Talk:Kashmir conflict

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@Owais Khursheed: by the statistics that you yourself included, 87% of the Srinagar population want independence, and 3% want to join Pakistan. Syed Ali Shah Geelani is in this 3%. By what measure do you claim that he represents "Kashmiri views" [3]?

Poonch-Rajouri in the 1965 war[edit]

@Faizan: this edit summary: "This is part of 1965 war. If you still disagree I will have to take it to dispute resolution edit summary", is quite inadequate to the issue raised. It may be part of the 1965 war, but this article is not about the 1965 war. I said in my revert that it is not part of the India-Pakistan conflict (in the context of Kashmir). It could be part of the Internal Conflict, for which there is another section. But, then again, you would need to show how it is part of the overall conflict. You cannot just stick random bits of information in an already very long article just because you believe it is important. You need to show the RS that highlight its importance, or you have to argue here as to how it is important.

You are free to take it to WP:DRN if you wish, but you need to first articulate what your argument is. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 10:37, 7 April 2017 (UTC)

I have created a new sub-section on the page on 1965 war where refugees will be mentioned. That will deal with Kashmir refugees as well as refugees in other parts of the subcontinent. On this page there is no suitable section to talk about refugees from the 1965 war except the section about the 1965 war. I do not agree that such a thing can go under internal conflict. There is nothing about the 1965 war in internal conflict. This is a war event and the best place to write about it is under the war. Faizan (talk) 10:52, 7 April 2017 (UTC)
You still haven't answered the question: how is this part of India-Pakistan conflict? Yes, wars do hurt people, and the Indian army might have done a poor job in this instance. But did it impact the India-Pakistan conflict? If so, how?
Everything that happened during the 1965 war cannot go here. You need to address the WP:WEIGHT issue. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 11:05, 7 April 2017 (UTC)
I have not found a rule saying that everything under India-Pakistan conflict must discuss effect of each event on relations. For instance, I have also added Mirpur Massacre of 1947 even as I cannot find any WP:RS indicating that event's effect on relations between India and Pakistan. I inserted it because it is an offshoot to the main events. Faizan (talk) 11:13, April 7, 2017‎
Yes, the Mirpur edit was also bad. In fact, it was even worse because it violates the timelines. The discussion of the Jammu massacres in that section is also overweight, added by another POV pusher that is now gone. I will need to trim it eventually. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 11:55, 7 April 2017 (UTC)
  • As I mentioned in my last edit summary, I too have a similar objection about the content's weight in that place. As Faizan said, it has to be certainly documented in the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965 article. But in this much broader article that deals with the Kashmir conflict and under the section of India - Pakistan conflict, I don't think, a whole para, explicitly about internal refugees of a war, has be inserted. Regarding Mirpur massacre in the article, it also has no effect on the conflict. But it is mentioned only in one line, so I don't object to its weight. — TylerDurden10 (talk) 11:37, 7 April 2017 (UTC)
Perhaps a brief line on refugees from Poonch-Rajouri and Chamb fleeing harassment can suffice? Faizan (talk) 11:47, 7 April 2017 (UTC)
First we would need a source that discusses it in the context of the 1965 war to know how it impacted the war. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 11:58, 7 April 2017 (UTC)

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Nehru quote from Taya Zinkin[edit]

Content from the Dixon Plan section for discussion

Here it would be pertinent to quote Pandit Nehru as reported by Taya Zinkin, the representative of "Manchester Guardian" of London, presently, The Guardian, on June 30, 1950, in answer to her question whether he would accept the "status quo" with plebiscite confined to the Valley of Kashmir, that, "I would not agree to a plebiscite so long as Pakistan held a part of the State because the people of Kashmir were 'timorous'.[1] Of course if the Kashmiris want a plebiscite to be fought on economic and not mind you, religious grounds they can have it. But I shall never allow so long as I live a plebiscite over cow's urine and all that. It would undo the whole of communal harmony." [2]


  1. ^ Timorous meaning [1]
  2. ^ Kashmir: The Storm Center of the World by Balraj Madhok [2]

@Mamta Jagdish Dhody: can you please explain your rationale for including this quote in the Dixon Plan section? Please note that Balraj Madhok does not qualify as a WP:HISTRS. Our section says that Nehru had proposed a partition-cum-plebiscite plan, sourced to proper historians, whereby a plebiscite would be held only in the Kashmir Valley. What is this quote saying with regard to that? Was it said before the proposal or after? -- Kautilya3 (talk) 10:51, 31 May 2017 (UTC)

The basis to all my edits is resolving the heinous crime situation in India, wherein comes the dirty "STONE AGE WAR", in Kashmir! Anyone who has contributed significantly to absolve it comes in my focus, including Balraj Madhok and, how I can add my knowledge to it with reference. If you are a serious editor you must have noted the steady build up of all wikipedia articles as per the relevant present from past history. Blogs are not acceptable to wikipedia, in spite of the fact that they present an independent analysis of the present times.

Please see:-

What all has been done for Kashmir cannot be put down on this talk page! Only if we focus on what is creating the trouble there, can we zero down on the main contributors to the peace of this heaven on earth, which in ancient times used to be a place where old people and the sick liked to retire to, for convalescing, spiritual healing. Religion is not an issue in Kashmir which earns from tourism. Crime is, as well as Strategic defence. Nehruji and Taya Zinkin, come in here. Please do not however make it an issue of his political inheritors, unless they are ready to focus on these two issues! Mamta Jagdish Dhody (talk) 13:46, 31 May 2017 (UTC)

This ending makes one laugh :- Mamta Jagdish Dhody (talk) 14:00, 31 May 2017 (UTC)

Well, Nehru did agree to a plebiscite in the Kashmir valley, leaving the Pakistan-held areas untouched. So, whatever may the truth of the statement he made to Taya Zinkin, it has been superseded. So, this statement doesn't belong here.
Your blogger by the way is plagiarising from A. G. Noorani. The original is here. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 16:55, 31 May 2017 (UTC)

Its ok. I make edits to increase your knowledge base, even if it is not original - at least it will lead to the original, and one can always refer to it. See the article on —war torn Kashmir— whose legacy nestles from the Hindu Kush started from here and Canada :- . In my perspective, which will not align with yours maybe, it is related to these articles.

1. . 2. . 3.

The entire Kashmir conflict is India's past and future, that one has to live with and can never leave as it is in the roots of an ancient civilization. Mamta Jagdish Dhody (talk) 18:56, 31 May 2017 (UTC)

  • Woah woah woah! What's happening here? I don't think this discussion is being any objective. Mamta Jagdish Dhody, you have to seriously consider refraining from engaging in WP:OR. Regards, Tyler Durden (talk) 19:04, 31 May 2017 (UTC)

Iftikhar Malik quotation[edit]

The following text was inserted in the Dixon Plan section quoting Iftikhar Malik, a pro-Pakistan scholar.

