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- 1 New paragraph?
- 2 Oldest stuff
- 3 Operation Peacock
- 4 Heading
- 5 Name
- 6 IMO This page needs...
- 7 OPERATION VENGEANCE
- 8 Removed
- 9 Birth name
- 10 Alternate history.
- 11 Intro rewording
- 12 War crimes reference
- 13 Midway: good plan? That's POV
- 14 Changes
- 15 Personal Life
- 16 The official name of the IJN Fleet
- 17 Kaigun ko-jiken
- 18 Quotes and trivia
- 19 Just gimme a reason
- 20 "Imadu"?
- 21 Court jester
- 22 Shogi
- 23 "Architect of the Attack on Pearl Harbor"
- 24 The "sleeping giant" quote
- 25 Practise makes perfekt?
- 26 Count off?
- 27 Naval War College clarification
- 28 References
- 29 Japanese Gamblers?
- 30 Decision
- 31 Age
- 32 Assassinated people categories
- 33 Correction needed for section on planning of Midway
The article practically stops after Yamamoto's death. For such an important man, there should be a paragraph detailing any happenings concerning him after his death. His so called "legacy".
Incorrect use of the word deranged in this article, it should be derailed. Will the OP please correct it? Kalpak
- Thanks. --126.96.36.199 04:17, 25 May 2004 (UTC)
From the article: (italics added)
"He also accurately envisaged the "island-hopping" and air dominance tactics such a war would have, although his vision failed him when it came to battleships, which he (in common with most officers in the American navy, it must be conceded) still believed to be the key component of naval force -a failing which would be a key component of the causes for the disaster which was to befall Japanese naval forces at Midway."
I don't see how this follows - what does a failed vision concerning belief in battleships have to do with the (Japanese) disaster at Midway? Whoever won the Battle of Midway it would have reenforced the viability of Naval Air Power, but have little bearing on a faith in battleships. The Battle of Lete Gulf could be cited as relevant, but not appropriately so in this article.
Leonard G. 03:50, 5 Aug 2004 (UTC)
- Agreed. If anything is the single most responsible reason for the Japanese failing at Midway, it's the lack of damage control measures in the Japanese navy. After sustaining the same type of attack which had sunk four Japanese carriers, the Yorktown still floated, crippled but serviceable. Doovinator 20:07, 5 Aug 2004 (UTC)
- Well, not just the damage control measures. They also had all sorts of ordnance lying around unstowed (in their rush to switch from land-attack to ship-attack weapons). I'm not sure we can really say for sure which was the biggest factor in the disaster (how exactly does one do the scientific experiment :-), and luck (exact location of hits, for instance) may have also played a role. However, certainly it didn't help that doctine called for carriers to be out front, to screen the "valuable" battleships. And it is true, I believe (without dragging down reference sources), that Yamamoto didn't forsee that the battleship's value had already declined as drastically as it (in actuality) had. Noel (talk) 21:22, 14 Dec 2004 (UTC)
I whittled this down and put in some text that I realized was covered in later paragraphs. Deleted the whole paragraph. Japanese battleship doctrine and its effect on the Midway battle is well covered appropriately in later paragraphs. Only "Island hopping" has been lost, someone may wish to re-insert at an appropriate location. "Island hopping" is usually used in the context of U.S. strategy of bypassing non critical islands, cutting them off from their logistics support and simply ignoring them. Leonard G. 03:10, 6 Aug 2004 (UTC)
There are several myths and misconceptions perpetuated in this article and this discussion:
First, Admiral Yamamoto did not suffer a failure of vision with respect to the role of battleships at Midway. He fully expected the Japanese carriers would bear the brunt of the fighting. The battleships of the Main Body were expected to clean up whatever the carriers left for them to catch. In this Yamamoto correctly perceived that the carriers of the time could deliver a tremendous pulse of firepower, but could not sustain intensive combat operations for long due to limits of ordnance, fuel and aircraft durability under combat conditions. Thus, the Japanese carriers would probably run out of firepower before polishing off the American Fleet, so the battleships of the Main Body would come up to finish the job. Yamamoto misappreciated nothing in bringing the battleships, he was simply using the assets he had available as he lacked adequate carriers to do everything required.
Second, the Japanese battleships were not held to the rear at Midway to allow the carriers to protect them. They were held to the rear to remain undetected and available to engage in the later stages of the operation as Yamamoto expected it to unfold. The carriers were out front because it was expected they would be needed to neutralize Midway and then neutralize the American carriers, before the battleships would be needed to finish off remaining American surface forces. When Yamamoto's plan fell apart due to the American intelligence coup, the Main Body wound up out of position and unable to intervene.
Third, no doctrine yet existed for battleships to screen carriers and to assume so at this early date is an artifact of hindsight that projects later World War Two practice on the part of the USN onto the IJN. In fact, at this date, Japanese battleship anti-aircraft batteries were quite weak, especially by later-war standards and would not have added much to the barrage thrown at attacking U.S. aircraft. Also, Japanese defensive maneuvering did not emphasize screening the carriers through massed fire. Photographs of Japanese evasive maneuvers show individual ships cutting circles in the water to evade attacking planes. Comparison between this practice and the synchronized movements of American ships in protective ring formations around carriers is instructive. S/Electric Joe
Good discussion of Midway. For more IJN details see Parshall's excellent "Shattered Sword".
I knew the three principals of the Yamamoto mission (excluding Y himself, of course!): Mitchell, Lanphier, and Barber. Mitchell always believed that Barber did the deed, citing the geometry of the intercept and Lanphier's contradictory accounts. There is no doubt that L intended to use the mission as a political springboard to the White House--he said as much at the time. OTOH, Rex Barber's ambition was to return to Oregon and resume farming.
One noteworthy item that emerged from discussion with other Guadalcanal fighter pilots is the fact that Lanphier wrote the mission report (conversation with retired Col. Paul Bechtel, 12th FS in 1943). It should also be noted that, whether Y's airplane lost its wing in flight or not, it was physically impossible for Lanphier (or anyone) to have shot off the wing from 90 degrees deflection, as he described. The only way to do so was to sever the spar, and that could not be done by shooting "end on" at the wingtip (envision shooting a pea into a soda straw at 300 mph from 300 yards away).
