 05:52, 9 September 2010 (UTC)

Zhukov here, Zhukov there, Zhukov, damn, everywhere![edit]

What about the Front commander? What did he do? Zhukov was a Corps commander and was not in position to lead Air Force, commander of which was another Comcor Yakov Smushkevich and under subordination of the front commander. For references purposes if Comcor - Comandarm ranks a little bit confusing, one should be aware that Zhukov was a Lieutenant-General, while Shtern was a Colonel-General. Aleksandr Grigoryev (talk) 07:33, 28 February 2010 (UTC)

"Total defeat"[edit]

The statement in the introduction that "The battles resulted in total defeat for the Japanese Sixth Army" seems a bit strong to me. The Russians kicked 6 Army out of the disupted territory, certainly, which makes them the nominal victors. However, they were content to stop there and not escalate the conflict, suggesting they felt their own noses had already been sufficiently bloody.

The article as a whole seems to overemphasize the idea that the Japanese were permanently traumatized by the outcome and unwilling to take the Russians on again until August 1945. This is inconsistent with a lot of other sources I've read that emphasize that the Japanese Army still considered Russia the principal enemy and Siberia the principal target for expansion, only choosing to move against southeast Asia in quest of autarky as preparation for a renewed effort to seize Siberia. Reverses in the Pacific and the continuing resistance of the Chinese meant this never took place, but I'd hardly say the Japanese Army had abandoned the idea. Yaush (talk) 23:16, 29 November 2010 (UTC)

There was nothing to escalate. Japanese cabinet resigned, "naval party" came to power and ultimately took a turn to confrontation with USA. Win/win in political and military aspects. Tbma (talk) 05:11, 19 December 2010 (UTC)

"There was nothing to escalate"

No?

So, why do you think the Japanese governement put brakes in the Kwantung Army when they bombed the soviet airfields in 27 june without requesting permission? (something present in the article, btw).

And about the "naval party" came to power, in fact the Emperor was very angry about Nomonhan, not because at last part of the 6th Army was lost there, but because the Kwantung iniciated a small war without permission. So, even before what I will call the russian diagnosed "Zhukov's sindrome" appear, it was not the intention of Tokyo to escalte the conclict. Still, this was only one among various reasons that resulted in the attack in the pacific. In short, Yaush is absolutely correct, the pacific war was a necessity, not a wish, the Japanese never feared the soviets and their intention was always attack them, as this article explains: http://wikibin.org/articles/ja...of-the-far-east.html

In The World at War, Matsuoka's secretary claims the key points presented in the article. From the japanese side, I personally never heard about the "Zhukov's sindrome". Unfortenetly, this is present not only here in Wikipedia, but in nearly all texts about the battle. Maybe let the japanese doctors help with the "diagnosis" would be nice, isn't?

—Preceding unsigned comment added by 189.30.216.253 (talk) 17:58, 11 March 2011 (UTC)

  • Not sure what are you refereing to. Tbma (talk) 20:46, 6 August 2011 (UTC)

"Communist forces"[edit]

"..., would advance across the Khalkin Gol, destroy Communist forces on Baintsagan Hill on the west bank, ..." and "They had suffered over five thousand casualties to this point but still had 75,000 men and several hundred planes facing the Communist forces."

Minor issue: The supposed ideology of the forces is irrelevant here, isn't it? Why not call the Japanese forces "Fascist forces", US forces "Capitalist forces" etc? Or am I taking this too seriously? I just think it's not an accurate or elegant term. "Soviet and Mongolian forces" would be fine, or not? Ricbep (talk) 21:49, 31 December 2010 (UTC)

First of all, I agree. Communist forces doesn't sound right, for several reasons. Should be replaced with Soviet forces. I will do the edits.
In general, we can take this one step further by noting that there were never a communist country in the world (so an adjective communist with reference to countries, their armed forces, etc. is wrong). Those that are usually called communist countries, in reality were socialist ones. There was a communist ideology present (as in "communism is our goal") but there was never a claim made that communism as a political state was ever reached anywhere.
Looks to me though, that the confusion of these terms is a perennial theme in English language sources, just like the aforementioned "Soviet"/"Russian" confusion. cherkash (talk) 04:31, 18 March 2011 (UTC)

Conditions of the IJA[edit]

Ok, the IJA was in fact inferior to the Soviet one, but still this article puts this inferiority much more than it really was. The Japanese forces could have won this conflict despite such inferiority. Japanese strategy of surround the Soviets was very good, and if the Army was gived the proper logistics, reserves, artillery and aerial support, it could have defeated Zhukov's forces as well as they did with them.

