Talk:Logical positivism

Things to focus (on)

1. both scientific-method empiricism and logical proofs are accepted
2. logic positivism is related but not necessarily tautological to logicalism = the claim that everything that can exist has logical foundations (they don’t have to be scientoempirically observed and be mathematically proven [at least all of them] because the possible substantialities are infinite). Logicalism isn't against proofs, but there cannot be infinite proofs and aren't trivially generalizable/ the omniuniversal axiomatics [omniaxiomatics] = the axiomatic system which includes all axiomatic systems isn't a finite theory (many axiomatic systems are mutually exclusive; but theoretically an infinite axiomatic program [axiomatic programs work better than axiomatic lists in complex systems] would be able to manage it; but existence is always local and never infinite [see: Hubble volume/ an infinite physical computer would face causality fragmentation]
3. the axiomatic prerequisites for common mathematics isn't tautological to the axiomatic prerequisites for physical foundations (which are tree-like axiomatic programs and not necessarily typical axiomatic systems)/ The foundations of mathematics have innate logical gaps because mathematics is a generic measuring-calculational-proof-scientific [not ontological in itself] axiomatic system. Any effort to complete the foundations of mathematics is either erroneous, or produces one of the infinite possible allomathematics (mathematics with different axioms). Infinite physics and universes are logically possible. The foundations of a universe have to be built on an axiomatic tree-program without logical gaps, but that produces only biased (one out of many) universe. There's no single universe.
4. overscientification: The erroneous claim that science has to focus only on our universe (without proof on why science is limited), usually claimed by mathematicians (like Sabine Hossenfelder) which cancel themselves, because mathematics is compatible (due to logic) but not tautological to physics (and to its foundations)
5. problems of axiomaticity/ axiomatic systems: incompleteness, inconsistency, uncalculability. The physical foundations don't have to be a closed system (open systems work better in axiomatic program trees which meet the criteria of physical foundations)
6. axiomatic workarounds/ ways of the physical foundations to workaround without to cancel the problems of axiomaticity/ axiomatic systems: Heisenberg's uncertainty principle isn't fundamental in quantum field theory (the overall wavefunction has one definition); but in the infinite series of Wigner's friends it becomes important (still though the overall wavefunction has one definition, but it's not trivially infinite)
7. Some people who work on physicalism are Christians, and others are simplistic. Physicalism = the claim that everything that can exist is physical (cyclic and hollow nondefinition), isn't tautological to logicalism = the claim that everything that can exist has logical foundations
8. logicalism/logicogony = cosmogony from logical foundations vs nihilogony = cosmogony due to the decay of the permanently nonexistent nothing[ness] into something/ universes
   • If you are a logicalist, you deem the logical foundations self-caused if they are rigorous (the physical foundations can have logical gaps as an open system, but these gaps have to be filled by tree-like axiomatics/ practically logical gaps aren't allowed on the physical foundations, but the logical completeness requires self-interactions and in some cases tree-like axiomatics = family tree of mathematically related universes. Most universes are mathematically nonparallelizable. Not all univeses belong in the same axiomatic tree = multiverse. There is no true omniverse/ the omnimultiverse isn't a true system; the full collection of universes is just a set; not all univeses are mathematically related.
   • nihilogony isn't compatible with logicogony — Preceding unsigned comment added by 2A02:2149:8B27:5500:E8B1:EBBE:FDD:980D (talk) 06:27, 28 April 2023 (UTC)

A 'Cultish' article

What more can be said about it? Understandably, those with sufficient interest in topic to spend their time at work on this entry would include cultists. But one might wish for a more neutral point of view. Badiacrushed (talk) 11:50, 25 April 2017 (UTC)

Can someone find the time to edit the whole article properly?

Many sentences are written in appallingly poor English, e.g. missing a vital auxiliary verb. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 92.2.222.183 (talk) 10:55, 6 July 2014 (UTC)

Yes, it seems to have been written by someone who did not know the meaning of words very well. Seadowns (talk) 17:05, 13 May 2020 (UTC)

Section one (originally without title)

I think everyone is missing the point of how important this philosophy is to the advancement of science and civilization. Philosophy of Science is a major development following Logical Positivism, which followed Empiricism and its offshoot Dialectical Materialism. These matters are not just armchair mental gymnastics, but precursors to political and sociological events. Because of the sloppy history of philosophy, science can be promoted as a political theory or psychological aberration. Besides relegating all of historic philosophy to meaningless babble, LP advances a new definition of Science. It is our obligation to advance this tighter definition of Science from mysticism in psychology, sociology, political "science", anthropology, medicine, etc., to new physical sciences based on observation, measurement and inter-subjective confirmation. Danarothrock (talk) 09:21, 10 September 2012 (UTC)

I don't have enough time now to look at this article and discussion properly right now, But sentences like, "positivism—which states that the only authentic knowledge is scientific knowledge" puts a bug up my... anatomy.

(I don't think you have had enough time to read any of the subject matter of this article. You persist in promoting your own perversion of language and philosophy.

I was a serious student of philosophy, particularly empiricism, logical positivism, etc., and have actually read the books alluded in this article.

I have a strong objection to the first, introductory paragraph in the article - "Logical positivism (later and more accurately called logical empiricism) is a school of philosophy that combines empiricism, the idea that observational evidence is indispensable for knowledge of the world, with a version of rationalism, the idea that our knowledge includes a component that is not derived from observation."

Please provide references by Vienna Circle authors to support this paragraph.

Rationalism, in no way, was advanced in logical positivism. Willard Quine attacked the nature of reductionism as being non-confirmatory. All practitioners of LP espoused the ultimate priority of experential, sensory, verifiable observation against rational constructs or deduction. I will concede, and it is well documented, that the juncture of empiricism and rationalism was the concern and underlying reason of the meeting of the First Vienna Circle, but rationalism, per se, was rejected as metaphysical. A priori principles of rationalism were defeated by nearly every LP author. The only quasi-rationalist component of logical positivism is the religious belief in mathematical and logico-linguistic abstractions, which is my critical rejection of the philosophy. After all, what would you expect from mathematicians? Danarothrock (talk) 10:51, 9 July 2008 (UTC))

Could this be a oft repeated thoughtless poor translation of some well thought out Austrian language. One is into extremes when using the word "all" ( applying to something of such intensely central notions as "knowlege".... in a sense knowlege is Being... ) in a proposition. Authentic implys unauthentic but also something of the highest truth, rather than 'a' truth, simple truth, &etc . Truths often agree with proofs, but 'all that is' doesn't and/or don't ( agree that is ). There is much of the absurd in the grandioseness of such sweeping statements without a thorough dissection. It is easily read as a tautology ( isn't "sciencia" a word that kinda means "knowing"). And what is "authentic", don't all three words partake of the central concept of "truth". Is "scientific knowlege" "real" isn't the question, the question is is whether the statement is meant to be humble as "philosophy" is noted as being or such that attracts several kinds of venality while really saying nothing. In humble hands it makes for an interesting skelaton, but for those who take it as real it tends to become necromatic. Wblakesx 09:40, 30 September 2006 (UTC)wblakesx ( I'll place this on my watch list for later ) P.S. "To follow up on LMS's comments, it should be noted that Otto Neurath (and to a lesser extent Rudolf Carnap envisioned logical positivism as having wide sweeping implications not just for logic and the philosophy of science but also for education, the arts, and politics. The ambitions that Neurath and Carnap had for this movement are apparent in their manifesto, "The Scientific Conception of the World: The Vienna Circle." Neurath, in particular, attempted to link logical positivism with other cultural movements like the Bauhaus movement in Germany, and with the socialist movement in politics (Neurath considered himself to be a Marxist). One of the most intriguing aspects of the history of logical positivism is how these broader aspects of the philosophy were generally lost during its reception into British and American philosophy." Jim F. ( an edit of the above ) "...Otto Neurath (and to a lesser extent Rudolf Carnap envisioned logical positivism as having wide sweeping implications ....The ambitions that Neurath and Carnap had ... attempted to link logical positivism with other cultural movements like the Bauhaus movement and with the socialist movement ",

this sounds like a proper domain, perhaps even wider and deeper. It should probably have no more than a minor role economics or politics or we might get an even more Hobbean old world.

Myth is a form of knowlege, parables may express authentic knowlege... but these are minor quibles. Feelings and desires are facts to a biologist and his cousins, they form parts of elaborate systems of survival and are subject ot rules and laws, in a given envirornment events are as entirely predictable as quatum physical science allows predidictability, nay More! , the broader the statement, the more predictable.... Much of the world is inaccessable even to speaking apes. What's that line from Hamlet... we haven't dreamt worlds and never will, truth is referential, if you don't have the reference, if you've buried it, you cannot see

But I'll have to come back later to see if I haven't gone Too terribly far off in my rant.

Cleanup

User:Knucmo2 has inserted a Cleanup tag. I don't know very well Wikipedia etiquette, but perhaps one can use the talk page to suggest improvements. I don’t see in talk anything from User:Knucmo2. So I ask: what’s the problem? [[Murzim 15:51, 25 March 2006 (UTC)]]

I think that you have made a worthy contribution to the article, and that it should be saved. I also think that the flow of the article could be improved. You have made the intellectual connections clear. However what precisely the logical positivist project is, and how the encyclopeadia is relevant should be retained at the opening of the article. I'll try and edit along these lines. Sholto Maud 02:54, 27 March 2006 (UTC)

The article now sounds better: it's well organized. Thanks. [[Murzim 08:15, 27 March 2006 (UTC)]]

Just Plain Wrong: Analytic/Synthetic

The definitions of analytic and synthetic statements given in this article are completely wrong. An analytic statement is one in which the predicate is contained in the subject; the famous example is "all bachelors are men." Simply through an analysis of the concept of "bachelor," we can deduce that, a bachelor being an unmarried man, man is contained in the subject, bachelor. Synthetic propositions amplify their subject through their predicate, and, depending on whether one accepts Kant or not, can be either a priori (Kant) or only a posteriori. —The preceding unsigned comment was added by 209.243.39.242 (talk • contribs) .

Could you expand on your definition of synthetic statement. How does one 'amplify' a subject through a predicate? How are you using the term 'amplify' here? And how can one measure the degree of amplification? I think Strawson, and Quine had different definitions. Sholto Maud 11:31, 9 February 2006 (UTC)

There are different definitions about analytic and synthetic statements. The first definition was introduced by Kant. An analytic statement is one in which the concept of the predicate is contained in the concept of the subject. A synthetic statement is one in which the concept of the predicate is not contained in concept of the subject. According to Kant, analytic statements explicate the concept of the subject, while synthetic statements add a predicate to the concept of the subject. Kant conjugated this distinction with the distinction between a priori and a posteriori. A statement is a priori when its true does not depend from the experience, otherwise it is a posteriori. Kant recognized three kinds of statements: analytic a priori (e.g. every body occupies a space), synthetic a posteriori (e.g. every body is heavy), and synthetic a priori (e.g. 7+5=12). According to Kant, mathematical statements are synthetic a priori, and the theoretical principles of physics are synthetic a priori.
From the point of view of logical positivism, an analytic statement is one which is true (or false) by means of the meaning of the terms that occur in the statement; otherwise it is synthetic. The distinction between a priori and a posteriori is the same as Kant. According to logical positivism, mathematical statements are analytic a priori; the principles of physics (and in general every scientific statement) are synthetic a posteriori. There are not synthetic a priori statements. Carnap in Philosophical Foundations of Physics distinguishes the following kinds of statements:
L-statements, which are true or false by the rule of logic alone: they are true or false by the meaning of the logical terms, such as OR, AND, IF, NOT, EVERY, EXISTS (e.g. rain or not rain). They are a priori.
A-statements, which are true or false by the meaning of the term, including not logical terms (e.g. all bachelors are men). They are a priori.
P-determined statements (P stands for Postulate, i.e. Axiom), which are implied by the axioms of the scientific theory (they are P-true) or whose negation is implied by the axioms (they are P-false). They are synthetic a posteriori.
Not determined statements, which are independent from the axioms. They can be factually true or false. They are synthetic a posteriori.
According to Quine, the distinction between analytic and synthetic is untenable.
Finally, I think that the distinction between analytic and synthetic in the article is oversimplified. [[Murzim 13:56, 15 March 2006 (UTC)]]

Thank you for your considered response. Perhaps you should consider ammending some of the article on this topic. I notice that you have not addressed the first definition of synthetic above that talks about the "amplification" of the subject. Also, the statement "There are not synthetic a priori statements." is that an absolute statement of a staement of how logical positivists view the situation? I have read authors claiming that synthetic a priori statements are possible and necessary. Sholto Maud 21:05, 15 March 2006 (UTC)

"There are not synthetic a priori statements" is the basic philosophical principle of logical positivism. From the Vienna Circle Manifesto: "It is precisely in the rejection of the possibility of synthetic knowledge a priori that the basic thesis of modern empiricism lies." (Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung. Der Wiener Kreis, 1929; English translation The Scientific Conception of the World. The Vienna Circle, in Sarkar, Sahotra (ed.), The Emergence of Logical Empiricism: from 1900 to the Vienna Circle, New York: Garland Publishing, 1996, p. 330). I cannot address the first definition of synthetic above that talks about the "amplification" of the subject; however, the "amplification" of the subject is a notion introduced by Kant. [[Murzim 18:06, 16 March 2006 (UTC)]]

Old talk

(Because this talk page was becoming difficult to read, I made some minor edits: I moved unanswered questions and comments about remaining deficiencies in the article to the top, formatted conversations so as to make the conversation structure clear, and deleted one unattributed, off-topic comment.)