According to the pro-Pakistan & anti-Indian scholar Iftikhar Malik,[1] Dixon privately felt that Nehru was ‘downright lying’ because of India remaining evasive despite Dixon's shuttle diplomacy.[2]


  1. ^ Adeney, Katherine (2001). "Iftikhar Malik, Islam, Nationalism and the West: Issues of Identity in Pakistan (Book Review)". Nations and Nationalism. 7 (2): 263–264. The fourth [theme] is unfortunately an anti-Indian/pro-Pakistani bias, revealed most notably in the chapter on Kashmir, but also in 'Nationalism in contestation'. 
  2. ^ Iftikhar H. Malik (1992) Indo‐Pakistani relations: A historical reappraisal, Contemporary South Asia, 1:1, 133, DOI: 10.1080/09584939208719672 "But despite Dixon's shuttle diplomacy, India remained evasive, leaving the Australian envoy 'wondering whether Nehru really wanted an early settlement of the Kashmir situation on a basis which might be acceptable to Pakistan, whether Nehru was playing a lone card or whether he was supported by his Cabinet and responsible Indian opinion generally'. Privately, Dixon felt that Nehru was 'downright lying', as during the Dixon/Nehru/Liaquat meeting in New Delhi when Nehru spoke for 16 hours while allowing his Pakistani counterpart to speak for merely one hour. Liaquat, as appears from the recently declassified British official papers, had, at that stage, agreed to consider River Chenab as the border according to the Dixon formula, but Nehru backed out leaving both Pakistan and Dixon out in the cold."

The point of this appears to be merely to throw mud at Nehru, because no "lie" is mentioned. Dixon apparently doubted whether Nehru was representing the Cabinet and the public opinion or fighting his own lone battle. It hasn't been explained what was the basis of this. While I don't mind somebody properly analysing Nehru's intentions, I don't think this scholar has any credentials to do it.

His assertion that Liaquat Ali Khan was willing to concede the Chenab formula during the summit is false, as evidenced by many sources.[1] Liaquat was pushing for a plebiscite in all of J&K without an attendant Pakistani withdrawal while also asking for the removal of Shekh Abdullah. After the failure of the summit, Nehru proposed partition-cum-plebiscite, and Dixon tried to persuade Liaquat in a separate visit to Karachi in August 1950. It was at the point that Dixon proposed the Chenab formula (for Jammu province only). Liaquat apparently accepted it then, but with the condition that Sheikh Abdullah should be removed. Noorani states that Abdullah's removal would not have been acceptable to anybody in India, whether the Cabinet or the public opinion.[2] Iftikhar Malik's analysis is entirely substandard. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 12:11, 31 May 2017 (UTC)


I did some detailed reading over this. It does appear that Nehru's stance was inconsistent, going by the criticism in various reputable sources. Some particularly relevant extracts:

This one from Francis Pike while mentioning Dixon supports the contention that Nehru was deliberately stalling so as to avoid the plebiscite, and wanted to strengthen hold over the territory:

The reason for Nehru's failure to implement a plebiscite for Kashmir are worth analysing. Nehru's insistence that the popular will should be exercised in Junagadh and Hyderabad, and his failure to implement this solution in Jammu and Kashmir, was obviously grossly hypocritical. Quite simply, his fear of losing a plebiscite, and with it Kashmir, was not something he was prepared to concede...This position was reinforced by Nehru's refusal to sanction a United Nations Commission under Admiral Nimitz, to arbitrate a staged withdrawal of the armed forces of both sides. A further attempt to mediate a Kashmir solution saw the United Nations appoint an Australian lawyer, Sir Owen Dixon, to report on the problem. He also concluded that a fair plebiscite could not be held as long as Indian troops occupied Kashmir. By now it was clear to most observers that Nehru was filibustering for time, in the knowledge that the longer India occupied Kashmir, the more unlikely it was that the status quo would ever be changed. Nehru himself observed in August 1952 that 'Our general outlook should be such as to make people think that the association of Kashmir state with India is an accomplished fact and nothing is going to undo it.[3]

Robert J. McMahon corroborates that position, concerning the use of a plebiscite promise as a delaying mechanism:

Increasingly, American officials blamed India for the impasse. They believed that India, in rejecting the UNCIP's various truce proposals on dubious legal technicalities, was simply trying to avoid a plebiscite. They were right. Since India was already in possession of the most desirable portion of Kashmir, and since the overwhelming Muslim majority in the state made a vote to join Pakistan the most likely outcome of a fair referendum, a postponement of the plebiscite clearly served India's interests. Some Indian officials admitted candidly to their American counterparts that they would find a partition of Kashmir preferable to a plebiscite. If a plebiscite is postponed to the indefinite future, Nimitz observed astutely, India will have the opportunity of so consolidating her position on the contested area that the conditions of a 'fair' plebiscite may never exist.[4]

Furthermore, academic Hassan Abbas writes that Nehru repeatedly changed his words on the plebiscite well into the 1960s:

On May 10, 1954, Nehru, while addressing the Indian Council of States, had said: India, honestly and sincerely, does not want to tarnish its image in the world, and it is high time that the tyranny and brutalisation in the valley must cease. Kashmir is neither an inseparable nor an integral part of India...[India] must accept the facts and start making arrangements for allowing the people of the disputed territory to exercise their inalienable right of self-determination. It was astonishing, however, that Nehru tried to wriggle out of the promised plebiscite in 1961 by saying, There is no question of any plebiscite in Kashmir, now or later. I am sick of the talk about plebiscite, which does not interest anybody. That was not all. In August 1963 he changed his stance yet again, when he met Pakistan's foreign minister in New Delhi, and the resulting communique of their talks clearly stated that the Kashmir dispute would be settled in accordance with the wishes of the people of a fair and impartial plebiscite. Nothing came of this as well...India had taken a very long and tortuous route to shift from a position of hypocrisy to one of truth...Countless attempts at a solution of the Kashmir problem had foundered on the rock of Indian transigence even while officially it held to the pledge of plebiscite...[5]

So from a reliable perspective, it is a scholarly view that cannot be disregarded. Mar4d (talk) 14:44, 31 May 2017 (UTC)