Now on the topic: this article should provide the conditions in which the Kwantung Army operated in this battle with not contradiction. It can't say they didn't have engineers, didn't have the required bridges, didn't have the required air support, reserve troops, and proper logistics and keep saying the Japanese were simply beated and never wanted to come back again by "fear". This is totally partial and contraditory. And was not the vision of the Japanese minds above all.

There are too many iffs in the statement regarding the alleged state of the Japanese forces. The reality is they attacked with numerically inferior but what they considered to be high quality forces with a deeply thought through strategy. They were defeated by an enemy whose position was inferior, had a communication/supply line 500 miles long to the nearest rail head (no roads in that area either) and who was not the equal of the Japanese on a 1-1 basis. The Japanese attack plan may look brilliantly conceived in theory but was impossible to execute in practice as it relied on split second coordinated timing of the attacks that did not take into account any delay or setback. They committed their numerically inferior forces on a piecemeal and unconcentrated basis allowing the enemy to rip them apart with artillery (of which the Japanese had almost none to start with) and tanks. Only under cover of darkness was there any moment in the battles where morale and troop quality allowed Japanese to gain an upperhand. Zhukov's plan by contrast was simplicity itself - a double envelopment - and he didnt attempt to crush pockets he created by frontal assault he simply pounded them into dust with artillery. Therefore Japanese forces were inferior and whats worse they didnt learn their lesson - no amount of courage can overcome a tank attack when your infantry has no anti-tank guns. The heroics of attacking with mines mounted on wooden sticks and molotov cocktails to destroy armour is more a sign of desperation than superior arms.

As regards their so called difficulties in supply - first of all they did have access to airplanes and the closes railhead was very close to the front. They simply failed to put them to use correctly and grossly underestimated Soviet resolve to supply their own troops whose logistical and reserve position was to start with inferior to the Japanese one. The conclusion of the Japanese was that if a well prepared and supplied attack on an unprepared and little regarded opponent could be so bloodily defeated it was best to leave well enough alone. Furthermore the Southern Army advocated attacking the weak Dutch East Indies instead of Siberia for the same type of resources Japan was looking for. So yes, they never came back becase of Khalkin Gol. TrustyJules (talk) 10:30, 1 September 2011 (UTC)

B*!

The Japanese couldn't change their tactics, eh?

The Red Army could take a beating from the Finns and learn. The IJA could not. Very imparial view... — Preceding unsigned comment added by Marcelo Jenisch (talkcontribs) 19:37, 22 September 2011 (UTC)

At the time of initial attack the Japanese weren't numerically inferior. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 77.45.187.209 (talk) 06:17, 10 December 2011 (UTC)

Also the first photo is mislabeled. This is NOT a BT-7. Look more closely[edit]

"Archival research" was a casualty?[edit]

Is there any particular reason why archival research is listed as a casualty? I know warfare can often be quite destructive, but was unaware of any archives being destroyed by this conflict. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 67.165.252.191 (talk) 09:47, 6 August 2011 (UTC)

That's not what it means... It's unclearly done, but it's supposed to indicate the casualty figures are from archival sources. (I'm not going to change it, 'cause I'm not absolutely sure about that...) TREKphiler any time you're ready, Uhura 10:09, 6 August 2011 (UTC)

Spelling[edit]

Someone with knowledge on the subject needs to go through this document and iron out the variant spellings. Khalkhin Gol or Khalkhyn Gol should be used consistently throughout. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 130.74.92.193 (talk) 22:08, 20 February 2012 (UTC)

"Khalkhin" is a transliteration from Russian; "Khalkhyn"—from Mongolian. Either is correct. You are, however, right that it should be spelled consistently throughout (and preferably with the article's title as well).—Ëzhiki (Igels Hérissonovich Ïzhakoff-Amursky) • (yo?); February 20, 2012; 22:14 (UTC)

Aircraft Losses[edit]