We need to rethink the scope of this article. Should it discuss the verifiability theory of meaning in depth? I think that it shouldn't, because there is already a page for a treatment of that subject. Should it discuss criteria of meaning in general? I think that it shouldn't, and that an article with that title would be useful as a place for much of the material that is here. What is difficult for me to understand, and what I think should be the subject matter of this article, is what logical positivism is.

Logical positivism is a theory holding that scientific rigor should be applied to philosophy. (from the first sentence) Is it the only such theory? Is there more than one way to understand its premises? What is the history of people's understandings of what logical positivism is? What is the origin of the term "positivism" - what does the word for nonnegative, nonzero numbers have to do with scientific rigor?

An important tenet of logical positivism is the verifiability criterion of meaning, which implies that matters of fact and relations of ideas are the only meaningful statements. (from the the third sentence) Is it the only tenet? And so forth - I ought to go to sleep.

Anyway, I think that this article should treat the meaning and usage of the term "logical positivism", and the history of the logical positivist movement, with links to relavent philosophy.

-- Jrn 05:33, 11 Oct 2004 (UTC)

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This is a start, but logical positivism was an entire philosophical movement, not just a theory of cognitive significance. This--"only statements about empirical observations are meaningful, effectively asserting that all metaphysical statements are meaningless"--appears to be an attempt at formulating the verifiability theory of meaning, which was essential to the Vienna Circle's thinking, but does not exhaust what logical positivism was about. Maybe you could do some more research? The topic is eminently researchable--many books have been written about it. --LMS

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To follow up on LMS's comments, it should be noted that Otto Neurath (and to a lesser extent Rudolf Carnap envisioned logical positivism as having wide sweeping implications not just for logic and the philosophy of science but also for education, the arts, and politics. The ambitions that Neurath and Carnap had for this movement are apparent in their manifesto, "The Scientific Conception of the World: The Vienna Circle." Neurath, in particular, attempted to link logical positivism with other cultural movements like the Bauhaus movement in Germany, and with the socialist movement in politics (Neurath considered himself to be a Marxist). One of the most intriguing aspects of the history of logical positivism is how these broader aspects of the philosophy were generally lost during its reception into British and American philosophy.

Jim F.

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This article needs either a discussion of "positivism" in general (starting from Comte) or a link to a separate article on positivism, SR

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Michael Polanyi seems to be another opponent of positivism. I'm studying his book. Anyone else interested in discussing Polanyi's rejection of positivism? <>< tbc

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Logical positivism asserts that only statements about empirical observations are meaningful, effectively asserting that all metaphysical statements are meaningless.

I copied the sentence above to use in the pseudo-science article. I received this feedback from another forum: "[You] tacitly imply that non-empirical statements are equivalent to metaphysical statements. The difficulty with the LP criterion confronts us long before we consider traditionally metaphysical questions. Most of mathematics and virtually all of the humanities are problematic. History is curiously problematic because of the the "repeatability" issue - an apparently apriori standard of what is accepted as "empirical". And finally since science itself embodies its own "scientific metaphysics", the criterion was self-defeating." --Chris

Positivism and Imperatives/Questions?

Questions and imperatives don't seem to meet the positivistic criterion for "meaningfulness". Would positivists thus say that something like "go to your room!" is "meaningless"? If so, does this imply we should stop issuing commands and asking questions? --Ryguasu 01:30, 19 Feb 2004 (UTC)

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I seem to remember that Richard_Swinburne says in The Coherence of Theism that "The toys in the cupboard come to life and dance when they are not being observed" is a meaningful statement which is at the same time impossible to falsify, under verifiability. Am I right, and if so, does this merit inclusion under Criticisms? (I'm new here, and still working this all out; your help is appreciated) --Shikasta 22:22, 5 Oct 2004 (UTC)

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From an earlier version of this page:

Logical positivism asserts that only statements about empirical observations are meaningful, effectively asserting that all metaphysical statements are meaningless.

Unfortunately, this fundamental tenet of logical positivism belongs to the family of statements that it asserts to be meaningless. As a result, the entire edifice of logical positivism vanishes in a puff of logic.

This insight appears not to have occurred to the logical positivist school of philosophers.

Although this may have been stated in an amusing way, and perhaps the language needs toning down, I assert that as:

1. The first sentence quoted is an accurate statement of the fundamental tenet of logical positivism
2. It is a metaphysical statement of the kind that it states are meaningless

the text quoted is a valid comment, (as well as being a bad joke).

Note that none of the above is an attack on Popper's valid (and related) idea of falsifiability which has no such problems

-- The Anome

As far as I remember logical positivist philosophy, this is "statement about language" or something like that,

and such statements fall into special category in logical positivism. For example all math falls into this category: it's not empirical, but positivists didn't reject it. --Taw

I have restored the observations quoted, but this time with language toned down, your comment merged, and an attempt at NPOV. Is this more acceptable?

-- The Anome

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Under this view, statements such as "God exists" or "Pegasus is a winged horse" are examples of meaningless, metaphysical nonsense that are neither true nor false, and thus should not be believed.

Isn't "Pegasus is a winged horse" true by definition? --Camembert

Analytic statements relying on a metaphysical term are also meaningless. I think a logical positivist would say that the statement "Pegasus is a winged horse" presupposes that "Pegasus exists" in some metaphysical sense and that the conjunct of these two statements is meaningless. Suppose we had these statements in the article instead: "Pegasus exists" and "God is an omnnipotent being". The later could also be said to be analytic, but you'd be hard pressed to get a LP to agree that the statement is meaningful. The current article doesn't explain it this way though.

Response by Jod:

(1)The logical positivists were well aware of Russell's theory of descriptions. "Pegasus is a winged horse" would be analyzed as "There is exactly one thing x such that x is a horse, x has wings, and x is called "Pegasus."" This would be false, not meaningless, because the existence and properties of horses is subject to empirical investigation.

(2) The claim that Popper's falsifiability criterion "supplanted" the positivist criterion, and is not subject to the same problems, is both highly conentious amd, at least in part, false. In a strictly logical sense Popper's criterion is just as bad as verifiability. Verifiability cannot account for positive universal or negative existential claims; falsifiability cannot account for positive existential or negative universal claims. Very few contemporary theorists of science think Popper's can simply be taken as a replacement; the consensus is more along the lines of "things are just more complicated than that." In the light of Quine's work, Kuhn's work, and others, it is importantto recognize that economy of theory and the "inertia" of one's present beliefs can itself dictate which observations are "worth" taking seriously.

The analytic-synthetic distinction

It seems to me that the statement regarding analytic statements in the first paragraph of the Introduction...

"...and analytic truth, statements which are true or false by definition, and so are also meaningful."

...misstates the LP position regarding analytic statements. The logical positivists viewed analytic statements to be true, but meaningless truths; empty of factual content. Analytic statements are empty similarly to how tautologies are empty. Mathematics fall under the class of analytic statements to the Logical Positivists as well. We can use synthetic claims to describe the world using mathematical language (e.g. "There are five apples on the table.") but mathematic proofs, etc. are analytic and therefore empty of meaning.

I hope I haven't overlooked something that has already been covered or a crucial statement in the article itself that would immediately clear up my concern. In any event, I thought I should mention it.

Grammatical Error?

"...not an axiomatic system that's unable prove its own consistency."

Under the heading "Philosophy of Science," the following sentence needs fixup. (I suggest changing "and" to "which" and inserting "and" before "while". But I don't want to mess with something that is far from my area of expertise.):

"Upon the global defeat of Nazism, and removed from philosophy rivals for radical reform—Marburg neo-Kantianism, Husserlian phenomenology, Heidegger's "existential hermeneutics"—while hosted in the climate of American pragmatism and commonsense empiricism, the neopositivists shed much of their earlier, revolutionary zeal.[1]" RogerKni (talk) 17:54, 11 January 2016 (UTC)

I'm going to go ahead and change "removed" to "the removal", and insert "and" before "while". If this isn't right, please correct my correction. RogerKni (talk) 03:34, 12 January 2016 (UTC)

Unified Science

Do any of the contributors to this page know what the idea of unified science is? It is a topic that is in Enc. Brittanica but not Wikipedia, so it would be great if we could fill the hole. Pcb21| Pete 2 July 2005 22:53 (UTC)

I think the issue of unified science is that often known as "the unity of science". I've created a very cursory entry on that rather large topic in philosophy of science. philosofool 12 July 2005

You must read "The International Encyclopedia of Unified Science" by Otto Neurath, Rudolf Carnap and Charles Morris (Neo-Positivists of the Vienna Circle). There are discussions of the various approaches to many "sciences" - biology (morphology, physiology, genetics, organism, cell, diversity, structure, chemistry, etc.), cosmology (distance, redshift, expansion, material distribution, relativity, etc., this was before the "Big Bang" 1938), psychology (Mind vs. brain, phenomenological introspection, objectivity, consciousness, intentionalism, functionalism, psychoanalysis, Gestalt, behaviorism, etc.)

Otto Neurath - "I. Unity of Science Movement - Unified science became historically the subject of this Encyclopedia as a result of the efforts of the unity of science movement, which includes scientists and persons interested in science who are conscious of the importance of a universal scientific attitude." Danarothrock (talk) 09:58, 10 September 2012 (UTC)

Difference between logical and sociological postivism?

Aren't those articles talking about the same thing? See sociological positivism (aka positivism in social sciences)? Technical note: at present this article redirects to a section in positivism disambig. --Piotr Konieczny aka Prokonsul Piotrus ^Talk 23:57, 8 September 2005 (UTC)

Malicious, accepted and mistaken nonsense

Did logical positivists, Popper, etc distinguish between false assertions made to mislead ("No, I don't have a knife behind my back.", "The Chinese sharpen their teeth.", "There is no global warming."), those that are made through accepted wisdom ("There are fairies in the forest.", "The moon is only half a mile up.", "There are WMDs in Iraq."), and those that are mistakes of cognition, perception and recollection ("My keys are on the table.", "Only a mile or so to go.", "George Bush has cut public expenditure.")? I include the political examples because they can be considered the result of a concerted effort to deceive, but the people I imagine making the assertions are not all lying. I bring this up a) because the article does not discuss modes of nonsense b) because the quote "Otto Neurath famously compared science to a boat which we must rebuild on the open sea." reminds me that I suspect that the main impediment to the development of science and its application outside of the scientific establishment is the utility to a relatively small class of the malicious propagation of fantasies.

Another aspect not discussed in this article is the psychological necessity of fantasy. Did they have anything to say about that? And did Jung, for instance, have anything to say about Logical Positivism? Mr. Jones 10:56, 18 October 2005 (UTC)

With respect, I don't think this is very relevant. Most readers will probably be able to imagine what the positivists would have thought about lying - false sentences can be meaningful, but in that case their verification conditions are not fulfilled. Thomas Ash 03:26, 1 December 2005 (GMT)

Karl Popper

"Although Karl Popper belonged to the Vienna Circle in his early days, he became the main critic of the neo-positivist approach." This contradicts claims that Popper was not part of the Circle, e.g. the Vienna Circle article. Could someone check this out, and clarify in a reply to this message? Thomas Ash 03:26, 1 December 2005 (GMT)

"Although he was friendly with some of the Circle's members and shared their esteem for science, Popper's hostility towards Wittgenstein alienated Schlick, and he was never invited to become a member of the group." [1]

As to "main critic", Popper supported many of the LP propositions - verifiability, falsifiability, meaninglessness of metaphysics, etc., and was quoted in many LP works. Danarothrock (talk) 10:22, 10 September 2012 (UTC)

Thomas Kuhn

I certainly wouldn't class Kuhn as a logical positivist, although there are certainly those who might. However, in my opinion, and the opinion of many others, Kuhn is not a logical positivist, and to read his work in this way is to miss the point. He certainly is not a logical positivist in the sense of, for example, Schlick and Tarski (or Popper, if you read him as a logical positivist). For example, Popper's idealistic views about how scientists carry out their work is markedly different to Kuhn's more realistic view of how scientists actually carry out their work. Also, Kuhn's notion of rationality is far more realistic, as opposed to the logical positivist notion of rationality, which equates it with objectivity (something Kuhn suggests is impossible). I could go on, but my point I think is straight forward: Kuhn is not a logical positivist.