B Tillman April 2006
- Wrong on doctrine. Yamamoto kept the heavies back & led with his carriers (scouts), per doctrine. (Nobody I've read suggests BBs screen CVs.) Had he put his battleships in front, he could have pounded Midway's installations with little risk from air attack, leaving Nagumo to rove & cover him. With all the cruisers' VSs (denied Nagumo in the event), he'd also have found Fletcher in time to strike before Fletcher's birds turned his carriers into funeral pyres. Trekphiler 22:10, 16 February 2007 (UTC)
Someone added a reference to an "Operation Peacock", which I've never heard of. I'm too lazy to go get the ref books down at the moment - this ring a bell with anyone? Noel (talk) 21:22, 14 Dec 2004 (UTC)
- There's a codeword dictionary I've seen that mentions it. Trekphiler 22:15, 16 February 2007 (UTC)
Changed "most of WW2" to "first third". April 1943 was just the 17th month of a war that would last 45 months. The middle third of the war involved rolling back the outer defense perimeter, while the last third cracked the inner defense perimeter and brought the war to the Home Islands.
- Yeah, "17th month" if you're counting from when the U.S. entered the war. If you weren't so blinkered, you'd know that World War II actually started in September 1939 (not December 1941!!!) and Japan was extremely active in the Pacific well before the sneak attack on Pearl Harbour. (In fact there is a good argument that the "Asian WW2" started in 1937.) -- 188.8.131.52 12:06, 23 July 2005 (UTC)
This is a semantic squabble of no real importance. Suffice it to say he was the CinC of the Combined Fleet for the first 17 months of war against the western Allies. S/ Electric Joe
I'm been wondering for a decade now: Does his name mean "base of the mountain fifty-six"? -Hmib 10:03, 25 July 2005 (UTC)
- Shouldn't his name 山本 五十六 link to the Japanese Wikipedia article on him? Uncle Ed 15:54, 5 December 2005 (UTC)
- The link was already there, with all the other interwiki links:
: [[nl:Isoroku Yamamoto]] [[ja:山本五十六]] [[pl:Isoroku Yamamoto]] :
- If you want an interwiki link to show up within the page, you'd have to prefix a colon: [[:ja:山本五十六|山本五十六]]. Hmm, apparently on a Talk page you don't.
- —wwoods 18:07, 5 December 2005 (UTC)
- Thanks: [[:ja:山本五十六]] turns his kanji into a clickable interwiki link. Uncle Ed 17:50, 6 December 2005 (UTC)
THE BATTLE OF THE JAVA SEA This entire section should be deleted. Yamamoto directed the Java Sea operations only in the most rarified and distant fashion. The actual operations were conducted by by the Japanese Second Fleet under Vice Admirals Takahashi, Kondo and Ozawa. Yamamoto "directed" these operations only in the sense that Second Fleet reported to Combined Fleet. The sense of this section is as if Yamamoto was flying his flag in the battle or directly ordering about the forces involved tactically. He did nothing of the sort. S/ElectricJoe
ADOPTION "In 1916, Isoroku changed his last name to Yamamoto, because the name Yamamoto was an honorable and ancient one in the history of Japan. One such figure was Tatewaki Yamamoto, who fought against the Emperor, and his forces at the Battle of Wakamatsu, during the Bosshin War (戊辰戦争). Since he was one of the leaders of the rebellion, when he was captured, he was beheaded at Wakamatsu. Since Tatewaki had no sons, Isoroku was also the future of the Yamamoto clan."
This is a terribly written paragraph. It would be more accurate to state that Takano Isoroku was adopted by the Yamamoto clan as Yamamoto Isoroku. All reference to Yamamoto Tatewaki should be stricken as a digression. S/Electric Joe
IMO This page needs...
There is a need write NPOV on this page. All familiar language shoud be avoided spur, whim... Big contributions done. Time for a break and a polish. :-) Gtabary 02:07, 15 December 2005 (UTC)
What, pray tell, is NPOV about accounting for how Yamamoto's plan has been represented? It clearly states that it pertains to such misrepresentation and the new text is quite objective. I don't understand how this is at all either unfair to Yamamoto or to anyone else. S/ Electric Joe
Mrs Campbell suxxxx
support: Buckboard 09:09, 12 February 2006 (UTC)
This entire section, while having a lot of valuable information, also has a lot of misinformation, particularly about the "controversy" but in other details as well. For instance, Lanphier died in 1987, not 1983. Lanphier's "account" was disputed from the moment the mission ended because he announced on the radio, in defiance of top secret security regarding the "Magic" Operation (not mention good sense), that "I got Yamamoto!" Moreover Lanphier, trained as a journalist, wrote out the citation awards for himself and the others involved and worked tirelessly to get HIS version into print without regard for the consequences to Magic. Rex Barber did not wait until 1983 to object, but made repeated attempts through channels to clear the record from 1943 on, as did Major Mitchell. Lanphier was a competent officer and a good pilot, but he was also a self-aggrandizing individual who gave varying versions of his story depending on time and audience, invented details when necessary, and left out Barber, Mitchell, and Holmes from his early statements to the press, the first of which app. was to the AP correspondent Norman Lodge, a gross breach of security for which Admirals Halsey, Nimitz, and King came down hard on Mitchell and Barber.
In the end Air Force historians rather wimpishly decided to give each a half credit for the shootdown of Yamamoto (they had earlier awarded Barber and Holmes half credit for shootdown of the staff bomber) despite physical evidence at the crash site supporting Barber's account (attacked from rear, plane crashed in level flight in jungle) and a lack of evidence supporting Lanphier (attack from right angle and right wing shot off before crash).
Also it's stated Yamamoto was "killed instantly" but then contradicts itself later, coming to a conclusion unsupported by facts. Two post-mortems reported that the admiral's body was not distended as were others at the crash site and lacked the maggots found on them, suggesting he was alive after the crash. If the search party finding the crash site "tidied it up" they not only did so out of respect but to spare themselves criticism (or worse) for not mounting a quicker search in time to save the admiral.
Much of the original information on this mission appears to come from early sources, including Sherrod's official history of Marine Corps aviation in WWII. I have used Glines (who uses primary sources for his material) and later updates.
