- Fourth generation warfare directly attacks the will of the technologically advantaged opponent to continue the conflict. Mao's Long March and the Ho's Wars in Indochina are examples of 4GW. Peaceful use of ideological networks, such as Ghandi's march to the sea, are examples of 4GW's peaceful cousin, Fourth Generation Politics.
I think that this displays a misunderstanding of the concept. 4GW is a fusion of politics and warfare. Note the earlier definition of 4GW and check out Mao tse Tung's quote on the definitions of politics and war.Ace Diamond 20:47, 11 May 2005 (UTC)
- Fourth generation warfare directly attacks the will of the technologically advantaged opponent to continue the conflict.
I changed continue to prevail, as the continuation of the conflict is the means of prevailing. Deleuze 14:34, 15 May 2005 (UTC)
It seems this article mostly misunderstands the fundemental concept of fourth generation war. Most of it needs to be rewritten with a better understanding of the subject, IMO.
I may attempt this, but I don't have too much spare time right now. Hopefully this can be done.DrDimension 14:56, 8 April 2006 (UTC)
I don't pretend to be an expert on the subject, but would the Israeli-Palestinian conflict be a Fourth Generation War? srvbeach21 00:40, 18 July 2006
Yes it would be. As is Ghandi's opposition to the British Empire. 4GW is basically a conflict in the moral and mental levels rather than the physical level of war. 22.214.171.124 04:14, 30 April 2007 (UTC)
The Isreali-Palestinian conflict is a good example, to some degree so was Vietnam, and the Chinese revolution. The book The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century is a good reference, and I recomend anyone interested in learning about 4GW read it, here's a [].--Mistau1 23:07, 20 August 2007 (UTC)
I suspect that the book by John Robb called "A Brave New War" maybe useful in understanding what may very well be the future of 4GW theory and practice. I hope that I will find out in the next few months after Christmas. Oh, The Sling and the Stone is a damn good book on the concept.
126.96.36.199 06:36, 10 November 2007 (UTC)
The entire 4GW 'concept' is trashed comprehensively in FOURTH-GENERATION WAR AND OTHER MYTHS by Dr.Antulio J. Echevarria II  —The preceding unsigned comment was added by 188.8.131.52 (talk) 18:21, 3 February 2007 (UTC).
I guess that explains why the state has been doing so well in Sri Lanka, Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia and other parts of the world? Nothing else IMNSHO explains those developments as well as the 4GW concept. 184.108.40.206 04:14, 30 April 2007 (UTC)
- Doing so well. Right. Even the guru of this bogus concept doesnt think theyre doing "so well". Given the state of the article I dont want to associate myself with it, but at least one subsection is factually wrong. A shame since facts are generally nice things to find in articles.
- Lind seeks to use the views of Van Creveld as supporting his debunked theories. They aren't Lind views. . And even worse, Van Creveld is factually incorrect on curfews pt.5, and staying within the law pt.6. See Falls Curfew & Force Research Unit respectively (there were curfews elsewhere, the New Lodge for example, and lots of other examples of illegal activity I cant be bothered to list). Its not even worth remarking on all the other things wrong with what Van Creveld claims except that its worth asking what exactly his views on Ireland have to do with "warfare's return to a decentralized form"? (whatever that is)
- Lind signs off his article by encouraging US military leadership to learn to love 3-1 ratio losses. lol! Crank.
- A criticism section would be good if it was sourced etc. As far as Lind being a crank, this article is about 4gw, not Lind. KAM 17:13, 23 May 2007 (UTC)
- To me, Robb does not read like a crank. I think the article has some questionable points that may result from not seeing the deeper structural differences that differentiate 4GW from earlier forms. Consider Al-Qaida amd its metastasis after the U.S. chased them out of Afghanistan. To what parties in earlier wars might they best be compared? Several features of the current world situation remind me of the U.S. frontier in the 1800s. Until settlers claimed and defended large stretches of land, the plains Indians did not have any specific territories to defend. As long as hunting was good, their settlements could be anywhere. The national boundaries of the U.S. were relevant to them only insofar as U.S. troops were less likely to attack them when they were north of the border. In that respect they were like al-Qaida's being able to move from Afghanistan to Pakistan or wherever they can find a relatively ungoverned territory. The American Indians could take their "income" from the land, just as al-Qaida finds economic support that does not involve them in farming or in taxing the locals. The American Indians wanted to drive the European invaders out, and a similar motivation is working in the case of many of the metastasized al-Qaida groups. The American Indians were the less able to continue to resist as the bison were killed off and the land settled in a high enough density to make armed defenders more powerful than roaming attackers. The change in the recent past (and the change that may become more influential in the future) lies in the cheapness of attack in life and munitions, the ease of keeping an attacking group dispersed enough to be impossible to hunt out and yet in close enough communication that they can make concerted attacks on key points.
- In fighting Nazi Germany it was clear what people had to be killed, and what industrial capacities had to be reduced to ashes. In fighting al-Qaida there is no comparable center to attack. At best we might succeed in killing bin-Laden, or even him and a large group of his upper-echelon commanders. Lacking an industrial center, and lacking any territory that they would regard as the homeland that must be defended, it becomes impossible to defeat them by conventional means. The defeat must be analogous to the "drying up" of the Great Plains as a hunting area on which small bands of fighters could roam. Only if local populations give at least tacit approval and support can a group like al-Qaida continue to succeed. But many people in the U.S. and other Western nations may be averse to giving citizens of third-world countries an equal share in the wealth of the world because they believe that accumulation of wealth is a zero-sum game.
