Talk:German–Soviet Commercial Agreement (1940)

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1940 in title[edit]

Were there any other German–Soviet Commercial Agreements? Is the (1940) disambiguition needed in the title? Renata (talk) 19:46, 31 January 2009 (UTC)

Yes. There was a smaller 1939 Commercial Agreement signed 4 days before the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, though the page is titled German-Soviet Trade Agreement, with no date.Mosedschurte (talk) 23:00, 31 January 2009 (UTC)
I see two options to standardize the naming:
a) Move German-Soviet Trade Agreement → German-Soviet Commercial Agreement (1939)
b) Move German–Soviet Commercial Agreement (1940) → German–Soviet Commercial Agreement
What do you think? Renata (talk) 21:48, 1 February 2009 (UTC)

That could work, with the obvious redirects to support current links.

There's also a 1941 agreement, but its a commercial and border agreement (different name), so it shouldn't be a problem in terms of names.Mosedschurte (talk) 22:42, 1 February 2009 (UTC)

Which one you think is better? A) or b)? I think there should be one of them, but not both. Renata (talk) 05:43, 2 February 2009 (UTC)

A) would be the most logical. They were really fairly similar, and the words "trade" and "commercial" really don't describe the differences anyway. We could, of course, redirect "German-Soviet Trade Agreement" to the 1939 article so that it won't be a problem for current WWII articles on the topic. Or maybe to a disambiguation page, and I could go back and change some of the links to the other article myself.

If A) is the way, "German–Soviet Commercial Agreement" already redirects to this article, and I would leave it that way, because this was by far (by about 500%) the larger agreement. Or maybe to a disambiguation page, as well. Mosedschurte (talk) 06:01, 2 February 2009 (UTC)

Moved and created dab page. Feel free to adjust anything you disagree with. Renata (talk) 18:38, 2 February 2009 (UTC)

Wrong image removed[edit]

The map of "Soviet and German invasions and annexations" contains numerous errors, e.g.: Slovakia had been neither invaded nor annexed by Germany, Ukraine looks like a territory invaded or annexed by the USSR, etc. I see no problem to re-insert this map after all errors are corrected, although the name should be "German and Soviet invasions and annexations" (more chronologically correct).--Paul Siebert (talk) 02:19, 17 February 2009 (UTC)

First, it is correct, and Slovakia became a Nazi-occupied puppet state by 1939, and especially by the 1940 Salzberg Compromise.
In any event, it is made using the Wikipedia Commons World War II Europe maps, made from the University of Texas maps, such as these wide-scale maps which cover all of continental Europe, Englan, Iceland, etc:
All of which also show Slovakia as effectively part of the Reich by 1940.
And the Ukraine and Belorussia were separate SSRs, such that no arrow stops in those countries.Mosedschurte (talk) 02:44, 17 February 2009 (UTC)

"In 1936, the Soviets attempted to seek closer political ties to Germany along with an additional credit agreement, which were rebuffed by Hitler, who wished to steer clear of such political ties."[edit]

The source (Ericsson) just says that the Soviets still seemed interested in closer political ties, so Germany still hoped to have good economic relations with the USSR. This edit is a direct misinterpretation of the source. Please, be accurate in future, because this is highly inappropriate and prohibited by the WP policy. Please, check other edits for such inconsistencies, because you have to do that per policy.--Paul Siebert (talk) 04:24, 19 September 2010 (UTC)

It's very sad to note - but almost all [1] changes represent a direct misinterpretation of the sources cited.

Just one first catched example - At the outset, Britain realized that this blockade would be less effective than their blockade of Germany in World War I because Germany now could trade with allies Italy and the Soviet Union referenced Imlay, Talbot C., Facing the Second World War: Strategy, Politics, and Economics in Britain and France 1938–1940, Oxford University Press, 2003, ISBN 0199261229p.113 - so actully source even not mentioned Soviet Union but instead a "several neutral countries including Italy".

Minister von Heeren, Consul General Neuhausen, and Dr. Voss,

the director of the Hermann Goering Works and the new director of the Skoda Works, have meanwhile negotiated with the Yugoslav Government concerning arms deliveries to Yugoslavia in return for delivery of copper, lead, zinc, tin, and hemp. The Yugoslav Minister President and Foreign Minister * have promised to deliver the raw materials so vitally important to us simultaneously with the. delivery of German arms and, above all, to seize and ship to us the entire Yugoslav output of copper.

Large quantities of goods important for the war effort, which are

already German property, are still warehoused in neutral ports or the country of origin. We have the understandable desire to get them to Germany in so far as possible through Italy. This can be done only in case they are bought by an Italian firm and shipped to Italy in Italian or neutral vessels for forwarding from here to Germany. The Italian Government declared orally to Herr Clodius in the trade negotiations of September 11 to 13 that it would support such transactions as far as possible

The negotiations have just been concluded. 1 The most important results are as follows :

1. Grain deliveries. 1,000,000 tons of corn, 400,000 tons of wheat, 200,000 tons of barley. In regard to corn there is the reservation that returns of the harvest make possible delivery of this amount while maintaining the most urgent deliveries to otner countries necessary to ensure that Rumania's own requirements of raw materials are met. Furthermore, the delivery of 200,000 hogs and 80,000 cattle is pro- vided for, among other things.