Work on this section continues, bearing in mind a need for NPOV. Buckboard 09:09, 12 February 2006 (UTC)
I eliminated the term "Operation Vengeance" because the mission was definitely ad hoc and I cannot find the term in any sources. However I have no problem with it if a source can be shown. Buckboard 11:53, 12 February 2006 (UTC)
Removed this as it's redundant & POV
"As a tactical raid, the attack was a smashing victory, handily achieving its limited objectives at an amazingly low price of 29 aircraft (and five miniature submarines that contributed nothing of value). Hindsight and wishful thinking on the part of the Japanese regarding the attack's flaws, and American unpreparedness should not detract from the appreciation that military forces seldom achieve such complete surprise and devastation in an operation. Credit for husbanding the ambitious brain-child of his talented air subordinates to fruition is Yamamoto's."
exolon 00:34, 18 March 2006 (UTC)
This was neither redundant, nor POV. It was a necessary summation to explain why Yamamoto is given credit for this operation. Otherwise we'll have people crawling all over this trying to say it was all really Genda's doing, or Onishi's. Genda's and Onishi's efforts would have gone nowhere except for being initiated by and nutured by Yamamoto.ElectricJoe 04:09, 27 January 2007 (UTC)
I believe this statement to be inaccurate:
"Yamamoto was born Isoroku Sadayoshi (高野 五十六 Sadayoshi Isoroku) in Nagaoka in Niigata. His father was Takano Sadayoshi (高野 貞吉 Takano Sadayoshi), a lower-ranking samurai of Nagaoka-han."
"Takano/高野" is a family name and "Sadayoshi/貞吉" appears to be a given name. Therefore, if his father's name was Takano Sadayoshi, Isoroku was probably born Takano Isoroku (高野 五十六).
I'm changing the article to read: "Yamamoto was born Isoroku Takano (高野 五十六 Takano Isoroku) in Nagaoka, Niigata. His father was Sadayoshi Takano (高野 貞吉 Takano Sadayoshi), a lower-ranking samurai of Nagaoka-han."
If anyone can confirm or refute this, please do.
"Absent the American code break-through, the MI plan would appear neither particularly complex, diffuse, or dangerous. The Aleutians feint would have drawn American attention, Operation K would have ascertained the Pacific Fleet's whereabouts, the submarine cordon would have picked up the American carriers moving toward Midway, and the First Fleet, Second Fleet and First Mobile Force would have concentrated into a lethal whole."
Isn't this an awful lot of would-haves? How do we know that all these "would haves" would happen? No plan survives first contact with the enemy, and all that. Suppose Nimitz--no fool himself--recognized the feint? Suppose Operation K did not pick up the whereabouts of the pacific fleet?
- I have to agree that this article is full of scenarios that "might" have been but were not. Let us focus on what did happen and ignore most of the would have, could have, should have scenarios. Same goes for the mischaracterizations of other historians. Just stick to our best understandings of the facts. You may point out risks that effected decision making, or documented "close calls", but please keep them to a minimum: they are distracting. -- 184.108.40.206 12:04, 22 July 2006 (UTC)
- This particular alternate history is based on a good bit of incorrect information in any case. Recommended reading: "Shattered Sword" by Parshall & Tully, 2005. It is very well researched, particularly in the authors' access to Japanese materials, some of which were not translated until recently. I base all the following statements on that book.
- Firstly, the Aleutian Islands attack (Operation AL) was not an attempt to lure the Americans out but a simultaneous operation, however ill-conceived it may seem to split one's forces and attack two objectives on the same day. The only reason the Aleutians were attacked the day before Midway was that Nagumo's Midway-bound carrier strike force was a day late leaving port. Incredibly, NO schedule adjustments were made: no delay for the Aleutians attack, and no delay for the Midway invasion force, which consequently risked premature detection by Midway-based search planes. The reasons behind splitting forces were largely political, stemming in part from the Doolittle raid on Tokyo at a propitious (for America) time in the planning. If it was a feint, the Japanese would have attacked the Aleutians at a few days earlier. Carrier fleets need reaction time; they can't leave port on a moment's notice. The exact reasoning remains hard to divine, but it seems the Aleutians op was viewed as a "land grab" while the Americans were busy getting the stuffing beaten out of them 1500 miles to the south. At this juncture the Imperial Navy was rather contemptuous of the US Navy, and Yamamoto evidently felt that four of his carriers were more than a match for anything Nimitz could produce. So he offered no objections.
- Secondly, the American carriers weren't that early, arriving a couple of days before the battle. Rather, the Japanese submarines were horrendously late arriving on station, and worse, Yamamomoto was not apprised of that fact. The reason is "rather scandalous" as worded by Parshall & Tully; the sub ops were the domain of one of the Emperor's relatives, who neglected to mention this failure.
- Thirdly, it's not certain that Operation K failed due to the code-breaking. The Japanese flying boats were intended to be refueled by submarine at French Frigate Shoals (600 miles from Hawaii), but when the sub arrived it was discovered that the Americans were using it themselves for similar purposes (a base for seaplane operations). Nimitz had no such level of detail in his intelligence information; even the target of the operation (Midway) was only confirmed through some clever work. They were intercepting about 60% of the message traffic, processing 40% of that due to time constraints, and could only decipher about 10% of the code groups in a given message.
- It didn't. It failed because of a previous, identical (stupid) mission that dropped a handful of bombs (on Niihau?) in May. As for "the Americans using it themselves", that's a mistake (or misunderstanding); the tenders were to prevent the Japanese from using them again. Trekphiler 22:28, 16 February 2007 (UTC)
- Yamamoto had plenty of clues that the Americans were onto him. He knew: a)Operation K was scrubbed. b)Message traffic was very heavy indicating that the carrier fleet wasn't sitting at home in Pearl. c)Midway itself, when scouted by submarine, was bustling with activity. Midway's aircraft complement had doubled or tripled, and bright worklights revealed round-the-clock construction. d)The number, and timing, of Midway's scout plane takeoffs & landings indicated heavy search activity out to the limit of their range. All of this information was in Yamamoto's hands, and Nagumo's (the Midway carrier strike force commander.)
- Midway was clearly expecting visitors, digging in and maintaining a constant vigil. Yamamoto's entire convoluted scheme depended on the Americans following his script. The first act of that play, for the Americans, was being home at Pearl and needing days to arrive at Midway. It was quite evident that Midway was alerted, plus there were signs (radio traffic) that the carriers were at sea. Yet the intricate invasion plan continued, unaltered in any detail. --Shyland 01:05, 19 October 2006 (UTC) (edited after re-consulting Shattered Sword --Shyland 19:38, 24 October 2006 (UTC))
I reworded the intro, due to the "stellar tactics" which I felt was POV--one could spend hours punching holes in Yamamoto's tactics--and for the "highly respected in the US" line. Most modern US historians--note I am not casting judgement as to whether they're right or not--tend to denigrate his strategic vision and tactics; see the quoted "Shattered Sword".--Steve Dallas 01:23, 30 June 2006 (UTC)Steve Dallas
War crimes reference
In "Revision as of 11:49, 22 July 2006", the wording of the second paragraph was changed from
"He is highly respected in Japan, and to a lesser extent, the US for both tactical prowess and for running a "clean" war (in other words, he usually steered clear of committing war crimes)."