I do agree that Kuhn is not a logical positivist, but not really because he has a "more realistic view of how scientists actually carry out their work". There is a distinction between a philosophy of how science ought to be carried out (what the logical positivists were interested in) versus a sociological analysis of how it actually is carried out (which is what much of Kuhn's work investigates). --Delirium 04:54, 11 March 2006 (UTC)

• It is unclear what qualifies a thinker/writer as a logical positivist. Kuhn published his Scientific Revolutions first as an article in the International Encyclopedia for Unified Science which was published by the Vienna circle also known as logical positivists. A fundamental presupposition of this publication was that science could be unified through some kind of absoulte dimensional system. If we assume that this system embodies an objectivist rationality, and is presupposed in any of the contributions to the Encyclopedia, then it seems tha Kuhn qualified as a logical empiricist. Sholto Maud 12:36, 12 March 2006 (UTC)

• Kuhn usually is not qualified as logical positivism. On the contrary, Kuhn's philosophy is generally contrapposed to that of logical positivism. Kuhn published his Scientific Revolutions first as an article in the International Encyclopedia for Unified Science, but this is not a prove that Kuhn was a logical positivist (also Popper published his Logic of Scientific Discovery in Vienna Circle's series). I think that the reference of Kuhn as a logical positivist is misleading, and suggest to remove it from the article. [[Murzim 22:01, 14 March 2006 (UTC)]]

I'm not sure on what basis one would say that Kuhn usually is not qualified as logical positivist. In publishing his Scientific Revolutions first as an article in the International Encyclopedia for Unified Science it is clear that this major work has a strong connection with the main intellectual project of logical positivism. What we need to clarify is this,

• was the International Encyclopedia for Unified Science the major project embodying the aims and ideals of logical positivism?
• was Kuhn's Scientific Revolutions considered an expression of these aims and ideals?

If so then Kuhn's paradimg qualifies as a logical empiricist. Sholto Maud 01:07, 15 March 2006 (UTC)

Barone, Il neopositivismo logico, 1986 (a book of about 700 pages, the best Italian book on logical positivism) consider Kuhn as an opponent of logical positivism. Barone studied the philosophy of logical positivism from 1950s to 1980s.
Hempel, 'Scientitic Rationality', in Wittgenstein, Vienna Circle, and Critical Rationalism, 1979, pp. 291-301, distinguishes two different schools about the methodology of science: He said that one is derived from the works of logical positivists, and the other from the works of Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend. There is – said Hempel – a controversy between those different schools. Thus Hempel implicitly recognized that Kuhn cannot be ascribed to logical positivism. This distinction is present also in Hempel, 'Scientific Rationality: Analytic vs. Pragmatic Perspectives', in Rationality Today, 1979, pp. 46-58, in which Hempel describes a conflict between a school (he called Analytic) originated from Vienna Circle, Berlin Circle, and correlated philosophers (he cited Popper, Braithwaite and Nagel), and a school (he called Pragmatic) ascribed to Kuhn, Feyerabend and Hanson. The two schools differ about the conception of rationality and of methodology of science.
In Friedman's Reconsidering Logical Positivism, 1999, there is only one citation of Kuhn, in page 1 of the Introduction, in which Friedman remembers Kuhn’s well-known critique of logical positivism.
About the publication of The Structure of Scientific Revolution in the International Encyclopedia, one cannot consider every author as a logical positivist. For example, can one consider Russell, Dewey or Bloomfield as logical positivist?
Carnap was very enthusiastic about Kuhn's work, and he said that this "monograph will be a valuable contribution to the Encyclopedia" (Friedman, Dynamics of Reason, 1999, p. 42).
A good analysis of relations between Kuhn and logical positivism can be found in Gurol Irzik, 'Changing Conceptions of Rationality – From Logical Empiricism to Postpositivism' in Logical Empiricism, 2003, pp. 325-346. He said that this relation is very complicated and frequently presented in a more simplified way (Kuhn against Carnap), while in reality there is a strong connection between Carnap's and Kuhn ideas on methodology of science. However, Kuhn's philosophy can be ascribed to postpositivism (I'm now oversimplifying…).
In standard Encyclopedia, Kuhn is not considered a logical positivist. I’ve consulted:
Philosophielexikon (in German), 1983, 646 pages, where it is said that Kuhn expressed a strong critique against Logical Positivism's philosophy.
Routledge History of Philosophy, vol. IX, Philosophy of Science, Logic and Mathematics in the 20th Century, 1996, 461 pages. In the article about Logical Positivism, pp. 193-213, Kuhn is never cited.
The Encyclopedia Britannica, in the article about Positivism, in which logical positivism in considered, never cited Kuhn as a logical positivism (I've consulted the on line version of Britannica).
Macmillan Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2006, ten volumes, about 6200 pages, in the entry on Logical Positivism never cited Kuhn.
Abbagnano, Storia della filosofia (in Italian), six volumes, in the entry dedicated to "il neo-empirismo" (an Italian expression for logical positivism), pp. 382-423, never cited Kuhn.
Finally, Decline and Obsolescence of Logical Empiricism: Carnap vs. Quine and the Critics, ed. by Sahotra Sarkar, 1996, said that "the death [of logical positivism] was inflicted by Popper, […] or Kuhn". [[Murzim 12:13, 15 March 2006 (UTC)]]

Undeniable Fact: Kuhn's Scientific Revolutions (and philosophico-sociological paragidm of scientific inquiry) was first published the International Encyclopedia for Unified Science.

• A: Was the International Encyclopedia for Unified Science the major project embodying the aims and ideals of logical positivism? Yes/No.
• B: Was Kuhn's Scientific Revolutions considered an expression of the aims and ideals of the International Encyclopedia for Unified Science publication? Yes/No
• If A & B then ...

Sholto Maud 10:42, 16 March 2006 (UTC)

I've cited the interpretation of Kuhn's philosophy presented in respectable encyclopedia and history of philosophy, written by respectable scholars. I've cited Hempel on Kuhn. Can you cite respectable sources that consider Kuhn a logical positivist? [[Murzim 17:50, 16 March 2006 (UTC)]]

I agree that Sholto Maud is moving into the realm of original research here. It is widely accepted that Kuhn is not a logical positivist; our job as encyclopedia writers is to report that, not to go back and dig up his original works and concoct our own interpretation. --Delirium 11:27, 17 March 2006 (UTC)

We seem to have problems.

• a) I have not disputed the accuracy of any of the citations given above.
• b) I do not consider my questions original research, I consider that I am stating historically accurate fact.
• c) neither user Delirium nor user Murzim have addressed questions A or B in their answers
• d) Murzim says that there are "two different schools about the methodology of science" but does not state what they are.
• e) Murzim does not state "Kuhn’s well-known critique of logical positivism", which should be mentioned in the article.
• f) The fact that "in reality there is a strong connection between Carnap's and Kuhn ideas on methodology of science", does not clarify "the two different schools about the methodology of science".
• g) In the articles about Logical Positivism in Abbagnano, Storia della filosofia, Macmillan Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Encyclopedia Britannica", and Routledge History of Philosophy, vol. IX, Philosophy of Science, Logic and Mathematics in the 20th Century, 1996, 461 pages. pp. 193-213, Murzim says that Kuhn is never cited. Given 1. Kuhn’s well-known critique of logical positivism, 2. that in reality there is a strong connection between Carnap's and Kuhn ideas on methodology of science, 3. that the publication of The Structure of Scientific Revolution is in the International Encyclopedia, it is concluded that these books are missing some important information, which should also be mentioned in this article.
• h) Finally, Murzim says, " Decline and Obsolescence of Logical Empiricism: Carnap vs. Quine and the Critics, ed. by Sahotra Sarkar, 1996, said that "the death [of logical positivism] was inflicted by Popper, […] or Kuhn". " We must be careful with hasty pronouncements like this, which are sure to sell books. An important part of the project of logical positivism was the unification of science, and the internatinoal encyclopedia was published with this aim in mind, thus its title. A survery of contemporary scientific literature reveals that the project of the unification of science is still alive. So then this part of logical positivism/logical empiricism/emprical rationalism/rational physiology/field physiology - call it what you will - is not dead.

I agree with Delirium is right on one front, that if it is widely accepted that Kuhn is not a logical positivist, then our job as encyclopedia writers is to report such.

I'd like to ask, do any of the above citations reference the International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, and talk about why Kuhn chose to publish in that encyclopedia?

If it is pleases the court, I propose that we accept premise A (above) is true, and then propose a meeting point, such that we change the article to read, "many important philosophers such as, Woodger, Bohr, Dewey, Russell, Kuhn etc., contributed to the logical empricist project of the international encyclopedia of unified science." Sholto Maud 12:36, 17 March 2006 (UTC)

There is another problem with the list of logical positivists: Herbert Feigl (1902-88), Philipp Frank (1884-1966), Kurt Grelling (1886-1942), Hans Hahn (1879-1934), Carl Gustav Hempel (1905-97), Victor Kraft (1880-1975), and Hans Reichenbach (1891-1953) are not included (the lack of Hempel and Reichenbach is serious, because they were two of the most important members of logical positivism). On the contrary, John Dewey, Bertrand Russell, and Niels Bohr usually (i.e. in respectable histories of philosophy) are not regarded as logical positivists. Dewey is an American pragmatist, Russell is … well, he’s Russell, he does not belong to a specific philosophical school, and Bohr can only be regarded as a sympathizer of logical positivism, not a member. However, I prefer now not to change anything in the list, because I hope we can find an agreement on this point. What do you think? [[Murzim 12:47, 17 March 2006 (UTC)]]

• Yes the lack of the mentioned authors should be addressed. To be comprehensive, the article should breifely document their association with log. pos., their take on log. pos. and what contribution they are generally known for. When one reads the works of many of the above mentioned philosophers, it often becomes apparent that classifications like 'pragmatist', 'analytic philosopher', 'rationalist', 'empiricist', are simplifications - often for the purposes of undergraduate university courses and philosophy dictionaries - and that these philosophers don't actually fit into neat, exclusive sets, as instanced by the Russell comment above. Sholto Maud 22:14, 17 March 2006 (UTC)

Perhaps we can include in the article the list of all entries in the International Encyclopedia (see Vienna Circle). By the way, unified science was originally a project of Vienna Circle. As stated in the Preface of International Encyclopedia "The Encyclopedia was in origin the idea of Otto Neurath. It was meant as a manifestation of the unity of science movement". Here unity of science movement is not simply logical positivism, but it means a more general movement, which included philosophers and scientists from different schools. [[Murzim 13:10, 17 March 2006 (UTC)]]

• This is a positive suggestion. It is correct to say that "unity of science movement is not simply logical positivism", and that it is "a more general movement, which included philosophers and scientists from different schools." This kind of generalist attitude is an instance of the other kind of defintion of the word "synthesis" (mentioned above), which works to break down the traditional classification of philosphers into exclusive schools in which the language of one person's philosophic-psychology has no relation or communicative potential with the language of another person's philosophic-psychology. I support Murzim's proposal to include in the article the list of all entries in the International Encyclopedia, with the ammendment that the author's name of each Internatiaonal Encyclopedia for Un. Sci. article is included. If the Wiki article simply leaves this list and does not interpret it (so no OR or bias claim), it will leave the reader to make up their own mind about whether Kuhn, Russell, Dewey etc. should considered log. pos. and will be historically accurate. Sholto Maud 22:14, 17 March 2006 (UTC)

Sholto Maud asked why Kuhn chosed to publish in the International Encyclopedia. I've found some information in Oliveira, J. C. P. (2002) 'Carnap, Kuhn and Revisionism: On the Publication of "Structure" in "Encyclopedia"'. Oliveira's thesis is that the editors of the International Encyclopedia have planned to publish an article about history of philosophy. As reported by Reisch in 'Planning Science: Otto Neurath and the International Encyclopedia of Unified Science'. BRITISH JOURNAL FOR THE HISTORY OF SCIENCE, vol.27, p.2, N 93, p. 153 – 176, Neurath had asked Italian mathematiciam and philosopher Enriques to write a book on the history of science. The project was frustrated by the war and the dead of Enriques in 1946. Later the work was offered to Bernard Cohen who apparently suggested Thomas Kuhn. Really, in the index of the International Encyclopedia, the books of Kuhn is under the section 3. History of Science, with Kuhn's The Copernican Revolution. However, Carnap found Kuhn's work very good (this is a documented fact). Problems arise with the interpretation of this fact. Kuhn belived that Carnap was simply polite; others think that Carnap found Kuhn's work close to logical positivist's philosophy; others think that Carnap did not recognized the defference between Kuhn and logical positivism, and considered Kuhn's work as a book about hystory of philosophy (at that time Kuhn was known for his history of Copernical revolution). Of course, the entire question is still open. [[Murzim 23:17, 23 March 2006 (UTC)]]

Fascinating. It is often stated that Kuhn opposed logical positivism, but rarely do there seem to be any citations to Kuhn's work to back up this claim. Again, this research might benefit the article with correct citations as per usual. Sholto Maud 02:48, 24 March 2006 (UTC)

Bohr & Kuhn

I think that some people here have been displaying a misunderstanding of how the International Encyclopedia worked. Its editors, especially Neurath and Carnap, did not require that all of its contributors subscribe to their program for Unified Science in its entirety. In fact a number of contributors to the Encyclopedia did not consider themselves to be logical positivists, nor were they considered as such by members of the Vienna Circle. This is true for such contributors as John Dewey, Karl Popper, Bertrand Russell, and Niels Bohr. One could make a case that these people did subscribe to philosophies that the logical positivists regarded as allied with their own (i.e. American pragmatism, analytic empiricism etc.) but that is different from calling these people logical positivists in their own right. I think the same applies to Kuhn. To the best of my knowledge, he never called himself a logical positivist, and I know of no commentator on his work who would regard him as having been a positivist. Nevertheless, that doesn't mean that someone like Rudolf Carnap might not have seen his work on the history of science as lending support in some way to the positivists' own project. And in fact that does seem to have been Carnap's take on Kuhn, who strongly supported the publication of The Structure of Scientifc Revolutions as a volume in the International Encyclopedia. --JimFarm 14:32, 2 July 2006 (UTC)

I think I might be included as one of those people JimFarm mentioned... It seems to me that we need to ask whether all the contributors to the encyclopedia of unified science endorsed the encyclopedia's mission to unify science. I belive that it is safe to assume that A) since the encyclopedia was one of the main outputs of the logical positivism circle, that the encyclopedia's mission was also one of the aims of logical positivism. But don't you think it seems odd that a writer would contribute to an encyclopedia of "unified science" and at the same time not endorse the mission of unifying science!? If one did not endorse the mission, why not publish elsewhere? With respects to Bohr, for what its worth...

