Talk:HMS Dreadnought (1906)

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Jump to: navigation, search
Good article HMS Dreadnought (1906) has been listed as one of the History good articles under the good article criteria. If you can improve it further, please do so. If it no longer meets these criteria, you can reassess it.
Article milestones
Date Process Result
December 4, 2004 Featured article candidate Not promoted
January 6, 2007 WikiProject peer review Reviewed
May 31, 2010 Good article nominee Listed
Current status: Good article


"Although the battlecruiser concept would become unpopular in the aftermath of World War I, Fisher was nonetheless forced by the Admiralty to create an all-big-gun battleship instead."

Huh? I don't see the relation between battlecruiser popularity and fisher creating "an all-big-gun battleship instead." --Aqua 07:27, Dec 9, 2004 (UTC)

HMS Cobra[edit]

This page says HMS Cobra sank in 1899. The HMS Cobra page says it was launched in 1899 but wrecked in 1901. Does anyone know which is correct? -- 12:36, 26 August 2005 (UTC)


The article said:

"sailing vessels. Not only did this limit the amount of long-range firepower to four guns, it also allowed water into the ship through the many openings nearer the waterline."

I rewrote. It wasn't a limit on range that was the issue so much as the distribution; broadside batteries (typical before turrets) could only be used on one broadside, where turrets opened wide fields of fire, & both broadsides--with half the number of guns. This flaw was allowed to persist in Dreadnought, to an extent, with her barbetted secondary armament, & two wing turrets; the spec box needs cleanup for calling them "midships": a midships (P, Q, or X) turret would not be masked by superstructure, while both Dreadnought's wing turrets were.

On a separate point, can somebody clarify when director firing was introduced? It's implied Dreadnought used it; as I recall, it wasn't introduced until after she was, sometime in the '10s or '20s.

Re the spec box, it needs cleanup in the "fate" category, too: seems to me that should include yr struck, yr decommissioned, yr scrapped, &/or yr sunk, as appropriate, in one category.

Trekphiler 14:42 & Trekphiler 15:21, 4 December 2005 (UTC)

I also remember reading reading somewhere that Dreadnnought did not have central fire control when introduced. This seems strange. David R. Ingham 01:32, 20 July 2006 (UTC)

HMS Dreadnought did not receive director firing until the First World War - she was the least suitable of all the dreadnoughts due to her age for undergoing the expensive and time consuming addition of the director. --Harlsbottom 20:23, 22 November 2006 (UTC)

"In effect, the Dreadnought's concept was equal to three or more battleships in "real" firepower during combat."[edit]

This is comparing to a ship like Hood with two big guns forward and two aft, isn't it? It says "four". So that should read "equal to one and a half or two battleships" shouldn't it? David R. Ingham 01:28, 20 July 2006 (UTC)

Three or more is an exaggeration, I suppose, but 2-3 would be accurate. She could fire six guns right forward and eight broadside. A pre-dreadnought could fire two guns right forward and four broadside. TomTheHand 01:55, 20 July 2006 (UTC)
And it is much easier to range in larger salvos than smaller ones. So I think the sentence could stand.--Stephan Schulz 02:11, 20 July 2006 (UTC)
Just to clarify, Dreadnought could not fire six guns forward. The damage done to the superstructure by the inner tubes of 'P' and 'Q' turret would have been too great. Dreadnoughts were not designed or intended to be used in the 'chase' role, hence the parallel development of the battlecruiser. At the time of Dreadnought's launch, salvo firing and getting the range was still very much a developing "art", but generally more than four guns is necessary for good spotting. --Harlsbottom 20:23, 22 November 2006 (UTC)


The article said:

"design speed of a steady 21 knots (39 km/h). This would allow her to outrun any combat ship then afloat, making her largely immune to mass attacks by an enemy fleet, or by smaller but deadly craft such as torpedo boats and submarines (HMS Viper and HMS Cobra had maximum speeds approaching 34 knots (63 km/h), but both sank in 1899)."

I rewrote. To begin with, it's irrelavent if RN ships sank, & frankly, if any DDs sank; it's not like there would never be any more built. The issue, put colloquially, is "be able to outrun anything you can't outgun, & outgun everything else". Dreadnought did that. She did it so well, she redefined "battleship". Trekphiler 15:07, 4 December 2005 (UTC)

In a related matter, the article says the Dreadnought had geared turbines. Since the first successful turbine gearset wasn't invented until, I believe, 1912, that seems impossible. They were direct drive turbines, as I recall. Will check before editing the article though. —Preceding unsigned comment added by (talk) 02:55, 15 December 2007 (UTC)

The change to steam turbines didn't only affect the top speed, it also made it possible to steam at these speeds almost indefinitely (or as long as the coal/oil lasted). The lack of vibration of the turbine machinery made this possible, whereas with conventional (piston) reciprocating engines the vibration when running at high speed was much greater, and high speed running was used as little as possible due to wear and the possible overstressing of the engines until something broke. Dreadnought changed that, and could steam at full speed only limited by the supply of coal, she could therefore transit areas much more rapidly than the other conventional triple-expansion engined ships. If needed, given sufficient coal, Dreadnought could steam at full speed for several days without any problems from the machinery. That made a great difference to a Fleet's capabilities. —Preceding unsigned comment added by (talk) 10:27, 24 September 2010 (UTC)


The mention of an unfounded fear of concussion links to Concussion, which is about head injuries, not anything related to big guns... please clarify :-) --AlanH 19:06, 30 April 2006 (UTC)

A point to be noted in connection with the question of concussion - due to a glaring omission made by the Director of Naval Ordnance not long after the launch of Dreadnought, Captain John Jellicoe (as he then was), every Royal Navy capital ship from Dreadnought to (but not including) Hood had their sighting hoods located on top of the turret. Including monitor turrets that works out to 218 twin turrets. Due to the position of the sighting hoods it meant that superfiring turrets from Orion to Ramillies could not fire within at least 30 degrees of the axis, otherwise the spotters in the turrets below would have suffered concussion from the blast. --Harlsbottom 02:54, 9 February 2007 (UTC)

Proposed Split[edit]

Would anyone object to splitting this article in two? What I'm imagining is that the Dreadnought article itself would deal only with the ship, and a new article on the development of Dreadnought-style battleships is created to handle sections lke those on Japanese developments would be created - something like Dreadnought (naval warfare) (although maybe this could be incorporated into the Battleship article...). I think this would have the advantage of streamlining this article, while at the same time not sacrificing any important material. Any thoughts? Carom 17:05, 5 December 2006 (UTC)

Well, call it dreadnought battleship for a start as its a natural phrase which would lend itself to easy linking without piping. it would also then get a {{main}} from here and "Battleship#dreadnought" GraemeLeggett 21:25, 5 December 2006 (UTC)
Should add that dreadnought battleship just redirects to battleship at the moment.GraemeLeggett 21:28, 5 December 2006 (UTC)
I suggested a split in the peer review the other day. I still think that a lot of content would be better off in a Development of the dreadnought battleship article. --Harlsbottom 08:50, 6 December 2006 (UTC)
But such an article name smacks of OR whereas by starting out with what defines a dreadnought battleship you can put in the context of its development and what follows. Another suggestion would be "history of the dreadnought battleship" as with History of the tank. GraemeLeggett 09:47, 6 December 2006 (UTC)