"He is highly respected in Japan, and to a lesser extent, the US for both tactical prowess and for preventeing his men from committing war crimes."
Is there a reference on which this change was based, i.e. a citation about Adm. Yamamoto ordering his men not to commit war crimes, as opposed to him not issuing orders to commit them? After doing a little bit of searching, the only references I can find regarding war crimes committed during operations planned or commanded by him pertain to the murder of captured US Navy pilots during the Battle of Midway.
--Emamid 11:24, 16 August 2006 (UTC)
- Yamato was hundreds of miles away aboard Yamato. His plan was to lurk out of detection range with most of his battleships and heavy cruisers. (I'm still at a loss as to what exactly he intended to do with said battleships eventually...chase carriers on the open ocean in spite of a speed disadvantage?) If the fleet had broken radio silence by that time they must have been keeping communications to a minimum. It seems doubtful that if he even knew of the prisoners, he issued any order one way or the other, to execute them or keep them alive. Naval warfare typically results in few prisoners, but I haven't read anything that indicated he took measures to prevent war crimes. Can anyone cite a source to that effect? --Shyland 23:01, 24 October 2006 (UTC)
- As I recall, there was some mention in Shattered Sword of Japanese naval aviators having shown they were "no less willing than their American counterparts" to strafe people in parachutes or around sinking ships. I can't find it now. --Shyland 00:51, 25 October 2006 (UTC)
- ...And, I've got issues with the "highly respected in the US for tactical prowess" part. The attack on Pearl Harbor, while well-planned and well-executed, seems unlikely to have engendered respect in the U.S. And while code-breaking was a very important part of his disastrous loss at Midway, one could argue that Yamamoto's battle plan was also a huge factor. Even if the enemy knows you're coming, he's not guaranteed to win. The IJN had clear superiority in many respects, until it was irretrievably lost forever at Midway. The reasons for that loss are numerous and complex, but among them Yamamoto's plan, and total inflexibility in not deviating from it when circumstances changed, must rank high. The plan involved multiple groups operating in tightly-synchronized fashion, across 1500 miles of ocean, in strict radio silence, and furthermore expecting the enemy to behave exactly as Yamamoto predicted. The Japanese didn't even get out of port on schedule (Nagumo's carrier force was a day late), and no adjustments were made. When it started looking like the Americans weren't following the script, no adjustments were made. --Shyland 00:51, 25 October 2006 (UTC)
Midway: good plan? That's POV
"The plan was well thought out, well organized and finely timed." Totally POV. My POV is completely opposite. There are lots of sources ( Parshall & Tully, Lord, Fuchida, etc.) claiming Yamamoto's plan was a big factor in the devastating defeat at Midway. I find it hard to believe Midway was planned & executed by the same people who were behind the overwheming success at Pearl Harbor. I don't think I'm a good candidate to do the rewriting; I'm sure my own POV would creep in.
Yamamoto split his forces THREE ways, nullifying the massive numerical superiority claimed in the article (as of 17Nov2006): two concurrent attacks extremely far apart (Midway and the Aleutians), and a third group originally slated to be roughly two days' sailing(!!??) away from either. As to "finely timed", this phrase hardly fits when your carrier group is a day late leaving port for Midway, and all the other groups proceed according to plan! I could go on and on...see comments above in "War Crimes" section for starters. The whole Midway section needs rewrite. --Shyland 23:24, 17 November 2006 (UTC)
So your POV is right and anyone else's is wrong? Just because a battle is unsuccessful, does not mean it wasn't well planned or well thought out. Remove the circumstance of the American cryptological break and the operation would have gone off quite well. A cryptological break such as that at Midway is the sort of event it is almost impossible to plan against. However, Yamamoto tried to cover himself with Operation K and the submarine picket lines. Unfortunately, the American cryptological break permitted them to circumvent those measures as well. Lord's access to classified information and Japanese material was extremely limited. Fuchida has been proven to have lied by none other than Parshall & Tully. Parshall & Tully did tremendous work in Shattered Sword, but that does not make them gods nor universally correct when they express their opinions. There is plenty of room for debate about the quality of the Midway plan, and as currently written the basis for debate is highlighted. Thus Yamamoto is treated fairly and not arbitrarily condemned as an idiot, and the controversy is treated fairly by being revealed with both points of view mentioned.ElectricJoe 03:53, 27 January 2007 (UTC)
- Wrong. Removing the crypto break is effectively rewriting history. If "Yamamoto tried to cover himself with Operation K and the submarine picket lines", why did he sail his task force before the pickets arrived, & after the flying boats had failed in recon? (And, 1 may ask, why did he allow that stupid stunt in May?) A smart commander plans for the undexpected (like U.S. carriers being closeby...); he didn't need to know his codes were compromised to do that. Are Parshall & Tully "universally correct"? No, but I've seen much the same argument in Willmott's Barrier & the Javelin; don't try & tell me he had no access to decrypts. Yamamoto isn't being "arbitrarily condemned as an idiot", he's being fairly condemned for bad command decisions. Trekphiler 22:54, 16 February 2007 (UTC)
Okay, the fight over exactly when WWII started is just senseless. Yamamoto was "a" CINC of the IJN during WWII, so I got rid of any reference to the exact duration of his command. Thus the people that want to date the war from 1937, 1939 or 1941 can make their own calculations.
The references to a "clean" fight and/or preventing war crimes have also become horridly cumbersome and wildly inaccurate. I've changed the wording to more accurately account for how Yamamoto is viewed in the United States.
The number of aircraft dispatched against Pearl Harbor has been corrected from 250 to 350.
I reinserted a paragraph summarizing the tactical evaluation of the Pearl Harbor raid for parallelism with the political and strategic ramifications, and to make clear that the raid would not have been successfully brought to fruition without Yamamoto's contribution.
When I originally editted this article I had not had the pleasure of reading Parshall & Tully's excellent work. I've made several changes based on that information.