I am not sure where we are going with this. I have admitted a long time ago that the doubts about whether Nehru was ever sincere about the plebiscite in Kashmir will persist. The footnote 101 documents some such doubts. You are welcome to add more if you wish. But the main body of the article is based on Mahesh Shankar's thorugh analysis based on published statements of Nehru. He documents exactly when Nehru changed his mind and why. Some people might suspect that he changed his mind much earlier. The British and American diplomats could have leaned on Pakistan to demilitarise Azad Kashmir and called Nehru's bluff. But nobody did. So we will never know the truth of these speculations.
As far as the subject matter at hand is concerned, Nehru gave written submission to Owen Dixon proposing plebiscite in the Valley and the rest of the state partitioned through negotiation. The combined response from Dixon and Liaquat Ali Khan was, "yes, but only if Sheikh Abdullah is made to step down". There ended the Dixon initiative. If there is some lie in any of this, it needs to be stated and documented. We are not going to put up with vague innuendo. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 16:39, 31 May 2017 (UTC)


  1. ^ Snedden, Christopher (2015), Understanding Kashmir and Kashmiris, Oxford University Press, p. 225, ISBN 978-1-84904-342-7 
  2. ^ A. G. Noorani, The Dixon Plan, Frontline, 12 October 2002.
  3. ^ Francis Pike (28 February 2011). Empires at War: A Short History of Modern Asia Since World War II. I.B.Tauris. pp. 348–. ISBN 978-0-85773-029-9. 
  4. ^ Robert J. McMahon (1 June 2010). The Cold War on the Periphery: The United States, India, and Pakistan. Columbia University Press. pp. 34–. ISBN 978-0-231-51467-5. 
  5. ^ Hassan Abbas (26 March 2015). Pakistan's Drift into Extremism: Allah, the Army, and America's War on Terror: Allah, the Army, and America's War on Terror. Taylor & Francis. pp. 65–. ISBN 978-1-317-46327-6. 

Mountbatten & Gurdaspur[edit]

@NadirAli:, I am reverting your addition to the Partition and invasion section, which reads as follows:

According to Yaqoob Khan Bangash it was certain that Lord Mountbatten did not want Kashmir to remain independent and he was possibly trying to get the state to accede to India. Nehru had made it clear in a letter on 17 June 1947 that ‘[i]f any attempt is made to push Kashmir into Pakistan Constituent Assembly, there is likely to be much trouble...[the] obvious course appears to be for Kashmir to join the Constituent Assembly of India’. Evidence for Mountbatten’s attempting the state to accede to India can be gleaned from the fact that on 4 August 1947 Mountbatten remarked that Kashmir could join either Dominion provided that the Radcliffe Boundary Commission awarded Gurdaspur District to India. This was despite the fact that it was generally accepted at the time that Gurdaspur District, due to its Muslim majority, would be awarded to Pakistan. When its three sub-districts were instead awarded to India, Liaquat Ali Khan complained to Lord Ismay, Mountbatten’s chief of staff, that the award was a political instead of judicial decision and an injustice and breach of faith by the British.[1]


  1. ^ Yaqoob Khan Bangash (2010) Three Forgotten Accessions: Gilgit, Hunza and Nagar, The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 38:1, 124.

It is out of order and completely undue. The passage preceding it states that the Maharaja had decided to be independent and this was communicated by the prime minister Ram Chandra Kak to Mountbatten, and Indian and Pakistani leaders in unequivocal terms on 23 July. So, what happened earlier is of no consequence, and what Mountbatten thought is entirely inconsequential because it wasn't his decision.

The Gurdaspur District issue is a red herring. What matters is the Pathankot tehsil, which contained India's land route to Kashmir and it happened to be Hindu majority. Had the Pathankot tehsil been awarded to Pakistan, all hell would have broken loose. But it wasn't. What happened to the other two tehsils has no bearing on the Kashmir conflict.[1] -- Kautilya3 (talk) 00:50, 28 May 2017 (UTC)

Many historians such as Alistair lamb say Mountbatten influenced the Radcliffe commission on Nehru’s urging so that India could access Kashmir through Gurdaspur which should have gone to Pakistan. If its in the sources and repeated by a number of historians its relevant. Even if Pathankot was the only tehsil not given to Pakistan India still would not have gained access to Kashmir because Muslim majority tehsils Batala and Gurdaspur would block India’s access. These tehsils were given to India. Shireen Ilahi does not counter this.[2]--NadirAli نادر علی (talk) 06:38, 3 June 2017 (UTC)

──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── There are two issues that should be separated:

  • Whether the awarding of Batala and Gurdaspur tehsils to India affected the Kashmir conflict.
  • Whether Mountbatten influenced the Radcliffe award in this instance.

For the second issue (Mountbatten), yes, there have been many speculations about it, but no conclusive evidence. Until there is such, that discussion does not belong in this article. It can go in the Radcliffe Line article though.

As to the first issue, the railway line to Pathankot went through Batala and Gurdaspur tehsils, but there were separate road connections to Pathankot that did not go through these tehsils. So, to argue that these tehsils were pertinent to Kashmir, it should be shown that the railway lines were crucial. Do you have such a source? Since there was no railway between Pathankot and Kashmir and the road that existed was an abysmal one, India was able to manage a poor communication line from Pathankot to Kashmir. So, how is it possible that a good roadway to Pathankot wasn't good enough? This seems to be a highly dubious argument. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 08:59, 3 June 2017 (UTC)

You say, Shireen Ilahi does not counter this. Quite disingenuous. Here it is in black and white:

Both Lamb and Ziegler, and the historians that side with either one or the other, seem to forget the crucial point that the consensus records have already illuminated - only Pathankot tehsil was of consequence to Indian access to Kashmir (by road) and its non-Muslim majority placed it solidly on the Indian side of the line.

Her entire article is devoted to refuting the non-arguments of Lamb and co. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 11:35, 3 June 2017 (UTC)
To Kautilya3: Many historians such as Alistair lamb say Mountbatten influenced the Radcliffe commission on Nehru’s urging so that India could access Kashmir through Gurdaspur which should have gone to Pakistan. If its in the sources and repeated by a number of historians its relevant. Even if Pathankot was the only tehsil not given to Pakistan India still would not have gained access to Kashmir because Muslim majority tehsils Batala and Gurdaspur would block India’s access. These tehsils were given to India. Shireen Ilahi does not counter this.[2]--NadirAli نادر علی (talk) 06:45, 9 June 2017 (UTC)
@NadirAli: why are you repeating the same post all over again? Did you read my response? -- Kautilya3 (talk) 08:44, 9 June 2017 (UTC)

For reference: A map of the Pathankot tehsil] with respect to Jammu and Kashmir. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 22:40, 21 July 2017 (UTC)

