Talk:Heideggerian terminology

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This page needs a grammatical clean-up at a minimum, and perhaps some technical/philosophical clean-up as well.--Radicalamy 18:31, 16 August 2006 (UTC)Radicalamy

Cleaned up somewhat, though it needs further work.Lucaas 20:31, 19 August 2006 (UTC)

There is a point to including the german translation of Ontological. Although it is true that the english word 'ontological' has its etemylogical root in the greek term 'ontos' - this is about Heideggerian terminology, and a better understanding of the German terms Heidegger uses is helpful, I believe. Sam 18:55, 12 September 2006 (UTC)

I agree, in general it is good to give a German term even along with the everyday German meaning. However, I think it is redundant for these Greek terms, eg, philosophy, ontology, etc., nor are they really German in the first place. Lucas

ah, I see your point. I'll take it out and if in the future more terms are added, we'll go with that guideline for simplicity. Thanks for the input. Sam 17:50, 13 September 2006 (UTC)


I removed two empty additions, Worldhood and Clearing. Until there is content written for them, I do not think they should appear in the list. - Sam 17:36, 10 November 2006 (UTC)

Disclosedness / Erschlossenheit[edit]

How about a section about Disclosedness (Erschlossenheit)? Seems it's a term important enough to put here. Then it would be fit that Aletheia is incorporated under it. Nejtan 08:48, 1 December 2006 (UTC)


please explain —The preceding unsigned comment was added by (talk) 01:55, 20 January 2007 (UTC).


The page now reads: "Simply put, Heidegger uses this word only to denote the noun - that something is." I don't think this is correct. Heidegger uses Sein for that noun. Heidegger says (p. 32, H.12):

Understanding of Being is itself a definite characteristic of Dasein's Being. Dasein is ontically distinctive in that it is ontological.... ["Being-ontological" signifies] "being in such a way that one has an understanding of Being". That kind of Being ... we call "existence".

Therefore, Dasein exists, but a stone does not exist in this sense, because a stone does not have an understanding of being. Heidegger would say that Dasein exists, whereas a stone is vorhanden (usually translated "present-at-hand"). —Preceding unsigned comment added by Antonios Christofides (talkcontribs) 14:31, 26 August 2010 (UTC)


Someone over at the article on Facticity seemed not to understand Heidegger's concept of thrownness. Perhaps that should be added to this article and a link to this article should be included there? KSchutte 03:26, 26 February 2007 (UTC)


Should be in there... -- (talk) 21:16, 25 April 2008 (UTC)


The section says "Only when it breaks or something goes wrong might we see the hammer as present-at-hand, just lying there." I think this is wrong. When a tool breaks, it becomes unready-to-hand, not present-at-hand. In the Sept. 6 lecture of Philosophy 185, available as an archived webcast at the UC Berkeley site, Dreyfus and students spent considerable time discussing just when a tool is not ready-to-hand, a point not at all clear in Being and Time. Dreyfus concluded, perhaps tentatively, that a hammer is R-to-H only when it's being used transparently (one's attending to the activity of hammering, and the hammer becomes invisible, or "withdraws"). What is the hammer's status when it's lying in a drawer? Not presence-at-hand, apparently, but unreadiness-to-hand. Cognita (talk) 05:59, 15 September 2008 (UTC)

The lectures are at . Cognita (talk) 06:04, 15 September 2008 (UTC)

Hi there, I just wanted to say that I think there is some confusion about the terms 'ready-to-hand' and 'present-at-hand' in the article. For example, the article mixes up the terms when it says, 'When a thing is revealed as present-at-hand, it stands apart from any useful set of equipment but soon loses this mode of being present-at-hand and becomes something, for example, that which must be repaired or replaced.' Both when the hammer is lying there, but before it is necessarily intended for use, and when it is in use, when it becomes almost attentively 'invisible' as you say, it is ready-to-hand. Presence-at-hand belongs more to the 'ontological' (in the sense that Heidegger somewhat redefines this word to be associated with Dasein's projection of meaningful structures of 'concern' onto entities) whereas ready-to-hand belongs to the ontical, and has a proximal, 'worldly character' (H.75 Being and Time). When the hammer breaks it becomes both 'unready-to-hand' and moves closer to being present-at-hand. Heidegger does seems to be saying that if you only focus on the present-at-hand in developing philosophy, you will really get nowhere in articulating the meaning of Being, but the term itself is still crucial in terms of how Dasein attributes meaning to the world, which I don't think is reflected in the article at the moment. As Heidegger says, 'whenever the world is lit up in the modes of concern which we have been Interpreting, the ready-to-hand becomes deprived of its worldhood so that Being-just-present-at-hand comes to the fore.' (ibid) Hope that helps. Will 11:26, 6 June 2014 (UTC)

Presence-to-hand and Readiness-to-hand as Attitudes[edit]

Removed hypertext linking the word 'attitude' to the Wikipedia article on propositional attitudes in the second paragraph. Presence-to-hand and readiness-to-hand are attitudes that Dasein takes up toward things in its environment, but these are not propositional attitudes like beliefs and desires. Presence-to-hand and readiness-to-hand are ways of relating to entities in one's environment, not to propositions. —Preceding unsigned comment added by (talk) 19:15, 2 March 2010 (UTC)

"Thematic" & "Pre-thematic"[edit]

One of the most common questions from students engaging early Being and Time for the first time concerns the difference between "thematic" and "pre-thematic." Might it be sensible to add a section to the article for these two? If so, I might try to type something up before the end of the night.

(Yogenzaga1 (talk) 00:05, 3 November 2010 (UTC))

Citations, wording of the Ready-to-hand section[edit]

This article is quite helpful--I'm glad it exists as a discrete entry--but there do seem to be a number of issues I don't quite feel qualified to repair (as much as I hate to criticize without helping). Generally speaking, there are several parts that read like OR, but most importantly I think some of the language might be confused. For example, the second paragraph of the Ready-to-hand section reads,

Importantly, the present-at-hand only emerges from the prior attitude in which we care about what is going on and we see the hammer in a context or world of equipment that is handy or remote, and that is there "in order to" do something. In this sense the ready-to-hand is primordial compared to that of the present-at-hand. The term primordial here does not imply something Primitive, but rather refers to Heidegger's idea that Being can only be understood through what is everyday and "close" to us. Our everyday understanding of the world is necessarily essentially a part of any kind of scientific or theoretical studies of entities — the present-at-hand — might be. Only by studying our "average-everyday" understanding of the world, as it is expressed in the totality of our relationships to the ready-to-hand entities of the world, can we lay appropriate bases for specific scientific investigations into specific entities within the world.

It could just be my limited knowledge of Heidegger talking, but I think the key terms are accidentally switched in at least one place and I can't tell what the next to last sentence is saying. "...essentially a part of any kind of..studies of entities...might be?" --Rhododendrites (talk) 01:45, 20 February 2013 (UTC)