"History of..." sounds better, especially when compared to other weapons. --Harlsbottom 13:59, 6 December 2006 (UTC)

Ok, per the discussion above, I think I'll create a new article, entitled Dreadnought battleship (or maybe Dreadnought (battleship) which will get the bulk of the information on the history and development of the type. this article and the Battleship article will have {{main}} redirects to this new article (which means I'll also cut down some of the info in the Battleship article. Unless anyone has a problem with that, I'll go ahead this weekend. Carom 20:28, 8 December 2006 (UTC)


I have retitled the section describing Dreadnought's career, and cleared up a few misconceptions. In particular:

  • Dreadnought was not significantly slower than the "super-Dreadnoughts"
  • The 12-pdr guns were not later additions, but part of the original design.
  • Dreadnought could not posibly have been considered obsolete in 1910, since not a single "super-Dreadnought" was in service in any navy at that date.

Some tidying-up is needed, which I will attend to in the next few days.

Regards to all, John Moore 309 23:11, 19 February 2007 (UTC)

Section Technology[edit]

"Thus protected from smaller ships, lighter guns that would normally be placed along the sides of the ship to deal with them could be omitted."

I don't understand the reasoning. How was the Dreadnought protected from smaller (supposedly faster) ships? Asking another way, if medium guns were used for protection against smaller faster ships (eg. torpedo boats), how was the Dreadnought supposed to protect herself?


How much of the 'genesis' and 'technology' sections need be here, and how much at Dreadnought? Don't know the answer, but there is little point the two articles being a fork of one another. The Land 17:53, 26 June 2007 (UTC)

Ideally a substantial amount of 'genesis' on Japan and the USA could be done away with, and the British development part expanded (a task for me in the next day or two I think). Most of the 'technology' section is relevent to the ship itself, but could be cleaned up I suppose. --Harlsbottom 18:14, 26 June 2007 (UTC)
That would be lovely. The Land 20:12, 26 June 2007 (UTC)
I've just realised the section on Cuniberti needs kicking out. Fisher's thoughts predate it (which I will elaborate on) anyway, and Cuniberti's proposed vessel referred to a ship which would fire at point-blank range (3,000 yards), and not the long ranges for which the dreadnoughts were principally designed. Comment? --Harlsbottom 21:32, 26 June 2007 (UTC)
Worth keeping Cuniberti in, even if rewritten to say exactly why he's not as important as people think! Woudl be itnerested to know what your sources are, by the way. The Land 09:54, 27 June 2007 (UTC)

I'm using Parkes' British Battleships - some would call it the definitive tome on the subject (696 pages) - it's a very good general overview. It quotes at length from Cuniberti's Janes article and I'll quote the relevent section in the draft I'm working on, which can be seen here; User:Harlsbottom/HMS Dreadnought (1906). --Harlsbottom 10:03, 27 June 2007 (UTC)

DK Brown (in Warrior to Dreadnought) makes it clear that Fisher was a late convert to the all-big-gun concept. At the time of Cuniberti's article, he seems not to have moved on from the line that he was promoting in the 1890's of "the largest possible small gun and the smallest possible large gun", which is the exact opposite of the dreadnought concept. Fisher or no Fisher, it was inevitable that the RN would build an all-big-gun ship once the USN had committed itself to the South Carolinas. Brown also believes the Cuniberti had little direct influence on RN thinking, but may have contributed to the international trend towards the all-big-gun concept that the "Dreadnought" was designed to anticipate. As for Parkes, I would not call it "definitive", though it is certainly monumental; it is safer to rely on more modern sources such as Conway's and Brown. John Moore 309 16:11, 27 June 2007 (UTC)
There is also a wodge of recent Dreadnought scholarship centered around Jon Tetsuro Sumida.... let me see if I have anything in my collected PDFs which is useful when I get back home. The Land 16:15, 27 June 2007 (UTC)
I am also somewhat wary of Fisher's claim to have pre-empted Cuniberti (since he claimed it in his memoirs), however I am convinced that Cuniberti was barking up the wrong tree in 1903. Unfortunately I don't have my copy of Warrior to Dreadnought or Brown's article on the design and conception of Dreadnought. Anyway, hence the reason I'm working on a user page and not the main article.
As to Sumida, his work ought to be referred to with trepidation. His recent "A Matter of Timing" bordered on the side of pure conjecture. His earlier "In Defence of Naval Supremacy", while an excellent study of the Edwardian navy is suspect in certain respects technically. --Harlsbottom 16:56, 27 June 2007 (UTC)
Sounds like there's enough accessible material for us to be able to cover the historiography in the article - not something which often happens in military history articles :-) The Land 18:22, 27 June 2007 (UTC)

Well, I've finally been re-acquainted with my copy of Warrior to Dreadnought as well as Brown's article on the Design and Construction of Dreadnought. I wouldn't say that Fisher was a late convert to the all-big-gun ship, for he definitely started having ideas drawn up in 1902, albeit with 10-inch guns. And then there's the 8 16-inch gunned Inflexible vessel which he and Watts briefly opined upon in 1881 as illustrated by John Roberts in a 1979 issue of Warship.

Anyway, I am trying to make my draft less-Fisher-centric - it has been updated accordingly. Considering the weight of materiel - I have yet to scour my Sumida, Lambert, and Brooks articles - would it be too much to suggest an article series for this if I accumulate enough referenced materiel? I'm thinking "Development of the battleship HMS Dreadnought", "Armament of the battleship HMS Dreadnought", "Construction and Career of the battleship HMS Dreadnought". Comments? --Harlsbottom 19:27, 4 July 2007 (UTC)