2. Petroleum deliveries have been assured for the foreseeable future to the utmost limits of transportation facilities.

Rumanian oil deliveries, - 70,000 tons in October and less than 60,000 tons in November,

Netherlands Government was also interested

in having Germany continue her imports from the Netherlands Indies on as large as possible a scale.

"A. Sweden: Iron ore deliveries to Germany for 1940 as specified by German-

Swedish agreement : 10,000,000 tons. Swedish ore shipments to Germany since the beginning of the war have been as follows :

September 590,000 tons

October 795,000 tons

November 873,000 tons

December ca. 661,000 tons (including 118,000 tons via Narvik)

January 490,000 tons ( including 260,000 tons via Narvik)
B. Norway: Deliveries to be made to Germany in 1940 : Iron- ore: 1,200,000 tons (ores poor in phosphorus, mainly via Kirkenes) Deliveries since the beginning of the war :

September 80,000 tons

October 27,000 tons

November 21,000 tons

December 73,000 tons

January 40,000 tons

Copper (metal content) : 7,200 tons

to be extracted from ca. : 180,000 tons cupriferous pyrites

19,000 tons cupriferous calcined pyrites 20,000 tons copper ore ZWIG ore: 6,500 tons

No limit on molybdenum concentrates. Output not more than : 750 tons Deliveries to Germany in 1938 : 415 tons Titanium ore: 40,000 tons

Sulphur: 5,500 tons (taking into consideration the sulphur content of the cupriferous pyrites, the total sulphur deliveries are about 40,000 tons). Iron alloys:

Ferrochrome : No limit on deliveries, ca. 6,000 tons

Ferro-silicon : ca. 13,000 tons

Sillcomanganese : ca. 5,000 tons

At present shipments are progressing normally/'

Jo0doe (talk) 09:03, 19 September 2010 (UTC)

British naval blockade being a "failure"[edit]

The article says the blockade was a failure, but I know a well regarded source saying the opposite, Wages of Destruction, Adam Tooze, page 450:

'But, though the continental bloc could certainly satisfy both 'ideologi-cal' and 'pragmatic' criteria, the advocates of a long-term alliance withthe Soviet Union were never in a majority in Berlin and this too was asmuch for pragmatic as for ideological reasons. In the long term a genuinealliance would have involved an unacceptable degree of German depen-dence on the Soviets. As General Haider noted in his diary in December1940: 'Every weakness in the position of the Axis brings a push by theRussians. They cannot prescribe the rules for transactions, but theyutilize every opportunity to weaken the Axis position.' In a Eurasiancontinental bloc, it would be the central power, the Soviet Union, notJapan or Germany, that would ultimately occupy the dominant position.The Third Reich had no intention of slipping into the kind of humblingdependence that Britain now occupied in relation to the United States,mortgaging its assets and selling its secrets, simply to sustain the wareffort. That this was the direction in which Germany might be headedwas evident already in the spring of 1940. Just prior to the Germanoffensive in the West, Moscow demanded as part payment for its rawmaterial deliveries the construction of two chemicals plants in the SovietUnion, one for coal hydrogenation (synthetic fuel), the other to embodyIG Farben's revolutionary Buna process (synthetic rubber).

The SovietUnion was to have full access to both the blueprints and the complexinstrumentation necessary to monitor the high-pressure reactions. Notsurprisingly, IG Farben balked and with the support of the German mili-tary the deal was blocked. But the fact that the Soviets could even makesuch demands indicates the seriousness of the German dilemma. Thehugely increased volume of trade needed to sustain Germany's block-aded Grossraum was bound to give the Soviet Union ever-increasingleverage.By the autumn of 1940, Germany's dependence on deliveries of rawmaterials, fuel and food from the Soviet Union was creating a positivelyschizophrenic situation. In trade negotiations, German machine tools 42.2

were one of the means of settlement prized most highly by the Soviets.Such exports, however, were in direct conflict with the preparations of Germany's own armed forces for the invasion of the Soviet Union.Astonishingly, rather than interrupting the Soviet deliveries to prioritizethe Luftwaffe, Goering in early October 1940 ordered that, at least until11 May 1941, deliveries to the Soviet Union, and thus to the Red Army,should have equal priority with the demands of the Wehrmacht.

Evenin the immediate prelude to operation Barbarossa, Germany could notafford to do without Soviet deliveries of oil, grain and alloy metals.The willingness to engage in such bizarre compromises reflected theincreasing concern in Berlin over the precarious situation of Germany'sraw material supplies.

As the military-economic office of the Wehr-macht concluded at the end of October 1940: 'Current favourable rawmaterial situation (improved by stocks captured in enemy territory) will,in case of prolonged war and after consumption of existing stocks,re-emerge as bottleneck. From summer 1941 this is to be expected incase of fuel oil as well as industrial fats and oils.

As can be seen, the main problem was the Soviet Union, not the naval blockade itself, which as can be seen, was being in fact extremely effective. Marcelo Jenisch (talk)