Regarding the positioning of US forces at French Frigate Shoals to disrupt Operation K, this is found in Prados, page 316. Regarding the timing of the Japanese submarine cordon's arrival, even late the submarines arrived before the earliest time the Japanese calculated the carriers would be headed their direction. Ergo, since the carriers left Pearl Harbor on the basis of cryptological information in time to benefit from the late arrival of the Japanese submarines on station, this can be accounted a benefit of the cryptological break. Thus, all three factors contributing to the American surprise derived directly from the cryptological break.ElectricJoe 04:53, 27 January 2007 (UTC)
- Fletcher & Spruance were hurried due to crypto, & beat the pickets as a result? I've never heard that before. My understanding was, the subs sailed a day late, giving Nimitz the time he needed. Was this compounded by a hurry-up due to crypto? AFAIK, the actual date of Yamamoto's (or Nagumo's) scheduled arrival wasn't known... Trekphiler 23:00, 16 February 2007 (UTC)
Low Bywater mark
I deleted "Sixteen years before Pearl Harbor attack, an English naval expert Hector Bywater uncannily prophesied in detail the war in the Pacific. Could Yamamoto have been influenced by Bywater's remarkable plan too?" Yamamoto wasn't an idiot. He was a professional navy officer. This is on par with the conspiracy theorists' implication, being Japanese, they were incapable of originality or achieving surprise without help. Trekphiler 23:08, 16 February 2007 (UTC)
I rewrote this:
- "advanced across the Pacific until engaging in a climactic "Decisive Battle" in the northern Philippine Sea between the Ryukyu Islands on the west and the Marianas Islands on the east. This battle was intended to take place when the American forces had finally been worn down to parity with the Japanese Navy."
- "whittling down the American Fleet as it advanced across the Pacific until the Japanese Navy engaged it in a climactic "Decisive Battle" in the northern Philippine Sea (between the Ryukyu Islands and the Marianas Islands), with battleships meeting in the traditional exchange between battle lines."
On the attack
I rewrote this:
- "Surprise attacks were a Japanese military tradition when starting a war"
- "Surprise attacks have a long military tradition when starting a war, and Japan could see clear to supporting"
I think Peattie & Evans point out most wars had been started without declarations of war.
On the greater issue, I must question the presumption Nagumo needed to use his aircraft to attack Hawaii. Also, the threat from U.S. aircraft was overblown; his fighters were more than capable of defending him, especially since his aviators had vastly more experience, as well as combat experience, & surprise on their side. Lack of VB or VT strength was not an issue; if he could find Halsey & Brown at night, his cruisers were more than enough to destroy them (as Spruance almost learned, to his detriment, at Midway). Neither does the article say one word to the fact Nagumo had orders to find & sink the carriers, even if it meant loss of half his carriers. Neither would I read too much into Yamamoto's not punishing Nagumo; it was Japanese practise not to criticize senior commanders, regardless their decisions. It seems to me this needs rewriting. Trekphiler 01:22, 17 February 2007 (UTC)
I rewrote this:
- "Nimitz dispatched a destroyer to guard the intended refueling point for Operation K's flying boats,"
- "Following a foolish nuisance raid by Japanese flying boats in May, Nimitz dispatched a minesweeper to guard the intended refueling point for Operation K"
based on Holmes, Double-Edged Secrets & Undersea Victory. (He mentions the officer who planned in in UV; anybody know who it was?) Trekphiler 02:46, 17 February 2007 (UTC)
Meet you midway
I rewrote this:
- "With his air power destroyed and his forces not yet concentrated for a fleet battle, Yamamoto was unable to maneuver his remaining units to trap the American forces when Admiral Raymond Spruance prudently withdrew to the east rather than risk a night surface encounter in which his carriers would be at a disadvantage. Correctly perceiving that he had lost, Yamamoto aborted the invasion of Midway and withdrew his forces from the field, having no desire to occupy a distant atoll he no longer had the capacity to support and defend. The defeat ended Yamamoto's six months of success and marked the high tide of Japanese expansion.
- "Yamamoto's plan for MI has been the subject of much criticism. Many commentators state it violated the principle of concentration of force, and was overly complex. Others point out similarly complex Allied operations that were successful, and note the extent to which the American intelligence coup derailed the operation before it began."
- "With his air power destroyed and his forces not yet concentrated for a fleet battle, Yamamoto was unable to maneuver his remaining units to trap the American forces when Admiral Raymond Spruance prudently withdrew to the east, in a position to further defend Midway, believing (based on a mistaken submarine report) the Japanese still intended to invade. (He did not apprehend the severe risk of night surface battle, in which his carriers would be at a disadvantage, not knowing Yamato was on the Japanese order of battle.) Correctly perceiving he had lost, Yamamoto aborted the invasion of Midway and withdrew. The defeat ended Yamamoto's six months of success and marked the high tide of Japanese expansion.
- "Yamamoto's plan for MI has been the subject of much criticism. Many commentators state it violated the principle of concentration of force, and was overly complex. Others point out similarly complex Allied operations that were successful, and note the extent to which the American intelligence coup derailed the operation before it began. Had Yamamoto's dispositions not denied Nagumo pre-attack reconaissance assets, the cryptanalytic success, and the unexpected appearance of Fletcher's carriers, would have been irrelevant."
I'm far from convinced Yamamoto had "no desire to occupy a distant atoll he no longer had the capacity to support and defend." He couldn't have supported or defended it successfully had it been taken. Rather, he knew he no longer could take it. As for Spruance, he didn't forsee night battle as much as take a blocking position; I can't recall the name of the sub skipper who got it wrong offhand. The importance of codebreaking in the immediate U.S. success is overblown, as Willmott points out; Yamamoto had sufficient strength to overcome the surprise of Fletcher's unexpected appearance, had his initial dispositions not been ludicrous (quite aside the redeployment of Shinyo or Ryujo, sometimes mentioned). Trekphiler 03:37, 17 February 2007 (UTC)
For the defense
I rewrote this:
- "Particularly harmful were the severe losses of carrier dive-bomber and torpedo-bomber crews in the carrier battles that emasculated the carrier air groups."
- "There were severe losses of carrier dive-bomber and torpedo-bomber crews in the carrier battles, emasculating the already depleted carrier air groups. Particularly harmful, however, were losses of destroyers in the foolish Tokyo Express supply runs. IJN already faced a shortage, and commerce defense was laughably bad with the existing numbers as it was, thanks to poor doctrine and low priority to the task."
While the aviators & fleet battles get all the attention, in the long run, the commerce war meant more to Japan's ability to continue fighting. Trekphiler 03:53, 17 February 2007 (UTC)
The whole section about his personal life is painfully POV. I've improved the wording of the chatter about geisha, but I really think the entire section should be jettisoned or, at least, completely rewritten. If there's important about his being a teetotaler, it is wholly unrelated to his gambling which also seems -- from the piece, I have no other knowledge -- to have referred more to enjoyment of games of skill than to any focus on betting per se. Czrisher 18:04, 14 March 2007 (UTC)
The official name of the IJN Fleet
IJN (Imperial Japanese Navy) introduced its navy system from Royal Navy, IJN had the official name for the Fleets in English.
