Talk:Desert Air Force

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Jump to: navigation, search
WikiProject Poland (Rated C-class, Low-importance)
WikiProject icon This article is within the scope of WikiProject Poland, a collaborative effort to improve the coverage of Poland on Wikipedia. If you would like to participate, please visit the project page, where you can join the discussion and see a list of open tasks.
C-Class article C  This article has been rated as C-Class on the project's quality scale.
Checklist icon
 Low  This article has been rated as Low-importance on the project's importance scale.
WikiProject Military history (Rated C-Class)
MILHIST This article is within the scope of the Military history WikiProject. If you would like to participate, please visit the project page, where you can join the project and see a list of open tasks. To use this banner, please see the full instructions.
C This article has been rated as C-Class on the quality assessment scale.

USAAF involvement[edit]

This article contradicts itself, there is no sourced evidence that USAAF Squadrons were part of DAF, as part of the 9th Air Force they may have supported the British Army but so did the USAAF in Europe, didn't make them part of 2 TAF, I think this reference in the first few paragraphs should be removed--Pandaplodder (talk) 14:01, 23 October 2008 (UTC)

Hi Pandaplodder, The references are ample and plentiful. Here is just one reference from Craven and Cate, Vol. 2:
"DAF would exercise operational control over Tactical Bomber Force under the direction of TAF through D-day; thereafter, DAF would retain only the 47th Bombardment Group (U.S. A-20's) and the 232 Wing (RAF Baltimores) for coordination with the Eighth Army as it advanced through Calabria, turning over to XII Air Support Command for use in AVALANCHE the remaining units of TBF. The U.S. 57th and 79th Fighter Groups were assigned to DAF under a similar arrangement. DAF, along with Headquarters, Malta, would be responsible for the protection of any convoys which might move along the south and east coasts of Sicily during AVALANCHE."
Here is another:
"NAAF had carried, and would continue to carry, the main burden of operations. Its missions, flown from bases located in or just west of recently occupied Tunisia, were closely coordinated with those of Maj. Gen. Lewis H. Brereton's Ninth Air Force. The fighter units of the latter force (57th, 79th, and 324th Groups) had been transferred to the operational control of NATAF; similarly the 12th and 340th Bombardment Groups (M) had been attached to NATAF and the 316th Troop Carrier Group now flew its missions with NATCC."
From the time the US 12th, 57th, 79th, and 340th groups reached Africa they were trained, fed, equipped, and commanded by the RAF in support of British operations. After February 18, 1943, NATAF under Air Marshal Sir Arthur Coningham was in command of the Western Desert Air Force under Air Vice-Marshal Broadhurst and the 57th, 79th, 12th, and 340th groups flew under their command until they were transferred from the 9th to the 12th Air Force at the end of August 1943. For some of these tactical groups, British support continued well into 1944, even after reorganization of MAC/NAAF into the Mediterranean Allied Air Forces.489thCorsica (talk) 06:03, 3 July 2009 (UTC) Probably the most telling reference is here:
"A development of some importance in the career of USAMEAF manifested itself administratively on 12 October when orders were cut assigning nine officers to the IX Bomber Command, which organization was then and for a month afterwards unofficial. This command had its roots in a discussion on 5 September between Tedder's senior air staff officer, Air Vice Marshal H. E. P. Wigglesworth, and G-3 officers of USAMEAF, during which Wigglesworth asserted that he had control, delegated by Tedder, over the target selection for the U.S. heavy bombers. Col. Patrick W. Timberlake, G-3 of Brereton's staff, took a serious view of this assertion in that it violated the Arnold-Portal-Towers agreement that American combat units assigned to theaters of British strategic responsibility were to be organized in "homogeneous American formations" under the "strategic control" of the appropriate British commander in chief. In a memo of 7 September, Timberlake granted that this canon might be justifiably violated in the case of the 12th Bombardment (M) and 57th Fighter Groups, but he could see no reason why operational control of the 1st Provisional and 98th Groups, comprising four-fifths of the heavy bomber force in the Middle East, should not be vested in American hands. Subsequent negotiations carried the point with the British, who even turned over their 160 Squadron (Liberators) to the operational control of IX Bomber Command."
Not only under British control but apparently also against the official Arnold-Portal-Towers agreement.489thCorsica (talk) 06:26, 3 July 2009 (UTC)

My references indicate that when NATAF was established on February 18, 1943, Sinclair and Cross were Air Vice Marshals not Commodores. This page states:
"Also assigned to NATAF was the Northwest African Tactical Bomber Force under Air Commodore Laurence Sinclair, US XII Air Support Command under Major General Edwin House, and RAF No. 242 Group under Air Commodore Kenneth Cross.[8]"
Is this certain? My info could possibly refer to June 1, 1943, and perhaps they were Vice-Marshals by that time?489thCorsica (talk) 19:40, 4 July 2009 (UTC)

Cross was Acting Air Commodore at the start of 43. [1] he didn't make AVM until 1956.GraemeLeggett (talk) 22:32, 4 July 2009 (UTC)
I've checked the citation and the ranks are as given there. It's from the UK Official History so although not guaranteed to be right, is most likely to be so. Stephen Kirrage talk - contribs 00:17, 5 July 2009 (UTC)
The London Gazette gives Cross's promotion to temporary Grp Captain as 14th July 1943. GraemeLeggett (talk) 07:52, 5 July 2009 (UTC)
USAAF aircraft in the Middle East all carried an RAF fin flash as can be seen by looking at contemporary photographs. — Preceding unsigned comment added by (talk) 10:10, 7 June 2015 (UTC)


no statistics here? the jagdgeschwader 27 downed about 1100 aircraft for the loss of 200. is it possible that somebody brings correct numbers to show the inferiority to luftwaffe in this campaign. —Preceding unsigned comment added by HROThomas (talkcontribs) 22:22, 4 July 2009 (UTC)

"By this and other means, by the end of November 1941 the RAF in Egypt had been bolstered..." Completely ignoring Longmore's bold but barely affordable move of multiple Squadrons to Greece from early November 1940 (30 Squadron, 84 Squadron, 211 Squadron, with 80 Squadron) and then 112 Squadron, later adding 113 Squadron, 11 Squadron and 33 Squadron, continuing to May 1941. PLus brief detachments from FAA units and from RAF Squadrons still in Egypt. For goodness sake. See eg Playfair Vol I, II; Richards Vol I; RAF AHB Narrative Middle East Campaigns Vol I Operations in Libya Sep 39-Jun 41; RAF AHB Narrative The Campaign in Greece. — Preceding unsigned comment added by (talk) 01:20, 18 June 2011 (UTC)