"When the Unity of Science movement organized, Neils Bohr was listed as the first member of the Aadvisory Commitee."

"Bohr thought that his explanation of the unity proper to physics was one of his most basic, and certainly his most misunderstood, contributions to science." (p. 224)

• Edward MacKinnon (1980) Niels Bohr on the Unity of Science, Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, Vol. 1980, Volume Two: Symposia and Invited Papers, pp. 224-244. http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0270-8647%281980%291980%3C224%3ANBOTUO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-I

Again given A) then it seems safe to assume that Neils Bohr was an important figure in the logical positivist movement. Sholto Maud 09:52, 3 July 2006 (UTC)

List of Logical Positivists

I'm now modifying the list of logical positivists. I've listed the members of Vienna Circle. I'll list the members of Berlin Circle, and then non-German speaking philosophers (Ayer, Polish philosophers, Scandinavian philosophers: Ake Petzäll, Eino Kaila, and von Wright, Danish philosopher Joergen Joergensen), and finally the contributors of International Encyclopedia. Suggestions are welcome. [[Murzim 19:50, 18 March 2006 (UTC)]]

I've added Ayer, Polish philosophers, Scandinavian philosophers, Danish philosopher Joergen Joergensen. The next step is the listing of contributors of Unified Science and International Encyclopedia, with the title of their books or articles. Suggestions are welcome. [[Murzim 20:50, 19 March 2006 (UTC)]]

I've added Wittgenstein and the complete list of contributors to the three collections published by logical postivism, with the title of their articles or books. Suggestions are welcome. [[Murzim 21:51, 19 March 2006 (UTC)]]

Murzim has done alot of work. :) If only there were some way of having this formally recognised in formal academic circles. Sholto Maud 00:50, 20 March 2006 (UTC)

A few years before his death Gödel wrote: 'I was a conceptual and mathematical realist since about 1925. I never held the view that mathematics is syntax of language'. His philososphical stance is more commonly described as platonist and of course Gödel's platonism has been known and commented upon. Including him in a list of 'philososphers associated with logical positivism' needs some qualification. At most he is historically or cirumstancially associated with logical positivism.al 17:36, 21 July 2006 (UTC)

I think that sections 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, and 3 should not be in this article. It seems to me that, in an article about logical positivism, the focus should be on the content and history of the core beliefs and disputes of the logical positivists. The exhaustive lists of (sometimes, I think, rather obscure) publications, and also the biographical details about individual positivists, are worth having on Wikipedia, but belong in separate articles. Perhaps there should be a separate page or category or something that lists the publications of the logical positivists? It would be enough here, I think, to link to that page (and also, as in the "People" section, to the individual pages for the various positivists). If nobody objects, I will make those changes in a few days. (Iolasov 22:12, 24 July 2007 (UTC))

Unified science

Should we move the entire list of publications of the Encyclopeadi of Unified science to it's own separate page, or merge it with the pages on unified science, and make reference to the publication on the logical positivism page so as to cut the overall size down a bit? Sholto Maud 08:07, 2 April 2006 (UTC)

Analystic/synthetic

Surely the analystic/synthetic distinction is standardly associated with Kant? In the introduction it makes it sound like the logical positivists were the first to think of it, and Hume is referenced in stead of Kant. Any thoughts? Cadr 13:09, 12 April 2006 (UTC)

Misplaced Criticisms section

As it stands now, the "Criticisms" section is far below the lists of people associated with Logical Positivism. My concern is that when reading through the article sequentially a reader will get the impression that when these lists start the substantive part of the article is over and stop reading unless he/she is looking for such a list or a bibliography... and thus those readers will never even get to the Criticism section.

So I propose moving the Criticisms section just below the end of the "Unified Science" paragraph. Or, if the lists of people could be seperated from the bodies of the "Einheitswissenschaft", "International Encyclopedia of Unified Science", and "Monographs on the Scientific World-Conception" sub-sections then the Criticisms section would fit after those, but before the lists of people, as well. Thoughts? -- noosphere 22:47, 13 May 2006 (UTC)

Perhaps "Criticism" can be put after "The assertions and origins of logical positivism". I agree that "Criticism" is now too below. [[Murzim 09:30, 16 May 2006 (UTC)]]

Logical positivism, metaphysics, religion and ethics

Sholto Maud asked clarifications about the statement that “Logical positivism denied the soundness of metaphysics and traditional philosophy, and affirmed that statements about metaphysics, religion and ethics are devoid of cognitive meaning and thus nothing but expression of feelings or desires”. He asked some references. Here there are some references:

Rudolf Carnap, Pseudoproblems in philosophy (1928)
Rudolf Carnap, The Elimination of Metaphysics Through Logical Analysis of Language (1932)
Rudolf Carnap, Philosophy and Logical Syntax (1935), in particular the chapter “The Rejection of Metaphysics”
Alfred Julius Ayer, Language, Truth, and Logic (1936), in particular the chapter “A Critique of Ethics and Theology”
Moritz Schlick, What is the Aim of Ethics? (1930)
Charles Leslie Stevenson, The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms (1937)

Perhaps the assertion above can be more clearly formulated in these terms:

“Logical positivism denied the soundness of metaphysics and traditional philosophy, and affirmed that the assertions of metaphysics, religion and prescriptive ethics are devoid of cognitive meaning and thus nothing but expression of feelings or desires”

[[Murzim 20:00, 16 June 2006 (UTC)]]

Thankyou again Murzim for your work. I would like to clarify the revised formulation if possible: a) does logical positivism asserts that expressions of feelings or desires are not "sound"; b) what is "soundness in this sense?; c) what is an example of "cognitive meaning" (there is no entry on this)?; and d) what is the philosophical consequence if something has no cognitive meaning: i.e. why were the logical positivists concerned to emphasise that feelings had no cognitive meaning? (Is this important for the unity of science?) Sholto Maud 10:11, 3 July 2006 (UTC)

A consensus among the logical positivists is that most of traditional philosophy is meaningless dribble. They attempt to bring clarity, truth and reality to philosophy by defining and extending the bounds of science (as in Philosophy of Science, ie., Logical Positivism). A. J. Ayer in Language, Truth, and Logic, Chapter 1 - The Elimination of Metaphysics, first sentence - "The traditional disputes of philosophers are, for the most part, as unwarranted as they are unfruitful." All of these guys criticized and defeated every philosophical doctrine in history, mostly by defining what makes up physics and what makes up metaphysics (ie., everything else). All traditional philosophical developments were based on metaphysical concepts. A lot of this was due to the ignorance of the Dark Ages of human knowledge, but also the crushing weight of the Church and its influence on thought, writing, and eternal pursuits. As Science and technology became more successful, it became clear that scientific knowledge was derived differently than subjective, value-based, perceptions and theoretical generalizations based on a-priori "first knowledge". Semantics and epistemology were rigorously re-defined by Gilbert Ryle and other LPs. The "Verifiability Criterion of Meaning" was derived. There are only two types of true statements - those that are inter-subjectively confirmable by empirical observation, and those that are analytic (true by definition ((logical and mathematical statements))). The latter are not scientific and are often confused. Danarothrock (talk) 07:14, 14 September 2012 (UTC)

Unified Science

I'm thinking that the content of the texts referred to here might go better in separate articles each dedicated specifically to the publication. Any objections if I move the contents to separate articles? Sholto Maud 11:44, 19 July 2006 (UTC)

Quine

As far as I know the statement about Quine in the last paragraph is dubious, it need's to be explained and there should be a citiation. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 58.105.111.91 (talk)

Yes, and I've tagged it as such. Quine had criticisms of logical positivism of course, but it's quite inaccurate to say that one of his criticisms was that logical positivism tried to "provide truth conditions for science independent of its historical paradigm". I assume that this is a reference to Quine's confirmation holism, but unlike Kuhn, Quine didn't have a particular interest in the sociology of science or "historical paradigms", so it would be misleading at best to summarize his view on confirmation holism as a claim that science is (or ought to be) situated within historical paradigms. But in any case, this misses the bigger point of his attack on the analytic-synthetic distinction. --Delirium 09:09, 22 January 2007 (UTC)

I think that the reference is to Quine's criticism of analytic-synthetic and of reductionism in Two Dogmas of Empiricism, and thus I've consequently updated the text. Murzim 19:59, 28 January 2007 (UTC)

Bolded names?

Why are many of the linked names near the middle of the article bolded as well? It is distracting. If it serves no purpose, either remove it, or give me the OK and I'll remove it. Thanks. --Steevven1 ^{(Talk) (Contribs) (Gallery)} 16:01, 23 March 2007 (UTC)

De Finetti

I think that the presence of De Finetti in the section dedicated to the influences of logical positivism on Italian philosophy is probably a misunderstanding. I cite from M.C. Galavotti, Kinds of Probabilism. "Reichenbach, Carnap and de Finetti represent divergent conceptions of probability, in many ways irreconcilable, despite the fact that all of these authors share an empiricist approach rooted in the work of authors like E. Mach and H. Poincaré . In addition to this common background, Reichenbach and Carnap share the logical empiricist matrix, while de Finetti embraces the pragmatism of C.S. Peirce and W. James, though filtered through the work of the Italian thinkers M. Calderoni, G. Vailati and A. Aliotta. The main consequence of this philosophical choice is the different attitude taken towards rationality. Albeit based on different notions of probability, the theories of both Carnap and Reichenbach are sustained by a strong notion of rationality, while de Finetti perspective is deeply anti-rationalist. In addition, de Finetti subjectivism is inspired by what today we would call an anti-realist philosophy, whereas Reichenbach and Carnap seem rather oriented towards some form of realism, at least taken as methodological realism." I'll remove the reference to De Finetti, if there are not oppositions. Murzim 18:48, 24 April 2007 (UTC)

category: logical positivsm

I thought there used to be such a category, was it deleted? Is there any objection for creating one? Nadavvv 18:13, 2 July 2007 (UTC)

Editing Links

Does anyone mind if I delete the link to Cosma Rohilla Shalizi's essay 'Logical Positivism'? It is, IMHO, neither informative nor well-informed. I was particularly struck by his comment that there are no living verificationists. -- (Iolasov 01:39, 23 July 2007 (UTC))

Criticism

This version for the criticism section is easier to understand and, more importantly, it is more interesting to read than the current version. What do you think? A.Z. 01:18, 10 September 2007 (UTC)

npov concerning the death of logical positivism?

Recently the following sentence from the introduction was edited:

In the early 1930s, the Vienna Circle dispersed, mainly because of political upheaval and the untimely deaths of Hahn and Schlick, but logical positivism lived on.

The words "but logical positivism lived on" were removed. The reason given was NPOV.

I don't see any problems with NPOV. The disputed sentence neutrally reported a plain fact. Logical Positivism did in fact live on well past the 1930s. It exerted a major influence on American philosophy after WWII. Also, Carnap continued to advocate it until his death in the 1970's, and one of the most popular works of logical positivism, Language, Truth, and Logic, was published in the 1950s.Twerges (talk) 05:52, 14 May 2008 (UTC)

I was discussing this same problem with Jok2000 himself. He removed it because according to him, the metaphor, "lived" is misleading and it goes contrary to what the book cited suggests. But I think he does agree that logical positivism prolonged its influence well into 1960s. Stampit (talk) 19:18, 14 May 2008 (UTC)

lived is the wrong metaphor (or meaning, if you will), especially in the context of the sentence ending with "lived on". There is no "until" portion, so you know people like me who think logical positivism is cute, don't really mean to promote it, as it's flaws (or researched counter-opinions) did not allow it to "live on". Jok2000 (talk) 19:44, 14 May 2008 (UTC)

Oh, I see. When I wrote the text, I only meant to disambiguate--the text claimed that "the movement" dispersed in the 1930s and I thought most readers would assume that "the movement" was referring to logical positivism. I only wanted to make clear that it was the vienna circle, not logical positivism, that dispersed at that time. It's certainly not my POV that logical positivism remains a viable doctrine.