Yes--try going to graduate school. Wikipedia is not meant to be the place for original synthesis scholarship, or historiographic treatments based upon your (self-described) amateur sense of what is and what isn't proper history. It's supposed to be an encyclopedia--a distillation of accepted material. If you attempt to write up a serious entry while also labeling some of the sources you'll be drawing upon as "pure conjecture," (as you did above) then you're leaving yourself wide open for major revision by those who actually know something about this--like any postgraduate student studying military history at Oxford or Cambridge. If you want to do this and be taken seriously, then send it off to a real journal and get real credit for it. —The preceding unsigned comment was added by (talkcontribs) 03:18, 2 August 2007.
Setting aside its discourteous tone, the argument of the previous (unsigned) post is absurd. If Wikipedia is "a distillation of accepted material", then obviously you don't need to be an academic to contribute to it. It is improbable that a "postgraduate student studying military history at Oxford or Cambridge" would know more about HMS Dreadnought than Harlsbottom does, unless he happened to specialise in this subject; and if he did, and had derived his greater knowledge from original research, he would be violating core policy by using Wikipedia as a medium of publication. Finally, why should it be a problem if our edits are revised by someone who knows more about the subject than we do - and is able to source "accepted material" for his changes? Isn't that how the project is supposed to work? Regards to all, John Moore 309 12:18, 2 August 2007 (UTC)
This doesn't seem to be an absurd point. Harlsbottom proposed a series of articles on aspects of the Dreadnought. Do we really need separate articles on the development, the construction, the armament and then the career of the ship? Shouldn't those be sections within the original article? Moore seems to have misread the comment as a claim that only professional historians should be writing this stuff, but how do any of us know how accurate any of these historians really are? —Preceding unsigned comment added by Raistlan55 (talkcontribs) 03:25, 10 April 2008 (UTC)
The whole point of providing inline citations on Wikipedia, quite apart from providing a source for interested parties to read, is to allow a measure of verifiabilty. The rules on "No Original Research" prevent editors from refuting any published historians if they are found to be inaccurate - which isn't uncommon. However, the only way round that is to find an opposing point in print or get yourself published. How do any of us know how accurate any of it is? By reading as much as possible and judging it on its merits. Hence my intransigent attitude over at Frederic Dreyer.
The previous commenter made absolutely no reference to my proposal on an article series, therefore I'm not sure where you're coming from in that respect. No one here is disputing the importance of the Dreadnought in history I am sure. The fact that the genesis of the ship in the Royal Navy was surprisingly long and detailed warrants an article of its own given its importance, and the fact that many details are too Anglo-specific to be listed on the Dreadnought article. As to an article on the armament of the Dreadnought, see the featured article Armament of the Iowa class battleship, which proves it's possible for what is hardly the most significant ship armament in history. Considering how fast Dreadnought was built and the extent of her career an article on those two aspects could be comprehensive and run to a great number of sourced Kbs fairly easily. Harlsbottom (talk) 07:33, 10 April 2008 (UTC)
I think there is enough material out there for an article series in the fullness of time. There is a separate article about the armament of the Iowas, for instance. However I'd advie you to start with one main article for the time being! The Land 20:42, 4 July 2007 (UTC)
Well, that was lucky. I almost thought that was The Land who made the above comment. If you actually read my previous post I was stating that a work by an author connected to Dreadnought historiography, not actually on Dreadnought, bordered on pure conjecture. My interest in this subject is the fact that to my knowledge nobody in the last ten years has produced a new summary of the development of the all-big-gun ship in the Royal Navy, the last person being D.K. Brown with Warrior to Dreadnought. Note the fact that any chages I have made to this article I have referenced to the best of my recollection, and that any major changes would be made once I complete a draft article and have it thoroughly vetted by my knowledgable peers on Wikipedia. The multiple comments above are a testament to the fact that accuracy is being striven for here. --Harlsbottom 19:31, 2 August 2007 (UTC)

Another remark: Maybe I'm blind, but do we link from this article to Dreadnought? --Stephan Schulz (talk) 21:58, 28 November 2007 (UTC)

We do now. The Land (talk) 22:06, 28 November 2007 (UTC)

Paragraph on subdivision of hull[edit]

A paragraph states that "Another major innovation was the elimination of longitudinal passageways between compartments below the main deck level. While doors connecting compartments were always closed during combat, connected compartments had been found to be a cause of weakness following a collision during fleet exercises which resulted in the sinking of a battle cruiser." It is my understanding that one advantage the Germans had at Jutland was that their ships were designed without such passageways, while the British ships still had them (to provide for greater habitability on long voyages). Also, how could the design of the Dreadnought benefit from a weakness in a battlecruiser, when no such ships had been built at that time? Vgy7ujm (talk) 23:31, 26 December 2007 (UTC)

The collision in question is that between HMS Camperdown and HMS Victoria sometime in the 1880s, no battlecruisers involved. The British certainly tried in Dreadnought to eliminate underwater passages (or Massie, at least, says they did); not sure if the British reverted to their use or not. Of course, even if there are no passages for personell to travel, there can still be ventilation ducts, steam pipes, electrical conduits and the like which go through the watertight bulkheads - this all muddies the picutre a bit... The Land (talk) 14:07, 28 December 2007 (UTC)
I'm not quite sure whether that means Dreadnought was the first (war?)ship in the Royal Navy or the world to do away with longitudinal passageways. It's not a very well-worded sentence.
Dreadnought was unique for the time, in having "un-pierced bulkheads" which was subsequent practice on all major warships. One innovation resulting from this was the installation of elevators, telephones and stoking indicators in the engineering spaces to facilitate communications between the otherwise difficult-to-reach compartments. Oh, for a copy of John Roberts' Anatomy of the Ship-HMS Dreadnought! --Harlsbottom (talk) 15:14, 28 December 2007 (UTC)
It is my understanding that one advantage the Germans had at Jutland was that their ships were designed without such passageways - German sailors did not live in their ships in the same way that Royal Navy ones did. When in port, where possible, the German navy billeted its crews ashore in barracks, whereas the Royal Navy ships were the sailor's homes. Therefore the British ships had to accommodate the crews full time and so the ships were not as extensively compartmentalised as the Germans ones, it was a matter of compromise between fighting efficiency and damage control. This 'living aboard' is also the reason that when a British sailor lost his ship he also lost his home and personal possessions. This also applied to the men of the Merchant Navy who when a ship was sunk were often left with nothing but the clothes they were wearing. In their case the sinking of their ship meant the termination of their employment contract with the ship owner, and so in addition to being suddenly made homeless, the unfortunate survivor was then jobless as well, their pay ending immediately on the loss of the ship. This accounts for the number of 'survivor's charities' set up in places like Liverpool and abroad in places such as Canada, Australia, etc., as many survivors on reaching shore were effectively destitute.—Preceding unsigned comment added by (talk) 09:24, 13 July 2010 (UTC)

Range of guns?[edit]

The firing range of typical secondary guns in earlier designs is mentioned in the article, but what was the range of the Dreadnought's own big guns? -- (talk) 15:48, 6 March 2008 (UTC)] gives them conservatively 15,000 yards range. At 13.5 degrees, and with 4crh Greenboy shells their range would have been greater.--Harlsbottom (talk) 17:14, 6 March 2008 (UTC)

American Reaction[edit]

The United States was so impressed by the HMS Dreadnought. The USS South Carolina (BB-26) and USS Michigan (BB-27) had all four turrets on the center line. From the name of the British ship "Fear God Dread Nought"; U.S. Congressman John S. Williams (D-MS) House Minority leader authored a bill to change the name of USS Michigan to USS Skeered O' Nothing. The bill never left committee. Source: Pater, Alan F. United States Battleships. Beverly Hills, Ca. Monitor Book Co. 1968. P.8 Ustye (talk) 06:14, 17 February 2009 (UTC)

Strange use of "viceversa"[edit]

According to my dictionary "vice versa" is two words but more importantly "If the shells were seen to splash beyond the target, the range was shortened, and viceversa" implies: If the range was shortened the shells were seen to splash beyond the target. This makes no sense.