The aircraft losses we have right now compare apples to oranges. For the Soviets, the 208 number is not "aerial combat", but total loss in combat, including write-offs of combat damaged plane. The 42 "non-combat loss" consist of accidents and write-offs of older aircraft. For the Japanese - the 142 total losses (162 in my source) - do not include non-combat losses. It's a number compatible to the Soviet 208 number, also including total losses in battle and write-offs due to combat damage (there were 74 of those). There were also 436 cases of repair for Soviet aircraft (385 fighter, 51 bomber) with some aircraft getting repaired numerous times. For the Japanese - 220 aircraft were combat damaged, but repaired. Not sure if those numbers are directly compatible. The author also states airforce personnel losses were at 174 dead and missing, 113 wounded for the Soviets, while the Japanese lost 152 dead and 66 seriously wounded; the numbers involved are given as over 900 for the Soviets (maximum 580 at once) and over 400 for the Japanese (up to 200 at once). Source: (http://militera.lib.ru/h/kondratyev_v/09.html).Tvoi Ded (talk) 11:45, 26 November 2012 (UTC)

  • Combat comparative charts are supposed to simplify things and make them understandable without going thru a lot of "red tape." For example, Russian aircraft losses to operational causes such as landing accidents, running out fuel, crashing due to pilot error, parts falling off in flight, etc. should equally be documented for Japanese aircraft losses. In a combat zone these would be classified as "operational losses." These operational losses would then be compared to Japanese aircraft losses...etc. Then the next column would be "losses in air to air combat" for BOTH adversaries...not just one combatant. The next column would be "aircraft lost to ground fire", again, listed for BOTH adversaries. The reverted charts showed that comparison (although they might not have been that itemized (detailed), these charts do not. They must both be equal...otherwise they are not comparing both opponents. The original two adversary graphs were simple to read and understandable, and they reflected losses equally to both combatants.

What I recommend, is that the two old graphs (charts) be combined into these current graphs. How many Russian planes were shot down in aerial combat? How many Japanese planes were shot down in aerial combat? How many Russian planes were downed by AAA (Anti-Aircraft Artillery)? How many Japanese planes were downed by AAA? How many Russian and Japanese planes were shot down by small arms fire (rifles and machine guns)? These charts need to show those figures. March 2013

I disagree. The focus on aircraft loss is really over the top. Why so much attention on every detail on these, while other losses aren't described at all (for instance tanks or artillery). Also what's the fuss about the Japanese personnel losses? One might get the feeling that in this article attention is drawn to aircraft losses to take it off the other combat losses of this war. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 85.151.197.231 (talk) 17:41, 20 May 2013 (UTC)

Recent addition of Soviet casualty estimates to summary box[edit]

I've left them in place for now, but does Glantz actually quote these figures? And how important is it to quote a figure that beggars belief? --Yaush (talk) 16:56, 21 December 2013 (UTC)

149th Rifle photograph?[edit]

I am no military historian, but this looks like a photograph of american soldiers. no unit called the 149th Rifles is mentioned in the text. Should this picture be here? Dil Green — Preceding unsigned comment added by 92.24.172.122 (talk) 16:16, 13 July 2015 (UTC)

Number inconsistency[edit]

According to one of this article's main sources, the Japanese only brought 28,000 men to this battle. But the modern western estimate- in other words, the one most likely to be correct- lists 45,000 Japanese casualties (killed and wounded). How is that supposed to work? Was 28,000 just for the initial attack? Seems like it, since another source cited here, "Nomonhan: The Second Russo-Japanese War", lists the Japanese as committing 60,000 men at one point. Plus 75,000 at another. Though it also goes with the exaggerated figure of 45,000 killed.--Nihlus1 (talk) 07:54, 10 August 2015 (UTC)