We could add an "until" phrase to the text, like "logical positivism lived on until the 1960s".Twerges (talk) 04:01, 15 May 2008 (UTC)

I've changed the sentece: "In the early 1930s, the Vienna Circle dispersed, mainly because of political upheaval and the untimely deaths of Hahn and Schlick. The most prominent proponents of logical positivism emigrated to United Kingdom and United States, where they considerably influenced American philosophy. Until the 1950s, logical positivism was the leading school in the philosophy of science." It correctly describes that (1) logical positivists mainly emigrated to US (Carnap, Reichenbach, Hempel); (2) they influenced American philosophy and (3) logical positivism was well alive at least until 1950s. Murzim (talk) 12:32, 15 May 2008 (UTC)

Thanks, Murzim. That edit summarizes the information well.Twerges (talk) 19:59, 25 May 2008 (UTC)

---

Logical positivism as a method, paradigm, analytic approach, or school of thought (whatever you might prefer to call it), has not "died". It "lives" on but most new work takes the form of more logical, mathematical discussion within the literature of many fields. It is simply a matter that most of what can be said in broad terms the cover the sciences generally has been brought into particular specialties. When it appears in that form the term "logical positivism" might not be used, but the key ideas are essentially the same. I intend to modify this section to show that. Bracton (talk) 18:02, 23 March 2009 (UTC)

There is a major NPOV violation in the article. If you delve into the specifics of the claim that it is "defunct," this is because logical positivists in the modern age are uncapitalized; they have views that are consistent with Logical Positivism, but they're not endorsing a philosophy in capital letters in a way that implies membership in a group or acceptance of an authoritative position. If you search for modern references, there is a consensus that most "scientists" are small-letter logical positivists. And that form is how the term is used in modern language. It describes a point of view relevant to science, not a formalized school of philosophy.76.105.216.34 (talk) 21:50, 13 December 2015 (UTC)

Sentence from "Karl Popper's Objections"

Is this claim true?

Although Popper's philosophy of science enjoyed great popularity for some years, if his criterion is construed as an answer to the question the positivists were asking, it turns out to fail in exactly parallel ways.

Not only is the claim unsourced, but it seems untrue.

I don't see how Popper's falsifiability criterion is liable to the same objections as positivism. Positivism failed because it defined all statements outside of empirical observation and tautology as meaningless, which would include their statements. But Popper does not claim that unscientific statements are meaningless, so he could easily claim that his statements are unscientific but true nevertheless, or at least useful. He could simply claim that he is discussing the philosophy of science which is not scientific itself but which is nevertheless true and important.

If the claim from the article is true, then it's not supported sufficiently.Twerges (talk) 23:48, 3 June 2008 (UTC)

A digression in scope that needs to be fixed.

Although the logical positivists held a wide range of beliefs on many matters, they were all interested in science and skeptical of theology and metaphysics. Early on, most logical positivists believed that all knowledge is based on logical inference from simple "protocol sentences" grounded in observable facts. Many logical positivists supported forms of materialism, metaphysical naturalism, and empiricism.

Is this article about logical positivism or about the logical positivists? There is a distinction to be made between the characteristics of a belief, and the characteristics of the people who hold a belief. The quoted paragraph is not written to say anything about logical positivism per se, but rather only about so-called logical positivists. This is fully outside the scope of the article, since it is supposed to be about a philosophical idea, and not a clique of people with their shibboleths. As a result of this shift in scope, the article is also riddled with weasel words like "most logical positivists" and "many logical positivists". Obviously it is irrelevant to the article what the ideologies of some (in this case fully imaginary) faction of the past did or did not profess to believe. Logical positivism as a thing-to-know is completely distinct from any "logical positivism movement" that might or might not have existed in the Marxist sense. --75.49.223.247 (talk) 03:31, 21 June 2008 (UTC)

I see your point, but it seems like you may be drawing too much of a distinction. Logical positivism was a school which was strongly associated with a group of people.

"There is a distinction to be made between the characteristics of a belief, and the characteristics of the people who hold a belief."

I see your point.

But the paragraph only lists their beliefs about logical positivism. It doesn't mention their beliefs about, say, politics or music. Obviously, the personalities of the positivists are irrelevant to the issue. But their beliefs about positivism are relevant to an article about it, since they defined it. Any further mention of those people would be too far afield, IMO.

"riddled with weasel words like 'most logical positivists' and 'many logical positivists'"

I don't think those are weasel words, because they're not intended to make a claim in an underhanded way. I think the author was trying to convey that logical positivism was not precisely defined in a way that all its adherents would accept.

"Obviously it is irrelevant to the article what the ideologies of some (in this case fully imaginary) faction""'

Is it an imaginary faction? How so? I'm almost certain that there were people who adhered to those beliefs; at least AJ Ayer and Rudolph Carnap would have accepted them.

...In short, I think it's relevant to the list the beliefs of positivists as the relate to positivism. Any other beliefs of theirs would not be relevant.

I do think, however, that some of those sections could be re-phrased. Perhaps there could be less emphasis on the positivists and more on the doctrine.Twerges (talk) 05:06, 21 June 2008 (UTC)

Replaceable statement

The section Criticism and influences says:

The verifiability criterion of meaning did not seem verifiable; but neither was it simply a logical tautology, since it had implications for the practice of science and the empirical truth of other statements. This presented severe problems for the logical consistency of the theory.^{[citation needed]} [My emphasis of dubious statement]

As much as I know and have read by myself, there is no such logical inconsistency. The trouble is not illogics, it is a double standard, rejecting metaphysics while defining itself metaphysically. This might be perceived as a logical inconsistency, so I believe the statement is some kind of confusion of "inconsequency" with "inconsistency". I believe the sentence is badly formulated, instead of being an ad-hoc-statement out of the blue. Any ideas for a replacement? Maybe Popper or other contemporary critics had some on this theme? ... said: Rursus (bork²) 09:10, 17 July 2009 (UTC)

Not everyone agrees with that point of view. See this quotation from http://www.basicincome.com/bp/whatwasalmost.htm "What was almost comically typical of Britain’s, and especially Oxford’s, parochialism is that a completely effective demolition of logical positivism had already been published before A. J. Ayer introduced it [in his book Language, Truth and Logic, 1936] into the English-speaking world in the first place. In 1934, in Vienna, a book had appeared called Logik der Forschung, by Karl Popper. It was not to come out in English translation until a quarter of a century later, when it was published in 1959 under the title The Logic of Scientific Discovery. In it there were many criticisms of logical positivism, including some I have mentioned already, but its central and most devastating one was that logical positivism claimed to be first and foremost a (indeed the) scientific view of the world, and yet its central tenet, the Verification Principle, wiped out the whole of science. This criticism, if clinched—and few people today would deny that Popper’s book pretty well clinched it—spelt total shipwreck for logical positivism." Perhaps the section could be rewritten to attribute the idea to someone else.190.234.212.43 (talk) 17:22, 10 December 2009 (UTC)

The Forlorn German Philosophy

I removed recent edits by Shiki2, including a section entitled "The Forlorn German Philosophy" and a reference in the "Declining Use" section to Logical Positivism being "forlorned by contemporary German philosophers." These additions were baffling, non-encyclopedic in tone, and apparently reflected a confused sense of the meaning and usage of the English word "forlorn." Thefellswooper (talk) 20:17, 30 July 2009 (UTC)

Philosophy of Religion???

It seems inappropriate to highlight this article as "Part of a series on Philosophy of religion" (i.e. via the box at the top of the page). What is your opinion? Tcolgan001 (talk) 15:49, 9 April 2012 (UTC)

I agree entirely, and as nobody has voiced any contrary opinion since your post several months ago, I'm removing it. Charles Lowe (talk) 18:42, 28 August 2012 (UTC)

Movements running courses

According to the article, “by the late 1960s, it became obvious that the movement had run its course.” This statement is made under the assumption that there is a course that "movements" run. They start at a given time, run their course, and become defunct in accordance with some transcendent plan. Such an analogy is Fichtean-Hegelian, which should please academics. No “movement,” then, except for one, could ever express an eternal, or, at least, enduring truth. That one is the very “movement” that expresses the dogma that ”movements” run courses. If not, then the very statement that “movements” run courses would have resulted from a “movement” that, itself, would run its course and therefore would have only a temporary validity. This is similar to the self-destructiveness of Fichtean-Hegelian “dialectic” in which all theses generate antitheses that then become syntheses, including the dogma of Fichtean-Hegelian dialectic itself. To whom are these courses supposed to be evident? Do all of the collected members of a specific group of people cognize these courses? Does the group consist only of academic “philosophers” or can other people obtain knowledge of the courses that “movements” run? Is there then a priesthood that has privileged cognition, not available to laymen, of the courses that “movements” run? Might not logical positivism have professed one or several enduring truths that cannot be merely dismissed as belonging to a “movement” that has “obviously” run a course that has been assigned to it by some transcendent authority?Lestrade (talk) 21:00, 14 May 2012 (UTC)Lestrade

The dogma that followed was Existentialism. Good grief!! Danarothrock (talk) 07:37, 14 September 2012 (UTC)

Invalid Criticism of Verificationism

In the first two paragraphs of the Criticisms section, the claim that negative existential claims and positive universal claims are unverifiable is given without any source. Has any scholar actually made this criticism? Also, it is obviously false. Negative existential claims and positive universal claims can be verified to the extent that they are meaningful. Using the example given, it can be verified that all ravens are black. This can be done by systematically searching the entire universe and observing that all of the ravens found are black. Of course this is not practical, but the point of verificationism is not that there must be a practical way to verify the statement, but that it must be physically possible to verify the statement. Limitations of technology do not count as limitations on the possible verifiability of a statement. Rectipaedia (talk) 19:31, 30 July 2012 (UTC)

What makes you omniscient in knowing that "all ravens are black" if you lack the means of observing all ravens in the universe? The statement is false until such technology is used by two persons to verify. Generalization is a logical fallacy. Darwin made these errors in his genetic theory. Now consider "albinoism is known to affect all vertebrates". There are white ravens with red eyes. Danarothrock (talk) 07:52, 14 September 2012 (UTC)

I removed the offending material, not just because of the reasons mentioned above, but also because it had two tags which were three and five years old, respectively. Rectipaedia (talk) 17:37, 10 August 2012 (UTC)

I provided sources mentioning that they're pretty well known. You've got that backward, the stereotypical claim would be that they're meaningful only if they're verifiable (at least in principle). In principle, it's impossible to exhaustively search the entire universe and one might want to quantify over past and future ravens as well. See all ravens are black (and Russell's teapot). The second paragraph seemed like WP:OR, so I didn't restore it.—Machine Elf ¹⁷³⁵ 20:56, 10 August 2012 (UTC)

You said that I "got that backward" but then repeated what I said in different words. Let proposition P be "universal claims can be verified" and let proposition Q be "universal claims are meaningful". I said that P ← Q. You said that Q → P. These two statements are equivalent.

I concede that universal claims which are not tautologies are unverifiable because this must include the past and future and also other possible worlds. However, it is physically possible to exhaustively search the entire universe. It is expensive and time-consuming, but that's irrelevant. It is still possible. Also, the implication that unverifiable statements about the past and future are meaningless is not a problem for the verification principle but rather a problem for those who try to accept it but do not like its implications. One simply has to accept that a direct consequence of combining the verification principle with a non-deterministic physical theory of the universe is the many-worlds interpretation. The source that you quoted does say that universal claims are unverifiable, but I don't see where it says that this causes a problem for the verification principle.

I don't understand why you referenced the raven paradox or Russell's teapot. The statement "all ravens are black" is indeed an example of a universal claim, but the paradox has nothing to do with verificationism. The relevance to this subject is contained entirely within those four words. Going to that wikipedia page provides no further insight whatsoever into the subject at hand.

The same can be said for Russell's teapot. Russell's teapot has no relevance to the subject. It does discuss unverifiable claims, but it is about burden of proof, not criteria for meaning. Russell's teapot is simply an analogy used to argue that the burden of proof lies with the one making the unverifiable claim rather than the one denying it. It is, of course, logically inconsistent because denying the claim that "there is a teapot between Earth and Mars" is equivalent to making the claim that "there is not a teapot between Earth and Mars". Both are unverifiable statements. Therefore, the principle must apply to both of them. This implies that the burden of proof lies with each and not the other which is a self-contradiction. The argument seems logical because it makes use of Occam's razor. Rectipaedia (talk) 01:18, 12 August 2012 (UTC)

No, the naive logical positivist is saying that's meaningless gibberish because the universal can't be verified; not that an attempt to verify might be warranted, to the extent that it can be understood. No, it is not physically possible to exhaustively search the entire universe. No, it is not merely expensive and time consuming. Correct, denial is irrelevant. No, the many-worlds interpretation is fully deterministic, but that has nothing whatsoever to do with it. Neither the article, nor the sources need to rehearse the well known problem of induction, 1) Putnum treats it as self-refutating and no one seriously entertains the verification principle any longer; 2) the SEP clearly says: "Everybody had noted that the Wittgensteinian verificationist criterion rendered universally quantified statements meaningless"; and Smith (1996) lays it to rest: 3) "The secondary and historical literature on logical positivism affords substantial grounds for concluding that logical positivism failed to solve many of the central problems it generated for itself. Prominent among the unsolved problems was the failure to find an acceptable statement of the verifiability (later confirmability) criterion of meaningfulness".