Noises Off (talk) 13:57, 9 March 2009 (UTC) Noises Off

design failings[edit]

I didn't notice much in the article about what was wrong with dreadnought, which after all was a revolutionary new design. Without particular explanation, Morris in Fisher's face comments in the section on Dreadnought (p. 153) that there were issues with the steering, the control top on the masts between the funnels could be blinded by smoke and was sometimes too hot for anyone to go up there, and the conning tower proved to be an impractical design. Doesn't give more detail, but I wouldn't doubt the criticisms must be better documented somewhere. Sandpiper (talk) 07:33, 21 April 2009 (UTC)

Yup. Agree. These things are quite well-documented and should be in the article. The Land (talk) 20:16, 21 April 2009 (UTC)

Section technology[edit]

The first britisch dreadnoght with superimpsed turrets was HMS Neptune, not the Orions.

As for the instruments for "transmitting range etc. to the turrets" I would suspect that they where electric rather than electronic. -- (talk) 20:40, 30 May 2009 (UTC)

Torpedoes and the "All Big Gun Ship"[edit]

The ineffectiveness of secondary batteries was first demonstrated during the Battle of Pungdo in which several western officers of several fleets served as advisers. Torpedoes were never a factor in the design of all big gun ships. The first mission of a large naval combatant is to choke off the enemy's commerce by sinking merchant ships and destroying ports. Their potential to destroy ports was the big worry for politicians. Second is to serve as supporting artillery for invading ground forces. The all big gun design came about as result of the range of big guns, both at sea and ashore. (talk) 12:09, 1 June 2009 (UTC)Don Granberry.

Sorry, I strongly disagree. Large ships are there to keep large ships in check. Smaller ships are much more efficient at disrupting commerce. I'm not aware of significant artillery attacks on defended ports - indeed, it would be a rare stupid commander who got into a firefight with a significant land-based fortress. Anyways, you are free to differ, but if you want to get your opinions into Wikipedia, you need to provide reliable sources supporting it. --Stephan Schulz (talk) 12:24, 1 June 2009 (UTC)

battle of tsushima[edit]

Have been reading the comments by Padfield in 'the battleship era' re the battle of tsushima. He draws rather different conclusions to those presented here. Perhaps the most important consideration (he says, though he lists it third after gunnery competence but it dictated the entire engagement) was that the Japanese fleet was twice as fast as the Russian. This allowed them to choose the range, place, when to engage, etc etc. Next, the japanese were good at shooting and hitting, and the Russians were terrible. They had better shells. The russian ships were overloaded so their armour belts were below the waterline and holes above it let in water. The victory was accomplished by an overwhelming hail of fire of all sorts, not by precision gunnery which didn't exist in the sense later achieved, even though the japanese were better and generally were under orders not to waste shells by chooting when they did not have a good target. The russians had more big guns than the Japanese, but lost. it was a victory achieved by going in all guns blazing and thus certainly did not demonstrate 'that only big guns mattered' as the article claims. He withdrew and used detroyer/torpedo attacks when that was more effective. Togo was the better admiral. Sandpiper (talk) 08:45, 15 October 2009 (UTC)

  • Maybe I can help out alittle bit here. Better shouldn't be the word in this case; both admirals were professional men...Togo had COMBAT EXPERIENCE! Rozhestvensky only had some light combat experience from the Russo-Turkish War in 1877. By the time the Russian admiral met Togo in the Tsushima Straits, Togo already had had TWO battleship (fleet) actions under his belt. That would be like some green horn going up against seasoned gunfighters like Wyatt Earp or Wild Bill Hickock in 1881 or 1876 respectively. Most readers seem to be focusing on material used in battles (guns, engines, shape, etc.)'s not the gun that kills, it's the man behind the trigger!

And by the why, the Russians were good shots, they hit the IJA flagship with their main guns right off the bat! Almost continuously! —Preceding unsigned comment added by (talk) 07:40, 23 July 2010 (UTC)

I'd aways understood that the assessment made of the Battle of Tsushima was that whilst the smaller calibres certainly played their role, the decisive work was done by the heaviest calibres, the Japanese 12 inches. That the decisive blows had been struck by the time the secondary and tertiary batteries came into play. That certainly would support the concept of the "all big gun ship". —Preceding unsigned comment added by (talk) 13:22, 9 August 2010 (UTC)

The Japanese navy had been modernised and trained by the Royal Navy - the Russians had not been. —Preceding unsigned comment added by (talk) 18:39, 8 April 2011 (UTC)

steering failure[edit]

The sea trials didn't go as well as expected. Some incidents were carefully concealed.

While the Dreadnought was on trials in the West Indies there was a massive steering gear break down while the ship was at high speed. The rudder went hard over and the ship started circling and was very nearly wrecked on a nearby reef.

It's an interesting speculation what might have happened had the newest and most modern battleship in the world been wrecked or even sunk on its maiden voyage as was the later Titanic. —Preceding unsigned comment added by (talk) 15:18, 27 March 2010 (UTC)

GA Review[edit]

This review is transcluded from Talk:HMS Dreadnought (1906)/GA1. The edit link for this section can be used to add comments to the review.

Reviewer: Xtzou (Talk) 22:14, 28 May 2010 (UTC) Hi, I am reviewing this article and will be adding comments as I go. Xtzou (Talk) 22:14, 28 May 2010 (UTC)

  • " After Jutland, she was relegated to coast defense duties in the English Channel, only rejoining the Grand Fleet in 1918. She was reduced to reserve in 1918" - under Career it says "Dreadnought was put into reserve at Rosyth in February 1919."
    • Good catch.
  • In the first para, two sentences start with "A related issue was that" - repetitious and needs rewording.
  • "with a main battery of a dozen twelve-inch guns in eight turrets, twelve inches of belt armour," - here the numbers are spelled out,
  • " to include a secondary armament of 9.2-inch (234 mm) that could fight at longer ranges than the 6-inch (152 mm) gun on older ships, but a proposal to arm them solely with twelve-inch guns was rejected" - here there is a mixture of spelled out and numbers. Sometimes this is warranted for the sake of clarification, but the use here seems inconsistent. There needs to be consistency throughout the article on this issue. (It is very distracting the way it is.) See MOS - Numbers
    • This is a conflict between the conversion template and the MOS. I've changed all (I hope) numbers to digits.--Sturmvogel 66 (talk) 03:19, 30 May 2010 (UTC)
Effects of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–05
  • Is there a need for this heading? It only contains two sentences which could just be added to the section above.
Development of the Dreadnought
  • "This was deemed necessary after the Russian battleship Tsesarevich was deemed to have survived a Japanese torpedo hit by virtue of her heavy internal bulkhead during the Russo-Japanese War." - repeat of "deemed" so needs rewording.
General characteristics
  • Is this header needed? Couldn't the statements under it just go under Description with no separate header?
    • Done
  • "Dreadnought were significantly larger than her predecessors of the Lord Nelson-class." - should this be "was significantly"?
  • "During her April–May 1915 the two guns from 'A' turret were reinstalled" - is there a word left out here? And perhaps a comma?
  • I have made some minor copy edits in the article; please revert any errors I may have introduced.