To Kautilya3: Yes, there were other roads connecting Pathankot that didn't pass through Batala and Gurdaspur Tehsils, for example the Pathankot-Dunera and Pathankot-Palampur cart roads, but it was (and still is) Pathankot that was the major Rail-head in Punjab that provided main access to the hilly areas of (now) Himachal Pradesh from Punjab, and not the other way around. Had Gurdaspur and Batala not been given to India along with Pathankot, it would have taken years, if not decades, for India to construct a reliable all weather rail/road infrastructure in its northern hilly areas to connect to Pathankot, and then onwards to Jammu. Shereen Ilahi, whoever she is, has completely missed the point. Lamb and co (sic) didn't argue that it was 'impossible' for India to annex Kashmir had Gurdaspur district been transferred to Pakistan, they argued that the controversial award of Muslim majority Gurdaspur district to India made the (otherwise non-viable) accession of Kashmir to India 'feasible' . Also, Shereen Ilahi is 'assuming' that the Pathankot tehsil was to be transferred to India anyway as its non-Muslim majority placed it solidly on the Indian side of the line. She has ignored the fact that in the `notional' award attached to the Indian Independence Act, all of Gurdaspur District was marked as Pakistan, and later, several Muslim majority tehsils were handed over to India. So Ms. Ilahi is making a baseless "assumption" here. Samm19 (talk) 21:20, 17 July 2017 (UTC)

The 'Gurdaspur district' was not awarded to India. Three tehsils out of four were awarded to India. If I recall correctly, Wavell's line gave all of the Gurdaspur district to India. (You say it was "rejected", but by whom?) However, whether it was "rejected" or not is not the point. Whatever reasons made Wavell give Gurdaspur district to India, didn't disappear by the time Radcliffe came on the scene? So, the theory that Mountbatten was conspiring with India to influence the award is very weak. Unlike Radcliffe, Wavell did explain the reasons for his award. You can go and read them.
If I were Radcliffe, I would say that the district is roughly 50-50 Muslim vs. non-Muslim. I know that population exchange is taking place. So, perhaps I would want to give half of it to India and half to Pakistan. But, unfortunately, the Gurdaspur's tehsils were stacked on top of each other along the north-south axis rather than east-west axis. So, there was no clean way to divide them 50-50. Giving three tehsils to India would preserve the railway line and canals. That seems visibly unfair to Pakistan. Perhaps I could make it up by giving some other territory to Pakistan in exchange.
That could have been the reasoning that went on with Radcliffe. There is no Kashmir here and no Mountbatten either. Whoever wants to make theories needs to address all such issues. Shereen Ilahi is doing that. Bangash is just repeating the standard Pakistani gripes without rhyme or reason. That is not scholarly at all. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 22:04, 17 July 2017 (UTC)
The 'notional' award is precisely what the name says. It was notional. It was a rough and ready line drawn for the purpose of illustration to the British Parliament, as part of passing the Indian Independence Act. If the notional award was to be the final one, there would have been no need for a Boundary Commission at all. So there is no point discussing the notional award. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 22:23, 17 July 2017 (UTC)
Also, interestingly, an explicit denial has been given:

Lord Radcliffe has denied that access to Kashmir and Jammu was at any time of the 'other factors' affecting the award.[3]

So, I am afraid idle speculations won't do. Some solid evidence is necessary to make any headway. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 23:08, 17 July 2017 (UTC)
To Kautilya3: Wavell's plan was rejected by HMG; The British Cabinet in Jan 1947.[4] Wavell was a strong proponent of united India and his whole idea of 'breakdown' was meant to make Pakistan small, weak and unattractive for Jinnah. Wavell in his breakdown plan did mention that his 'proposal' of giving Gurdaspur to India was, of course, negotiable. There is a reason for which Wavell never acknowledged that Punjab was partitioned according to his breakdown plan. But that is another debate.
The point is, you are rejecting the opinion of Mr. Bangash, an Oxonian currently serving as Assistant Professor of history at one of the most prestigious universities in Pakistan, and deriding him as "not scholarly" and trying to present Ms. Shereen Ilahi (whoever she is) as a true scholar, just because the views held by the former are opposed to your own and the latter agrees with you. You, of course, are entitled to your opinion but removing/deleting properly referenced content from wikipedia just because you don't agree with it, or personally find it 'not scholarly', is not very 'neutral', and if I am not mistaken, wikipedia is supposed to be neutral. As already pointed out by @NadirAli:, If an opinion is held by a number of historians, and has been repeated many times, it is relevant (and therefore should not be deleted).
As for Lord Radcliffe, he himself is "the accused", whatever he says holds little, if any, credibility. Samm19 (talk) 23:24, 17 July 2017 (UTC)


  • Wavell's 'Breakdown Plan' had nothing to do with the partition line, and is irrelevant to the discussion. (And, I should note, there is way too much WP:OR in your commentary.)
  • Bangash may be an Oxonian, but all that it means here is that he is a reliable source. So is Shereen Ilahi. Other than that, it is the evidence and the analysis that matters. Bangash too is conceding Ilahi's point in his footnote 22:

[22] Chaudhry Muhammad Ali, The Emergence of Pakistan, 215-20. Only Pathankot tehsil had a Hindu majority, but, without Gurdaspur and Batala tehsils which had Muslim majorities, India could still not have unfettered access to Kashmir.

So it is not the Pathankot tehsil that is being contested, but the Gurdaspur and Batala tehsils. Supposedly it provided "unfettered access", which was important enough for Nehru, Mountbatten as well Radcliffe to bend the rules and cheat in favaour of India. It is a pretty far-fetched theory that might have currency in Pakistan, but note here. Victoria Schoefield, who is sensible about these matters says this:[5]

In the final award the three tehsils... went to India. A memorandum prepared by the minister of state, which included Radcliffe's observations after he returned to England, reported that the reason for changing the 'notional' award regarding Gurdaspur was because 'the headwaters of the canals which irrigate the Amritsar District lie in the Gurdaspur District and it is important to keep as much as possible of these canals under one [i.e. Indian] administration'.[35: Hugh Tinker, 'Pressure, Persuasion, Decision...', The Journal of Asian Studies, August 1977, p.702] Wavell, however, had made a more significant political judgement in his plan, submitted to the secretary of state, Lord Pethick-Lawrence, in February 1946: 'Gurdaspur must go with Amritsar for geographical reasons and Amritsar being sacred city of Sikhs must stay out of Pakistan... Fact that much of Lahore district is irrigated from upper Bari Doab canal with headworks in Gurdaspur district is awkward but there is no solution that avoids all such difficulties.' Wavell had also noted the problem this would create by leaving Qadian, the holy city of the Ahmadiyyas, in India, but the interests of the Sikhs were considered to be paramount. 'The greatest difficulty is position of Sikhs with their homelands and sacred places on both sides of the border. This problem is one which no version of Pakistan can solve'.[36: Wavell to Pethick-Lawrence, 7 February 1946, Transfer, vol.6, doc. 406, p.912]