You "don't understand" why I linked to all ravens are black? It says: "A related issue is the problem of induction"... And if you find the Russell analogy uninformative, never mind the pale raven perched beyond your light cone.—Machine Elf ¹⁷³⁵ 03:51, 12 August 2012 (UTC)

"No, the naive logical positivist is saying that's meaningless gibberish because the universal can't be verified;" Here, I can't figure out what you are saying "no" to and I don't know what "that" refers to. Perhaps you could elaborate. "not that an attempt to verify might be warranted, to the extent that it can be understood" Maybe, an understanding of the first sentence would provide some insight, but short of that, this sentence strikes me as a non sequitur. Also, I do not understand the relevance of the principle of charity. "Correct, denial is irrelevant." is another thing I did not understand. Some context would help. Also, what is the relevance of the problem of induction?

Since you insist that it is physically impossible to exhaustively search the entire universe, you should explain. If I were to build a robot that systematically explored every inch of space in an expanding sphere, avoiding objects that would destroy it (such as stars and black holes which need not be searched anyway because anything that would destroy the robot would also destroy any ravens), what physical laws would need to be violated in order for the robot to complete its task?

1) Yes, Putnam does treat the verification criterion as self-refutating. He makes this argument with the premises that the verification principle is both unverifiable and not analytic. And it is a weak argument because he does explain why he thinks it unverifiable or not analytic. He does not base this argument on the unverifiability of universal claims. 2) Yes, the SEP does say "Everybody had noted that the Wittgensteinian verificationist criterion rendered universally quantified statements meaningless." It does not say that this causes a problem for verificationism. 3) Smith (1986 not 1996) does not lay it to rest. In fact, he does not address the subject. He says that logical positivism had problems but he attributes none of them to the unverifiability of universal claims.

My point is twofold. First, I am not at all convinced that the unverifiability of universal claims causes any problems for logical positivism. Therefore, I do not think it can be considered an obvious fact. If it were obvious, it should be possible to construct a simple argument in favour of it. Second, I do not know of any sources that make this argument. Therefore, I do not think that the criticisms section should list the unverifiability of universal claims as a problem. Rectipaedia (talk) 17:00, 13 August 2012 (UTC)

WP:TENDENTIOUS—Machine Elf ¹⁷³⁵ 02:32, 14 August 2012 (UTC)

The statement under question is "Another problem was that universal claims ("all ravens are black") are problematic in terms of verification." As far as I can tell, (and I have read the source carefully) this opinion is not expressed in the source that you gave. If I have made a mistake, please reply with relevant quotations and clearly explain your interpretation. If the source does not explicitly state what you have written, you need to make it clear why you think that you have accurately represented the referenced material. Rectipaedia (talk) 20:41, 21 August 2012 (UTC)

Early critics of logical positivism said that its fundamental tenets could not themselves be formulated consistently. The [[verifiability theory of meaning|verifiability criterion of meaning]] did not seem verifiable; but neither was it simply a logical [[Tautology (logic)|tautology]], since it had implications for the practice of science and the empirical truth of other statements. This presented severe problems for the logical consistency of the theory.<ref name="Putnam1985">{{cite book |first=H. |last=Putnam |year=1985 |title=Philosophical Papers: Volume 3, Realism and Reason |series=Philosophical Papers |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=9780521313940 |lccn=lc82012903 |url=http://books.google.com/books?id=HAjfSA3ir3kC&pg=PA184 |page=184}}</ref>Another problem was that [[universal quantifier|universal]] claims ("[[all ravens are black]]") are problematic in terms of verification.<ref name="sep-vienna-circle">{{cite web |first=Thomas |last=Uebel |editor=Edward N. Zalta |year=2008 |title=Vienna Circle |work=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |edition=Fall 2008 |url=http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/vienna-circle/ |quote=What Carnap later called the “liberalization of empiricism” was underway and different camps became discernible within the Circle... In the first place, this liberalization meant the accomodation of universally quantified statements and the return, as it were, to salient aspects of Carnap's 1928 conception. Everybody had noted that the Wittgensteinian verificationist criterion rendered universally quantified statements meaningless. Schlick (1931) thus followed Wittgenstein's own suggestion to treat them instead as representing rules for the formation of verifiable singular statements. (His abandonment of conclusive verifiability is indicated only in Schlick 1936a.) A second element that began to do so soon was the recognition of the problem of the irreducibility of disposition terms to observation terms... A third element was that disagreement arose as to whether the in-principle verifiability or support turned on what was merely logically possible or on what was nomologically possible, as a matter of physical law etc. A fourth element, finally, was that differences emerged as to whether the criterion of significance was to apply to all languages or whether it was to apply primarily to constructed, formal languages. Schlick retained the focus on logical possibility and natural languages throughout, but Carnap had firmly settled his focus on nomological possibility and constructed languages by the mid-thirties. Concerned with natural language, Schlick (1932, 1936a) deemed all statements meaningful for which it was logically possible to conceive of a procedure of verification; concerned with constructed languages only, Carnap (1936-37) deemed meaningful only statements for whom it was nomologically possible to conceive of a procedure of confirmation of disconfirmation.
Many of these issues were openly discussed at the Paris congress in 1935. Already in 1932 Carnap had sought to sharpen his previous criterion by stipulating that those statements were meaningful that were syntactically well-formed and whose non-logical terms were reducible to terms occurring in the basic observational evidence statements of science. While Carnap's focus on the reduction of descriptive terms allows for the conclusive verification of some statements, his criterion also allowed universally quantified statements to be meaningful, provided they were syntactically and terminologically correct (1932a, §2). It was not until one of his Paris addresses, however, that Carnap officially declared the meaning criterion to be mere confirmability. Carnap's new criterion required neither verification nor falsification but only partial testability so as now to include not only universal statements but also the disposition statements of science... Though plausible initially, the device of introducing non-observational terms in this way gave rise to a number of difficulties which impugned the supposedly clear distinctions between logical and empirical matters and analytic and synthetic statements (Hempel 1951). Independently, Carnap himself (1939) soon gave up the hope that all theoretical terms of science could be related to an observational base by such reduction chains. This admission raised a serious problem for the formulation of a meaning criterion: how was one to rule out unwanted metaphysical claims while admitting as significant highly abstract scientific claims?}}</ref>

As far as I can tell, your relentless attempts to delete this extremely mild and sympathetic treatment of the very well-known criticism is presumably a WP:COMPETENCE issue.—Machine Elf ¹⁷³⁵ 05:43, 22 August 2012 (UTC)

Thank you for fulfilling my first request in referring directly to the sentences in the source. However, none of the statements in red explicitly support your contribution. Let me remind you not to go beyond what is expressed in the sources. You must not interpret the material yourself. This is considered original research. If I am being thick, please provide some kind of explanation as to how what is written in the source explicitly supports your contribution. It is clear that there is no single statement in the source which has the same literal meaning as your contribution. Therefore, there must be some analysis required to come to your conclusion. If the analysis is simple and your conclusion obvious, please spell it out here.

I should point out that the two highlighted statements which mention "a series of difficulties" and "a serious problem" are not about universal claims. Also, while the statements that are about universal claims do say that they are meaningless given certain definitions of verifiability (such as the Wittgensteinian one), they do not say that this is a problem for verificationism. Rectipaedia (talk) 08:50, 22 August 2012 (UTC)

The source appears to say (or rather, to make a universal claim about others saying) that in at least one significant variety of verificationism, universal claims are meaningless. This seems equivalent to saying that in verificationism, universal claims are problematic.

Now, if I'm missing some subtlety, do explain it to me Rectipaedia. But otherwise I don't see your point now. If you're just nitpicking over the precise wording, please suggest a more refined wording rather than warring to remove entirely what now looks to be a properly sourced statement. Cesiumfrog (talk) 10:10, 22 August 2012 (UTC)

No, I am not nitpicking over the precise wording. I agree with your interpretation of the source, but I don't think you have read Machine Elf's statement carefully enough. It says "Another problem was that universal claims ("all ravens are black") are problematic in terms of verification." I am not disputing that universal claims are problematic in terms of verification. I am disputing that this fact itself is a problem for verificationism. In other words, Machine Elf is not simply saying that universal claims are meaningless. He is saying that the meaninglessness of universal claims is a problem for verificationism. I would simply reword his statement as "Universal claims ("all ravens are black") are problematic in terms of verification." or "The verification principle renders universal claims meaningless." if it weren't for the fact that these statements would not belong in the criticisms section because they are not criticisms. Rectipaedia (talk) 19:50, 22 August 2012 (UTC)

For future reference when you object to only one part of a compound statement, it is constructive to begin by breaking apart the statement instead of tendentiously warring to also erase the part you aren't even contesting.

Universal claims ("all ravens are black") are problematic in terms of verification.[1] This was widely considered another problem for verificationism.

Cesiumfrog (talk) 00:11, 23 August 2012 (UTC)

Apparently, we all agree it's properly sourced, but oddly enough, User:Rectipaedia is shopping at WP:No original research/Noticeboard#Logical Positivism Criticism.—Machine Elf ¹⁷³⁵ 06:58, 23 August 2012 (UTC)

I think I've made it clear that I do not agree that it's properly sourced. Rectipaedia (talk) 20:29, 23 August 2012 (UTC)

Oh, quit moving the goalposts (let alone accusing others of naivete). You started by saying:

the claim that [..] universal claims are unverifiable is given without any source[.. and] is obviously false.

Well, obviously you've now conceded the claim was beyond reproach. If you still want to nitpick some fine distinction between "problematic" vs "problem", you should start by breaking up the compound statement and tagging only the part you consider dubious, so that your concern be communicated clearly and consensus can develop.

Your actions have been as if you were more concerned with defending your personal philosophy than with compromise; and haven't advanced positive reasons to persuade me it's an interpretive leap (from how the universal claims thing is associated with the discussion of "serious problem") to surmise the source described it as a criticism. Cesiumfrog (talk) 00:12, 24 August 2012 (UTC)

Where did I nitpick between "problematic" vs "problem"? What do you mean by a "positive reason"? It is against Wikipedia policy to surmise anything. A surmise is original research. The source needs to explicitly describe it as a criticism. Even if you think the source has implicitly described it as a criticism, I would like you to explain how it has done so, because I do not see it. Rectipaedia (talk) 02:01, 24 August 2012 (UTC)

Are you just trolling? You concede universal claims are "problematic" but argue at their description as a "problem". You give negative evidence (that Britannica didn't discuss the issue) but not positive evidence (no counter-source that actually contradicts the non-plagiarising summary of Elf's source). Anyway, since I never knew who out of you and Machine Elf was actually more correct about the content, I decided to google it for myself:

• The problem with verificationism (or so it is commonly thought) is that some statements are “universal” [..hence..] verification is impossible. Because of problems such as this falsification was proposed as a way to conduct scientific investigations.[2]
• The problem with Verificationism, according to some, is that some statements are “universal” [..so..] To counter this, Karl Popper [..proposed..] Falsificationism[3]
• The Problem of Induction:[....] The verifiability criterion of meaning was essential to logical positivism [..But..] was soon seen to be too strong; it counted as meaningless [universal claims] as well as statements that were at the time beyond the reach of experience for technical, and not conceptual, reasons[..] These difficulties led to modification...[4]
• Verificationism, to put it quite pointedly, is a snare and a delusion. First, theism has nothing to worry about regarding the strong formulations of verificationism, as these principles are intrinsically implausible. A very large number of scientific and common sense statements would be meaningless if either of these principles were true, including many statements that logical positivists themselves accept as meaningful. This highlights a general problem with all versions of verificationism. [...] So we are really only left with the weak verificationist/falsificationist position.[5]
• there were many criticisms of logical positivism [but the] central and most devastating one was that logical positivism claimed to be first and foremost a (indeed the) scientific view of the world, and yet its central tenet, the [famous-—or infamous-—] Verification Principle, wiped out the whole of science. This criticism, if clinched—and few people today would deny that Popper’s book pretty well clinched it—spelt total shipwreck for logical positivism. Popper’s argument can be summarized as follows. From Newton until the time of the logical positivists the central task of science had been seen as the search for natural laws, these being unrestrictedly general statements about the world that were known to be invariantly true. [..So..] from the Verification Principle it follows that [all] scientific laws are meaningless statements, and are empty of informational content.[6]

How much must it take with you? It's great that I personally am being provoked to learn about the topic, but what I'm learning is that your proposed deletion will not directly improve the article.Cesiumfrog (talk) 04:51, 24 August 2012 (UTC)

I am not trolling. Since your third source can probably be considered reliable and since it does support the statement, I restored it, albeit with a bit of elaboration. Rectipaedia (talk) 07:03, 24 August 2012 (UTC)

Now, that "total shipwreck" line might give the lead zest. Cesiumfrog (talk) 10:24, 24 August 2012 (UTC)

---

Much aside, it made me think about the black raven bit. The paradox, at least according to WP, is how it seems counter-intuitive that observations of one set of objects should provide evidence for a claim ostensibly not pertaining to objects in that set. It has been contested whether this article links to this paradox in an appropriate manner. This paradox is an interesting curiousity, to be sure. But is it relevant? In context, the article uses raven blackness purely as an example of what is meant by a universal statement. Examples are good, and this seems like a good one (regardless that in actual fact, blackness of ravens is as broken an example as whiteness of swans..). But it is pure coincidence that this example is the same example associated with the aforedescribed paradox. The paradox is not relevant to the local context, so if the example should link to something, it should link to Universal quantification and not the paradox. The paradox is separate from the problem of our inability to ever have tested all elements in some infinite sets (which is what the article is actually describing, Popper's criticism). I would go so far as to say just the potential confusion soils the example, so we should pick another.