Xtzou (Talk) 14:46, 29 May 2010 (UTC)

GA review – see WP:WIAGA for criteria

  1. Is it reasonably well written?
    A. Prose quality: Clearly written.
    B. MoS compliance: Complies with required elements of MOS
  2. Is it factually accurate and verifiable?
    A. References to sources: Reliable sources
    B. Citation of reliable sources where necessary: Well referenced
    C. No original research:
  3. Is it broad in its coverage?
    A. Major aspects: Sets the context
    B. Focused: Remains focused on the topic
  4. Is it neutral?
    Fair representation without bias:
  5. Is it stable?
    No edit wars, etc:
  6. Does it contain images to illustrate the topic?
    A. Images are copyright tagged, and non-free images have fair use rationales:
    B. Images are provided where possible and appropriate, with suitable captions:
  7. Overall:
    Pass or Fail: Pass!

Congratulations! Xtzou (Talk) 16:18, 31 May 2010 (UTC)

Gunnery Developments[edit]

I'm a little confused by this edit [1] on gunnery developments. The edit description is the most confusing at all: "Age of sail battles were typically at several hundred yards, not a thousand". My own edit summary was merely to highlight the error in the article text of "...battle ranges out to an unprecedented 6000 yd, a distance far enough to force gunners to wait for the shells to arrive before applying corrections for the next salvo." My point was that this statement was nonsensical, even during Age of Sail battles at far shorter ranges, gunnery crews could not correct until the shells had arrived.

My impression is that except for firing as the ships closed with each other and in a chase, precision aimed fire was less important than was the rate of fire and done far less often. The RN, forex often waited until point-blank range before opening fire, which meant that they could fire as soon as they reloaded without taking time to aim precisely. Your edit weakened the points that I was trying make with that section. Especially with the confusion between the different sized shell splashes obscuring each other. There's a world of difference between the amount of confusion caused by 18 and 24-pdr roundshot splashing short and those between 12 and 9.2-inch explosive shells. --Sturmvogel 66 (talk) 22:36, 18 September 2010 (UTC)

The other changes to the paragraph tightened an overly long and confused bit of text into something that conveyed the same information, but with far fewer words. And, by the way, some AOS battles did take place at ranges exceeding 1000 yards, though admittedly much shorter ranges were typical. Fell Gleamingtalk 21:26, 18 September 2010 (UTC)

I'll grant that my prose could use some tightening, I thought your edits to the subsequent sentences improved them, but not if you're going to weaken the points I and my source were trying to make. I'm unaware of any AOS battles taking place at such long range, can you provide any further info?--Sturmvogel 66 (talk) 22:36, 18 September 2010 (UTC)
I'm unsure how you think your points were weakened -- except for the one point which was entirely inaccurate. Increasing artillery range didn't "force gunners to wait for shells to arrive" to make corrections; a gunnery crew has to do this regardless of range. It's merely that the increased range increases flight time, which makes the corrections slower.  :: To answer your second question, by the Napoleonic Wars, a 24 pounder had a range of 2,000 yards. There were several battles where firing commenced at a range of 1,5000 yards or more -- though conclusive action usually occurred at much shorter ranges. By the Civil War, naval Parrott rifles were exceeding 4,000 yards in range. Fell Gleamingtalk 23:20, 18 September 2010 (UTC)
As there has been no response, I am restoring the updated text. If you feel this version weakens a point you are trying to make, please post here for discussion. Thanks. Fell Gleamingtalk 15:06, 20 September 2010 (UTC)
Sturm, if you don't like my version, please suggest a compromise text rather than blind reversion with discussion. The text that is in there now is inaccurate and needs to be corrected. If you feel a point is weakened in the new version, I'm certainly willing to address that. Fell Gleamingtalk 15:56, 20 September 2010 (UTC)
Dude, there is such a thing as real life, y'know. I'm still waiting on any AoS ship-to-ship battles that were fought at ranges over 1000 yds. I find that very hard to believe since very few cannon had sights of any kind. The text is not wrong in any way shape or form; to quote Brown "The need to spot fall of shot and apply corrections before the next salvo meant that the effective rate of fire of a 6-inch at 6000 yds was much less than achieved in short-range target practice".--Sturmvogel 66 (talk) 15:59, 20 September 2010 (UTC)
Eh? Tangent sights on naval guns began to be introduced during the Napoleonic Wars; by the late 1820s they were ubiquitous in the Royal Navy. And many actions during the period had ships opening fire at more than 1,000 yards. In some stern chases, firing might not only commence, but continue for lengthy periods, at ranges approaching a mile. In any case, this is irrelevant to the error in the article, which implies that ranges shorter than 5,500 yards would not require gunners to wait for shell arrival before applying corrections. This is true at 10,000 yards, 1,000 yards, and even 100 yards. The only difference in all cases is time of flight. If you have other concerns, please state them here so we can reach consensus. Fell Gleamingtalk 16:23, 20 September 2010 (UTC)
My reading leads me strongly to believe that effective naval gunnery above point blank range only came in around 1900. I can show sources for this. Time of flight is a lot shorter at 100 yds than at 10,000 yds (arithmetic would suggest around 100 times shorter), though technically your point is correct. I feel there is a compromise here waiting to be struck. Adding and re-adding the same rejected text probably won't help us here. --John (talk) 16:33, 20 September 2010 (UTC)
This isn't true at all. Most fleet battles took place at point blank range, but single-ship actions varied. The USS Constitution vs. the HMS Guerriere, for instance, began with broadsides at a range of two miles, and the Constitution didn't close until they had shot away one the Guerriere's masts. Another one (whose name escapes me at the moment) involved a RN Frigate chasing a Spanish ship, which had its rudder shot away at a range of over a mile, forcing the ship onto a rocky reef. With a little time, I can look up many more examples, but this isn't really relevant to the point at hand. Your statement about time of flight is as I already said. Ranges didn't magically jump from 100 yards to 5,000 plus at the year 1900. Time of flight was an increasing problem that began to be recognized during the Napoleonic Wars, and grew vastly in significance when rifled naval guns replaced the smoothbores shortly thereafter. Fell Gleamingtalk 16:52, 20 September 2010 (UTC)
As one final point, time of flight at 5,000 yards is not 5X the time at 1,000 yards. In practice, it would be about twice as long but, depending on the angle of elevation used, it can even be shorter. The additional range comes from higher muzzle velocities primarily, which of course are the primary factor affecting flight time. Fell Gleamingtalk 16:55, 20 September 2010 (UTC)