I believe the 45,000 figure comes from (exaggerated) Soviet data. 'Western estimate' is probably a misnomer in that it likely was just Western Literature taking the Soviet claim at face value: Japanese sources (there are several) all place their casualties at under 20,000. On the 60-75,000 Japanese, this is probably Soviet exaggeration as well: the Japanese committed the equivalent of a reinforced mechanized inf. Division to the battle (with a few auxiliaries and elements of the 7th Division), while the USSR/MPR had over 5 divisions and as many brigades. In my opinion the higher estimates should de-emphasized or even removed entirely in favor of the more accurate post-Soviet data as well as the IJA medical records. --The Pittsburgher (talk) 15:18, 27 August 2015 (UTC)
That's very interesting. Do you have any sources that are superior to the ones in the article, i.e. the claims of the IJA and Red Army? That modern Western estimate should probably be removed too; its citation is a mess and no page number is given.--Nihlus1 (talk) 10:51, 7 September 2015 (UTC)
The mongolnow.com article pretty much covers most of the claims/counterclaims by both sides: Japanese casualties are given in several slightly differing but largely congruent figures such as the internal medical record, the Bureau 6A count you already posted, and the Kwantung Army official count. No matter which is used, all come out to under 20,000. The Soviets initially estimated 29,085 Japanese casualties, but the 1st Army Group later inflated this to 44,768, and then to 52,000-55,000. The official Soviet history then recorded 61,000 Japanese losses. Thus, while their initial estimate was not far off the Soviets gradually exaggerated Japanese losses to the point where their history books showed a number twice that of the 1939 figures. The mongolnow article, Drea's paper, and the Strategic Studies Institute analysis also do a good job establishing the numbers that took part in the battle, that is, 60,000 or more Soviet-Mongol vs 30,000 or fewer Japanese-Manchu.
Cheers, The Pittsburgher (talk) 12:41, 8 September 2015 (UTC)
Awesome, thanks. One last question: on the number of Japanese AFVs, were those two tank regiments all the armor they deployed? If so, that'd clearly mean they only had 73 tanks and 14 tankettes. The page currently uses a source citing 135 tanks and tankettes, and I don't want to permanently remove it in favor of the cited number for the two regiments until I know whether or not that's all the armor they brought.--Nihlus1 (talk) 02:35, 11 September 2015 (UTC)
The number of Japanese AFVs involved in the battle is probably the trickiest figure of all to pin down. In their official (exaggerated) history, the Soviets described the IJA forces thusly:
On August 10, all the Japanese-Manchurian forces concentrated in the captured part of Mongolian territory were combined into the Sixth Army under the command of General O. Rippo; the army, comprising two infantry divisions, one infantry brigade, two tank regiments, four detached battalions, and three cavalry regiments, numbered 75,000 men, 500 guns, 182 tanks, and more than 300 aircraft.
So the Soviets were claiming 182 tanks, but the real numbers were probably closer to 100: the Yasuoka Detachment (87 tanks and tankettes) was the largest armored force the Japanese committed, but was withdrawn after failing to destroy the Soviets. The Japanese mechanized infantry formations had their own organic armor, but their quantity was not enough to account for the 180-200 vehicles the Russians claimed. In my opinion the figure of 135 is probably accurate.
Cheers, The Pittsburgher (talk) 04:00, 11 September 2015 (UTC)

Conclusion Section[edit]

I recently deleted the following paragraph but the edit was reverted, so I'm posting here to bring it up for discussion:

"The Japanese, however, made no major strategic changes. They continued to underestimate their adversaries, deploying piecemeal units instead of mass units, emphasizing the courage and determination of the individual soldier to make up for the lack of firepower, protection, or overwhelming numbers. The problems that faced them at Khalkhin Gol, most importantly their deployment of only two light infantry divisions, and two tank regiments, would plague them again when the Americans and British recovered from their defeats of late 1941 and early 1942 and turned to the conquest of the Japanese Empire.[17][50]"

My problem with this paragraph is that it appears to be a very generalized analysis that has very little to do with the actual battle covered by this article. "Continued to underestimate their adversaries" is fairly POV. Additionally, "deploying piecemeal units instead of mass units" is a generalization that doesn't take into account other factors (such as the logistics needed for mass deployment, availability of forces, etc) which are unique to the circumstances of engagements, especially on isolated Pacific islands. Similarly, I'm not sure I understand how "their deployment of only two light infantry divisions, and two tank regiments, would plague them again..." ?

In short, I just feel like this paragraph is unnecessary. It attempts (through somewhat POV style) to negatively contrast the Japanese with the Soviet victors in this battle, but does so only by very loosely, imprecisely, and rather incorrectly projecting the events/characteristics of this battle on all other Japanese engagements throughout the remainder of the war. 159.18.26.96 (talk) 14:47, 9 September 2015 (UTC)