- No IJN men used the words Combined Fleet in the era of Japan.
- It was Rengo Kantai (in Japanese),Grand Fleet (in English). Isoroku Yamamoto was called Admiral of GF, that was Admiral of Grand Fleet, like Admiral of the Fleet (Royal Navy). —The preceding unsigned comment was added by Shun Zero (talk • contribs) 16:22, 5 May 2007 (UTC).
--Shun Zero 16:26, 5 May 2007 (UTC)
The article previously speculated that the name "Kaigun ko-jiken" (海軍乙事件) for Yamamoto's death had something to do with the game of Go. This is incorrect: in Chinese and formal Japanese, 甲 kō is A, 乙 otsu is B, 兵 hei is C, etc, so the name just means "Incident A". The subsequent death of Yamamoto's successor Mineichi Koga was hence referred to as Kaigun otsu-jiken (ja:海軍乙事件), or "Incident B". Jpatokal 14:19, 7 June 2007 (UTC)
Quotes and trivia
I've removed the following quotes and trivia because they are unsourced:
- “You cannot invade the mainland United States. There would be a rifle behind each blade of grass.” 1941
- “The US fleet is a dagger pointed at our throat and must be destroyed.”
- His award of the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross was somewhat ironic, due to the fact that he mistrusted the Nazis.
- In Star Trek: The Original Series "Yamamoto" is included in a list of large space warships.
- In the 3rd season finale of The West Wing, Yamamoto is held up as an example of a previous U.S. assassination by Leo McGarry in an attempt to convince President Bartlet to authorize the assassination of a foreign political leader/terrorist.
- Yamamoto's estate in Tokyo was in the Shibuya district. In immediate post-war Occupied Japan a housing compound for dependents and employees of Northwest Airlines personnel was built adjacent to the estate. Mrs. Yamamoto is remembered as a kind lady, occasionally inviting American children playing on the grounds into her home for juice and cookies.
The only "Star Trek" Federation Starship I know of that's close to Yamamoto is the "Yamato" on Star Trek: The Next Generation. It was the Enterprise's sister ship and accidentally self-destructed in a second-season episode. Of course it was named after the famous Japanese WW2 battleship Yamato, not the Admiral. User: Populism
Just gimme a reason
- "Yamamoto didn't want war with America. He knew he was awakening a giant. Why was he so convinced that America would come to terms after a surprise attack?
- "Was it all Japanese mistakes or were they also 'encouraged' to think this way? A Japanese perspective would be very helpful.
- "'Why was [Yamamoto] so convinced that America would come to terms after a surprise attack?'" That is the US$64000 question.... My suspicion is, he was not, but IJA leaders were, & he went along, lacking the courage to resist; I suggest he should have threatened not resignation but hara kiri, & carried it out, if he was ignored: it was the one thing all Japanese would understand, & if someone so senior was so convinced IJA was wrong..." Comment? Trekphiler 11:23, 29 December 2007 (UTC)
I agree with you that Yamamoto was not convinced the US would come to terms. Instead, I think he was a general officer who had been given questionable orders, and carried them out to the best of his abilty. Bear in mind that sepuku is conceptually an act that removes shame or wrong-doing, and this was not the case with Yamamoto, who had nothing to be ashamed of. As such, a ritual suicide to clear his name and debt would have been bizarre. For more of a Japanese perspective, you might refer to the Japanese Prime Minister's comment in the 1990's that there was no sneak attack on Pearl Harbor. While the translation was literally correct, it lacked nuance. What was most probably intended was that the Pearl Harbor attack was not completely unforeseen, not an unmitigated success, and may actually have done the IJA more harm in the long run. Cjonb (talk) 02:06, 26 May 2008 (UTC)
- I think hara kiri can be taken as a protest against intolerable action, against being forced into a position of doing something dishonorable. It appears Japanese officers, including Yamamoto, took loyalty to the Crown as superseding loyalty to the nation. Anybody know for sure? "it lacked nuance"? Looks to me like the same can be said of the mokusatsu at the end of the War, too. TREKphiler hit me ♠ 23:20, 16 October 2008 (UTC)
What is the "Imadu" that's after Yamamoto's name at the start of the article? Is that supposed to be a Japanese word? I don't see any Japanese writing present following just the name, "Yamamoto Isoroku." Can anyone shed some light on this? -Tadakuni (talk) 03:08, 6 February 2008 (UTC)
Since somebody doesn't think the Tokyo Express was foolish, let me clarify. IJN had a desperate, overweening need to protect trade, for which it needed DDs. Japan had insufficient capacity even to replace her losses. Ergo, wasting DDs on supply runs was foolish in the extreme. Cf Parillo, Japanese Merchant Marine. TREKphiler hit me ♠ 23:20, 16 October 2008 (UTC)
- The Tokyo Express was meant to supply Japanese ground forces on Guadalcanal by using the night to avoid American warplanes. This meant that these forces could continue to fight, where they otherwise would have been lost or more warship losses would be risked in escorting slow transports, which also were in short supply. The Japanese decision to contest Guadalcanal and expose themselves to the slow drain on irreplaceable resources can be questioned, but in the context of that decision the Express makes sense. More importantly, the word "foolish" indicates there is a historical consensus which I do not believe exists. Lastly, there were much more important problems regarding the utilization of the Japanese merchant fleet, especially their lack of convoying throughout the war. Thus, even if the Express had not utilized destroyers, they probably would not have been used in merchant protection the way USN and Royal Navy destroyers guarded the Atlantic convoys. Lord asriel (talk) 03:10, 19 October 2008 (UTC)
- Given the pitiful trickle of supplies DDs could deliver, & the importance you attach to Guad (with which I disagree, but that's irrelevant), & the evident importance IJA attached to Guad, supply convoys made more sense, even given the risk. As to "historical consensus", I don't think it's strictly necessary; a source or 2 arguing it was foolish (& between Parillo & Kaigun, there is some agreement) should do it. As to what use the DDs would've been put, you're right, they probably wouldn't have gone to convoys; that isn't an argument for wasting them, it's an argument against it, since every one lost is one not available to Kido Butai, hence one less available to convoy from the (already too small) pool. Which is foolish. TREKphiler hit me ♠ 09:02, 19 October 2008 (UTC)
Since there's some debate on it, "inveterate gambler, he enjoyed nothing more than a competitive round of chess (shogi), poker, or bridge. Often Yamamoto would challenge anyone on hand to play poker all night with the specific understanding that whoever quit first would lose the hand.", and Cpn Watanabe Yasuji is quoted saying, "In all games Yamamoto loved to take chances. He Had a gambler's heart.", both from Prange et al., At Dawn We Slept (Penguin, 1991), p.13. Add? TREKphiler hit me ♠ 22:21 & 22:38, 19 December 2008 (UTC)
"Architect of the Attack on Pearl Harbor"
As it is claimed that the subject of this article was the architect of the attack on Pearl Harbor--notwithstanding his attendance at Harvard University--should this article be written in a more balanced way? —Preceding unsigned comment added by 220.127.116.11 (talk) 18:07, 21 August 2009 (UTC)
The "sleeping giant" quote
The "sleeping giant" quote is considered unlikely by historians and certainly shouldn't be used as a "clincher sentence" for a paragraph giving Yamamoto's thoughts on a war with America. It seems to be used here to make the Admiral look prescient which was just why the screenwriter wrote the line for its use in the movie Tora, Tora, Tora. Are we writing movie screenplays or encyclopedic articles?
