Talk:Meinong's jungle

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This account of Meinong's theory of objects is badly mistaken.[edit]

This account of Meinong's theory of objects is badly mistaken. As in Leibniz, and his monads, the world is dual like a coin. One side is physical, which the word "existence" applies to, and the reverse side is its mental correspondent, which is the whole concept of the object, meaning a subject filled with all of the actual predicates.These correspondents are the object's mental representation, so each physical object has a corresponding mental object.

The mental object does not exist in spacetime, as the physical object does, it is an idea or experience, which esists in spaeless, timeless platonic Mind.

Bertrand Russell in his notorius article "On Denoting"

made the same mistake you have since Rusell deneid there could be mental objects such as Meinong portrayed. This makes Russell a crackpot.

Dr. Roger B Clough NIST (retired, 2000). See my Leibniz site: For personal messages use rclough@verizon.netw the physical object is perceived by Mind or mind. — Preceding unsigned comment added by Hguolcr (talkcontribs) 14:03, 15 January 2015 (UTC)