Perhaps though the paradox is more broadly relevant to the article? If its counter-intuitiveness is an inevitable consequence from verificationism or logical positivism more broadly (perhaps even analytic philosophy), then maybe the paradox itself could be a separate criticism. But I do think such a synthesis would need to be sourced and made explicit.

Perhaps the problem of induction is also a criticism. (This is another thing inherently involving universal statements, but from which universal statements and that paradox are still separate topics.) Clearly reliable science is built upon something that resembles induction despite the fact that induction seems like it should be an unreliable method. It's a third problem. Have others directed it as a noteable criticism of logical positivism? I think currently the Popper section links to inductive reasoning, but not to the problem of it.

I also note that many sources present Popper's criticism as the single thing which basically killed logical positivism or at least verificationism. And yet, the article (and lead), and the verificationism article, give the impression that no such thing occured, and that the most serious criticisms were completely different ones (for example, that verificationism isn't itself verifiable, which to me seems like a silly criticism). I get the impression these articles have been written from a peculiar point of view?

Also, regards nit-picking of what is and isn't criticism, seems the big section on "A.J. Ayer's defense" is not criticism. Maybe the heading should be changed, or the views of logical positivism's proponents should be integrated elsewhere in the article. But this does seem to be one of the few articles that warrants having a criticism section, since it describes a school of philosophy most commonly noted now in the context of being an abandoned historical phase. (Actually, I'd rather title the section "abandonment".) And I do think the lead should emphasise Popper instead of unpteen other critics (source: just scan the chapter list of common philosophy of science texts). Cesiumfrog (talk) 02:03, 29 August 2012 (UTC)

I would just like to address the issue of the wiki-link to the raven paradox article. I agree that it is not relevant. I think, if Machine Elf cannot successfully argue its relevance, the link should be removed. Perhaps some others could provide some input and we can reach a consensus. Rectipaedia (talk) 04:33, 29 August 2012 (UTC)

It's a verbatim link to “all ravens are black”. Personally, I'd go with “all philosophers are mortal”. The consensus, so far, is petty trolling.—Machine Elf ¹⁷³⁵ 13:01, 29 August 2012 (UTC)

Assuming good faith, I don't know how I can interpret that last sentence. Also, the implication in pointing out the link was verbatim seems disingenuous, since you know exactly what it redirects to (having created that redirect yourself subsequent to joining this discussion). And to clarify, it was on nobody's behalf that I opposed the conflating of Hempel's raven paradox with an example for explaining what universal claims are in the first place. Constructively, below it appears everyone can be satisfied if we make an additional but separate paragraph for the Hempel matter.Cesiumfrog (talk) 23:11, 30 August 2012 (UTC)

You mean failing to assume good faith. Disingenuous... subsequent to?? Get your facts straight. You're an expert now, or was that a confession? Please, "conflating of Hempel's raven paradox with an example for explaining what universal claims are in the first place"... you were wrong, deal with it.—Machine Elf ¹⁷³⁵ 07:34, 31 August 2012 (UTC)

I mean I can't see any meaning that is compatible with the assumption of good faith, which then caused me to suspect that assumption, though I still acknowledge the possibility that the failing is of my own comprehension. If you weren't being disingenuous please disabuse me (but clearly [7] is indeed subsequent to [8]). You present a diff exemplifying that I have substantially contributed to other articles (e.g. raven paradox); what is it which you perceive may be confessed by that? (On the other hand, if you were wanting a confession of the limits to my own familiarity with the topic at any point in time, you needn't have looked further than my explicit comments above. [9] So..?) For the sake of improving my future contributions, please state plainly what it is that you think I am (or was) wrong about and why.

In general, Machine Elf, I find your brevity is impinging on your capacity to make yourself understood. Cesiumfrog (talk) 04:58, 2 September 2012 (UTC)

You were the one who accused Rectipaedia of trolling! Those edits were 2 minutes apart, over three weeks ago, when Rectipaedia was making his or her original claim, that precisely such a universal claim can, in fact, be verified... So if you're going to keep trying drudge up dirt to make me out to be the bad guy and poison the well for the RfC, (because I reverted you once), I have no need or interest in further communication with you.

Considering my lengthy responses to Rectipaedia at the top of this thread, prior to your "joining this discussion", I find your habit of making personal observations to be most unhelpful.—Machine Elf ¹⁷³⁵ 05:39, 2 September 2012 (UTC)

I agree with Cesiumfrog that your responses tend to be short and hard to understand. If you were to explain, in detail and in your own words, why you think the link to the Raven paradox is relevant, we might make some progress in resolving this disagreement. I think the issue might be that you don't understand when it is appropriate to link to another article. For this reason, I suggest you read WP:Manual_of_Style/Linking. You seem to think that the link is appropriate because the subject is generally relevant to criticisms of logical positivism. I think that it would only be appropriate to link to another article if the article were directly relevant to the sentence containing the link. The article should help the reader understand the point being made by the sentence and its paragraph. The Raven paradox should only be linked to in a context where the problem of induction is being mentioned. It should not be linked to in a context in which the problem of induction is relevant but is not mentioned. Rectipaedia (talk) 20:14, 2 September 2012 (UTC)

No, not the problem of induction, this demonstrates my point. There's three (not 2) different problems here: i) that propositions about big sets can only be tested by induction, ii) that induction from positive instances isn't necessarily valid, iii) that induction from non-instances isn't necessarily invalid. Obviously all three are closely related (as Machine Elf emphasises) but that makes it easy to inadvertently confuse them. Hence, the one example (raven blackness) which is (as per Machine Elf) identified specifically to one of those three, is not the most suitable example to use (at least not without modification) in a sentence aimed only for explaining (terminology in) one of the two other problems (i & ii). As Rectipaedia says, we ought help the reader understand (and distinguish) things they may be unfamiliar with, with clarity instead of by using allusion to conflate (three) separate points unnecessarily. Myself and Rectipaedia have both expressed willingness for the raven paradox to be covered in the article, and I fail to understanding why Elf still insists it absolutely must always additionally be the example mentioned in sentences where it isn't directly-relevant and, to the contrary, likely promotes this confusion. Cesiumfrog (talk) 00:43, 3 September 2012 (UTC)

There were four issues that I dealt with in my edit. I've decided to deal with one issue at a time. I've removed the repeated link to universal quantifier. I doubt you will challenge that. The second issue is that I think the wiki-link should be removed because it is irrelevant. As Cesiumfrog pointed out, the statement "all ravens are black" is just an example of a universal statement. In order to merit a link, the paradox has to have some relevance to the local context. As the one who wants to include the link, MachineElf, please clearly explain the paradox's relevance. Rectipaedia (talk) 03:35, 30 August 2012 (UTC)

I had originally removed the second paragraph because it confusingly presented (apparent) falsificationism, as opposed to verificationism, and more generally, so as to concentrate on criticism of early logical positivism. It raises the question of post-positivist "logical empiricism" with Hempel's criticism of later, more sophisticated/pragmatic criteria of "cognitive significance" in terms of mere "confirmation" as opposed to "verfication".^[10]

The elegance of Hempel's study laid to rest any lingering aspirations for simple criteria of cognitive significance and signaled the demise of logical positivism as a philosophical movement.

Precisely what remained, however, was in doubt. Presumably, anyone who rejected one or more of the three principles defining positivism—the analytic/synthetic distinction, the observational/theoretical distinction, and the verifiability criterion of significance—was not a logical positivist. The precise outlines of its philosophical successor, which would be known as “logical empiricism”, were not entirely evident. Perhaps this study came the closest to defining its intellectual core. Those who accepted Hempel's four criteria and viewed cognitive significance as a matter of degree were members, at least in spirit. But some new problems were beginning to surface with respect to Hempel's covering-law explication of explanation and old problems remained from his studies of induction, the most remarkable of which was known as “the paradox of confirmation”.^[11]

— James Fetzer, "Carl Hempel" in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

I didn't mean to suggest that Hempel's ravens aren't directly related. I would have gone with a simpler example, but as we've had to expand the introduction considerably, we need a proper subsection to address Hempel's criticism's as well...—Machine Elf ¹⁷³⁵ 18:12, 30 August 2012 (UTC)

If you want to have a section on Hempel's criticism of logical positivism, that's fine and the raven paradox might be relevant to that. But it is not relevant to the discussion of the problem with the verification of universal claims. Rectipaedia (talk) 20:49, 30 August 2012 (UTC)

Stop edit warring already!—Machine Elf ¹⁷³⁵ 07:57, 31 August 2012 (UTC)

Elf, it takes two to edit war.

Your actions have been as if you were more concerned with defending your personal[personally-preferred] phrasing than with compromise; You do realise that everyone else has been expressing agreement with you that Hempel's paradox is relevant to the article, and are only objecting that linking from that particular sentence is not an appropriate place for it? Cesiumfrog (talk) 04:58, 2 September 2012 (UTC)

You're accusing me of edit warring. That's a joke. You're the one with the battleground mentality. It's not my personal phrasing. In fact, I'm objecting to you trying to use my personal phrasing. Obviously, I realize that it's relevant to the article and the introduction to the criticism section may as well use the relevant example of a universally quantified statement rather than a completely irrelevant one.—Machine Elf ¹⁷³⁵ 05:15, 2 September 2012 (UTC)

To clarify, are you still opposed to using a different example (anything other than raven blackness) to explain what a universal statement is, even if a separate paragraph is (or can soon be) added which explicitly describes Hempel's criticism (including his raven blackness paradox)? Cesiumfrog (talk) 06:10, 2 September 2012 (UTC)

Clearly, I think the introduction was better using preexisting example, because it's more relevant. That's not a personal preference; your personal preference is, in fact, irrelevant.—Machine Elf ¹⁷³⁵ 06:31, 2 September 2012 (UTC)

I have made a few edits intending to clarify the scope of 'verification' and 'meaningfulness', based on the link to https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Verificationism and my reading of the Encyclopaedia cited. Please can someone check. Based on this interpretation it seems to me that logical positivism was arguably correct in some technical sense but confused the philosophical debate of the time, and has confused me.--Djmarsay (talk) 10:57, 15 February 2021 (UTC)

Is the Link to the Raven Paradox in the Criticisms Section Relevant to the Local Context?