Like most of the military officer biographies at Wikipedia, this one suffers from POV. Considering Yamamoto's role in Midway and that the Japanese losses are among the worst in naval history, I have to wonder if he would have been remembered quite differently if he had survived the war. Erwin Rommel probably falls into this same category.--TL36 (talk) 06:42, 28 September 2009 (UTC)
- While he may not actually have said it, it's extremely probable he believed it. He'd done as much as he could to prevent war between Japan & the U.S. (short of assassination or, what I think he should've done, seppuku in protest). Prescient? He didn't have to be, just able to read statistics. Japan produced fewer aircraft for the duration than Consolidated (I think), her best a/c design at war's start was already outperformed by U.S. prototypes, & her ASW was (as Chihaya put it) "shiftless beyond description". It didn't take Carnac.
- As for POV, I'm not sure I see it. He boobed Midway badly, yeah, but it's also Japanese practise not to criticize a leader's decisions, & most Americans can't get past "sneak attack" when thinking about Pearl Harbor. Reconciling the two is a bit hard, so keeping up the legend is necessary by default. Also, he's the most famous admiral (probably) the U.S. has faced. (I can't see anybody saying "the Klingon Tanaka", tho Tanaka is the fighting admiral who probably deserves it. Or maybe Burke. Or Spruance...) TREKphiler hit me ♠ 08:01, 28 September 2009 & 20:45, 21 March 2012 (UTC)
Practise makes perfekt?
Seeing the page got changed from "practice" (U.S.) to "practise" (Brit) I have to ask, is Amlish or Britlish the correct usage, here, & should it be changed back? TREKphiler hit me ♠ 17:22, 12 November 2009 (UTC)
- I don't know what the wiki guideline is, but when in my head I separate American and British spellings, I include the close enemies of America and Great Britain. I think German/British warfare subjects should be spelled the UK way (whatever that is) and the Japanese/American warfare subjects should be spelled the American way. Binksternet (talk) 01:26, 13 November 2009 (UTC)
In reply to the deleted cmt by WesUGAdawg (in case anybody else wondered), let me say: the other 40 or so would've been VSs of the escorts, not used in the attack. TREKphiler any time you're ready, Uhura 06:22, 25 November 2009 (UTC)
Yamamoto did not attend the U.S. Naval War College as a student, though he did visit that institution on a single day in 1924.
According to the official U.S. Naval War College website , then-Captain Yamamoto visited the U.S. Naval War College on February 13, 1924. Many online sources repeat and cite the statement that Yamamoto attended the United States institution as a student but that is incorrect. He was an alumnus of two of Japan's naval educational institutions - the Japanese Navy's War College dating from 1914(US Navy Naval History and Heritage Command ) as well as an alumnus(1904) of the Japanese Naval Academy ("The Pearl Harbor papers: Inside the Japanese plans" By Donald M. Goldstein, Katherine V. Dillon, Page 111... .
The confusion seems to perhaps stem from people combining the two different countries' Naval colleges/academies. A source of the meaning and wording repeated in various online sources is possibly found in the 2007 book "Navy: An Illustrated History: The U.S. Navy from 1775 to the 21st Century" By Chester G. Hearn on Page 76: "After graduation from the Japanese Naval Academy in 1904... he attended the U.S. Naval War College, studied at Harvard University..." Shearonink (talk) 14:15, 29 May 2010 (UTC)
- Blair, Clay, Jr. Silent Victory. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1975.
- Willmott, H.P. Barrier and the Javelin. Annapolis: United States Naval Institute Pres, 1983.
- Parillo, op.cit.
Shouldn't the "Japanese Gamblers" category in the Category List be deleted since that description is perhaps only an alleged aspect of Isoroku Yamamoto's personality but is not an activity that the man was known for? I had deleted it but then decided I maybe did the deletion without the proper amount of thought so put the Category back in the List. Any Mega-Editor types out there with an opinion? It doesn't seem to me that Yamamoto is or was known for being a gambler as a profession, the term is perhaps a single aspect of his complicated personality. I'm not sure most members of the general public would look up Isoroku Yamamoto as a "Gambler". Shearonink (talk) 20:57, 10 June 2010 (UTC)
- Enjoying gambling as a pastime is not the same as professional gambler. Binksternet (talk) 05:06, 11 June 2010 (UTC)
Correctly pointing out this plan had never worked even in Japanese war games, and painfully aware of American strategic advantages in military productive capacity, Yamamoto proposed instead to seek a decision with the Americans by first reducing their forces with a preventive strike, and following it with a "Decisive Battle" sought offensively, rather than defensively. Yamamoto hoped, but probably did not believe, if the Americans could be dealt such terrific blows early in the war, they might be willing to negotiate an end to the conflict. As it turned out, however, the note officially breaking diplomatic relations with the United States was delivered late, and he correctly perceived the Americans would be resolved upon revenge and unwilling to negotiate. At the end of the attack upon Pearl Harbor, upon hearing of the mis-timing of the communique breaking diplomatic relations with the United States earlier that day, it is reputed that Yamamoto said, "I fear all we have done today is to awaken a great, sleeping giant." There is no printed evidence to support this quote.