- There are other groups that cohere by some sense of having common goals. For example, even though some drug dealing groups may be in competition, they probably will sort out ways of sharing the enormously profitable narcotics trade. They may step on each others' toes once in a while, but their common mortal enemies are the national police forces that seek to destroy them. By being transnational and by (usually) not contending with national governments for territory, the task of getting rid of them becomes a little like trying to clean flies out of a stable by shooting individual flies with a B-B gun. Meanwhile, the flies that used to be only capable of giving a bad bite have not become armed with weapons that can kill the farmer or burn the stable down. Even if the flies are eliminated from a certain volume of space around the barn, fresh recruits will fly in from all around.
- One of the things that has traditionally held national groups together is threat from the neighbors. If China is at war, or close to war, with Japan, then neither Chinese citizens nor Japanese citizens can feel safe if their own countries are not united. That means that individuals will tend to put aside differences to unite in their own defense, and also that they will be less tolerant of dissidents. But if the threat to the states of China and Japan come from a group of insurgents whose members are dispersed over the entire Far East, then political parties in Japan and factions of the CCP may equally feel free to fight among themselves. If insurgent groups destroy the infrastructures of each country, the people may have to look elsewhere for what they need, or, failing that, they may be inclined to scapegoat innocent sub-groups in their own countries.
- If Geronimo could have procured inexpensive ways to attack the settlers in ways that would have tended to shut them down, e.g., by poisoning their water supplies, then he might have been a far more potent force than he already was. But the truth is that his forces were equipped with horses and carbines. The French Resistance in World War II was rather better equipped to sabotage bridges and take down other important parts of the infrastructure, but the German forces were kept at a high enough level to make it difficult for the resistance forces to act without being discovered.
== Who tagged this article? == deepspace-man
What does person X suggest? --Purpleslog 21:53, 8 August 2007 (UTC) i'm new to this 'only takes a minute' talk. anyway. i'll be brief; clauswitz doesn't have to be read by a population, say in the six counties of the north east of ireland, for the transition from political demands to active and pro-active phisical means to be resorted to by neseccaty. and the control of a populations demands and asperations)is part of government purpose. the ira arose out of the, or a section of the, population. if no avinew exits to resolve then always their will divelop resistance and that will cang to pro-active organisation. governments, and states, know this; in britains case (see record of even the negotiations over rhodesia, buged every room)4gw targeted that population; the ira became a target in a secondary sence. all aspects, press, comunity relations, even the consessions (eg layout of new estates to allow only limited exits) meant the totall monatoring of the population. the use of psy-warfare isn't limited; it is totall war. no truth commissions, why? show methods that will be used latter. who benifits? that is the question. holding on to ireland, even a toe hold, had great remifications. now 'unloading' it must also follow a script. changes in tactics and straterges are done in their differing 'war rooms'. gangs and counter gangs doesn't restrict itself to milatary groups.
== Who tagged this article? == deepspace-man
What does person X suggest? --Purpleslog 21:53, 8 August 2007 (UTC) i'm new to this 'only takes a minute' talk. anyway. i'll be brief; clauswitz doesn't have to be read by a population, say in the six counties of the north east of ireland, for the transition from political demands to active and pro-active phisical means to be resorted to by neseccaty. and the control of a populations demands and asperations is part of government purpose. the ira arose out of the, or a section of the, population. if no avenue exits to resolve these demands always there will divelop resistance and that will chang to pro-active organisation. governments, and states, know this; in britains case (see record of even the negotiations over rhodesia, buged every room)4gw targeted that population; the ira became a target in a secondary sence. all aspects, press, comunity relations, even the consessions (eg layout of new estates to allow only limited exits) meant the totall monatoring of the population. the use of psy-warfare isn't limited; it is totall war. no truth commissions, why? show methods that will be used latter. who benifits? that is the question. holding on to ireland, even a toe hold, had great remifications. now 'unloading' it must also follow a script. changes in tactics and straterges are done in their differing 'war rooms'. gangs and counter gangs doesn't restrict itself to milatary groups. see proffessor Bill Rolson's Doctorial Thesis; initially surpressed. queens university belfast.
The current text has:
Non-combatants become tactical dilemmas
maybe you should alow for dyslexics with bad schooling that think; and have real experiance. work on it. i won't go into the rest of my excusses. you try leaving your area to find all the routes but one 'barrierd' (unless it's to allow a murder detail in) to get better housing with only a couple of exits and when digging a bit to find out that it was for 'security'. follow the implications of this; all those individuals involved to do it, civil servants, architecks; compliant NI Housing Executive, to keep it quite, to not report it in the media. to find out that BT has installed 'new' (so kind to spend money on the poorest area of the 'UK' that computorises before anywhere else) exchanges that do everything but pick your teath. and all that involve. to be asked at a British Army check point the name of your Union. ~To have your medical files 'disapeared', and on. to find out that this system was not new, not even new to ireland, but that the 'great thinker' and holder of black wogs heads, kitson, now had a new psychological task -white wogs. not all squadies keep their mouths shut. not even all Intelegence Officers.and the RUC arresting gays and coppying their address books (and what kind of data base back then) to 'squeez' them. the use of NGO's (see doctral theses of Bill Roston QUB.) Who were the target? the gemeral populatrion. the crime under 4gw, as far as i have worked it out aren't just as in the curfews (too much ignored as it is staight forward to bring a case) but numorious 'UK' laws and involved manipulation and interference at all levels of life. ie is a class matter.
you have the resorces; you do the work or send me the resorses and teach me how to use them
William S. Lind is Director for the Center for Cultural Conservatism for the Free Congress Foundation. That's a start for trying to supply a citation for the claim attributed to him in the article.P0M (talk) 21:35, 30 December 2008 (UTC)