Is the link to the Raven paradox in the Criticisms section relevant to the local context? Rectipaedia (talk) 02:48, 2 September 2012 (UTC)

The link being [[universal quantifier|universal claims]] ("[[all ravens are black]]"), which is a universally quantified claim. Furthermore, the following citation has been given to demonstrate the relevance of using Hempel's ravens for the example:

<ref name="sep-hempel">{{cite web |first=James |last=Fetzer |editor=Edward N. Zalta |year=2012 |title=Carl Hempel |work=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |edition=Summer 2012 |url=http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hempel/#SciRea |quote=It would fall to Hempel to become perhaps the most astute critic of that movement and to contribute to its refinement as logical empiricism... Hempel himself attained a certain degree of prominence as a critic of this movement... The analytic/synthetic distinction and the observational/theoretical distinction were tied together by the ''verifiability criterion of meaningfulness''... By this standard, sentences that are non-analytic but also non-verifiable, including various theological or metaphysical assertions concerning God or The Absolute, qualify as cognitively meaningless. This was viewed as a desirable result. But, as Hempel would demonstrate, its scope was far too sweeping, since it also rendered meaningless the distinctively scientific assertions made by laws and theories... The analytic/synthetic distinction took a decided hit when the noted logician, Willard van Orman Quine, published “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” (1951), challenging its adequacy... While the analytic/synthetic distinction appears to be justifiable in modeling important properties of languages, the observational/theoretical distinction does not fare equally well. Within logical positivism, observation language was assumed to consist of names ~~~~and predicates whose applicability or not can be ascertained, under suitable conditions, by means of direct observation... Karl Popper (1965, 1968), however, would carry the argument in a different direction by looking at the ontic nature of properties... Hempel (1950, 1951), meanwhile, demonstrated that the verifiability criterion could not be sustained. Since it restricts empirical knowledge to observation sentences and their deductive consequences, scientific theories are reduced to logical constructions from observables. In a series of studies about cognitive significance and empirical testability, he demonstrated that the verifiability criterion implies that existential generalizations are meaningful, but that universal generalizations are not, even though they include general laws, the principal objects of scientific discovery. Hypotheses about relative frequencies in finite sequences are meaningful, but hypotheses concerning limits in infinite sequences are not. The verifiability criterion thus imposed a standard that was too strong to accommodate the characteristic claims of science and was not justifiable... Both theoretical and dispositional predicates, which refer to non-observables, posed serious problems for the positivist position, since the verifiability criterion implies they must be reducible to observables or are empirically meaningless... The need to dismantle the verifiability criterion of meaningfulness together with the demise of the observational/theoretical distinction meant that logical positivism no longer represented a rationally defensible position. At least two of its defining tenets had been shown to be without merit. Since most philosophers believed that Quine had shown the analytic/synthetic distinction was also untenable, moreover, many concluded that the enterprise had been a total failure. Among the important benefits of Hempel's critique, however, was the production of more general and flexible criteria of cognitive significance... Hempel suggested multiple criteria for assessing the cognitive significance of different theoretical systems, where significance is not categorical but rather a matter of degree... The elegance of Hempel's study laid to rest any lingering aspirations for simple criteria of cognitive significance and signaled the demise of logical positivism as a philosophical movement. Precisely what remained, however, was in doubt. Presumably, anyone who rejected one or more of the three principles defining positivism—the analytic/synthetic distinction, the observational/theoretical distinction, and the verifiability criterion of significance—was not a logical positivist. The precise outlines of its philosophical successor, which would be known as “logical empiricism”, were not entirely evident. Perhaps this study came the closest to defining its intellectual core. Those who accepted Hempel's four criteria and viewed cognitive significance as a matter of degree were members, at least in spirit. But some new problems were beginning to surface with respect to Hempel's covering-law explication of explanation and old problems remained from his studies of induction, the most remarkable of which was known as “the paradox of confirmation”.}}</ref>

—Machine Elf ¹⁷³⁵ 06:06, 2 September 2012 (UTC)

• Comment - Is there some argument being made for removal? I'm StillStanding (24/7) (talk) 03:04, 7 September 2012 (UTC)

Yes, above.

As background, there are several major criticisms (e.g., problem of induction, meaning of universals, and Hempel's paradox) which are each distinct but yet in a broad sense are all related (for example they involve induction and have been used as criticisms of verificationism). The example of raven blackness is uniquely associated with Hempel's paradox (so much that it is more commonly known as the Raven paradox, and Machine Elf has made "all ravens are black" a redirect to that topic).

The paragraph-in-question is not about Hempel's paradox. It is about a specific one of the other criticisms (namely: meaning of universals, which is best recognised as Popper's criticism). The particular sentence-in-question is introducing the concept of a universal statement. To clarify what a universal statement is, it gives a paranthetical example of a universal statement.

For the purposes of the sentence- (and paragraph-) in-question, this example could be served by almost any universal statement (indeed Elf brought up the example "all philosphers are mortal", although the phrase "all ravens are black" is technically also an example of a universal statement).

Basically, the problem is that the raven example is confusing. The major criticisms already are exceptionally easy to confuse and conflate with one another. If we choose the raven example to explain what a universal is (in the narrow context of an exposition of Popper's criticism), but the raven example inherently represents (and is wikilinked to) a core of Hempel's criticism, then the reader is much more likely to be confused between these two different (but similar) major criticisms. This problem would be easily avoided by choosing any other example.

As for the raven paradox, a wikilink has been put in the "see also" section, and a paragraph/subsection expounding Hempel's criticism in detail (so that there would be a more appropriate context for the text to link to the raven paradox) has been suggested. Despite this constructive attempt at compromise, Elf has responded that she or he would still refuse to permit any change to the example in the sentence that is not directly about Hempel's paradox. Elf's only rationale is that it would be better to pick an example that is relevant in some tangential sense, and that Hempel's criticism is indeed related to the broader topic of logical positivism criticisms. Unfortunately, Machine Elf and Rectipaedia have been edit warring over multiple issues (and articles) now. StillStanding, what are your thoughts? Cesiumfrog (talk) 04:40, 7 September 2012 (UTC)

Rectipaedia thought that all ravens are black is irrelevant to the "local context". If local context means Logical positivism#Criticisms, it's clearly relevant, and I added a cite to demonstrate that. Presumably, Rectipaedia would want it removed if it were not relevant.

Cesiumfrog thought that all ravens are black is highly relevant in general, but that the particular sentence, 'Another problem was that universal claims ("all ravens are black") are problematic in terms of verification' should have an irrelevant example of universal quantification, apparently because the user imagines the short introduction is consistent with their elaborate OR... which is quite different from what the article actually says. (Cesiumfrog had previously suggested that the early and late history could be separated into two paragraphs, with Hempel apropos to the second paragraph. That change hasn't been made, but of course the link should be reevaluated if it's ever written).—Machine Elf ¹⁷³⁵ 18:42, 19 September 2012 (UTC)

Okay, Machine Elf, I think we might be getting somewhere in understanding your point of view. The first point of misunderstanding that I have identified is what is meant by "local context". What we mean by "local context" is not Logical positivism#Criticisms, it's the sentence that contains the link. The context is the discussion of the problem of the verification of universal claims. The local context does not include other criticisms of logical positivism. I think the problem comes down to a fundamental misunderstanding on your part of how wikipedia articles should be written. You are in favour of a link to a related but different subject. Cesiumfrog and I believe that the link is only appropriate if it helps the reader understand the immediate topic of discussion not some other related topic (even if the relationship is a very close one). The point is that Hempel's paradox is not being discussed in the very sentence containing the link. It doesn't matter that Hempel's paradox could be addressed in the same section of the article. It is not being addressed where it is being linked to. Another way of looking at it is to consider what function the words that make up the link serve in the sentence. The function of the words "all ravens are black" is to serve as an example of a universal statement and nothing more. The link would only be appropriate if the function of the words were to serve as a reference to Hempel's paradox. But it's not. Hempel's paradox is not being mentioned at this point in the article.

Cesiumfrog, I resent your comment that Machine Elf and I have been edit warring over multiple articles. We have not. I am guessing that you are referring to the Liar Paradox article. Machine Elf reverted one of my edits, but I have not edited the article since he did that. Rectipaedia (talk) 18:44, 23 September 2012 (UTC)

• Comment Agreed, the Raven Paradox is very close, but it does not really illustrate the section. In an RFC, I don't expect to slinging off about edit wars. MachineElf has used nowiki code above and I cannot see the reason for this; it makes it hard to read and off-putting. Whiteguru (talk) 22:12, 25 September 2012 (UTC)

• Aside: the article seems to have accumulated a number of footnotes containing several-hundred-word extracts (like the one illustrated above). I don't think this is helpful because 1) if anyone wants to read the source at such length they may freely follow the external link, 2) it's kind of obtuse and ineffective in conveying anything specific whereas if edited down to ~5—50 word quotes might help the point be gleaned with clarity, and 3) such excess perhaps borders on plagiarism anyway. Does anybody want to try editing them down (to save me from making a perhaps more clumsy attempt)? Cesiumfrog (talk) 00:37, 26 September 2012 (UTC)

• I've been busy moving and starting a new job. There's considerable repetition between the source originally provided and the Hempel, which is there to encourage someone to paraphrase the material. Obviously not you, attributed direct quotes are not plagiarism in any sense of the word.—Machine Elf ¹⁷³⁵ 00:09, 27 September 2012 (UTC)

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Too technical - needs rewriting

Too technical was the best flag I could find. The text regarding Popper seems pompous and almost deliberately dense. What does the last phrase in this sentence mean:

Popper thus identifies falsifiability to demarcate not meaningful from meaningless but simply scientific from unscientific — a label not in itself unfavorable.

The use of language would be more appropriate in a 16th century Court circular:

Popper finds virtue in metaphysics

As summarized this too seems to be nonsensical:

Something is referred to as "observational" if it is observable directly with our senses. Then an observation term cannot be applied to something unobservable. If this is the case, there are no observation terms.

Something is termed observable if it is observable with our senses. The term cannot be applied to something unobservable. So .....??? Can anyone translate the section into something less flamboyant and more straightforwardly comprehensible?

p.s I added an article flag, again the best I could find, as the style of the section is common throughout the article. LookingGlass (talk) 09:11, 7 September 2016 (UTC)

I think the biggest flaw here is the lack of accessibility in the wording to people who aren't philosophers. I'm going to go through and attempt to revise some of the language while not misrepresenting the original contentLartola (talk) 07:30, 25 September 2019 (UTC)

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Ethics

The entry gives the impression that all logical positivists were emotivists/non-cognitivists. This is not true. Schlick, the leader of the circle, was a cognitivist (of the naturalist variety) and he defended his views at length in his book on ethics. Please fix the article to reflect this. On the whole, the article gives the impression of being written by people who want logical positivism to be a more united movement than it ever was. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 88.83.60.122 (talk) 18:03, 20 January 2019 (UTC)

Bizarre article

What a bizarre article! I read the first sentence : "Logical positivism, later called logical empiricism, and both of which together are also known as neopositivism, was a movement in Western philosophy whose central thesis was the verification principle (also known as the verifiability criterion of meaning)." and was left reeling. Hans Reichenbach's formulation of logical empiricism is distinct from logical positivism, rejecting a machian phenomenalism. If the same thing has two names, wherefore "both" and anyway "neopositivism" has a broader meaning. I think the article needs to be approached in a different encyclopedic fashion. Leutha (talk) 08:19, 15 August 2020 (UTC)

@Leutha: I agree that this article's lack of clarity about the issues you mention is a problem. The fact that logical empiricism redirects here, so that some people's, perhaps many people's, first explanation of the terms logical positivism and logical empiricism will be the lead of this article, urges a more adequate treatment of these terms. It is hard to explain these terms: as Richard Creath wrote toward the beginning of his article "Logical Empiricism" in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, "The term 'logical empiricism' has no very precise boundaries and still less that distinguishes it from 'logical positivism'. It is therefore hard to map." Despite the difficulty, Wikipedia should do better than this article.

Anyone interested in taking up the task of improving this article will first want to look at Creath's article mentioned above and Herbert Feigl's article "Positivism" (originally published in 1978), which has a section on logical positivism and logical empiricism, in the Encyclopædia Britannica. See also: Uebel, Thomas E. (January 2013). "'Logical positivism'—'logical empiricism': what's in a name?". Perspectives on Science. 21 (1): 58–99. doi:10.1162/POSC_a_00086. Also pay attention to the relationship between this article and other articles such as Positivism § Logical positivism and postpositivism, Postpositivism, Verificationism, and Epistemic theories of truth § Verificationist views. Biogeographist (talk) 15:54, 15 August 2020 (UTC)

What does moral panic have to do with logical positivism?

It's in the 'see also' section. Is there something I'm missing?--Phil of rel (talk) 18:24, 19 January 2022 (UTC)

I came here to ask the exact same question. There’s no obvious relationship, and nobody ever replied to you, so I’ll remove it. Foxmilder (talk) 23:52, 29 December 2023 (UTC)

I’ve removed the link entirely, as it has no obvious relationship to the subject of the article. If, for some reason, another editor disagrees — if somebody believes the concept of a moral panic is, in fact, sufficiently relevant as to warrant inclusion here — please discuss this on the talk page first. Foxmilder (talk) 00:26, 30 December 2023 (UTC)

There's always an exception.

Well I'm the exception to this rule. As Well, the rule that this proposal in almost every instance would be obsured! Please don't restrict my usage, for this is the first and last talking point. I encourage you to question my statment? Meagan Shadrick (talk) 08:04, 30 January 2022 (UTC)

Wiki Education assignment: PHIL 390 Contemporary Philosophy

This article was the subject of a Wiki Education Foundation-supported course assignment, between 24 January 2023 and 12 May 2023. Further details are available on the course page. Student editor(s): PJanes16 (article contribs).

— Assignment last updated by RudyCarnap (talk) 10:45, 19 April 2023 (UTC)

Was Mao a logical positivist or influenced by them?

Logical positivists criticize "metaphysicians" in a similar way to Mao Zedong. Is there some overlap there? Was Mao influenced by the Vienna circle at all? Mao wrote his "On Contradiction" in 1937, just a year after the Vienna Circle stopped regularly meeting. Or was there perhaps just something in the general discourse of intellectuals at that time in terms of "metaphysics"?

Clearly Mao's work isn't the same as the verificationism of logical positivists but I perceive a similar sort of hewing to material reality in opposition to abstraction/rationalism/idealism. AslanFrench (talk) 01:06, 20 January 2024 (UTC)