- What Yamamoto actually believed would need solid sourcing. The "sleeping giant" quote is, at best, apocryphal. It would be a valuable add, especially if it brought to light the conflict between the "short war" & "long war" factions in Japan at the time. That debate appears to have borne weight on the credibility of "decisive battle". It would IMO also offer interesting insight into IJN's views on Mahan, & shed light on the dismally bad senior military leadership (IJN & IJA both). TREKphiler any time you're ready, Uhura 15:52, 23 October 2012 (UTC)
- I agree that what Yamamoto believes needs solid sourcing but this article has no actual sourcing at all for the section. The only source listed doesn't concern WWII or Yamamoto's thinking but leads one to remarks on the term "sleeping giant" by the editorial commentator William Safire. If this section can't be sourced, all of it needs to be removed. The term "reputed" seems misleading when referring to the "sleeping giant" quote.
- In another section, there is the following:
- When asked by Prime Minister Fumimaro Konoe in mid-1941 concerning the outcome of a possible war with the United States, Yamamoto made a well-known and prophetic statement: If ordered to fight, "I shall run wild considerably for the first six months or a year, but I have utterly no confidence for the second and third years." The word prophetic is POV and also incorrect given that the Midway disaster occurred six months later. More importantly, Encyclopedia Britannica and other historical accounts gives a different quote that is less favorable to the Admiral; "The Navy will be able to run roughshod over the theatre for a year and a half, but after that I'm not so sure ...." So which is it or could Yamamoto have made both statements to Prime Minister Konoe?TL36 (talk) 04:54, 1 April 2013 (UTC)
- ♠It appears he did say something akin to the "sleeping giant" quote, but its details are recalled differently. Personally, I've never taken the six months as a hard number; rather, I'm more & more taking it as a broad warning to the "hawks": in essence, unless you have a way to dictate terms to the U.S. & can do it in a short period, don't start this war, because it's liable to be a disaster for Japan. IJA didn't listen...
- ♠I'd disagree on "prophetic". We're writing from 2013, not 1941, & it looks like he was prophesying. Indeed, we may fairly say he was, on the terms I just described. Either way, the statement does look prophetic, if, in fact, he actually said it, which it's looking like he did. It still needs sourcing.
- ♠As for Midway, you've forgotten Coral Sea was only 4mo after Pearl...& a defeat for Japan. TREKphiler any time you're ready, Uhura 09:06, 1 April 2013 (UTC)
- I didn't forget about the Coral Sea, that battle is considered a draw by the historians I've read. I don't see how a statement is prophetic when the prophesy is incorrect and Yamamoto was certainly wrong in saying he'll run roughshod over the Pacific for 6 months (I'm being very generous about the length of time). Regardless, the person writing this is being subjective when inserting prophetic in that sentence. The article's next sentence, "His prediction would be vindicated as Japan easily conquered territories and islands for the first six months of the war" is wrong as well and needs to be removed. Besides Midway and Coral, Guadalcanal was invaded which was an important island in the Japanese strategic defense plan. I have other complaints about this article but for the present time I'm doing nothing more than editing out the word "printed" in the sentence, "There is no printed evidence to support this quote" about the sleeping giant quote. There is no documented evidence, written or otherwise to support this apocryphal quote taken from a Hollywood movie.
- I won't contact you again regarding this article because you're on a wavelength that confuses me. Previously, you commented that the sleeping giant quote was "apocryphal at best." Now, you've written "It appears he did say something akin to the "sleeping giant" quote."TL36 (talk) 17:13, 1 April 2013 (UTC)
- ♠If Coral Sea was a draw (it wasn't, the U.S. won it in a strategic sense), "roughshod" it still looked at the time. Guadalcanal wasn't til August, so that doesn't count. And Midway was, almost to the day, 6mo after Pearl Harbor.
- ♠More to the point, it's prophetic because it appears to predict exactly what did happen. And Japan, in the first six months of the war, did overrun Allied territories with comparative ease: Wake & Guam in Dec '41, Philippines by March '42, DEI early, Kokoda Track in May IIRC, Rabaul...& no effective Allied response; rather, there was a fairly confused, disorganized, & ineffectual reaction. It wasn't til Midway the U.S. scored a clear win: 6mo.
- ♠As for "apocryphal", I'd have said it was, because I've never seen anybody actually cite it, only quote it; it's looking now like more people than I thought actually heard him say something like it. I'm prepared to change my views if the evidence supports it. I still want to see it sourced. TREKphiler any time you're ready, Uhura 18:31, 1 April 2013 (UTC)
- I agree with you The Battle for the Coral Sea is a strategic win for the U.S. even if the battle itself is rated a draw. I strongly disagree with you that "Japan, in the first six months of the war, did overrun Allied territories with comparative ease." What battle did Japan win after just 10 weeks? Whether a draw or win, the Coral Sea battle makes Yamamoto's statement incorrect and thus, not prophetic. Obviously you don't want to admit it but Midway occurred within 6 months. However, discussing 6 months is immaterial because the documented response to the Prime Minister was "The Navy will be able to run roughshod over the theatre for a year and a half, but after that I'm not so sure ...." and that's why I mentioned Guadalcanal.TL36 (talk) 00:08, 2 April 2013 (UTC)
Sidebar shows age as 58 in parentheses, but I calculate 59 based on date of birth and date of death. Am I wrong? — Preceding unsigned comment added by 18.104.22.168 (talk) 15:22, 29 December 2012 (UTC)
Assassinated people categories
I figured this might be controversial so I'd bring it up for discussion first but since this seems to be a pretty open and shut assassination shouldn't this article have the categories Category:Assassinated_Japanese_people and Category:Assassinated military personnel? The article for Operation Vengeance already has the category for military assassinations on it, which could also be added here I think. If nobody replies or objects in a reasonable amount of time I'll be bold and just put them in but this should be discussed if it peaks anyone's interest. Cat-fivetc ---- 06:24, 27 February 2013 (UTC)
Correction needed for section on planning of Midway
The section on Midway states: <quote>Recent scholarship using Japanese language documents has revealed it was, rather, an unrelated venture of the Naval General Staff which Yamamoto agreed to conduct concurrently with the Midway operation, in exchange for the latter's approval.</quote> The "recent scholarship" in this sentence refers to Parshall and Tully's Shattered Sword. If you look at the book's notes, the authors credit Robert Elmer Barde's Ph.D. thesis as coming up with this revelation. There is moreover no evidence that the Shattered Sword's authors examined Japanese language documents to corroborate Barde's account of the planning of Operation MI. This passage should be removed or changed to reflect the reality of the matter. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 22.214.171.124 (talk) 20:20, 2 October 2015 (UTC)