────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────Indeed, but I'd already conceded chase situations were different than ordinary battles in terms of range when opening fire during the AoS. And tangent sights were generally only used for chase guns, as those had the highest need for them. Broadside guns rarely had sights of any kind. You are theoretically correct, but time of flight for a 18-pdr at 200 yards was short enough that the gunner had to wait for the gun to be reloaded before re-aiming for the next shot. With quick-firing guns, the opposite was true because muzzle velocity increased so much and reload time decreased as well. You don't seem to realize that I, and my source, are making comparisons with the period after the introduction of QF guns when the typical battle practice range was 1500 yds and QF guns could deliver coarsely-aimed fire as fast as they could be fired, because they didn't need to take the time for precision aimed fire. This is the gunnery revolution of the turn of the 20th century. FellGleaming's language guts the fundamental points that I was trying to make in my original text which, I'm perfectly happy to admit, could probably use some polishing. At 1500 yds there's only a couple of seconds of flight before any shell from the high-velocity guns of the 1880-1890s hits its target so that it's effectively instantaneous. At 6000 yds that's no longer true and gunners needed to wait to watch where their shells landed.--Sturmvogel 66 (talk) 16:59, 20 September 2010 (UTC)

Tangent sights were regularly fitted on all guns except carronades by the late 1820s. And there are plenty of AoS examples of extended firing at ranges of 1,000-2,000 yards in non-chase situations (I gave one such above). By the age of the ironclads (half a century before the Dreadnought), rifled naval guns were quite accurate at ranges of 4,000 yards. But again, this doesn't really affect the issue at hand. I understand your concern better now, and will work on drafting a compromise text that I think will answer your objections. Fell Gleamingtalk 17:18, 20 September 2010 (UTC)
Time to distance doesn't increase at an arithmetic rate because of wind resistance and parabolic arcs vs straight line distance. The Whitworth 70-pdr gun of 1865 took 2 seconds to reach 450 meters, 9.5 to reach 2290 meters, and 25 seconds to reach 5540 meters. And your account of USS Constitution vs HMS Guerriere is flat-out wrong. The article says nothing about exchanging broadsides at a range of two miles. Guerriere's opening range is unspecified, but Constitution waited until "half-pistol shot" which is 50 meters or less. More examples of long-range shooting in non-chase situations are needed, because your first example is invalid.--Sturmvogel 66 (talk) 17:21, 20 September 2010 (UTC)
Whoa, whoa..I just read the rest of your text. What's this about maximum flight times of "a second or two"? The artillery tables for the Civil War era 10 pound parrott gun (of which there was a naval variant) list a flight time of up to 31 seconds at maximum range. [2]. And my account of the Constitution-Guierrerre battle is not incorrect. Read Six frigates: the epic history of the founding of the U.S. Navy, which contains a detailed account of the engagement. Firing began at a range of two miles and continued for almost an hour at long range until the Guerreire began to flee. Fell Gleamingtalk 17:41, 20 September 2010 (UTC)
Reread my post a little more closely, I said nothing about maximum range with those low flight times, only that they were valid for 200 yds or so. Your source contradicts the sources used by the Wiki article.--Sturmvogel 66 (talk) 18:01, 20 September 2010 (UTC)
Calculate flight time yourself if you don't believe the source; its a simple kinematics problem. The point is that flight time wasn't a shockingly new problem; it was one which had been steadily growing since rifled guns were introduced. The larger factor (which you don't even mention) is not the flight time, but the increasing rate of fire. Even the big Mk X's on the Dreadnought could be fired 2 or even 3 times a minute. Compare that to an War of 1812 18 pounder, firing once every 2 minutes unless you had a crack crew. Fell Gleamingtalk 18:20, 20 September 2010 (UTC)
Who brought up QF guns and their increased rate of fire? Not you. And I've already presented time to flight numbers. My point, which you don't seem to be grasping, is that in the era of the QF gun, rates of coarsely aimed fire, at 1500 yds or less, were as fast as the gun could fire ("the hail of fire"), and needed no significant time to aim. That began to change around 1900 when increasing ranges meant that precision aimed fire was more important and that guns could no longer be fired at maximum RoF so long as they bore on the target.--Sturmvogel 66 (talk) 19:05, 20 September 2010 (UTC)
I understand that perfectly -- in fact, I already said it myself. What you don't understand is that the increasing range was less of a factor than increasing rates of fire. You also don't understand your current text, which implies "55000+ yards means having to wait till the shell arrived to make corrections" is flat out wrong. Gunners always need to wait until the shell arrives to make a correction. The issue comes only when the gun is reloaded and ready to be refired before the shell arrives. That's why the text is incorrect. Fell Gleamingtalk 19:09, 20 September 2010 (UTC)

minor points[edit]

The matter of the 12 pounder guns seems a little confused. One authority says that Fisher had the 12 pounders added in case Dreadnought was attacked by a torpedo boat.

A Victorian source, "Navy and Army Illustrated 1897" seems quite clear that 12 pounders were routinely included in the gunnery outfit for firing ceremonial salutes on entering or leaving harbour as at least one large Victorian warship was unable to fire a salute when entering a French harbour due to a lack of small guns.

The Dreadnought had direct drive turbines and these proved so much quieter in use that several large Edwardian steam yachts had direct drive turbines fitted. The far more efficient single and double geared turbines tended to produce a whining noise from the gearboxes. —Preceding unsigned comment added by (talk) 14:46, 12 October 2010 (UTC)

Turbine gearing is notoriously noisy, which is one of the reasons that nuclear submarines were easier to detect underwater than diesel-electric ones until 'rafting' was incorporated in the turbine machinery. It was for just this reason that the RN retained its Oberon and Porpoise class submarines so long, as they were extremely quiet boats.

conning towers[edit]

The high noon of the Victorian navy saw very little action although ship design had progressed to a scientific basis. A great deal of thought was given to crew protection despite the lack of practical action. It was theorised that when the ship went into action the captain and senior officers would move from the bridge to the safer area of the armoured conning tower. A heavy conning tower seems to have been incorporated in the Dreadnought design. It was a good idea that didn't really work out in action.

After the combat damage of Jutland it was realised that Admirals and captains preferred to remain on the riskier less armoured bridge rather than descend to the conning tower.

The design policy then became that as a ship came in for a big refit the conning tower would be removed and the weight allowance used elsewhere. The battlecruiser "Hood" was always due for a considerable refit, which never happened but was to include removing the 500 ton conning tower and possibly fitting extra armour elswhere. —Preceding unsigned comment added by (talk) 15:01, 12 October 2010 (UTC)

sighting hoods[edit]

Jellicoe was probably initially correct in his assesment that each turret should have a sighting hood, he was a methodical man who carefully considered ideas and tactics.

There must have been some sort of arrangement for at least aiming the guns from the fighting top, but it looks a rather vulnerable position at the top of the fore mast and it must have seemed to Jellicoe that if the fighting top was shot away...what next?

The obvious thing to do was to give each turret its own sighting hood so that the turret gunnery officer could see the intended target and continue firing individually if indeed the fighting top was hit or shot away.