There the matter rests, unless somebody can dig up some evidence to the contrary.
  • Please don't speak of "accusing" people. That is not the job of Wikipedia. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 15:15, 18 July 2017 (UTC)

To Kautilya3:

  • Let me remind you my friend that Wavell's 'Break Down' plan was brought into discussion by you and I have only replied/responded. As for WP:OR, I am new to wikipedia editing and am trying to learn about 'how to add references', but rest assured I know what I am talking about, and I can back up everything I write/say with authentic sources.
  • No, Mr. Bangash is not conceding Ilahi's point. As already shown, she doesn't even have 'a point' to begin with.
  • If one goes through the section 'Partition and Invasion', he may find out that the entire section is dedicated to Indian POV only and contains different kinds of unsubstantiated allegations leveled against Pakistan by Indian authors and scholars. I am surprised that you have no problem with that but are unwilling to let anyone post Pakistan's point of view in that section. So, let's leave aside other things and concentrate on this. What makes you believe that posting/presenting the official position maintained by Pakistan in this regard (that is corroborated by multiple local and international sources) should not be allowed ? Samm19 (talk) 16:48, 18 July 2017 (UTC)
  • As I said right in the beginning it would be "completely UNDUE" to go into the issues of partition or the British role in the whole affair. The British role was of course not limited to the allocation of Gurdaspur. It started sometime around 1939 in promising the creation of Pakistan and it went all the way until Pakistan signed the Mutual Defence Treaty with the US in 1954. There is long story to be told, and there are plenty of books about it.
  • This article is on Kashmir conflict and it focuses on India, Pakistan and the people of the state, who are the main people that are "conflicted". The maximum that can be put in this article is the mention that the award of Gurdaspur to India made Kashmir contiguous to India, and Pakistanis allege British manipulation of the award. I will add that in the next couple of days.
  • Regarding Wavell, you are confusing the 'breakdown plan' (January 1947) with his partition line (February 1946). The Radcliffe line essentially followed Wavell's, except for a few details. So, Wavell's line is quite important, even though it is hard to find sources about it.
  • As for Radcliffe, most people don't seem to know the process. Radcliffe didn't lock himself up in a room and work in vacuum. He was the head of Commission (in fact, two Commissions), which held public hearings with copious presentations and argumentations made by both the sides. Radcliffe didn't attend all the sessions, but the proceedings were flown in to him on a daily basis. So he knew what the issues were. It is quite ridiculous to claim that some letter from Nehru to Mountbatten was evidence of "cheating". All kinds of people were trying to talk to all kinds of people, trying to influence the award. You yourself quoted Liaquat Ali Khan trying to pressure Ismay. That was equally evidence of "cheating".
  • Christopher Beaumont, Radcliffe's secretary, has revealed that the only time Radcliffe met Mountbaten without an aide was on 11 August for a lunch. The Gurdaspur decision had been made before that date, and the Pakistan government has in its possession (through another instance of "cheating") a copy of the older map which shows that fact. So, sorry to burst your bubble. It is quite easy to prove that the Gurdaspur decision was Radcliffe's own decision.
This is my last post on this topic here. The rest to be continued at the Radcliffe Line article. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 03:44, 20 July 2017 (UTC)

To Kautilya3: My friend, I know what I am talking about and I am not confusing anything. However, I am unable to understand that why are you so much against allowing Pakistani View to be presented/posted? Pakistan, after all, is a party to the Dispute. You have every right to disagree with the Pakistani position, but why censor it ? Pakistan bases its entire Kashmir case on the unfair and planned transfer of the Muslim majority Gurdaspur District to India in order to give it a land access to Kashmir, and it considers this controversial transfer to be the 'origin' of the dispute. I fail to see how is this 'not related' to the topic. We all have our prejudices and biases but we shall not let our prejudice cloud our judgement. So, I would say that Pakistani View definitely deserves more than just 'two lines'. Samm19 (talk) 05:06, 20 July 2017 (UTC)

And... respected sir, I request you not to use phrases like "burst your bubble" etc., trust me, you haven't even come close to 'proving' anything. We can always agree to disagree however Samm19 (talk) 05:41, 20 July 2017 (UTC)

You have asked multiple times why I am "against" Pakistani View to be presented. So, here is the answer. Wikipedia is an encyclopedia (click that and read it), which focuses on presenting factual information. Views come into the picture only to the extent that facts may not be known, and multiple sources provide conflicting views. However, Wikipedia is not a forum to present "views". That would be a WP:SOAPBOX, which Wikipedia is not.
Now you assert Pakistan bases its entire Kashmir case on the unfair and planned transfer. That is complete WP:OR as far as I can see. You need to provide reliable third party sources that attest to that. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 10:41, 20 July 2017 (UTC)
To Kautilya3: Yes, you are right, sir. Wikipedia is an encyclopedia that is supposed to be neutral and present 'facts'. But the problem here is that you are presenting unsubstantiated Indian allegations as factual information, and are parading the opinions of Indian authors as 'facts'. India and Pakistan see Kashmir issue through different prisms and what is considered 'fact' by one is rejected as 'fiction' and 'fabrication' by the other. The international opinion on this matter is divided. Some scholars accept the Indian position while many others reject it. Same holds true for the Pakistani position. I believe that the proper approach in such matters is to allow both sides to present their views and leave it to the readers to decide who is right and who is not, and what the actual 'facts' of the matter are. Why double standards ?? Why allow Indian view but censor Pakistani? You are ignoring Wikipedia's basic principle and core content policy of NPOV:

All encyclopedic content on Wikipedia must be written from a neutral point of view (NPOV), which means representing fairly, proportionately, and, as far as possible, without editorial bias, all of the significant views that have been published by reliable sources on a topic.

About what I have posted, I have backed it up with proper and reliable sources/references, Pakistani as well as neutral. Please read it through. So, I will ask you once again to stop deleting/disallowing properly referenced content that goes against your pre-conceived notions, and that challenges the Indian position. I believe we can sort out this 'dispute' mutually. Otherwise, we can ask for 'neutral' opinion on this. Regards Samm19 (talk) 15:06, 20 July 2017 (UTC)
I am afraid you are being evasive. You have started this entire discussion of the Gurdaspur Award and wrote reams of posts, claiming Pakistan bases its entire Kashmir case on the unfair and planned transfer. I have asked for reliable sources that state this. You haven't provided any. Can you do that please? If there are problems with other issues in the article, you are welcome to raise them separately. But as far as this discussion is concerned, you need to demonstrate the claimed centrality of the Gurdaspur Award to the Kashmir conflict. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 18:05, 20 July 2017 (UTC)