Having read that paragraph I'd be inclined to agree. The prose is choppy and inconsistent, and contrary to what it says the IJA did make significant improvements to its tactics and equipment, while piecemeal attacks were not at all part of Japanese doctrine. Their reliance on the courage of the individual soldier was not due to an ignorance of modern firepower but rather as a way to compensate for Japan's lack of production capacity and population vs. the USA, USSR, and China. Such generalizations seem to be the result of poor research or the influence of pre-war propaganda. I'd say a major amendment would be in order. Good call.
Cheers, The Pittsburgher (talk) 15:07, 9 September 2015 (UTC)
I'd say it needs tuning, not deletion. "Overwhelming number" & the "tank regiments" needs deletion for clarity, but the rest is correct. The lessons learned here were not carried over into IJA doctrine, training, or operations later on. Why they weren't may need explaining, but mentioning this, & contrasting with Pacific War experience (the next major IJA conflict) isn't amiss, IMO. TREKphiler any time you're ready, Uhura 22:54, 9 September 2015 (UTC)
I'd agree that significant editing is necessary at a minimum, however the observations on the IJA are incorrect. Following the battle the IJA introduced a new anti-tank gun (the Type 1 47mm) to combat more advanced enemy armor which the 37mm round proved inadequate against. They also began to upgrade their tank fleet to the Type 97 "ShinHoTo" model, with an improved turret and high-performance 47mm gun based on the aforementioned weapon. Japanese doctrine did not stress the piecemeal deployment of armor but rather the "mobile mass:" an armored fist meant to punch through a weak spot in an enemy's line "at the critical point in the battle." The importance of superior firepower was also recognized: Prior to their final offensive on Bataan the Japanese 14th Army concentrated 300 guns supported by 100 medium bombers on an 18-20 mile front. The subsequent bombardment and armored assault led to the fall of that peninsula 6 days later. Similarly, to support the amphibious assault on Singapore island (Feb. 7, 1942) General Yamashita massed 440 heavy guns to pound the British/Commonwealth defenses. Later on May 4, 1945 during the Battle of Okinawa the 32nd Army's 5th Artillery Command coordinated a barrage of 12,000 rounds in a single 30-minute period. Building on this, in preparation for the anticipated Allied invasion of southern Kyushu Japanese leaders after the war told US interrogators point-blank:
The principle object in defending Kyushu was to defeat the Allied landing forces near the shorelines. Therefore, in order to accomplish this purpose, we put great stress on artillery. According to the military experience gained in fighting on islands of the Pacific, especially that on the Philippine and Okinawa islands, the use of superior artillery was absolutely necessary in order to crush the establishment of beach heads.
While the Japanese militarists undoubtedly emphasized their own "spiritual superiority" over their enemies, it was as an 'in addition to,' not an 'instead of' measure with regard to technological and doctrinal advances. Japan's leaders realized they could never outproduce the USSR or USA, so they focused on the intangibles to compensate.
Cheers, The Pittsburgher (talk) 15:19, 10 September 2015 (UTC)

i question this article's impartiality[edit]

the numbers of japanese losses here are taken from the japanese records without any questioning while the numbers of the russian losses are thought to 'be reduced for the propaganda purposes' and then only the highest estimation is taken into the account 82.162.0.202 (talk) 08:42, 7 December 2015 (UTC)

I doubt it's a matter of bias, since there is genuine confusion over the numbers. However, I think your Fort Leavenworth source is probably better. --Yaush (talk) 19:25, 7 December 2015 (UTC)
I also doubt it's intentional bias. Chances are good both sides minimized their own casualties & inflated the enemy's. Sometimes, there aren't good, reliable numbers. TREKphiler any time you're ready, Uhura 21:48, 7 December 2015 (UTC)
Losses on both sides come from the secret medical records of the respective militaries. They are about as accurate as it can get with regards to this topic. The Pittsburgher (talk) —Preceding undated comment added 02:41, 9 December 2015 (UTC)

cease-fire agreement needs more[edit]

This article states that the opposing forces signed a cease-fire in Moscow. This was canceled when a cease-fire was signed in Moscow.

To this agreement is also found a reference at Invasion of Poland: following the Molotov-Tōgō agreement that terminated the Russian and Japanese hostilities in the east on 16 September

But I could not find an article about to this agreement. can somebody write a section or article about it? WillemienH (talk) 19:45, 8 January 2016 (UTC)

Participant numbers[edit]

Anonymous user 139.216.222.224 just changed most of the figures in the order of battle without explanation. Before reverting these changes, I thought I'd ask if anyone has the cited sources for these figures and can check whether this is, in fact, a legitimate correction to bring the figures in line with the sources? --Yaush (talk) 17:48, 23 January 2016 (UTC)

I reverted one of those edits since it contradicted the reference. I was tempted to revert them all, but then I saw your post here on the talk page. At least some of the others appear to be discussed in the "Aftermath" section of the article. Mojoworker (talk) 23:45, 23 January 2016 (UTC)