It's a good idea but probably nobody at the time realised just how severe was the concussive force from a large naval gun as it fired. By the time that WW1 started the shortcomings of the idea had become obvious and the necessary rebuilding carried out. —Preceding unsigned comment added by (talk) 15:16, 12 October 2010 (UTC)

Conning towers[edit]

The battleship conning tower was a good idea on paper that didn't work out in practise. The conning tower was a heavily armoured position which was designed to be the safest place on the ship for the Admiral, Captain and senior officers when the ship went into action. The idea and design of a conning tower had gradually developed during the Victorian and Edwardian years into quite a heavily armoured and elaborate structure.

During WW1 when the heavy ships actually went into serious combat it was realised that the Senior officers preferred to be on the bridge of their ships during combat actions rather than in the conning tower, so the idea was only then proven unsuccessful.

The whole concept seems to have peaked with the battlecruiser "Hood" which had a conning tower weighing approx 500-600 tons. This was always due to be removed "next refit" and was never carried out.

The late Dr Oscar Parkes devotes some detail to the subject of conning towers in "British Battleships".AT Kunene (talk) 13:55, 16 January 2011 (UTC)

It might help if you gave page references for British Battleships. --Simon Harley (Talk | Library). 15:21, 16 January 2011 (UTC)


The turbines on the "Dreadnought" were indeed direct drive which needed considerable compromise between high speed turbines and slow moving propellers. One little known aspect of this was the low noise level. So much so that several very rich men had their yachts built using direct drive turbines. With the introduction of the much more efficient geared turbine there was always a background whining sound from the gearboxes.

One question that has always puzzled me though. These were very large warships for their time but few had the coal endurance for more than about a week. Was it possible that even by the time of the launching at the "Dreadnought" that this ship was expected to fight only in the North Sea? Was a war with Germany being planned or expected even at this early date?AT Kunene (talk) 10:47, 7 February 2011 (UTC)

The RN had coaling stations worldwide, so it is unlikely that Dreadnought was intended for use in the North Sea only. If it had been needed, the ship could have been accompanied by a collier or two.

She's a lady?[edit]

Referring to a gunship, a thing of war comparable to tanks and interceptors and such, as "she"/"her" at every turn sounds real silly. Such language is more suitable to poetic/fictional writing, in my opinion - just distracting here. Anyone agree? —Preceding unsigned comment added by (talk) 18:10, 14 February 2011 (UTC)

No, not at all. Ships are always female.--Sturmvogel 66 (talk) 18:45, 14 February 2011 (UTC)
Just found this: Seems to divide opinions, I gave mine too. —Preceding unsigned comment added by (talk) 19:49, 14 February 2011 (UTC)

We apply gender terms to ships as their respective navy does/did; within the RN there's no divergence of opinion, ships are always female. However if we were talking about ships of the German navy we'd use "he", "him" etc. — Preceding unsigned comment added by (talk) 19:27, 20 May 2012 (UTC)

No, same here in Germany. Ships are always female, even if they are named after male persons, e.g. "die Bismarck", "die Scharnhorst" etc. (talk) 12:56, 10 February 2015 (UTC) kookee


Is there any information about capital warships including the "Dreadnought" being designed and fitted with torpedos in addition to the main gunnery armament, as part of their original design and construction?

The later "Hood" was armed with torpedoes and has been described as "the last capital ship to be fitted with torpedos" and some theories conjecture that the ship blew up from a shell hit on the torpedo room.AT Kunene (talk) 09:58, 15 February 2011 (UTC)

Nelson and Rodney were fitted with torpedo tubes and carried torpedoes, so Hood certainly wasn't the last. --Simon Harley (Talk | Library). 10:07, 15 February 2011 (UTC)
Dreadnought also had torpedo tubes - see the main article. And these are submerged torpedo tubes, definitely not added as an afterthought. --Stephan Schulz (talk) 10:53, 15 February 2011 (UTC)

Only Battleship To Sink A Submarine?[edit]

This article states that "Dreadnought thus became the only battleship ever to sink a submarine." But United States Battleship Division Nine (World War I) indicates that "Both Admirals Rodman and Beatty concluded that the New York must have accidentally collided with a submerged German U-boat. They agreed that the submarine had rammed its bow into the ship's side, then been struck moments later by the ship's propeller. In their opinion, the damage would have been fatal to the German craft," citing Admiral Rodman's memoirs, Yarns of a Kentucky Admiral, and the book U.S. Battleship Operations in World War I by Jerry Jones. It goes on to note that "Postwar examination of German records revealed that the submarine lost may have been UB-113 or UB-123. This strange—and accidental—encounter marked the only time in all of Battleship Division Nine's service with the Grand Fleet that one of its ships sank a German vessel," again citing U.S. Battleship Operations in World War I.

Should the statement in this article be rewritten to indicate that it was the first battleship to sink a submarine? Or perhaps that it was the first of only two battleships to have done so (to retain some impression of the rarity of the action)? -- (talk) 03:17, 6 March 2011 (UTC)

Nothing should be done until the losses of UB-113 and UB-123 are double-checked in reputable sources to see if the locations and dates match up. The entries on for each ship do not match. UB-123's loss is reported as 18 October, probably in the northern mine barrage, which is at least semi-close geographically. UB-113 left for patrol on 18 September from Zeebrugge for the Western Channel. AFAIK no UB-class sub could stay at sea for 4 weeks and as it was headed directly opposite from Pentland Firth where New York hit something, I think that one can be definitely be ruled out.--Sturmvogel 66 (talk) 07:17, 6 March 2011 (UTC)
I don't think an unidentified submarine colliding with a battleship which hadn't even known it was there, and probably sinking as a result, is the same thing as "battleship sinks submarine". "Sinking" an enemy implies some positive and deliberate action, not just unknowingly being in the way. Dreadnought's action was deliberate : there was an intent to sink a submarine. Rcbutcher (talk) 07:29, 6 March 2011 (UTC)
Perhaps something noting intent, then, e.g. "Thus Dreadnought became the only battleship ever to intentionally sink a submarine?" -- (talk) 07:02, 9 March 2011 (UTC)
Why? It hasn't been established New York did sink a sub to my satisfaction.--Sturmvogel 66 (talk) 08:06, 9 March 2011 (UTC)
Added a note to the effect that New York might have sunk a submarine, but Dreadnought is the only battleship confirmed to have done so. Acceptable compromise? Verence (talk) 13:43, 5 September 2016 (UTC)
Sure.--Sturmvogel 66 (talk) 16:55, 5 September 2016 (UTC)

Scrap Date Discrepancy[edit]

The introduction of the article states that the HMS Dreadnought was sold for scrap in 1911, but the info bar states that its fate was scrapped in 1913. Are both of these years correct? I don't know much about the fate of the ship, but I was confused by the differing years and just want to verify the information. DeiKobol (talk) 05:12, 21 May 2011 (UTC)

No discrepancy. She was sold in 1921, but not actually scrapped until 1923.--Sturmvogel 66 (talk) 15:09, 21 May 2011 (UTC)

Sir Philip Watts and HMS Dreadnought[edit]

In your entry on Sir Philip Watts you say that he was the designer of the first Dreadnought but he is not mentioned in the article on HMS Dreadnought. I think he should be.