To Kautilya3: You, my friend, seem to have some serious comprehension issues. Read "Pakistani PoV" through, carefully, and then please tell us what makes you believe that it is not related to the (history/origin of the) Kashmir Dispute ???. And please tell us that why do you think that the 'provided sources' are not reliable ? or why should it not be included in the section "Partition and invasion" ? Also, please tell us that why are you OK with the unsubstantiated allegations leveled against Pakistan by Indian authors in the aforementioned section but NOT ok with Pakistani view ? Samm19 (talk) 18:52, 20 July 2017 (UTC)


  1. ^ Ilahi, Shereen (2003). "The Radcliffe Boundary Commission and the Fate of Kashmir". India Review. 2 (1): 77–102. ISSN 1473-6489. doi:10.1080/714002326. 
  2. ^ a b Hafeez Malik (27 July 2016). Soviet-Pakistan Relations and Post-Soviet Dynamics, 1947–92. Springer. pp. 55–. ISBN 978-1-349-10573-1.  Cite error: Invalid <ref> tag; name "Malik2016" defined multiple times with different content (see the help page).
  3. ^ Hodson, H. V. (1969), The Great Divide: Britain, India, Pakistan, London: Hutchinson, p. 354 
  4. ^ F. Riddick, John (2006), The History of British India: A Chronology, p. 119, ISBN 9780313322808 
  5. ^ Schofield, Victoria (2003) [First published in 2000], Kashmir in Conflict, London and New York: I. B. Taurus & Co, p. 35, ISBN 1860648983 

Notional award[edit]

About Notional Award, of course it wasn't 'final'. The point is, the notional award, in accordance with 'The terms of reference to the Boundary Commission'; of ascertaining the contiguous majority areas of Muslims and non-Muslims, [1] did 'suggest' that the entire Gurdaspur District, including the Hindu majority tehsil of Pathankot, would be included in Pakistan as it was 51.14% Muslim majority.[2] All of the 5 Muslim majority tehsils of Non-Muslim majority districts of Punjab that were to be included in India as per the notional award were handed over to India.[3] But the only non-Muslim majority Tehsil (i.e. Pathankot) that was to be included in Pakistan, was not given to Pakistan, and then to add insult to injury, two more Muslim majority tehsils (Gurdaspur and Batala) were given away to India along with Pathankot.[3] Therefore, Ms. Shereen Ilahi's assertion/claim that 'the non-Muslim majority of Pathankot tehsil placed it solidly on the Indian side of the line' cannot be accepted, and the assumption that Pathankot, owing to its Hindu majority, was to be included in India anyway, is ill-founded. Samm19 (talk) 00:19, 18 July 2017 (UTC)


  1. ^ V.P. Menon (1957). Transfer of Power in India. Orient Blackswan. p. 402. ISBN 9780691626666. 
  2. ^ Schofield 2003, p. 35.
  3. ^ a b Pervaiz I Cheema; Manuel Riemer (22 August 1990). Pakistan's Defence Policy 1947-58. Palgrave Macmillan UK. pp. 27–. ISBN 978-1-349-20942-2. 

Arbitrary break[edit]

closed due to the topic ban of its initiator
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To Kautilya3: I have a question for you. What was the the basic sub-unit to divide Punjab, district or tehsil ? If it was Tehsil, then why were Muslim majority Tehsils of Ferozepur, Zira, Ajnala, Nakodar and Jullundur given to India ? If it was district, then what is the basis of your claim that the only Non-Muslim majority Tehsil (i.e. Pathankot) of Muslim Majority district of Gurdaspur was to be included in India anyways giving it a road-access to Kashmir ?? 7-8 Muslim majority Tehsils of Punjab were given to India, no Non-Muslim majority Tehsil was given to Pakistan. Pathankot could easily have been the one (if those drawing lines were not pro-India) Samm19 (talk) 01:14, 16 July 2017 (UTC)

The terms of reference to the Boundary Commission had no requirements about any levels. But it was widely assumed that it would be at the tehsil level at least, with the possibility that it could go down to even finer levels when necessary. If it was at the district level, the entire Gurdaspur district (incuding the Shakargarh tehsil) might have gone to India as per Wavell's decision earlier. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 13:42, 16 July 2017 (UTC)

To Kautilya3: So, it was neither Tehsil nor District that was the basic sub-unit to divide Punjab but whatever suited the agenda of those drawing the line?. "Other Factors" too came into play. This gives rise to a very important question that why, without any exception, India 'gained territory' and Pakistan 'lost territory' whenever and where ever those ambiguous "Other Factors" came into play?. While a Muslims majority district of Punjab and several Muslim majority tehsils were handed over to India, ironically or perhaps strategically no non-Muslim majority tehsil or district was given to Pakistan.

As for Wavell's breakdown plan, it had been already rejected, and in the `notional' award attached to the Indian Independence Act, all of Gurdaspur District was marked as Pakistan.[1] Gurdaspur district along with four to five Muslim majority tehsils were given to India despite Mountbatten’s assurance that ‘there can be no question of coercing any large areas in which one community has a majority to live against their will under a Government in which another community has majority.’ [2]

Radcliffe Award was altered by Mountbatten; Gurdaspur was handed over to India and thus was manipulated the accession of Kashmir to India.[3] Despite all protestations ‘to the effect that if it was proved true that the Gurdaspur district in the north Punjab area or even a large part of ithad been given to East Punjab by the Boundary Commission, this would be regarded as a most serious fact by Jinnah and the Pakistan Government’ amounting to ‘so grave a breach of faith as to imperil the future friendly relations between Pakistan and the British’, no attempt was made to redress the Muslim grievances.(Viceroy’s Personal Report No. 17, 16 August 1947, IOR/L/P/6/123.) Samm19 (talk) 17:44, 17 July 2017 (UTC)

@Kautilya3: @NadirAli:, guys, need feedback

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Pakistani POV[edit]

closed because this content has been moved to Radcliffe Line
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Pakistan maintains that the Radcliffe Award was altered by Mountbatten; Gurdaspur was handed over to India and thus was manipulated the accession of Kashmir to India.[1] District Gurdaspur was a Muslim majority district, three of its four sub-districts (or tehsils) were Muslim majority.[2] In the `notional' award attached to the Indian Independence Act that had already been put into effect for purposes of administration ad interim, all of Gurdaspur district was marked as Pakistan with 51.14% Muslim majority.[3][4] Mountbatten, well aware of what was impending, delayed the announcement of the Radcliffe Award until 36 hours after India and Pakistan had received their independence[5] and in the final award, the major part of Gurdaspur district, i.e. three of the four tehsils (including two Muslim majority tehsils) and also a small part of the fourth, was handed over to India, giving India practical land access to Kashmir, thus making the Indian intervention in Kashmir possible.[6] It came as a great blow to Pakistan. Jinnah, other leaders of Pakistan, and particularly its officials, criticized the Award as ‘extremely unjust and unfair’.[7]

