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"Anthropic mechanism" as original research
The phrase "anthropic mechanism" does not show up in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. I think that is an adequate reason to delete the whole section from the article as original research. Charles Matthews (talk) 09:45, 16 April 2013 (UTC)
The article has been renamed in line with normal terminology in history of science, and edited in such a way as to make the sections easier to reference. This is all in aid of cleanup - please drop me a talk page note if there are issues arising. Charles Matthews (talk) 10:23, 16 April 2013 (UTC)
- Mechanical philosophy, as you say, "is a term for an aspect of the scientific revolution of Early Modern Europe". But this article was about mechanism which goes back to ancient Greece. Most of the links are pointing to Mechanism (philosophy) and only two pointing to Mechanical Philosophy. Maybe spin off Mechanical philosophy (which has plenty of links) into a separate article? —Machine Elf 1735 00:32, 11 August 2013 (UTC)
A new Gödelian argument
I agree that the Gödelian anti-mechanist arguments proposed thus far failed, but I offer a new one which I think is free of such flaws, after my careful study of the foundations of mathematics: http://settheory.net/godel-mind-machines Spoirier (talk) 17:39, 15 March 2017 (UTC)
Distorted definitions and lack of Wikipedia entries. The main article is paleosophically strict!
- You claim that mechanism requires absolute sets. That's wrong. The philosophical mechanism is something we can mathematically or analytically describe. Each mechanism is constituted of fundamental components. Due to modern mathematics and physics we know that metalogically there isn't any mereologically monomerous constituent part. Monomerous parts occur when we take some facts for granted, but that's always a mistake! The Platonic solids aren't monomerous because they do have more fundamental geometric constituents; thus the Platonic solids are neither fundamental, nor perfect bodies, but that doesn't mean they aren't mechanical constituents. You are a proquantum philosopher. You're erroneously strict with your definition. You are primitive-minded. You don't accept probabilistic mechanology and intersets/inter-sets. Interset theory works well with the physical data. Fundamental sets aren't absolute buckets, but that doesn't destroy their probabilistically (oh yeah, I said probabilistically) (partial of total) mechanical interconnectivity.
- Kürt Gödel wasn't an antimechanist, simply a non simplistic mechanist.
- Kürt Gödel was an interset mechanist.
- Intersets are thorougly mechanical, but not absolute instead relative entities.
Definition of interset
pronunciation: /'interset/ (not the layperson's word)
- a set that isn't thorougly definite but relative to other sets and set-interactions
- a set which its properties are affected by other sets