˜˜˜˜ Peter Le Mare — Preceding unsigned comment added by (talk) 09:20, 24 June 2011 (UTC)

Regarding the cost in the infobox[edit]

The infobox reveals the cost of production as £1,672,483. However, I found no footnote next to it, nor was it referenced elsewhere in the article. Also, is this in 1906 currency or a comparison to modern times counting inflation?-- OsirisV (talk) 14:13, 10 February 2012 (UTC)

Cited and corrected. Thanks for catching that.--Sturmvogel 66 (talk) 00:49, 11 February 2012 (UTC)

sighting hoods again[edit]

Pre WW1 gunnery instructions related to the size of propellant charge to be used for gunnery. The 1/4 charge was the normal load for peacetime use with the occasional use of the 1/2 load. The full charge was to be used in wartime only. It was possibly only when the full charges were used in WW1 with the resulting massive discharge pressures that the shortcomings of sighting hoods became obvious, something that the careful and methodical Jellicoe couldn't possibly have foreseen.AT Kunene (talk) 16:41, 15 February 2012 (UTC)

1) What's your source for the usage of different sized charges? The contemporary range tables provided no data for single quarter charge firings, so it's inconceivable that they would have practised with it. The Empress of India trials in 1913 were to have featured a number of full charge firings before the ship was prematurely sunk on the first day. The rest were "reduced charges" firings which I suspect were three-quarter charges rather than half charges.
2) The Admiralty were already well-aware of difficulties of sighting hoods when Dreadnought was designed, so to suggest that it was somehow surprised by events a decade later is rather odd. Battleships with superfiring turrets were fitted before 1914 with "trumpets" which sounded when the turret was trained on bearings which were specifically forbidden by the manuals for the turrets. Iron Duke was fitted with a system which locked the pistol-grips of turret guns when they were trained on a dangerous bearing. —Simon Harley (Talk | Library). 17:29, 15 February 2012 (UTC)
The French battleship Henri IV pioneered the superfiring turret in 1903 and it was not a success because the muzzle of the superfiring turret was directly above the sighting hoods of the lower turret. And the Americans redesigned their turrets for the South Carolina class battleships to eliminate sighting hoods in favor of sights on the sides of the turrets in 1905. So, yes, Beatty should criticized for failing to deal with an existing problem that could have allowed the RN save a considerable amount of weight and money by reducing the size of its battleships. To be fair, the disconnect between the DNO and the DNC didn't help any, but still...--Sturmvogel 66 (talk) 23:53, 15 February 2012 (UTC)

I think you're mistaken in detail here, at least. The 12-in Mark X had two loadings only: full charge (4 bags) and a reduced charge of 3/4 charge (3 bags) according to Range Tables for H.M. Fleet, 1918 (ADM 137/4356) and The Sight manual, 1916 (ADM 186/216). If you did not want to wear the guns by the rate of 3/4 charges (each 3/4 firing was a 1/4 effective full charge in terms of wear, according to John Roberts), Dreadnought offered three other types of practice for her 12-in battery: the 12-pdr guns on at least some of the rooves could be cross-connected to the 12-in gun below, a 6-pdr subcaliber gun could be fitted into the bore, or .303 aiming rifles could be fired into buckets. I am not aware of any gun that fired at less than a half charge, but I'd be pleased to learn more. DulcetTone (talk) 21:27, 21 February 2012 (UTC)

Naval arms race[edit]

Should it be mentioned that H.M.S. Dreadnought helped to spark a new naval arms race (there was already strong competition going on before her launch) by de-classing all existing designs, practically enabling all nations with the ability to construct such vessels to start from zero again? While making obsolete all foreign designs, she first and foremost also nullified the great naval supremacy of great Britain, practically reducing Britain’s many Pre-Dreeadnoughts to floating scrap. (talk) 13:01, 10 February 2015 (UTC) kookee

New image available[edit]

Transverse section above protective deck (station 62 to 90 and 102 to 184)
1 - Angle bar 3.5in×3in×8lbs; 2 - Angle bar 4in×4in×13lbs; 3 - Angle bar 3.5in×3.5in×l0lbs; 4 - Angle bar 3in×3in×6.5lbs; 5 - Angle bar 5in×3.5in×12lbs; 6 - Bracket; 7 - Angle bar 9in×3.5in×l8lbs; 8 - 3in thick teak deck planking; 9 - Zed bar 6in×3.5in×3in×14lbs; 10 - Upper deck; 11 - Torpedo net shelf; 12 - Angle bulb deck beam 9in×3.5in×23lbs; 13 - Main deck; 14 - Protective deck; 15 - 320lbs (8in) armour; 16 - 440lbs (llin) armour; 17 - Wood backing to armour (2.5 in thick at thinnest point); 18 - 14 lbs plate; 19 - 12 lbs stringer plate; 20 - 14 lbs, chequered plate (bunker flat); 21 — slope, upper layer 1 in noncemented armour; 22 - slope, intermediate layer, 0.75 in mild steel; 23 - slope, bottom layer, 1 in mild steel;

--Maxrossomachin (talk) 07:49, 10 November 2015 (UTC)

Great, but need a key for all the numbers.--Sturmvogel 66 (talk) 14:50, 10 November 2015 (UTC)
 Done --Sas1975kr (talk) 14:39, 13 December 2015 (UTC)

Opening line[edit]

I think we should change the opening line and remove the "revolutionised naval power" part, maybe swapping it out with "was the only ship of her class". Would this be a good idea, or no? Utahwriter14 (talk) 22:24, 8 January 2016 (UTC)

What purpose would changing the opening line serve?--Sturmvogel 66 (talk) 23:02, 8 January 2016 (UTC)
Just seems like it would flow a little smoother--the article feels like it just sort of jolts open. Utahwriter14 (talk) 23:27, 11 January 2016 (UTC)

Confusing paragraph about fighting germans[edit]

text reads "Dreadnought did not participate in the Battle of Jutland in 1916 as she was being refitted. This was the only time during the war that British dreadnought battleships fired on their German counterparts. Nor did Dreadnought participate in any of the other World War I naval battles."

This text indicated HMS Dreadnought did not participate in the Battle of Jutland in 1916 but did in fact during that time fire on a German Battleship. This is likely an error, seeing as the previous sentence refers her to ramming a submarine and later we learn she did not participate in any other WW I naval battle.

Did she fire or not? Text should be clarified either way. — Preceding unsigned comment added by (talk) 10:34, 24 February 2017 (UTC)

You've misunderstood the second sentence that you quoted. It applies to the Battle of Jutland, not the ship--Sturmvogel 66 (talk) 14:23, 24 February 2017 (UTC)

As it is not relevant (the fact the ship wasn't there is relevant, further information about a battle in which this ship did not take part is not, especially in the lead) JeffUK (talk) 12:25, 11 July 2017 (UTC)