Muhammad Zafarullah Khan, who represented the Muslim League in July 1947 before the Radcliffe Boundary Commission, stated that the Boundary Commission was a farce. A secret deal between Mountbatten and Congress leaders had already been struck.[8] Mehr Chand Mahajan, who represented Congress before the Radcliffe Boundary Commission, in his autobiography, has acknowledged that when he was selected for the boundary commission, he was not inclined to accept the invitation as he believed that the commission was just a farce and that decisions were actually to be taken by Mountbatten himself.[9][10] It was only under British pressure that the charges against Mountbatten of last minute alterations in the Radcliffe Award were not officially brought forward by Pakistani Government in the UN Security Council while presenting its case on Kashmir.[11]

Stanley Wolpert writes that Radcliffe in his initial maps awarded Gurdaspur district to Pakistan but one of Nehru’s and Mountbatten’s greatest concerns over the new Punjab border line was to make sure that Gurdaspur should not go to Pakistan, since that would have deprived India of direct road access to Kashmir.[12] As per “The Different Aspects of Islamic Culture”, a part of UNESCO’s Histories flagship project, recently disclosed documents of the history of the partition reveal British complicity with the top Indian leadership to wrest Kashmir from Pakistan. Alastair Lamb, based on the study of recently declassified documents, has convincingly proved that Mountbatten, in league with Nehru, was instrumental in pressurizing Radcliff to award the Muslim-majority district of Gurdaspur in East Punjab to India which could provide India with the only possible access to Kashmir.[13] Andrew Roberts believes that Mountbatten cheated over India-Pak frontier [14] and states that If gerrymandering took place in case of Ferozepur, it is not too hard to believe that Mountbatten also pressurised Radcliffe to ensure that Gurdaspur wound up in India giving India a road access to Kashmir. [15][16] Perry Anderson states that Mountbatten, officially supposed neither to exercise any influence on Radcliffe, nor to have any knowledge of his findings, intervened behind the scenes – probably at Nehru’s behest – to alter the award. He had little difficulty getting Radcliffe change his boundaries to allot the Muslim-majority district of Gurdaspur to India rather than to Pakistan thus giving India the only access road from Delhi to Kashmir[17] Professor Lawrence Ziring, considered an authority on Pakistan's political development[18] writes that the Gurdaspur district of the Punjab, a Muslim-dominant area, had been demarcated for India not Pakistan in order to provide New Delhi with direct land access to Kashmir. Jinnah’s effort to prevent this geopolitical strategizing provide futile, and indeed the granting of Gurdaspur to India by Britain signaled India’s intention to occupy the mountain kingdom with British acquiescence.[19]

However some British works suggest contrary to that 'Kashmir State was not in anybody's mind'[20] when the Award was being drawn and that even the Pakistanis themselves had not realized the importance of Gurdaspur to Kashmir until the Indian forces actually entered Kashmir.[21] Both Mountbatten and Radcliffe, of course, have strongly denied these charges. It is impossible to accurately quantify the personal responsibility for the tragedy of Kashmir as the Mountbatten papers relating to the issue at the India Office Library and records are closed to scholars for an indefinite period.[22] Samm19 (talk) 23:56, 19 July 2017 (UTC)


  1. ^ Zaidi, Z. H. (2001), Pakistan Pangs of Birth, 15 August-30 September 1947, p. 379, ISBN 9789698156091 
  2. ^ Schofield 2003, p. 38.
  3. ^ Schofield 2003, p. 35.
  4. ^ The Reminiscences of Sir Muhammad Zafrulla Khan by Columbia University, 2004, p. 155 
  5. ^ Anderson, Perry, Why Partition? 
  6. ^ The Reminiscences of Sir Muhammad Zafrulla Khan by Columbia University, 2004, p. 158 
  7. ^ Zaidi, Z. H. (2001), Pakistan Pangs of Birth, 15 August-30 September 1947, p. 380, ISBN 9789698156091 
  8. ^ Muhammad Zafarullah Khan, Tahdith-i-Ni‘mat, Pakistan Printing Press, 1982, p. 515 
  9. ^ Mehr Chand Mahajan, Looking Back: The Autobiography Bombay, 1963, p. 113 
  10. ^ The Reminiscences of Sir Muhammad Zafrulla Khan by Columbia University, 2004, p. 149-150 
  11. ^ Sohail, Massarat (1991), Partition and Anglo-Pakistan relations, 1947-51, Vanguard, p. 76-77 
  12. ^ Wolpert, Stanley (2009), Shameful Flight: The Last Years of the British Empire in India, Oxford University Press, USA, p. 167 
  13. ^ The Different Aspects of Islamic Culture (PDF), 2016, p. 355 
  14. ^ Author's Review, Eminent Churchillians 
  15. ^ Robert, Andrew (1994), Eminent Chruchillians 
  16. ^ Sher Muhammad Garewal,“Mountbatten and Kashmir Issue”, Journal of Research Society of Pakistan, XXXIV (April 1997), pp.9-10
  17. ^ Anderson, Perry, Why Partition? 
  18. ^ Book Review, Lawrence Ziring: Pakistan in the twentieth century: a political history 
  19. ^ Pakistan Journal of History & Culture (Quaid-i-Azam Number) Vol. XXII, No. 2,July - Dec, 2001Nazaria-i-Pakistan Trust 
  20. ^ Hodson, H. V. (1969), The Great Divide: Britain, India, Pakistan, London: Hutchinson, p. 355 
  21. ^ Hugh Tinker, Journal of Asian Studies, XXXVI, 4, p. 701
  22. ^ Robert, Andrew (1994), Eminent Chruchillians, p. 105 

To Kautilya3: Why do you want to move this discussion to another page, my friend ? I believe It belongs here Samm19 (talk) 05:41, 20 July 2017 (UTC)

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One sided / Biased article[edit]

This article is composed with very biased and one sided articles. It is not good for reference or education purpose. It only shows Pakistan's hard line views. For example, every where it keeps saying India is a fault and Pakistan is not.

Examples: "Nehru was lying....." - Not a fact. "Human rights violations are more in Indian Administered Kashmir than POK" - No reporting every comes out from POK due to hard dictatorship of Pak Govt. "Rapes etc by Indian military forces..." - not an actual fact or any evidence.

We should have normal narrative where both sides should be represented. I request this article to be updated accordingly or removed from Wikipedia. — Preceding unsigned comment added by Sonalrajeev (talkcontribs) 18:22, 26 June 2017 (UTC)

Similarly, in the introduction, it takes a quote from a book about the alleged human rights violations of the Indian army versus those of the terrorist organizations, and asserts that the army's violations are far worse (stated as fact rather than the opinion of one author). — Preceding unsigned comment added by 2606:A000:C689:4A00:F0CD:C6C:2F28:47DC (talk) 00:18, 10 July 2017 (UTC)

Indo-Pak war of 1947[edit]

closed due to the topic ban of the initiator
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To Kautilya3: Here it is: [1]

With this summit between Jinnah and Mountbatten at Lahore on 1 November, we enter a decisive phase of negotiations on Kashmir between India and Pakistan... A full account is available in a “Note of Discussion” by Mountbatten of his talks with Jinnah in the presence of Lord Ismay his Chief of Staff at Government House, Lahore.[21] The talks spread over three and a half hours, covered Kashmir (“most of the time”), Hyderabad and Junagadh.

Mountbatten offered a six para “proposals to form the basis of discussion.” It proposed plebiscite in Kashmir under the United Nations’ supervision and “a joint India-Pakistan force should hold the ring while the plebiscite is being held.” This was to form part of a wider accord on “procedure for accession of those States in which this matter is in dispute.” That was formulated in a draft which is quoted in extenso: “The Governments of India and Pakistan agree that, where the ruler of a State does not belong to the community to which the majority of his subjects belong, and where the State has not acceded to that Dominion whose majority community is the same as the State’s, the question of whether the State should finally accede to one or the other of the Dominions should in all cases be decided by an impartial reference to the will of the people.”

It was a fair offer. The “communal factor” was untied by India. It was ignored by Pakistan only to rely on it later. It clearly had Nehru’s endorsement since he repeated this offer to Liaquat a week later. Mountbatten claimed that Jinnah considered plebiscite to be “redundant and undesirable” and proposed an outright exchange of Junagadh for Kashmir. “Mr. Jinnah then went on to say that he could not accept a formula if it was so drafted as to include Hyderabad, since he pointed out that Hyderabad did not wish to accede to either Dominion and he could not be a party to coercing them to accession.” Jinnah said that “there was no sense in having Junagadh in the Dominion of Pakistan.” He had accepted it reluctantly. He explained that he was opposed to a plebiscite in Kashmir because of the presence of Indian troops there and with Sheikh Abdullah in power.

Samm19 (talk) 09:46, 21 July 2017 (UTC)

To Lopki90: before making edits, please discuss it here. Samm19 (talk) 11:01, 21 July 2017 (UTC)

To Kautilya3: I have added a 'more balanced' narrative. Jinnah was not against plebiscite, he believed that a plebiscite under the supervision of the Indian Army would be sabotaged. And he didn't trust Sheikh Abdullah. He alone is not to be blamed for the failure of Jinnah-Mountbatten talks. And Please read paragraph 2 and 3 (about Jinnah-Mountbatten talks), if needed, remove the redundant lines/parts as the same thing is being repeated in both paras. Regards Samm19 (talk) 13:07, 21 July 2017 (UTC)

To Kautilya3: Thanks for the advice. Now A G Noorani is not a reliable source ?? Why am I not surprised ?? anyway, if you insist on pushing Indian PoV and deleting everything that goes against your view, this section too has to be marked "Not Neutral"

Tell us why you believe that only Jinnah is to be blamed for failure of Jinnah-Mountbatten talks ? just because he was a Pakistani ? Samm19 (talk) 01:02, 22 July 2017 (UTC)

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UN Mediation[edit]

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The 'terms' of the UNSC Resolutions in Kashmir require an agreement between India, Pakistan and UNSC appointed mediators on demilitarization. There is no requirement for a unilateral and unconditional withdrawal upon Pakistan. The demilitarization of Jammu and Kashmir was to take place in a "synchronized manner" on both sides of the ceasefire line

B. (1) When the Commission shall have notified the Government of India that the tribesmen and Pakistan nationals referred to in Part II A2 hereof have withdrawn, thereby terminating the situation which was represented by the Government of India to the Security Council as having occasioned the presence of Indian forces in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, and further, that the Pakistan forces are being withdrawn from the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the Government of India agrees to begin to withdraw the bulk of their forces from the State in stages to be agreed upon with the Commission.​ [4]

- — Preceding unsigned comment added by Samm19 (talkcontribs)

Please remember to sign your posts, avoid white space, and indent appropriately. See HELP:TALK.
The source you quoted (not an UNSC resolution, but a UNCIP resolution) is called a WP:PRIMARY source. Wikipedians are not allowed to interpret PRIMARY sources. Calling it a "synchronized manner" is your interpretation, which is fit for a blog site, but not Wikipedia.
The content in the article is cited to reliable sources. Please check them. If there is a problem with a source, please bring it up. If you have another source that says something different, please mention it. You cannot randomly "dispute" a sourced statement. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 00:09, 22 July 2017 (UTC)

To Kautilya3: No, it's not "my" interpretation. It is the official position maintained by Pakistan. For your education:

Pakistan's official response to ICJ(International Commission of Jurists):

The Response of the Government of Pakistan[1]

(a) The demilitarization of Jammu and Kashmir was to take place in a synchronized manner on both sides of the ceasefire line. It was India which refused to implement the process of demilitarization.

(b) The proof of Indian refusal to demilitarize is to be found in the report of Sir Owen Dixon (an eminent Australian Jurist and United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan) to the Security Council, contained in Document S-1971, in which he concluded as follows:-

"In the end, I became convinced that India’s agreement would never be obtained to demilitarization in any form or to provisions governing the period of plebiscite of any such character, as would in my opinion, permit the plebiscite being conducted in conditions sufficiently guarding against intimidation and other forms of influence and abuse by which the freedom and fairness of the plebiscite might be imperilled."(Para 52 of Document S/1971).

(c) It should also be noted that after a thorough examination of the matter the Security Council in its Resolution No. 98(1952), adopted on 23rd December 1952, allowed both India and Pakistan to maintain a limited number of their forces on each side of the cease-fire line at the end of the period of demilitarization in order to maintain law and order. This number was to be between 3000-6000 armed forces remaining on the Pakistani side and 12000-18000 remaining on the Indian side of the cease-fire line. Pakistan agreed to this proposal; India did not.

(d) To claim, in the face of this clear and irrefutable evidence, that the plebiscite could not be held because Pakistan refused to withdraw its forces, is patently an attempt to deceive the world. The simple truth is that India did not allow the creation of conditions necessary for the holding of a free and fair plebiscite under UN auspices.

Please don't remove the "disputed" tag unless you are able to address the issue regards Samm19 (talk) 00:18, 22 July 2017 (UTC)


  1. ^ "Human rights in Kashmir: report of a mission". International Commission of Jurists. 1995. pp. 162–63. 

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